





Selfhood and the Soul

**Richard Seaford
John Wilkins**

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Edited by
Richard Seaford
John Wilkins
Matthew Wright

Selfhood & the Soul

*Essays on Ancient Thought
and Literature in Honour of
Christopher Gill*

OXFORD

Selfhood and the Soul



Christopher Gill, courtesy of Ross Gill.

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*To Christopher Gill from his friends and colleagues in admiration and
gratitude*

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Introduction

Richard Seaford, John Wilkins, and Matthew Wright

In numerous publications, and in particular in three substantial volumes—*Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy* (1996), *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (2006), and *Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism* (2010)—Christopher Gill has contributed powerfully to our understanding of the self in ancient thought, from Homer to Galen, always working on the intersections between literary and philosophical texts. His focus in the first of these volumes is on the self and personality, and the way in which Greek norms in psychology and ethics differ from those of the modern world, resting more on internal and external psychological and ethical dialogue than on the subjective and the individual. The second and third volumes concentrate on the idea of the person as a psychophysical and psychological whole. In the final volume Christopher even advises Galen on how his psychological understanding of the body might have better succeeded if he had followed a Stoic rather than Platonic model of the soul.

Christopher's work is marked by various kinds of breadth. It transgresses the traditional boundaries between philosophy, psychology, medical writing, and literature. And in doing so it maintains an interest in certain broad themes, one of which it shares with the ancient texts: a central commitment to examining the question of how we should live. Accordingly, another constant feature is its concern with the nature of the soul or inner self. A running theme throughout Christopher's work—and throughout this book—is the contribution made by a fuller understanding of the inner self to our search for the best kind of life: this theme can be explored in relation to a wide variety of philosophical, medical, and literary texts.

This volume—which derives from papers delivered in Christopher's honour at a 2013 conference in Exeter—was not designed to offer a series of answers to a single question or problem; nor was it designed to reflect the entire range of our honoree's interests (a feat which

would probably be impossible anyway). What we have aimed to provide is a series of free-standing essays that aspire to Christopher's remarkable combination of breadth with focus. Each of the essays, independently, in different ways, and from a variety of methodological approaches, engages with the type of ideas raised by Christopher's work. These ideas are wide-ranging, but what the thirteen chapters all have in common is a focus, implicit or explicit, on some aspect of selfhood or the soul. The volume has the following form. The first chapter (Seaford) is on the inner self, specifically concepts of the psyche, from Homer to Plato. The second (Vogt) concerns the idea of hope in Plato. The following two chapters, beginning with Plato, explore broad themes over subsequent centuries: Sorabji on freedom and the will, Hankinson on the self. Chapters follow on individual philosophers: Sedley on pleasure in Epicurus, Schofield on Cicero, Reydam's-Schils on Maximus of Tyre, and Banner on Plotinus on the self and the One. To complete the range of Christopher's interests we then have two medical chapters and three on literary topics. On Galen, Singer addresses the person as a psychophysical whole in Galen's *physiological* writings (confirming Christopher's approach in Galen's psychological works) and Scade challenges Galen's misrepresentation of Stoic thought on music. The three chapters on literature are Wright on love in Greek tragedy (which is less 'tragic' than formerly believed), Gee on Vergil's psychogeography of the underworld, and Bartsch on Persius' literary dietetics.

In the opening chapter, Richard Seaford suggests a *historical* explanation of the development of the concept of the inner self or *psuchē* as an immortal organ of comprehensive consciousness. There is no word for such a concept in Homer, but in Plato it is denoted by *psuchē*, which is central to being human. This fundamental development did not occur in a social vacuum, and cannot be explained without attention to history. Seaford suggests, on the basis of texts from various authors, that a crucial factor was the *monetization* of the Greek *polis* in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. Coined money was revolutionary not only as a universal means of exchange but also as extremely convenient—far more than any other forms of wealth—for possession by the individual, whom it tends therefore to *isolate*, because it can in principle fulfil all his needs. The individual is accordingly in a sense constituted by money. Just as concrete commodities of various kinds are all united and controlled by the abstract value of his money, so the various sensations, emotions, and desires of his consciousness are—with the introjection of the self-sufficiency of money—imagined as all united and controlled by the abstract inner self.

Katja Vogt discusses the idea of hope in Plato's *Philebus*. In early Greek literature hope is associated with the danger of desire without planning. But in *Philebus* hopes are anticipations, and so essential to agency. True and false pleasures are to be understood in relation to their orientation towards the future. Hope is a true pleasure if conjoined with good planning. Pleasure requires cognition: memory, *doxa*, and reasoning. *Doxa* here includes representational thinking that goes beyond 'judgement', and reasoning is planning for the right kind of presence of pleasure or pain. Pleasure and pain are both oriented towards the future, and so involve hope and fear: pleasure involves the desire for its (future) presence, pain the desire for its (future) absence. This affects the way in which pleasures can be true or false. They may for instance be false as involving desire that in practice leads to an undesired result. In agency cognition concerns the future. In this context the truth and falsity of *doxa* concerns the future: how can the imagined state be achieved, and will it really bring pleasure? It is success in both of these that constitutes a good human life.

Notions of freedom and the will, from Plato to Augustine, are explored by Richard Sorabji. For the Stoic Epictetus a rare kind of freedom, from inner and outer compulsions, results from the invulnerability achieved by the right adjudication of desires and the reduction of wants. Epicurus by contrast, under the influence of Plato, associates freedom with responsibility, distinguishing necessity, which cannot be called to account, from what occurs because of us, which is without a master and so can be blamed. Nothing of Epicurus survives on how necessity is to be avoided. But his follower Lucretius attributes *voluntas* to the *animus* within the *anima*, a capacity made possible—against the decrees of fate—by the swerve of atoms. In defending free will against the emerging Stoic view that things have been fated for all time Lucretius is followed by Cicero.

In the ancient idea of the *will* Sorabji distinguishes four strands: *rationality*, *freedom*, *power*, and *perversion by pride*. Each of them is found separately in different thinkers before being assembled in Augustine. Against the recent argument by Frede to the effect that the idea of free will is already found in Epictetus Sorabji urges various considerations that distinguish Epictetus from Augustine, and argues that none of the four strands that make up the idea of the will are to be found in Epictetus.

R.J. Hankinson considers what constitutes the self—both in the moment and over time—in both ancient and 'modern' philosophy. Major players are Plato, Epicurus, Locke, and Parfit. Hankinson sets out the necessary conditions to prove the possible transmigration of the soul, taking as his example the celebrated story of Pythagoras' recognition of himself as the Trojan hero Euphorbus. Strict conditions

are needed to argue for the nature of the experience and the memory that Pythagoras has, as also for the nature of the survival of the 'soul'. Reincarnation in *Phaedo* is found to have too little a substance of 'self'; attunement in the same dialogue is considered (offering some shared interest with Scade); discussions of modern tele-transportation are found to be insufficient (the original remains the most plausible self); Lucretius' Epicurean arguments against survival after death, though materialist, are sufficiently developed to share issues already encountered, of shared materiality and psychological continuity. The latter are rejected by Lucretius, but his engagement with possible objections to Epicurus' argument is so developed that it has a contribution to make to the present enquiry. From these possible conditions, Hankinson concludes that, despite thought experiments in recent centuries, such as tele-transportation of the self, *bodily* continuation in some form would seem to be a necessary condition for personal survival, the persistence of the body, interestingly, being the *normal* and most convincing connection between an earlier and a later self.

David Sedley argues that Epicurus developed his idea of what constitutes happiness in rivalry with the Cyrenaic school. Cyrenaic 'hedonistic presentism' does not exclude planning for future pleasures (physical or mental), but does insist that they can only be enjoyed at the time of their occurrence, not in recollection or anticipation. Happiness has no value over and above the enjoyment of individual pleasures. For Epicurus, by contrast, mental pleasure is to be had in the recollection and anticipation of pleasure. Further, life can be structured into a hedonic whole, a complete or well-rounded life that can be appreciated as a whole from any point in it, and in which happiness is more than the sum of individual pleasures. An infinitely extended life is no more pleasant than a finite one. On the other hand, cutting life short—though not recommended—is not an evil (for only pain is an evil), and even a shortened life can be complete by virtue of pleasant recollection and tranquillity concerning the future. The highest pleasure for Epicurus is *katastematic* (i.e. arising from absence of pain), the blissful state of perceiving the world with pure tranquillity about the future. But this tranquil enjoyment can be varied by *kinetic* pleasures (consisting in movement or change), which may moreover give rise to kinetic mental pleasure by being recalled and anticipated. In old age the anticipation of kinetic pleasures will give ground to remembering them, and to the *katastematic* pleasure of tranquillity at the prospect of pain and death.

The nature of the soul may have *political* implications. Malcolm Schofield discusses the relationship, in what survives of Cicero's *De Re Publica*, between the soul and *imperialism*. He reconstructs a debate

over whether Roman imperialism can be successfully conducted with justice (Laelius) or whether it may have to resort to injustice (Philus). Aristotle in *Politics* claims that the rule of some men over others is rooted in nature: the rule of mind over body is despotal, whereas the rule of intellect over appetites is constitutional and royal, and both kinds of rule are natural and expedient. Laelius uses but reverses this argument: the body willingly obeys (like children their father and—ideally—subjects their king), whereas the appetites have to be constrained by the intellect. *Imperium* resembles the former, and is anyway not the only form of power. Further, Roman wars of conquest were in origin protective of allies rather than enslaving. As for *provinciae*, perhaps Laelius admitted that they were enslaved (to their own advantage), but more likely is that he regarded them as on a par with the allies. Such is the argument that seems to have been used by Laelius against Philus' argument (based on generalization it seems rather than particular cases) that Roman imperialism involved enslavement and so injustice.

With Gretchen Reydam-Schils we return to the theme of the will. Her specific focus is on the forty-first *Oration* of Maximus of Tyre, and its exploration of the precise nature of the connection between human and divine will; but she is more broadly concerned with Maximus' relationship to the Platonic tradition in a general sense, and with the implications that emerge for his conception of the self. What are the consequences of the idea of divine providence in terms of human character and action?

Reydam-Schils combines literary and philosophical approaches, and—in common with several contributors to the volume, especially Wright and Bartsch—is interested in the use of metaphorical language as a way of articulating complex ideas. She examines Maximus' sources of imagery (which include, for instance, dancing, music, meteorology, and light) and sees them as a potential source of ambiguity or tension between different philosophical positions. Indeed, Maximus' overall perspective is seen here as based on a tension, or dialogue, between Platonism and Stoicism. Maximus' conception of the relationship between gods and humans can be seen as a development of themes and ideas from the Platonic dialogues (notably, *Theaetetus* and *Timaeus*), but his doctrine of divine providence also reveals considerable Stoic influence. It is argued that Maximus' particular combination of Platonic and Stoic features is entirely distinctive, setting him apart from other thinkers of Middle Platonism. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Maximus' notion of the divine, on Reydam-Schils' reading, is that it is unified, providential, and relational, concerned with all aspects of the cosmos and its order; while human life and activity is seen as being directed

to the cosmos (rather than the transcendent realm of Platonic Forms).

The self in Plotinus, argues Nicholas Banner, is transformational (to be understood in terms of the transformation of realities into one another) and indeterminate. The realities (hypostases) form a descending scale: the One or Good (ineffable, infinite, beyond being itself, the origin of all things), which gives rise to *nous* (divine intellect, containing the Forms), which gives rise to Soul, from which comes the World Soul (whence the individual souls of living beings) as well as extension and qualities. At the bottom is matter, which when imprinted with the Forms gives rise to the world of the senses. In the transformations of the self up the scale Banner describes the mediations, ambivalences, ineffabilities, paradoxes, and indeterminacy required by the close connection in Plotinus between ontology and epistemology and between unity and diversity. Plotinus seems to locate the human self at various points in the scale, leading Banner to describe it as ‘a spectrum of potentialities for epistemological / ontological transformation, all of which represent, *in potentia*, possible identities for the human soul’.

The ontology-cum-epistemology of transformation underpins ascent to the realization of divinity. The everyday practice of moderate asceticism, of purificatory virtues, of turning from *dianoia* inwards towards the summit of *nous*, of an ascent that is practical as well as conceptual—all this leads towards unification (ultimately with the One) that is also a separation from what has to be left behind. But can it be left behind? Why does the One give rise to the world of change and seeming in which we remain mired? Embodied souls cannot describe the ineffability of reality and of the self. Instead, the indeterminacy of the transitions in its ascent express the continuity of its integral place in reality and of reality itself. Banner ends with a recommending for our world, despite its shedding of metaphysics, of the Plotinian ascent.

Moving on to Galen, we have the relationship between body and soul discussed by P.N. Singer, who brings a new dimension to the theme in Galenic thought. Drawing on texts beyond the standard psychological treatises such as *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*, Singer argues that Galen had a strong physical explanation for emotional disturbance such as rage and fear. Such emotions had external and internal symptoms, the internal being a complex interaction of blood, *pneuma*, and body heat (the last excessive in rage, reduced in fear). Such emotions are often found beside such causes as bathing or certain types of food in the aetiology of disease. Singer shows that Galen does not attempt to reconcile this category of explanation and the Platonic model of the tripartite soul which he deploys in the psychological treatises. True, *Quod animi mores* among

the latter does recognize the physical or 'medical' impact of the mixtures of the body on the soul, but the psychological treatises are mainly interested in the ability of the rational part of the soul to control the emotional part, at the expense of the desiderative part. This third part appears little in the treatises on pulses, fevers, and other medical matters. Singer considers possible routes by which Galen might account for and reconcile the apparently discrepant models, the most likely starting point being his unmatched ability at physiological aetiology. Galen certainly dismisses an apparent Stoic explanation for rage, the desire for revenge, preferring the physical boiling of the heat in the heart. He thereby strikes out, away from a crowded philosophical field.

Emotion in Galen is the starting point of Paul Scade's discussion of the psychological effect of music in Stoic thought. An influential anti-Stoic passage of Galen supposes music to have an emotional and not a rational impact on the soul. Against Galen, Scade contends that in the early and later Stoa, music not only had a rational element, but might also, according to Diogenes of Babylon, help ethical development, and, might, in fact, even express the rational cosmic order better than words, or indeed a combination of music and words. (Though such musical expression may be difficult to understand and thus less universally comprehensible than a text-based medium.) Music acted not just as a metaphor for harmony and structured order, but rather as an underlying rational principle, based on an ordered structure of notes that was imprinted on the soul of the listener, working in Stoic thought rather as mathematics does in Platonic thought. Cleanthes expressed this power of music particularly clearly, claiming that philosophical prose can express human and divine truths sufficiently, but that metrical, melodic, and rhythmical structures do so even better. Music represents the structure of the divine in terms of underlying ratios, which underpin the correct 'tension' of the soul in the unified person. The ratio-based structure of music allows it to be transferred from the musician who has composed it within the tension of his own soul to the listener, whose soul can pick up these rational structures. The soul guides the body in the best harmonies through music, whose production is analogous to voice-production, one by plectrum, the other by voice. Ears, too, like eyes, will evaluate the ethical value of such transmitted messages. While it is the case that sound may be perceived by the irrational, even by animals, cognitive perception follows in those capable of it. There is no scope for Galen's case here. That said, Scade allows that language is still fundamental to logos in Stoic thought.

We move finally from philosophy and medical writing to literature more broadly. Much of Christopher Gill's own work has centred on

Greek tragedy, including, in particular, the way in which tragedy explores human emotions or articulates ideas of the self. The emotions which one normally associates with this genre include pity, fear, misery, despair, and suchlike; but Matthew Wright offers a detailed study of one particular tragic emotion which has not been as exhaustively studied or fully understood: this is *erōs* (erotic love or sexual passion). It is argued that *erōs* is an important emotion in tragedy, not only in terms of the individual characters' experience but also in terms of the plays' overall view of human nature and interpersonal relationships.

Several scholarly discussions of tragic *erōs* exist, but they have unanimously taken a dark view of this emotion, seeing it as a uniformly destructive or morbid passion, akin to madness or disease in its effects on the individual. Wright demonstrates that in fact *erōs* in tragedy is a much more varied and heterogeneous sort of phenomenon, with both good and bad effects, just as it is in other literary genres (or, indeed, in real life). This conclusion is based on a wider range of material than is dealt with by other treatments: Wright does not concentrate simply on those plays in which erotic passion is central to the plot (such as *Hippolytus*, *Medea*, or *Trachiniae*), but examines every extant reference to *erōs* from Greek tragedy, including the fragmentary plays, which seem to have explored erotic themes significantly more often, on average, than the plays that survive.

Another way in which Wright's approach differs from that of other scholars is that he is primarily interested in the language which the tragedians use to describe *erōs*. Love is not simply experienced by the subject but constructed through discourse; it is by studying the precise terms of this discourse, which are predominantly figurative or metaphorical in nature, that one comes to appreciate the tragedians' view of love more fully. Wright's discussion adopts an explicitly structuralist methodology, taking as its starting point Roland Barthes' suggestive work *Fragments d'un discours amoureux*. His own essay is organized in a deliberately idiosyncratic way: it uses the evidence from tragedy to compile a tragic 'Lover's Dictionary', which is presented and discussed alphabetically, figure-by-figure, after the manner of Barthes. One extremely significant fact to emerge from this discussion is that the discourse of *erōs* in tragedy corresponds in almost every respect to that found in other literary forms, including lyric poetry. This suggests that we need to understand tragic *erōs* in the context of Greek ethical thought more generally, rather than seeing it as a special (or especially problematic) category of emotion.

A highly innovative approach to Roman conceptions of the soul is demonstrated by Emma Gee, who visits a well-known text—the underworld narrative in the sixth book of Vergil's *Aeneid*—in the light

of psychoanalytic theory, ancient and modern cartography, and the emerging discipline of psychogeography. She offers a compelling new interpretation of Vergil as well as a broader literary framework in which to situate ancient ideas about the self and the afterlife. Freud and Lacan are important influences on Gee's reading, but ancient writers such as Plato, Strabo, Pausanias, and Seneca also provide valuable parallels and intertextual reference points.

From Gee's discussion Vergil comes across as a poet who is characterized by an keen sense of place, shown in this particular episode by a high degree of attention to specific geographical features, explicit directions for the soul's 'journey' through the afterlife, and other visual details of the underworld. Nevertheless, despite this level of detail it would not be easy for a reader to draw a map based on Vergil's narrative. In fact, Vergil embodies the problems and ambiguities involved in any attempt to conceptualize the afterlife in geographical or topographical terms. *Aeneid* VI is shown to be a narrative which combines several distinct 'layers' of space. These 'layers' do not represent realistic or literal conceptions of geography so much as metaphorical or imaginary topographies, which may correspond to Aeneas' (or his readers') conception of the self or of lived experience. Gee argues that it is not advisable, or even possible, to weigh one level against another so as to come up with a single definitive model of underworld space; rather, the different layers are superimposed on one another, adding extra resonance and complexity to the work.

Shadi Bartsch is concerned with another specific literary text that is notable for its exploration of the self in relation to society: the *Satires* of Persius. Bartsch's wide-ranging essay not only offers a close reading of the *Satires*, but also situates Persius' project within a literary and cultural context that incorporates ancient ethics, medicine, cookery, and poetics: the *Satires* emerge as (*inter alia*) a demonstration of the interconnection of these apparently diverse areas of interest.

One aspect of Bartsch's essay which links it to that of Wright is its special interest in the uses of metaphorical or figurative language. Although other writers have discussed the discourse of food and cooking in various Greek and Roman literary texts, Bartsch is specifically concerned with the therapeutic significance of food, which she explores in relation to a broader context of ancient dietetics (incorporating insights from Democritus, Galen, and the Pythagorean and Hippocratic traditions). She identifies several particularly significant verbal images which run through Persius' text—such as the use of *decoctus* as a culinary and medical term; literal and metaphorical reference to constipation and purgatives; the image of bile in relation to the digestive processes or the passions; the idea of

excess as a dietary or ethical trope; the assimilation of literature or rhetoric to powerful drugs (a metaphor which goes back as far as Gorgias); and the image of madness in connection to poetic inspiration.

On Bartsch's reading, Persius, for all his playful wit and irony, emerges as an unusually serious writer—a moralist who not only engages in depth with philosophical and medical thinking but also exhibits a marked self-consciousness about the status of his own text and its effects on the reader. In particular, Persius is seen as developing an analogy, already seen in Plato and elsewhere, between medicine and cookery, but extending the analogy to include literature as well. Given that literature, like food or medicine, may be said to enter a person's body or mind, we need to pay special attention to its nature and its effects: if it is healthy, it may do us good; but if it is unhealthy, it may bring about a harmful sort of 'cognitive indigestion'. This is true of all literature, to a greater or lesser degree, but certain types of literature—including satire itself—may turn out to possess a specifically therapeutic or curative function. Persius himself may be seen in the role of physician, administering his poetry as a 'drug' in order to cure his readers of the misperceptions that make them 'sick' and to bring them closer to a correct understanding of themselves and their place in the world.

In other words, then, the thirteen essays collected here all engage with aspects of the central question posed by Christopher Gill in his chapter 'Being a Person and Being Human'—that is, 'what it means to be human, divine (in the way that human beings can be) or "what each of us is"'.¹ In his 1996 book Christopher approaches that question in relation to Greek thought generally as well as modern views of the person and personhood. In his later discussion of 'The Unstructured Self', Christopher observes: 'In reacting against Stoic psychological monism, thinkers such as Plutarch and Galen are also, and more fundamentally, reacting against this conception of human personality as structure. In doing so they appeal to the idea, well established in earlier Greek philosophy, that human beings constitute a combination of body and psyche, and that the psyche is itself a combination of reason or mind, emotion and desire...In maintaining this view against the innovations of Stoicism, these thinkers see themselves as perpetuating the—traditional and well-grounded—thinking of Plato and Aristotle. In fact, as I have argued, the truth is more complicated.'² This volume, inspired by Christopher's work, sets out to explore further this complicated field.

¹ Gill (1996) 400–69 (quotation from 400).

² Gill (2006) 207–329 (quotation from 329).

1

The *Psuchē* from Homer to Plato

A Historical Sketch

Richard Seaford

The transition from the Homeric to the Platonic conception of the inner self has never—so far as I know—been explained *historically*. This chapter is a first attempt to do so, forming the latest chain in an argument—spread across several books and articles—about the philosophical and cultural consequences of the (historically unprecedented) rapid and pervasive monetization of the advanced Greek city-states after the invention of coinage at about the end of the seventh century BCE.¹

One possible reaction to the chapter will be that it overplays the economic factor. Let me therefore make it clear right from the start that I do of course recognize that there is much in the texts I discuss that falls outside the sphere of economics. But I must also emphasize that I regard the subject matter of ‘economics’ to be the objective relations that people create with each other in the processes of producing, obtaining, and allocating goods. Thus broadly defined, on the one hand it does in fact include even the study of inflation, but on the other hand should not be dismissed as marginal to the study of ancient culture.

1. Inner Events in Homer

It was demonstrated by Bruno Snell that in Homer there is no word for comprehensive ‘consciousness’ (including thought, emotion, and sensation), corresponding to our ‘mind’ or ‘soul’.² There is a word for intellectual capacity (*nous*),³ and various words for organs of thought or emotion (notably *thumos*, *kēr*, *ētor*, *prapides*, *phrēn*, *kradiē*), some of which are sometimes represented as physical organs with specific locations in the body.⁴ Their semantic convergence and metrical complementarity⁵ do not suffice to show that they have become semantically identical.⁶

Critics of Snell have urged the obvious fact that in Homer individuals take decisions, have thoughts, do things, and are distinguished from each other, from which they infer that there is in Homer a concept of self without there being a word for it.⁷

This criticism misses an important point. Where there is no word for a concept, this is either because (most likely) there is no concept, or even conceivably because there is a concept that has for some reason not generated a corresponding word, or because the concept is merely incipient, not yet sufficiently formed to generate a corresponding word. We cannot say which of these applies to the absence from Homer of a word for the inner self or unitary organ of comprehensive consciousness. But what we can be sure of is that the acquisition of a word not only (by marking *need* for the word) indicates the *importance* of the concept, it also *familiarizes* the concept and facilitates *thinking about* the concept, which in turn facilitates the *development* of the concept. True, people in Homer take decisions and do things; but there is no interest in (no mention of, no periphrasis for, no description of, no focus on, no reification of) a unitary entity of comprehensive consciousness, as—in sharp contrast—there frequently is in later Greek texts. Critics of Snell do not attempt to explain this absence, perhaps because—generally lacking anthropological as well as historical perspective—they tend to assume that our unitary entity of consciousness is universal, and so regard its absence from Homeric language as insignificant and undeserving of explanation.

It is sometimes *implied* that the Homeric individual is a conscious entity separate from each of his various organs of consciousness, an entity denoted occasionally by the pronoun *autos*.⁸ For instance, a man may converse with his own *kradiē* (‘heart’) or *thumos*.⁹ And a detailed study of *phrenes* in Homer concludes that ‘the relationship that a person has to *phrenes* is one in which *phrenes* are subordinate to him or co-operate with him’.¹⁰ This is to say that the relationship between an individual and his conscious entities is (consciously or unconsciously) modelled on the relationship between himself and other individuals. External relations are introjected. Conscious entities may, like parts of the body, be called *philos*, which refers much more

commonly to other (closely related) individuals. An instance is the line that occurs several times in the *Iliad*: ‘But why did my *philos thumos* converse with me thus?’¹¹

Moreover, the conscious entities are themselves often open to influence or compulsion effected by other (divine) individuals,¹² who sometimes put something into them as if it were an object or even a gift: for instance, Athena ‘put’ into the *phrenes* of Penelope to appear to the suitors, and ‘gave’ strength and courage to Diomedes.¹³ To the extent that there is in Homer any conception of inner space,¹⁴ it is permeable by personal (divine) intervention.

The Homeric *psuchē*, although it plays no part in living consciousness and so may *contrast* with the person (imagined as his body: *Il.* 1.3–4), may nevertheless also come close to being *identified* with the person: the *psuchē* of Patroklos, appearing to Achilles, resembles Patroklos in appearance and voice, and has memory, emotion, thought, and will (*Il.* 23.65–92). It seems to be Patroklos minus his actual body. In being separable from the body, and yet somehow almost identifiable with the person, *psuchē* can develop into something like a second self within the body, and then develop further into what it is in Plato: the subject, the comprehensive centre of the person, the invisible entity of unitary consciousness that originates decision and action.¹⁵ This Platonic *psuchē* is also *immortal*. From being in Homer conscious only in the next world, the *psuchē* was extended to *living* consciousness, but without losing the capacity to refer to the dead or to the force that keeps the living alive. It has this wide range of meanings in—for instance—Athenian tragedy.¹⁶ A special effect is created by their combination, as when Antigone says that her *psuchē* ‘died long ago’.¹⁷

What we would call the inner self has in Homer no unity: it is rather imagined in terms of body parts and of *various relations to individuals* (cooperation, gift-giving, dialogue, subordination, *philia*), and as being open to direct intervention by the gods. The Platonic soul, by contrast, is constituted by self-collected awareness, of the unity with oneself that requires the mind to be a unitary space. ‘Our privileged condition, of rational reflection, is defined as one in which we understand and can thus survey all others.’¹⁸ How did this unitary entity of comprehensive consciousness come to be imagined?

2. The *Psuchē* of Achilles

The Homeric *psuchē* may be valued as what keeps a person alive, as for instance when Hektor runs—and Achilles pursues—‘for the *psuchē* of Hektor’ (*Il.* 22.161). Now there is one passage in which this value of the *psuchē* is described in a way which—I suggest—differs significantly from what I have identified as models for inner events in Homer, and marks a new stage in the historical development of the inner self.

In attempting to persuade Achilles to return to the battle, Agamemnon has offered him numerous gifts. In refusing the gifts Achilles claims that even vast wealth is not equivalent in value (*antaxios*) to his *psuchē*, not even all the wealth of Troy or of the temple of Apollo at Delphi (*Il.* 9.401–5). The gifts are ‘hateful’ to him (378).

We can easily make sense of this. It would be foolish to exchange life for wealth. But the passage is unique in Homer in explicitly conferring value on the *psuchē*.

What is this value? ‘Not *antaxios*’ implies that the *psuchē* is more valuable than (and so comparable to) a mass of material goods. On the other hand, because the *psuchē* is invisible as well as fundamental, a different kind of thing from material goods, ‘not *antaxios*’ implies that its value is incommensurable—beyond equivalence—with material goods as such. This combination of the *psuchē* being both more valuable than all goods and beyond them implies that it *transcends* them.

Further, the translation ‘life’ for *psuchē* would be inadequate. When the *psuchē* leaves the body at death it goes somewhere else. True, its only function while in the body is to bestow life, or consciousness (it leaves a person who faints). But it is nevertheless an *entity*, not a *state*. And its status as an entity is especially prominent when, in the context of its leaving the body, its value is compared to that of other things that can be obtained.

What has produced this, the earliest focus on the worth of the *psuchē*? It is the isolation of Achilles arising from the breakdown of economic relations. More specifically, Achilles’ refusal of the gifts belongs to a *breakdown of reciprocity*—of the systematic reciprocity (requital that is ostensibly voluntary) that forms a dominant code of social relations in the society described or implied by Homeric epic. Achilles’ view is that the distribution of rewards (in return for fighting) has been unfair,¹⁹ that no amount of gifts will be effective, and even that he does not *need* the honour of gifts—because he is honoured by the distribution of *Zeus*.²⁰ For Achilles the breakdown of reciprocity means that gifts are not only ineffective but even unnecessary.

In Homeric society, as in many other pre-modern societies, gifts embody interpersonal relations—of honour, loyalty, alliance of various kinds, and friendship: the gift continues to be associated with its donor.²¹ Achilles isolates himself from such interpersonal relations and from their material embodiment. His identity is now shaped not at all by the relations (of honour etc.) embodied in gifts from mortals, but rather by the unspecified honour provided by Zeus. This transcendent abstract honour seals his social isolation, in which his invisible *psuchē* is imagined both in terms of economic value and yet as transcending it.

But why is his *psuchē* so valuable? The reason he gives is that ‘cattle and sheep may be seized, and tripods and horses obtained, whereas the *psuchē* of a man cannot be seized or taken to come back once it will pass the barrier of his teeth’ (9.406–9). The word translated ‘pass’ here is in fact *ameipsetai*, ‘exchange’. This may be taken to be a metaphor for the passing of a barrier,²² in which the *psuchē* exchanges life for death. But given the context, in which the loss of the *psuchē* contrasts with the acquisition of other kinds of object, there is a secondary implication that the *psuchē* is lost by an exchange *transaction*,²³ in which (in contrast to animals and tripods lost and gained) nothing ever returns. The *psuchē* here is not the real person, as for instance in the later ideas of it being imprisoned or entombed in the body. It is rather a *possession of the individual*.²⁴ As such it belongs entirely to a single owner, from whom—in contrast to gifts and plunder—it undergoes irreversible separation.

In the heroic world, goods circulate by plunder and by gift-giving,²⁵ which elicit reciprocity (negative and positive): the persistent association of goods (plundered or given) with their original owner demands a reciprocal act (of plunder, of a favour, or a gift). But this is the system of reciprocity that has, in the *Iliad*, broken down: Achilles fights, but is not given his rightful share of the plunder. And to accept the gifts now would be to subordinate himself to their donor.²⁶ He therefore isolates himself altogether from the power of goods, and accordingly reaches towards a conception of his own *psuchē* as a possession that is isolated from—and contrasts with—the kind of goods that in the heroic world circulate as plunder and as gifts. He rejects reciprocity in favour of a possession of a different kind—of transcendent value, entirely his own and entirely separable from him.

3. Death as Economic Transaction

In Hesiod's *Works and Days*, roughly contemporary with Homer but from a very different milieu, the only mention of *psuchē* is in the brief passage on *trade*: men are foolish enough to sail in spring, 'for *chrēmata* (property) are *psuchē* for mortals. But it is a terrible thing to die among the waves' (686–7). This means that 'their concern for property takes the place of their concern for life'.²⁷ According to Solon the sea-trader is not *sparing* of his *psuchē*.²⁸ Subsequently, in the monetized *polis* of the fifth century, someone may be accused of 'betraying your life (*psuchē*) for money' (Sophocles, *Antigone* 322). This implies an exchange of the most important thing in life for life itself. And yet of course, in a new version of the view advanced by Achilles,

This is for mortals the only expenditure that once expended cannot be recovered, the mortal *psuchē*, whereas there are means of acquiring *chrēmata*.

(Euripides, *Suppliants* 775–7).

Chrēmata can mean goods or money, but here clearly means money, for the verb and its noun used here for 'expend' (*analiskein*) and 'expenditure' (*analōma*) are regularly used for expending *money*. It is possible to '*analiskein* a portion of the *psuchē*' without actually dying.²⁹ But *analiskein* also refers, from Aeschylus onwards,³⁰ to *killing*. The expenditure of the *psuchē* (death) and of money (purchase) are, as in our Euripides passage, imagined as analogous because both involve absolute separation from its possessor (true though it is—as noted in Euripides—that one can resupply oneself with money). In the pre-monetary society of Homer, by contrast, the only comparison drawn by Achilles is between the obtainability of cattle etc. and the absolute loss of the *psuchē*.

A strand of anthropology initiated by Marcel Mauss, and still very much alive,³¹ centres around the fact that in (pre-monetary) gift economies the identity of the donor tends to persist in the gift, which thereby continues to connect him subjectively to the recipient with such feelings as honour, friendship, gratitude, or subservience. Object and subject seem to interpenetrate. This may take radical form. Here, for instance is a comment on a 1994 study by four anthropologists of four societies in the Solomon islands, the Moluccas, Papua New Guinea, and Morocco.

In societies such as these, the authors argue, it is utterly absurd to talk about individuals maximizing goods. There are no individuals. Any person is himself made up of the very stuff he exchanges, which are in turn the basic

By contrast, *purchase* seems governed by objective necessity, impersonal equivalence of value; and so the separation of the transactors from the commodities and money—and therefore from each other—is absolute.³³ There is polarization: to the absolute (isolated) objectivity of commodities and money corresponds the absolute (isolated) subjectivity of the transactors.

The historical importance of what Achilles says is that—though still in the pre-monetary world—he prefigures this polarization. The economy implicit in Homeric epic is a gift economy³⁴ on the point of being monetized. In rejecting the interpersonal reciprocity in which reward does not correspond to contribution, Achilles thereby implicitly favours the impersonal equivalence of value. And in isolating himself from the social connectivity of gifts, he values instead his own *psuchē*, which consequently seems more like an inner self than it does anywhere else in Homer. From the breakdown of the reciprocal economy emerges something like a self-identical individual. In putting himself beyond the influence of gift-exchange, Achilles implies the idea of an autonomous inner *psuchē*, which contrasts with—and is isolated from—gift-exchange, but cannot be beyond all interaction: its only form of ‘exchange’ (*ameibetai*) is irrecoverable loss. His *psuchē* is imagined as a possession that is subject to absolute loss, and that is greater in value than a mass of goods, which it moreover transcends. The earliest known approximation to an inner self is obtained by the *psuchē* being imagined in terms of transcendent exchange-value that is absolutely alienable. As such, it is analogous to the abstract value of *money*. Although he does not of course express any preference for commerce over reciprocity, and indeed rejects the influence of *all* goods, Achilles’ isolation does nevertheless prefigure the isolation of the subject of monetized exchange.³⁵

What do I mean here by isolation? In order to function, money must have the same power whoever owns it, and so must be entirely impersonal. Having as its sole function the universal impersonal embodiment (absolute reification) of interpersonal relations (of power), it is as historically unprecedented as the impersonal cosmology that it promotes.³⁶ Moreover, the ease with which coined money is stored, preserved, concealed, transported, and exchanged makes it highly suitable for possession and use by the autonomous individual.³⁷ In this way the absolute reification of interpersonal relations produces the absolute individual—absolute in the sense that in principle all he seems to need is the impersonal power of money, whereas even the Pharaoh had depended on personal relations (loyalty, command of violence, divine charisma, gifts, and so on).

True, in practice the monetized individual may need, even if wealthy, to call on the loyalty of friends and relatives. But the overall effect of monetization is undoubtedly to increase the potential or actual autonomy of the individual, and thereby also his practical and emotional isolation. Whereas gifts tend to leave donor connected to recipient, a monetized transaction concerns only the equivalence of money with goods, and *qua* monetized transaction separates the money or goods entirely from their original owner and leaves the transactors entirely unrelated to each other. Each transactor is completely separated from what he has transferred to the other transactor and from the other transactor himself. The monetized transactor is *individualized*. The gift, like kinship or the communal possession of land, unites individuals, whereas money tends to make them autonomous.

According to Pindar, if someone ('X') keeps wealth hidden inside, then he is unwittingly paying *psuchē*³⁸ to Hades without glory.³⁹ What does this mean? Rather than obtaining glory by risking or giving life (*psuchē*), as for instance Achilles eventually did, X is paying *psuchē* but obtaining no glory in return. But in what sense is he paying *psuchē*? Death is inevitable (and so better to gain glory with it), and its inevitability is envisaged as payment of *psuchē*. X's unawareness of the payment is suggested both by the invisibility of Hades⁴⁰ and by the hiddenness of his wealth: the implication is that hidden wealth cannot be kept intact, for payment (of *psuchē*) is invisibly occurring. Invisible wealth kept 'inside' is analogous to invisible soul. In fact the invisibility of the soul resembles money not only in that money may be hoarded 'inside', kept from public view, but also in that monetary value seems to inhere in commodities—and especially in coins, for the only function of coins is to embody the power of what seems to be abstract substance. The essence of each coin seems to be the invisible power within it. This provided, I submit, a historically unprecedented model for the *psuchē* as the invisible but powerful interior essence within each individual.

I omit the many other Greek texts⁴¹ in which death is imagined as an economic transaction (and the *psuchē* as analogous to goods or money), and select instead an account of *birth* by a fifth-century Pythagorean, Philolaos: the human being in the womb consists entirely of the hot, but on being born draws in part of the (unlimited) cold air outside and emits it like 'like a debt (*chreos*)'.⁴² Most of what Philolaos wrote is lost: he may have made explicit the consequence that at death the debt is repaid for the last time. This economic transaction is not suggested by the *physical* process, but provides a priori the terms for imagining how the individual is constituted.⁴³

Moreover, for Philolaos the macrocosm is created in the same way

as the microcosm. A central hearth draws in breath (as well as time and the void) from the surrounding unlimited. Here, I have argued, the model is the economy as a whole, in which the household (hearth) is limited but—because it cannot be self-contained—must participate in the unlimited circulation of money.⁴⁴

4. Herakleitos

The earliest extant *description* of the *psuchē* as an entity of consciousness is in several fragments of Herakleitos.⁴⁵ With

πυρὸς τροπαί: πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ
πρηστήρ

Fire's turnings: first sea, and of sea half [is] earth and half 'burner'. (B31)

compare souls taking the place of fire in

ψυχῆσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐκ γῆς δὲ
ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

For souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth, water becomes from earth, and soul from water. (B36)

The 'death' of the *psuchē* in becoming water is not annihilation but transformation,⁴⁶ or rather *birth*. This represents, in my view, an adaptation of the mystic doctrine of the passage of the *psuchē* through the cosmological elements.⁴⁷ And the opposition θάνατος/γενέσθαι in B36 evokes the mystic identification of death with birth exemplified by the mystic formula on one of the funerary gold leaves: νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου, 'now you died and now you were born (or came into being)'.⁴⁸ Compare also Herakleitos' 'The same thing in us is the living and the dead ...' (B88), and B62

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ
ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεώτες

Immortals [are] mortals, mortals immortals, living the others' death, dying the others' life,

with the mystic formula scratched⁴⁹ on a fifth-century BCE bone plate from Olbia:

βίος θάνατος βίος
Life death life.

In mystic initiation death is also its opposite, life (birth), and mortals

are in a sense immortals. Mystic initiation is a rehearsal for death, in which the *psuchē*—in Homer immortal but unconscious before death—becomes both subject and object of a special state of consciousness. The ritual and its doctrine were much concerned with the *psuchē*,⁵⁰ are therefore likely to have influenced ideas of the (immortal) *psuchē*, and are indeed evoked by Herakleitos, Parmenides, and Plato.⁵¹

‘Death’ in its normal sense, namely the death of the body, involves the loss of both breath and heat. For Herakleitos the *psuchē* in observable bodies may well have been composed of both air and fire (in varying proportions), but was susceptible also to becoming wet, which produces pleasure⁵² (B77), loss of consciousness,⁵³ and ‘death’.⁵⁴ Accordingly, the ‘wisest and best’ *psuchē* is associated by Herakleitos with light (and so fire) and/or dryness.⁵⁵

Despite this transformability and variability of the *psuchē*, it remains the case that (a) in what survives of Herakleitos it is only fire and *psuchē* that are stated to be subject to (the same) elemental transformations; (b) fire is the opposite of the ‘becoming water’ that is ‘death’; (c) there is a special relationship between fire and the *logos* and between the *logos* and *psuchē*;⁵⁶ (d) there is some essential connection between fire and the *psuchē* contained in the living human body.⁵⁷

Further, Herakleitos imagines transformation of the *psuchē* as an economic transaction.

θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν· ὃ γὰρ ἂν θέλει, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται.

It is difficult to fight *thumos*; for what it wants it buys at the price of *psuchē*.
(B85)

What the *thumos* wants is acquired with expenditure of *psuchē*. As we saw in §2, *psuchē* can be paid or expended, sometimes but not necessarily as death. Commentators differ on the meaning of *thumos* here (bodily desire, or anger), but have to agree in identifying the expenditure of *psuchē* with expenditure of the physical element of which *psuchē* is composed, whether the element be the dryness lost through drink, or the vapour or fieriness lost through anger. What they do not notice is that the idea of purchase coheres with Herakleitos’ comparison of the exchange of fire for all things with the exchange of gold (i.e. money) for all things (B90). Fire is not just the underlying component of all things, it also drives the cycle of exchange.⁵⁸ It is hard to fight *thumos* (anger) because it is driven by the fieriness (dry and airy) of the *psuchē*, and the loss (extinguishing, transformation) of this fire is—as in B90—envisaged as expenditure.⁵⁹

B85 and B90 cohere with two further fragments:

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω

βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

The limits of the soul you would not find, even by travelling along every path:
so deep a *logos* does it have. (B45)

And

ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὖξων.

Of the soul (there is a) *logos* increasing itself. (B115)

B45 describes the *psuchē* as a space that seems unlimited. Hence perhaps B101 ‘I sought for myself’.

The *logos* is an abstract formula, and so seems at home in the *psuchē*.⁶⁰ But commentators have failed to answer (and generally even to ask) the crucial question of *why* the depth of *logos* is unlimited.⁶¹ A related puzzle is the nature of the self-increase of the *logos* in B115. Everything happens according to the *logos* (B1). The *kosmos* is an ever-living fire that kindles in measures (*metra*) and goes out in measures (*metra*) (B30). B31 (quoted above) also contains the words

[earth] is dispersed as sea, and is measured to the same *logos* as existed before it became earth. (B31b)

Balance—the same quantities—is maintained throughout the cycle of transformations. *Logos* of quantity means quantity expressed as an *abstraction* (formula, measure, reckoning). It is accordingly found of a *monetary* account in the fifth century, and probably had this meaning already in the sixth.⁶² The exchange of fire for all things resembles the exchange of money for all things (B90) not just as *unceasing* and *universal* but also as *balanced*.

This helps to explain how the *logos* may increase itself, and is unlimited. The *logos* is the quantitative formula that makes possible (by determining that e.g. one vase is four drachmas) the cyclical transformation of fire and money from and into everything else. This process is unlimited in that everything is drawn into it, as well as in that money received for the sale of goods may be used for the purchase—or production—of more goods for the purpose of further sale, and so on. The cycle of commercial exchange may seem to have neither temporal nor spatial limit, especially when vigorously promoted—as in the lifetime of Herakleitos—by the recent invention of coined money. Indeed, the Greeks emphasize the fact that money (and the desire for it) is unlimited.⁶³ Its dynamic expansion happens according to—and so seems caused by—the *logos*, which therefore seems to be self-increasing and unlimited.

This self-increasing unlimited *logos* seems to regulate the *cosmic* transformation, but is located by Herakleitos in the *psuchē*. There is no contradiction here. For souls, as we have seen, participate in the cycle

of cosmic transformation. And to insist that the *logos* (in each *psuchē*) is not limited (to each *psuchē*) resembles his complaint that although the *logos* is communal (ξυνός), ‘the many’ live as if having private understanding (B2). Herakleitean cosmology may be regarded as a synthesis of cycles of nature, the cosmic passage of the (mystic) initiand, and the monetary cycle.⁶⁴

5. Abstract Value and The Inner Self

So far we have seen that the *psuchē* is constructed as—like money—an entirely alienable possession, unlimited, and endowed with *logos*. But there are further resemblances.

An immense advantage of coinage, from its very beginning, was that the value of the coin was determined by the symbol on it rather than by its precise intrinsic value. And from the beginning of coinage the conventional (agreed) value of coins was in general slightly higher than its intrinsic (metallic) value. This tends to favour the idea of coin as the concrete embodiment of quantified abstract value that is also embodied in all commodities. Abstract value is the same everywhere, and seems distinct from the individual coins and commodities in which it is embodied. Souls too are invisible and may seem to resemble each other while being distinct from the individual bodies in which they are embodied. For Anaximenes, for instance, souls are composed of air, and so—we may infer—are invisible and resemble each other. In an early medical text⁶⁵ it is observed that ‘the *psuchē* is the same thing in all living creatures, whereas the body of each is different’.

Anaximenes also stated that we are held together by our *psuchē*, being air, just as *pneuma* (wind/breath) and air enclose the whole cosmos (B2). Here too there is an analogy with monetary value, which seems not only to pervade all commodities and coins but also to *unite* them into a single system. Moreover, the whole cycle of exchange seems to be motivated—and so *controlled*—by money. Monetary value is an abstract entity that seems to unite and control concrete diversity. I suggest that—just as in Homer social relations were introjected—so this new all-pervasive mediator of all social relations is introjected as a factor in the construction of the *psuchē* as an abstract entity that unites and controls all diversity of perception, sensation, emotion, and thought in the inner self.

As for Herakleitos, ‘it is wise to listen not to me but to the *logos* and

agree that all things are one' (B50). Indeed, all things happen according to the *logos* (B1), an abstraction that is somehow embodied in fire. Fire is the cosmos (B30), and its directive capacity is illustrated by the fact that 'the thunderbolt steers all things'.⁶⁶ The *psuchē* can be wise,⁶⁷ and 'the wise is one thing, to understand how all things are steered through all' (B41). The Herakleitean *psuchē* is a unity in the sense that it—like the cosmos—consists of fire and contains the unifying *logos*. For both Anaximenes and Herakleitos soul and cosmos consist of the same controlling element: for Anaximenes it is air, for Herakleitos it is fire by virtue of its embodiment of the abstract formula called *logos*.⁶⁸ Accordingly, Aristotle singles out Herakleitos as taking *psuchē* as his *archē* (first principle or substrate).⁶⁹

On the one hand the all-pervasive power of money is unprecedentedly impersonal, and is projected onto the cosmos to produce the unprecedented idea of a cosmos subject to the impersonal power of an all-pervasive substance. And yet this imagined substance, universal and impersonal though it is, does not seem to exercise power in an entirely impersonal way, for two reasons. One is that the traditional idea of personal power over the world may persist, especially as it is difficult to imagine a mere substance exercising universal power. The other reason is that the power of money may itself not seem entirely impersonal: money seems to contain its own impersonal power (whoever owns it), but also to bestow it as personal power on its possessor. For Herakleitos the 'one thing, the only wise', is ambivalent between impersonal and personal, for 'it does not and does wish to be called by the name of Zeus' (B32).

Scholars have identified similarities (of various kinds) between *psuchē* and cosmos in Herakleitos, and some have attempted to explain them by the view that the cosmos is constructed out of introspection. For instance, Diels maintained that Herakleitos 'seeks to discover the world-soul from the human soul',⁷⁰ and Hussey identifies as a 'Heraclitean principle' that 'to interpret the cosmos it is necessary to study one's own self, and to apply what one finds there to explain the world'.⁷¹ This is not entirely mistaken. But it leaves unexplained why this self takes the new form that it does, why this new form appeared when and where it did, and why it differs so completely from e.g. the Homeric inner self. And how can these scholars exclude the possibility that the influence runs the other way, from cosmos to soul? Neither cosmos nor inner self is in this period simply *observed*, they are both to a large extent *constructed*.

These questions cannot be answered without an understanding of the historical process of *monetization*, which influences the new conceptions of self and of cosmos in a way that explains their similarities. Money underlies and drives the circulation of goods by

virtue of being a *substance* that—in order to *unify* the goods—embodies an *abstraction*. For Herakleitos the cosmic circulation of elements is driven by an all-underlying element (fire) that embodies an abstraction (*logos*), according to which all things are one. It is as *unifying abstract substance* that money becomes able to dominate exchange. Money is accepted in all kinds of exchange because it is known to be generally effective. Monetized purchase in the lifetime of Herakleitos proliferated, marginalizing the traditional and relatively ritualized practices of gift-exchange, redistribution, and barter.

The gift tends to embody interpersonal relations, leaving donor connected to recipient and subject to object, whereas money tends to isolate the individual. Separation of a single entity out from a whole is the creation of a new unity. Accordingly the separation out of the individual transactor from goods and from all other transactors constitutes him as a unity. Further, because the impersonal and seemingly autonomous power of money is in fact entirely owned by the individual, there may—from the perspective of interpersonal relations—seem to be little difference between money and its owner. The autonomous power to obtain all available goods and services belongs both to the individual and to his money. The power of money, as invisible and yet universal, resembles the power of the mind that directs its use, and so is easily internalized. Kreon in Sophokles' *Antigone* resists having his *mind* made into an object of trade by Teiresias, who in turn denies being *κατηργυρωμένος* ('silvered' or 'covered with silver').⁷² The invisibility of the powerful inner essence of each coin and the invisibility of the powerful inner essence of each individual (*psuchē*) are assimilated to each other. From the fifth century BCE onwards people are in various ways imagined as *coins*.⁷³

I suggest that the new unified autonomy of the individual is imagined in a form influenced by what makes it possible, namely the seemingly autonomous, unifying abstract substance of money. The early Greek soul is imagined as an *autonomous* ('self-moving'⁷⁴) *substance* that, by virtue of its abstraction, unifies and controls⁷⁵ the potentially fragmented individual. The transcendent abstraction of money unites concrete diversity, and thereby shapes both universe and inner self. It is not (or not only) a matter of the universe being modelled on the inner self or vice versa: rather, the social dynamic of monetary unification manifests itself in both. In the resulting analogy between inner self, money, and universe there is, despite the separation between autonomous subject and impersonal object, a resemblance with the kind of gift economy in which 'any person is himself made up of the very stuff he exchanges, which are in turn the basic constituents of the universe'.

On the absorption of all things into king Zeus the Derveni

commentator comments that ‘mind (*nous*) itself being alone is *worth everything* (*pantōn axion*), just as if everything else were nothing’. Here the identity of universe, mind,⁷⁶ and value is explicit. The problem of the relation of unity to diversity obtains in various spheres: the political, the cosmic, the mental, and the economic. The economic unification of diversity is embodied in *money*. Just as king Zeus absorbs and recreates all things, so the mind seems to unite and bestow existence on all else, and money seems to unite and bestow value on all else.

We have seen that for Philolaos microcosm and macrocosm are each generated by the drawing in of air (breath) imagined as an economic transaction.⁷⁷ For Plato in the *Phaedo* the *psuchē*, invisible and separable from the body, may nevertheless be ‘dragged by the body into things that are always changing, and itself wanders about and is agitated’. But when it rests from this wandering and enquires by itself and is stable and consorts with the pure and unchanging, this is to achieve wisdom (*phronēsis*) (79cd). The *psuchē* succeeds in being ‘by itself’ by gathering itself from all parts of the body (67c, 80e, 83a).⁷⁸ *Phronēsis* is the ‘only right currency (νόμισμα ὁρθόν), for which all those things [pleasures, pains, fears] must be exchanged’ (69a). Plato maintains that the guardians of his ideal state should be told that they have divine money in their souls (*Rep.* 416e).

6. Circulation and Abstraction, Community and Individual

The Herakleitean circulation of fire as substrate through the constant exchange or transformation of elements regulated by the abstract *logos* is a projection of the constant circulation of money as substrate through the exchange or transformation of goods regulated by the abstract *logos*. For Herakleitos’ younger contemporary Parmenides, by contrast, all that exists is ‘One’, invariant in time and space (eternal, unchanging, unmoving, homogeneous), abstract, self-sufficient, limited, to be perceived by the mind not by the senses. This comes close to—without explicitly expressing—the notion of immateriality or incorporeality.

Parmenides’ poem has been rightly hailed as containing the first extant chain of deductive reasoning. But his conclusion (abstract monism) can be attributed neither to deductive reasoning alone nor to observation. According to Aristotle it borders on madness.⁷⁹ It is

surprising therefore that there has been so little interest in identifying the source of the preconceptions that have entered into his argument and determine his bizarre conclusion.

Money is valuable only in payment and exchange, and yet is *possessed* only by being *withheld* from payment and exchange.⁸⁰ It is money by virtue of being changeable into all goods, and yet it is money by virtue of maintaining its unitary abstract identity in different times and places. Both these opposed features of money are essential to it. The Herakleitean cosmos is a projection of the former, of monetized exchange regulated by abstraction (*logos*). But the Parmenidean 'One' is a projection of the latter, of abstract monetary substance that is abstracted completely from exchange (circulation), and is therefore unitary, temporally and spatially invariant, and abstract. It is invisible not only by virtue of being abstracted from its metal embodiment but also in that even the metal embodiment is hoarded, kept from public view—as what the Greeks called 'invisible being' (*aphanēs ousia*).

This opposition between Herakleitos and Parmenides involves another opposition. For Herakleitos men do not understand the *logos* when they first hear it, like initiands in the first phase of mystic initiation.⁸¹ We should follow the communal (*xunos*), namely the *logos*, but the many live as having private understanding (B2). 'Thinking is communal to all' (B113), and 'those who speak with intelligence (ξὺν νόῳ) must rely on what is communal (ξυνῶι) to all, as a *polis* relies on law, and much more strongly' (B114). The *logos* in each individual *psuchē* is communal. Money belongs entirely to the individual, but its functioning depends on its being communally created and communally accepted. And the mystic initiand is isolated before being incorporated into the initiated group,⁸² who learn from the *logos*. In the fifth century *logos* could mean both monetary account and mystic doctrine. In both monetized exchange and mystic initiation the isolated individual must accept the communal *logos*, and both processes have influenced the communality of the Herakleitean *logos*.⁸³

The Parmenidean mystic vision, by contrast, goes no further than the phase of individual isolation. Insight is individual. The many remain entirely and permanently uninitiated. Parmenides' mystic underworld journey 'bears the man of knowledge' and is 'far from the footsteps of men'. He undertakes it alone, and it is to him alone that the goddess reveals the truth, whereas in the beliefs of mortals, who 'know nothing', there is no true conviction.⁸⁴ The individual isolation of the Parmenidean man of knowledge encounters not the communal universality of the *logos* but rather—through introspection and deduction—the ontological universality of the One.

These differences between Herakleitos and Parmenides are grounded in ideology. Herakleitos unconsciously projects money onto the cosmos from the communal perspective of the *polis* (circulation), but Parmenides unconsciously projects it from the aristocratic perspective of the extreme individual self-sufficiency that derives from the ownership of abstract substance imagined separately from circulation. I have argued this in detail elsewhere.⁸⁵ My concern is merely with the relation between universe and inner self. Parmenides finds *in the content of the mind* the fullness of being that—we maintain—expresses the abstraction of monetary substance from exchange. The impossibility of non-being (B2), the fullness of being (B8.11), are discovered—at least in part—by *introspection*, from which mere deduction produces the inevitable nature of the One. Parmenides' most detailed appeal to introspection is B4:

Look equally at absent things that are firmly present to the mind. For you will not cut off for yourself what is from holding to what is, neither scattering everywhere in every way in order nor drawing together.

This is directed against Herakleitos,⁸⁶ whose orderly cycle of universal transformation is to be rejected as result of introspection. What exists (being) is seen by imaginative introspection to be not only full but *unitary and continuous*, as it is said to be in e.g. B8.6 'one, continuous' and B25 'so it is all continuous; for what exists draws near to what exists'.⁸⁷ The mind (*nous*) sees absent things, and so is clearly distinguished from perception, as is the Platonic soul when it withdraws into itself and, being in itself thinks reality in itself, and sees what is invisible and intelligible (*Phaedo* 83b1–4).

We may object to Parmenides that in fact the mind may easily imagine plurality, diversity, change, scattering, and drawing together. In what sense is what it imagines unitary and continuous? Perhaps by virtue of being imagined by the same unitary mind. Perhaps even as an expression of the (historically recent) self-conscious abstract unity of the individual mind. Inner space may seem indivisible. But however precisely it occurs, introspection discovers what it is predisposed to discover, which is in this case the ideologically preconceived self-sufficiency of unitary abstract being. Then the path from mental abstraction to unitary self-sufficient abstract being is itself abstract (deduction).

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¹ See esp. Seaford (2004), (2012a).

² Snell (1960) 1–22. This point stands independently of the other claims (teleological or otherwise) made in association with it by Snell.

³ In Homer *novo~* does not refer (as does e.g. θυμός) to an inner site of mental (including emotional) experience, but rather to intellectual capacity: Jahn (1987) 117–22; Sullivan (1995) 18–35.

⁴ See e.g. Clarke (1999) 126; Sullivan (1988) 8–9. Sullivan (1995) 76 concludes her study of all seven of them in early Greek literature thus: 'in their entirety these entities do not simply compose what we would call somebody's "personality" or "self". It is true that individuals may find in each a seat of many of their deepest qualities but none adequately expresses the full person.'

⁵ Jahn (1987).

⁶ Note e.g. the criticisms of Jahn by van der Mije (1991); Jeremiah (2012) 15 n. 11: 'metrical felicity does not determine semantic/idiomatic felicity, meaning that listeners will not accept a strange psychological expression simply because it satisfied metre. Though in time metre may well have facilitated the production of synonymy between the terms, their provenance must ultimately have been outside the epic language.'

⁷ e.g. Sharples (1983); Gaskin (1990); Sullivan (1988) 6; Williams (1993) 25–9. An excellent recent defence of Snell on this point is by Jeremiah (2012) 11–15. For more on the soul or mind in Homer see e.g. Claus (1981) 11–47.

⁸ αὐτός seems to mean different things depending on context. Russo (1992) on *Od.* 20.24 claims that it denotes 'the "whole" psychological entity in opposition to its constituent impulses', contrasting its reference to mere corpses at *Il.* 1.4. But at *Od.* 20.24 αὐτός ἐλίσσεται refers to Odysseus' *bodily* movement, true though it is that—because it comes after a description of his emotions—it implies a broader sense of self than at *Il.* 1.4.

⁹ e.g. Odysseus addresses his *kradiē* at *Od.* 20.23; for *thumos* see n. 11.

¹⁰ Sullivan (1988) 195.

¹¹ 11.407, 17.97, 21.562, 22.122, 385. The *thumos* is *philos* also at *Il.* 5.155, 7.31, 11.342, 20.412; *Od.* 13.40, 14.405. *Philos* is also applied frequently to the *ētor* and the *kēr*.

¹² Russo (2012) corrects earlier attempts to downplay this phenomenon in Homer.

¹³ *Od.* 18.158; *Il.* 5.2.

¹⁴ Cf. Holmes (2010) 59 on ‘boundaries of the self’.

¹⁵ At Pl. *Alc.* I 130c6 the *psuchē* is explicitly identified with ἄνθρωπος and at Pl. *Chrm.* 156de it is in effect equated with the ‘whole ἄνθρωπος’: Robinson (1970) 4–10. Plato’s conception of the *psuchē* varies: notably, the *psuchē* is the mind or intelligence (e.g. *Apology* 29d, 30a, *Phaedo* 94b) or the soul as having also (as in *Republic*) emotional and desirous parts, and as seeing through eyes and hearing through ears (*Tht.* 184b–d). On self-motion as central to what the *psuchē* is see *Phdr.* 245e, *Laws* 895e. The human *psuchē* is a fragment of the universal *psuchē* (*Phlb.* 30a): there is a *psuchē* of the cosmos (*Tim.*).

¹⁶ Sullivan (1997) 145–51, (1999) 181–4, (2000) 111. Living person: *Soph. Ph.* 712; *Eur. Med.* 247, *Hipp.* 259, *IT* 882; cf. e.g. *Hdt.* 7.153.4; *Pi. Pyth.* 3.61, 4.122.

¹⁷ *Soph. Ant.* 559–60. This evokes the (usually temporary) participation of the mourner in the state of the dead, which takes a more elaborate form in the spurious ending of Aeschylus’ *Septem*, where Antigone says ‘share willingly, *psuchē*, with the unwilling in his sufferings, the living with the dead, with a kindred mind’ (1033–4).

¹⁸ Taylor (1989) 189.

¹⁹ 1.162–8, 9. 316–19, 330–3, etc.

²⁰ 9.602–8. Cf. 1.173–5, where Agamemnon refers to honour from others as well as from Zeus, and does not mention distribution.

²¹ Seaford (1994) 13–25.

²² As at *Od.* 10.328; *Aesch. Cho.* 965.

²³ The only other thing in the *Iliad* that is the object of *ameibein* meaning exchange is armour: 6.230, 235; 14.381; 17.192.

²⁴ It can therefore be ‘taken away’ from one person by another: e.g. *Il.* 22.257, 24.754; *Od.* 22.444.

²⁵ Horses and tripods, contrasted by Achilles with his soul, are among the gifts offered to him by Agamemnon (9.122–3).

²⁶ Donlan (1989).

²⁷ West in his Commentary.

²⁸ 13.43–6. Cf. *Tyrtaios* 10.14; *Soph. El.* 982; *E. HF* 1148; *Anon. Iambl.* 4.3, 5.3; *Isoc.* 6.105.

²⁹ *Eur. Andr.* 541; Cf. *Aesch. Cho.* 276. The *psuchē* may be reduced or diminished: *Bacchyl.* 5.151.

³⁰ *Aesch. Septem* 813, *Ag.* 570.

³¹ Mauss (1925; 1965); Gregory (1982); Strathern (1988); Weiner (1992); et al. For good discussion see Graeber (2001) 33–43; 151–228.

³² Graeber (2001) 19 on Cécile Barraud et. al., *Of Relations and the Dead: Four Societies Viewed from the Angle of Their Exchanges*, trans. Stephen J. Sufferin (Berg, 1994).

³³ Gregory (1982); Seaford (1994) 13–14. The gift-commodity opposition does not of course mean that everything falls neatly into the one category or the other, but it is good to think with.

³⁴ Seaford (1994) 14–17.

³⁵ Even though there is no money in Homer. It is perhaps significant that he mentions the wealth concentrated at Delphi, for dedications of precious metal were important in the development of money (Seaford (2004) 60–7, 75–87, 102–15).

³⁶ For money as an important factor in the Presocratic construction of cosmology see Seaford (2004).

³⁷ For modern psychological experiments that demonstrate the isolating effects of thinking about money see Vohs et al. (2006).

³⁸ Pindar uses the Doric form *psuchā*.

³⁹ *Isthm.* 1.68–70. Cf. the emendation ψυχάν in Pindar fr. 123. 7–9.

⁴⁰ ἄϊδῳ could mean for the Greeks ‘unseen’: Kurke (1991) 239.

⁴¹ See e.g. Aesch. *Psychostasia*, Ag. 437; Cho. 518–21 (cf. Ag. 163–6; Seaford (2012b) 254–5; Eur. *Med.* 968, *Pho.* 1228; Isocr. 6.109; Xen. *Cyr* 3.1.36; *Anth. Gr.* 7.622.6. Human life involves a *debt* to death: Eur. *Alc.* 419, 782, *Andr.* 1272; Pl. *Tim.* 942e–43a; *Anth. Pal.* 10.105.

⁴² A27: Huffman (1993) 289–92, 300; cf. 58D–K B30.

⁴³ Seaford (2004) 275–83.

⁴⁴ Seaford (2004) 275–83.

⁴⁵ Claus (1981) 125 remarks on ‘the remarkable interest in the *psuchē* that occurs for the first time in Heraclitus’, and that there are only six occurrences of *psuchē* as a ‘psychological agent’ before the fifth century (93).

⁴⁶ The truth is stated by Philo *De aet. mundi* 21: Herakleitos called death ‘not annihilation but transformation into the other element’. Against the odd idea that B36 refers to physiological processes within the living organism see Schofield (1991) (in Everson) 15–21.

⁴⁷ Seaford (1986).

⁴⁸ 26 Graf and Iles Johnston. For the gold leaves see 6§B.

⁴⁹ Along with ‘truth’, ‘Dio(nysos)’, and ‘Orphic’.

⁵⁰ e.g. the Olbia bone plates (West (1983) 17–19); Pi. *Ol.* 28–73; Eur. *Ba.* 72–5; Ar. *Nubes* 319; gold leaves 1 and 3 (Graf and Iles Johnston), and frequently in Pl. *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo* (Riedweg (1987)).

⁵¹ See e.g. Seaford (2004) 184–5, 226–38, 262–5, 299–301.

⁵² B77; cf. B117(drunkeness).

⁵³ B117, B118; etc. (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 203–8).

⁵⁴ B36, B77.

⁵⁵ B118: my ‘and/or’ reflects the textual problem, which is beyond my scope here.

⁵⁶ Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 186–8, 199–206, 212.

⁵⁷ B36, 31, 118, 117, 26, 25, 63, 136: Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 198–9, 203–8. Note also B26 as excellently interpreted by Schofield (1991) 27–9. Against Kahn (1979) 238–40, who argues that for H. the *psuchē* is composed of air not fire, I insist that the choice between air and fire as constituting the Herakleitean *psuchē* is a false one. For the whole cosmos is fire (B30), and *psuchē* is subject—like all else—to a cycle of transformation that incorporates all the elements. In B36 the transformation (‘death’) surely involves opposites (as Kahn admits B31a does), implying a fiery soul.

⁵⁸ B64, B66.

⁵⁹ In battle internal fieriness, being aroused most completely, may accordingly be completely lost: Herakleitos praises death in battle (B24, B136).

⁶⁰ It is presumably the soul’s possession of *logos* that gives it the cognitive capacity indicated in B107: ‘eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men having barbarian souls (*psuchas*)’. Although ‘barbarian’ at this date suggests the inability to speak or understand the Greek *language*, in B107 it surely suggests failure to understand the *logos* in the broad sense of the abstraction according to which everything happens (B1). Eyes and ears provide sense data, but not the abstract *logos*, which is often misunderstood (B1) or ignored (B2; cf. B72), despite being necessary for right interpretation of the sense data. At this time no barbarian society was monetized.

⁶¹ The *psuchē* has great depth also, in a practical context, at Aesch. *Su.* 407–8

⁶² Seaford (2004) 231.

⁶³ Seaford (2004) 165–9.

⁶⁴ For more detail on this see Seaford (2004) 231–42.

⁶⁵ Hp. *Vict. (On Regimen)* 1.28 (= 144,18–20 Joly–Byl).

⁶⁶ B64; see also B66.

⁶⁷ B118, B107.

⁶⁸ A different kind of unity is implied by the (possibly authentic, fr. 67a) comparison of the soul to a spider rushing around its web (the body).

⁶⁹ *De anima* 405a25.

⁷⁰ Diels (1909) x.

⁷¹ Hussey (1982) 41, who cites predecessors with roughly the same view of Herakleitos.

⁷² Soph. *Ant.* 1063, 1077; cf. Pi. *Nem.* 9.32 *psuchai* 'stronger than possessions'.

⁷³ Source references in Seaford (2004) 298.

⁷⁴ The initiation of movement (of itself and of other things) is according to Aristotle (*De An.* 403b29ff, 404b30, 405b11–12, 31ff.) the primary feature of some early accounts of the *psuchē*. See also Pl. *Phdr.* 246ce.

⁷⁵ The *psuchē* rules the body: Democritus 68DK B159, B187; Pl. *Alcib.* I 130ab; Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.9, 4.3.14 (invisible power); in dreams the *psuchē* 'administers its own household, (Hp. *Vict.* 4.86 = 218,8 Joly–Byl).

⁷⁶ This is *nous* not *psuchē*. And something like comprehensive consciousness may be implied also by *phrēn* (or its plural *phrenes*). But, in contrast to *psuchē*, *nous* and *phrēn* are never equivalent to the self or person, and do not survive independently after death.

⁷⁷ 'Hail the world's soul, and mine!', says the miser Volpone to his gold in Ben Jonson, *Volpone* Act. 1.

⁷⁸ For the development of this idea in Neoplatonism, and its relation to the Lacanian mirror-stage of infantile development, see Seaford (1998).

⁷⁹ GC 325a18–20.

⁸⁰ Cf. Marx (1857–8; 1973) 234: 'If I want to cling to it, it evaporates in my hand to become a mere phantom of real wealth.'

⁸¹ B1; Seaford (2004) 233 n. 19.

⁸² e.g. Plutarch *Mor.* 81de, fr. 178; Eur. *Ba.* 72–5, 576–641 with Seaford (1996) *ad loc.*, 693, 748; Ar. *Frogs*, (e.g.) 156–7, 450–6; Plato *Rep.* 560de, *Phaedrus* 247a, 250b (with Riedweg (1987) 30–69); Csapo (2008) (cosmic mystic chorus).

⁸³ Seaford (2004) 231–9.

⁸⁴ B1.3, 27, 30; B6.4.

⁸⁵ Seaford (2004).

⁸⁶ Seaford (2004) 251.

⁸⁷ See also B8.33; B8.47–8.

2

Imagining Good Future States

Hope and Truth in Plato's *Philebus*

Katja Maria Vogt

What is the role of hope in motivation and agency?¹ In early Greek thought, hope has a negative reputation. Solon, one of the Seven Sages, famously says that human beings are full of empty hopes. Hopes are false dreams.² Thucydides analyses loss and victory, and the decision-making that leads up to it. Here hope appears to indicate a lack of deliberation. Those who hope fail to come up with a plan. They have a poor grasp of their situation, and things go badly for them.³ In this chapter, I aim to show that Plato challenges this conception of hope. Hopes are not generally empty. They need not reflect a poor grasp of one's situation. And they are not generally associated with failure. The *Philebus* conceives of agential thought as thoroughly future-directed. Hopes and fears are anticipations, and anticipations are essential to agency. They figure in everyone's mental lives, not just in those of poor deliberators. As we think about what to do, we imagine ourselves in possible future states. We relate to what we see, and our affective responses are informative. They help us figure out what we want.⁴

This proposal, I take it, is inherently attractive. Moreover, it helps resolve a controversy. The *Philebus* is well known for the claim that pleasures are true or false.⁵ The dialogue's discussions of false pleasure are famously difficult. Hopes, according to the dialogue's analysis, *are* pleasures. As I argue, false pleasure can only be made sense of if one takes seriously what Plato says about the relation of agents to the future. This chapter proceeds in three steps. In Section 1, I sketch what I take to be the account of thought and pleasure in

Plato's *Philebus*. In Section 2, I argue that all pleasure is future-directed. In Section 3, I defend the following proposal: hopes are true if and insofar as they are the hopes of good agents, and that means agents who are good at planning their lives and whose lives are going well.

1. Pleasure and Thinking

The *Philebus* is a study of the good in human life. It begins by reformulating two age-old views, 'wisdom is the good' and 'pleasure is the good'. Wisdom and pleasure are not discussed as achievements or possessions. Plato shifts focus, towards the goings-on in the mind that reasoning and pleasure involve. 'Wisdom is better than pleasure' thus becomes the following view:

We contend that [...] knowing, understanding, and remembering, and what belongs to them, correct *doxa* and true calculations, are better than pleasure... (11b6–9)⁶

The view that Socrates takes here is really rather different from traditional versions of 'wisdom is the good'. The view is not that, having achieved wisdom, one lives a good life. Rather, the view is that successfully exercising one's cognitive faculties is good. Moreover, the way in which different reasoning activities are lined up with each other should come as a surprise to anyone familiar with Plato's epistemology.⁷ There is no attention here to the idea that *doxa* is a lesser kind of cognitive attitude than knowledge, or indeed to any kind of ranking among reasoning activities. The goal, instead, seems to be to provide a sketch of what goes on in the mind of a human being. The very fact that Plato envisages a range of thinking activities as together constituting the mental life of an agent should serve as a premise for interpreting the dialogue. It is reiterated when Socrates argues that no one would choose pleasure without reason:

Since you would not be in possession of either reason, memory, knowledge, or true *doxa*, must you not be in ignorance, first of all, about this very question, whether you were enjoying yourself or not, given that you were devoid of any kind of intelligence? (21b6–9)

Without cognitive activity one would not be aware that one is in pleasure. Pleasure is part of an agent's mental life in a way that is dependent upon activities that are not themselves affective or

desiderative, but cognitive. This is not the claim that pleasure and pain are kinds of thinking, or involve judgements, or anything of this sort. Instead, it is a claim about the interrelation between goings-on in the mind. For a living being to be aware of pleasure, the mind must be active in ways that belong, roughly speaking, to reasoning or cognitive activity.

Three kinds of cognitive activity are discussed in more detail: memory, *doxa*, and planning.

Moreover, due to lack of memory, it would be impossible for you to remember that you ever enjoyed yourself, and for any pleasure to survive from one moment to the next, since it would leave no memory. But, not possessing right *doxa*, you would not realize that you are enjoying yourself even while you do, and, being unable to calculate, you could not figure out any future pleasures for yourself. You would thus not live a human life but the life of a mollusk or of one of those creatures in shells that live in the sea. (21c1–8)

Again, the focus is on the intersection between cognitive and affective activities. Memory enables the agent to recall that she enjoyed herself. It generates continuity between now and a moment ago, several moments ago, and so on. Memory is needed for awareness of pleasure because, otherwise, moments of experience would be purely momentary ‘nows’. There may be creatures whose mental life is like this: consisting of nothing but minimal ‘nows’. Perhaps sea-urchins are like this. But this is not a human life.⁸ A few pages later Plato extends his analysis of memory. One of its functions is the preservation of perception (34a). Call this access-memory. A related activity is recollection. If one can no longer immediately access a perception, one can make an effort to recall it (34a–c). Thus, Plato envisages in total three cognitive activities involved in memory, and relevant to experience of pleasure: continuity-preserving memory, access-memory, and recollection.

The second class of cognitive activity that Socrates mentions is *doxa*. *Doxa* is introduced as having the task of assessing whether one is in pleasure. And yet, only a few pages later this task is assigned to perception (*aisthēsis*) (33d–34a). Now Socrates says that, when cognizers recognize that they are in pleasure or pain, this recognition is a perception (*aisthēsis*). A process of restoration (pleasure) or disintegration (pain) is perceived. If these processes are below a certain threshold—say, the early beginnings of dehydration—they do not register with the agent. One only comes to perceive dehydration after a certain level of disintegration has been reached; then one is thirsty (33d–34a; cf. 38b).

These passages should give interpreters pause. They suggest that *doxa*, in the *Philebus*, is used in a sense wide enough to incorporate the

perceptual ‘registering’ by which an agent comes to be aware of pleasure. Similarly, in the *Philebus*’ main account of the soul, Plato talks of *doxai*, *doxazomena*, and *doxasthenta* (39b–c), blurring the line between any differences one might take to exist between these attitudes. *Doxazomena* and *doxasthenta* are plausibly rendered as ‘what is being represented’, and *doxa* is not flagged as any different. A bit later, Socrates says that from memory and perception *doxa* arises in us. Alongside with *doxa*, Socrates says, memory and perception generate in us a ‘striving for *diadoxazein*’.⁹ That is, *doxa* does not conclude a thought process, as a judgement would.¹⁰ *Doxa* is already in the mind, and still the mind wants to figure things out, aiming to discriminate and settle how things are.

Schleiermacher’s translations reflect this understanding of *doxa*, in a way that may be philosophically more attuned to the text than today’s translations. For him, *doxa* in the *Philebus* covers a wide range of representational thinking activities, referring to a broader phenomenon than today’s translations of belief or judgement.¹¹ In interpreting *doxa* as judgement or actively formed belief, as is customary today, one presumes a continuity between the *Philebus* and a famous passage in the *Theaetetus* (189e–190a).¹² There Plato describes thinking as an inner conversation that is concluded by *doxazein*. Having looked at things this way and that way, the cognizer says ‘yes’ to one way of seeing them, thereby forming a judgement. In the *Philebus*, the verb *doxazein* figures prominently when Socrates turns to the comparison between *doxazein* and ‘taking pleasure’, *hēdesthai* (37a). Even here, it is by no means obvious that the relevant activity consists in judging that such-and-such is so-and-so. The comparison works also, and perhaps better, if *doxazein* is taken to mean ‘to represent something as so-and-so’.¹³ For current purposes, this question need not be resolved. It suffices to note that Plato’s notion of *doxa* in the *Philebus* seems wider than judgement.¹⁴ This point has significant implications for the well-known issue of false pleasure in the *Philebus*. Plato compares truth and falsity in pleasure to truth and falsity in *doxa*. In interpreting this, we need to get both *comparanda* right. That is, we need to get clear about the question of whether false *doxa*, as it matters to the discussion of false pleasure, is rightly thought of as false judgement. The way in which *doxa* is employed in the dialogue calls this premise in question. *Doxa* in the *Philebus* seems to include judgement, but it also seems to include other kinds of representational thinking.

Third in Socrates’ list is reasoning, *logismos*, a mode of thought that is specifically concerned with the future. Its task is to figure out future pleasures for oneself. Reasoning, here, is planning, a future-directed form of thought. It is agency-related thought, about what to pursue or

how to attain things in the future. At this point, Plato says little about planning. And yet it is clear that planning, or figuring out what to pursue in one's life, is crucial to the dialogue. The *Philebus* asks what kind of life is good for human beings. For long sections of the text, it approaches this question through metaphysics, as well as through analyses of cognitive activities and pleasure/pain. Again and again, these fairly technical discussions break off, and Socrates and Protarchus ask simpler questions, such as: what would people choose? They imagine what it would be like, say, to live a life without pleasure (21d–e), or, at the other end of a spectrum, the life of a sea-urchin, whose mental life is presumably such that nothing beyond the present is at all perceived (21c). No one would choose either, a verdict that appears to derive from nothing but a moment of imagining what such lives would be like. It is this component of making up one's mind that interests me here. In addition to thinking through the pros and cons of this and that form of life, agents also do something else. They imagine a given state of affairs, and respond to their sense of what it would be like.

Socrates' talk about 'planning' relates to earlier Platonic discussions, in particular in the *Protagoras*. There Socrates analyses how a pleasure/pain calculus would work, aimed at the greatest pleasure in total (351b–358d). The *Philebus*, however, departs from this picture. The good life has to be a mix. Pleasure is one ingredient, in the same way in which thinking is.¹⁵ Both blend with everything a human being does: there is no conscious experience without cognitive activities, and there is no conscious experience without pleasure/pain. Accordingly, whatever calculation the agent makes, it is not about choosing pleasure versus something else. It is about choosing a life in which pleasure/pain has the right kind of presence: in which the mix is a good mix. Pleasure and pain nevertheless play a role in figuring out what kind of life to pursue: in imagining, for example, what it would be like to live a life of reason without pleasure, the agent immediately sees that she would not like it. She would not enjoy it, and she would not choose it.¹⁶ This exchange between Socrates and Protarchus suggests that certain kinds of decisions are made, in part, by asking ourselves whether we could imagine a given path for ourselves. When we ask ourselves whether we can see ourselves in a scenario—Can you see yourself married to him? Can you envisage yourself living in New York City?—we find out some of what we want. This does not mean that 'planning' as a whole consists of imagining scenarios, observing one's pleasure/pain reactions. It does mean, however, that the *Philebus* advances a proposal: imagining scenarios helps us figure out some components of what appears to be a good life for us.

2. Pleasure's Future-Directedness

What is good for all creatures, according to Protarchus, is to be pleased and pleasure and delight (11b4–5). As in the case of reason, the very formulation by which ‘pleasure is the good’ is introduced departs from traditional phrasings. What is good, or so Protarchus holds, is *to be* pleased. The nouns ‘pleasure’ and ‘delight’ are mentioned afterwards, subordinate to the idea of experience. Pleasure is an experienced state. This sets up a constraint for understanding true and false pleasure. No one in the dialogue disputes that a person who experiences pleasure actually experiences pleasure.¹⁷

Pleasure can be bodily in the sense that one takes pleasure in a present physiological process, say, the ‘filling’ of drink when thirsty. Still, the mind is involved, for otherwise the agent would not experience anything. Accordingly, I shall not speak of bodily pleasures, and instead of pleasures taken in present states, or, for short, present pleasures. Present pleasures can be distinguished from pleasures of anticipation (32b–c). Pleasures of anticipation are expectations of pleasurable scenarios, and they are called hopes. Their negative counterparts are fears (32b–c). An anticipation is, in the terms of the dialogue, a *prosdokēma* or a *prosdokia* (32c). These terms fit the account of the mind that emerges throughout the dialogue, an account that focuses on the interrelations between thinking and pleasure/pain. The verb *prosdokaō* means expecting in an affectively coloured way, as in hope or fear. It is a representing of expected future states that is immediately tied to motivation. Later, Plato introduces pleasure/pain terms that pick out the affective condition of the agent: she is pre-pleased or pre-pained (*prochairein*, *prolupeisthai* 39d). And yet, here too the distinction between cognitive and affective/desiderative attitudes is blurred. These are attitudes about the future (39d4–5), and thus presumably about the very states of affairs that *prosdokia* expects to come about.

Now one may wonder whether Plato’s proposal about false pleasure is meant to apply specifically to anticipatory pleasure. However, this cannot be the case. Right after introducing the distinction between present pleasure/pain and anticipatory pleasure/pain, Plato softens it. First, it is evident that anticipatory pleasure/pain is not just about the future. To be pre-pleased is to be pleased right now, as well as to anticipate future pleasure. Second, Socrates reclassifies conditions that

formerly counted as pains, namely hunger and thirst, as desire (*epithumia*, 34d).¹⁸ As desires, pleasure and pain propel the agent into the future. Pain is such that one wants it to go away or not come about; pleasure is such that one wants to attain it or wants it to continue. That is, the distinction between present pleasure/pain and anticipatory pleasure/pain is less straightforward than it may initially appear. Both present and anticipatory pleasures are, at least in part, about future states of the agent.¹⁹ A constraint on reconstructing false pleasure emerges from this set-up. The way in which pleasure is false/true should have something to do with the fact that pleasure/pain are motivational and thereby directed towards the agent's future. This constraint puts hope and fear at the centre of the discussion. If all pleasure and pain is future-directed, all pleasure and pain has hope/fear components. Agents relate to future states of theirs that they either see as pleasurable or as painful, even if only by wanting present pleasure to last or present pain to go away.

Some aspects of pleasure/pain's truth or falsity can be addressed, in a preliminary fashion, without reference to the future. Pleasure/pain are true/false insofar as they 'register' and 'reflect' something (37e).²⁰ Insofar as pleasure/pain are concerned with the present, they reflect physiological processes. Against this idea, Protarchus raises an objection that philosophers today also raise. If pleasure and pain are thought of as perceptions of physiological goings-on, how come we do not (as we might say today) perceive sugar- or lipid-levels in our blood, and so on? Plato's response is that pleasure and pain are not about our physiology in that sense. They are about more general conditions, such as dehydration. Arguably, a case can be made that one perceives dehydration, and that one can make mistakes in diagnosing such conditions as dehydration. Say, one feels listless and wrought out, and misperceives this as a state of tiredness, when really one is dehydrated.²¹

To see more clearly how such mistakes may occur, consider briefly the metaphysics of pleasure/pain. Pleasure and pain, according to the *Philebus*, fall into the class of the unlimited (14a–20b).²² This classification involves several claims. (i) Pleasure is varied in such a way that there is no such thing as 'what pleasure is'. (ii) Since pleasure is not one kind of thing, different pleasures are not sub-kinds. (iii) There are not 'many' pleasures in the sense of so-and-so many kinds of pleasures. Instead, there is an unlimited array of variety. (iv) Pleasure/pain do not come in 'units'. That is, the intensity of pleasure is not measurable by reference to units. (v) Given pleasure/pain's unlimited nature, there are no extreme ends of maximum and minimum, by reference to which the intensity of a given pleasure/pain could be determined.²³

These premises aim to capture familiar phenomena about pleasure/pain, such as the difficulty of measuring pain. In some cases, we are quite confident in our assessment, say, describing pain as minute when a kid hits you in a playful way, or as acute when we have a splitting headache. But the elusiveness of pain assessments is nevertheless familiar, and reflected in methods of medical diagnosis. Think of a tool doctors sometimes employ, a row of sketches of happier/unhappier faces, which is used to help patients describe whether they are in much or little pain.²⁴ Socrates suggests that one needs comparisons: some pleasure/pain is more or less intense than some other pleasure/pain. That is all one can say (42a–c).²⁵ Thus one can make mistakes in assessing pleasure/pain. One could claim that some pain is absolutely much, thereby misrepresenting the nature of pain; one might have such slight pain that one is unsure about whether one is in pain or not, and mistakenly say one is not in pain when really one is (think of your dentist asking you whether biting on the repaired tooth still hurts); one can mistake one pain-condition for another pain-condition (say, tiredness for dehydration); and so on.

The metaphysics of the *Philebus* contributes a further premise for the interpretation of truth and falsity in pleasure/pain. Scholars tend to buy into Protarchus' assumption that true pleasure is unproblematic; only false pleasure is in need of explanation.²⁶ But the opposite instinct is equally crucial for the dialogue. Socrates refers to people who deny that there is any pleasure; they think all pleasure is chimerical, in fact just being the relief of pain (44b–d). These people, in effect, say that there is no true pleasure, and Socrates makes it his task to refute them, just as he aims to refute Protarchus. If the metaphysics of pleasure is taken seriously, the *Philebus* calls into question how any pleasure can be true as much as it asks how pleasure can be false.

Suppose someone makes a mistake of the sort described above. She misdiagnoses her present condition as dehydration rather than tiredness. Her diagnosis of what the pain reflects is false, and in this sense her pain is false. An agent who is in pain, taking it to be the pain of dehydration, will seek to end this state, say, by trying to find something to drink. The pain of thirst is a desire for drink. However, the drink will not alleviate her pain, given that it is the pain of tiredness. Really, what the agent needs is rest, otherwise the pain experience is not going to go away. The false diagnosis of present pain, thus, goes along with a desire that is false in the sense of directing the agent to an action that is not going to keep its promise: the action is undertaken as pain-alleviation, but it does not do the job. This example provides further help for interpreting the role of truth and falsity in pleasure/pain. It suggests that truth and falsity have

something to do with success. A course of action is envisaged as pleasurable, and this anticipation is pleasant. But as the course of action is undertaken, it does not keep its promise. The condition that the agent attains is not pleasurable, contrary to her expectations.

Socrates elaborates on the desiderative side of pleasure/pain by pointing out that one registers a process in relation to what, in a given situation, seems preferable. Present pain/pleasures are desires, and they are concerned with what agents want. Plato's primary example is heat and cold, being warm and freezing (32a–d). In some situations, cold is welcome, in others warmth is welcome (32d). Consider a person who uses air conditioning in the summer and heating in the winter. In effect, it is colder in her office in summer than in winter. Should she not be displeased with this? Not necessarily. A person may think of the summer as a time when a cool breeze is desirable, enjoying her icy office. A similarly cold room in the winter would strike her as a painful place to work in.²⁷ The earlier proposal that pleasure/pain reflects a present physiological condition must be amended. Pleasure/pain reflects relational states of affairs. They are about present conditions as related to what the cognizer envisages as pleasurable or painful future states for her to be in, where this in turn may depend on what the agent prefers in a given situation.

3. Imagination and Agency

Agents, or so Plato argues, are constantly concerned with their future. Socrates' famous metaphor of a scribe and a painter in the human soul elaborates on this point.

S: If memory and perceptions concur with other affections at a particular occasion, then they seem to me to inscribe words in our soul, as it were. And if what is written is true, then we form a true *doxa* and true sentences (*logoi*) of the matter. But if what our scribe writes is false, then the result will be the opposite of the truth. (39a1–7)

Memory and perception are the scribe's work: they make inscriptions into the soul. The scribe has a companion, a painter.

- S: A painter who follows the scribe and draws images of these words in the soul. [...]
- S: When a person takes his *doxazomena* and what is being said directly from sight or any other sense-perception and then envisages inside himself the images of these *doxasthenta* and 'sayings'. Or is it not something of that sort that is going on in us? [...]

S: And are not the images of the true *doxai* and sentences true, and the images of the false ones false? (39b6–c5)

Alongside the inscriptions, images are painted in the mind. These images are also true or false, in the same way in which their linguistic counterparts are. Interpreters have suggested that the scribe–painter model introduces imagination as a kind of cognitive activity.²⁸ This suggestion seems too quick. What is being said, however metaphorically, seems to be that representations come with linguistic counterparts, and that the mind produces corresponding images. Still, interpreters seem to be on the right track. Imagination, I submit, is introduced, though not because thought involves images. Imagination is introduced because cognizers are said to be specifically concerned with their future. Future states cannot be perceived or otherwise recognized as being the case; they have to be imagined. The inscriptions and images in the soul are said to involve past, present, and future (39c). When Socrates asks Protarchus whether these representations are also concerned with the future, Protarchus says ‘decidedly with the future’, and Socrates comments on this qualification:²⁹

If you say ‘decidedly’, is it because all of them are really hopes for future times, and we are forever brimful of hopes, throughout our lifetime? (39e4–6)

This is a remarkable proposal. The goings-on in our minds, it is suggested, are about the future more than about anything else. In emphasizing a cognizer’s relation to the future, Plato departs further from the account of thinking in the *Theaetetus*. There, thinking is concerned with figuring out what is true or false about a given matter, leading towards a judgement that affirms one view over others. The future does not seem to figure in thinking, or not in any distinctive way. Why would the Socrates of the *Philebus* say that the mind is constantly concerned with the future? The framing question of the dialogue—what people choose with a view to having their lives go well—suggests an answer. The cognizers of the *Philebus* are agents, aiming to have their lives go well. And agential thought is inherently concerned with the future.

This is what it means to say that people are always full of hopes: people always see themselves in future scenarios, worrying about bad things that they hope to avoid or get rid of, or anticipating good things that they hope to attain or preserve. Socrates repeats this claim. All human beings have manifold hopes (40a3–4). Here is his example:

And someone often envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and of a lot of pleasures as a consequence. And in addition, he also sees, in this inner picture of himself, that he is beside himself with

This is Plato's primary example for the claim that pleasures are true or false. Interpreters tend to take for granted that Rich, as I will call him, entertains a *false* hope.³⁰ Notably, Socrates and Protarchus do not say so. Instead, right after the example Socrates offers a general account of what makes anticipatory pleasures true or false. They are true or false depending on whether the person is good and loved by the gods. The gods, or so it is assumed, make those prosper whom they love.³¹ Assuming that the gods love the good, this means that the hopes of good people are true. Truth is tied to success, falsity to failure. Pleasure is false if that which is imagined neither is nor ever was the case, nor—most importantly—ever will be the case (40d7–10).

This proposal has not been developed by scholars, perhaps because its reference to the gods makes it sound all too metaphorical, and because it is not obvious how it relates to Socrates' insistence that truth/falsity in pleasure be compared to truth/falsity in *doxa* (36c–42c). This comparison is reformulated multiple times, in the attempt to get clear about it. For present purposes, the core of Plato's idea shall suffice: pleasure goes along with, or involves, a *doxa*-component (38a).³² Thus a plausible account of truth/falsity in hope must accommodate six premises, three of which, (i) to (iii), were already discussed in Sections 1 and 2:

- (i) True pleasure is as difficult to make sense of as false pleasure.
- (ii) Anticipatory pleasure/pain involves a *doxa*-component.
- (iii) This *doxa*-component must be understood along the lines of the dialogue's wide notion of *doxa*.
- (iv) Human mental life is, insofar as it is concerned with motivation and action, essentially future-directed.
- (v) Truth is tied to success, falsity to failure.
- (vi) Truth is tied to the agent's goodness, falsity to the agent's badness.

A traditional line of interpretation argues that Rich's pleasure is false insofar as the content of his dream—being rich and taking pleasure in it—is lowly. But Socrates does not talk about the contents of anticipations as good or bad. He talks about good or bad people (40b). Moreover, a wide range of interpretations proceeds by conceiving of *doxa* as judgement/belief, without asking how this accommodates (iii) and (iv). Doing so, these interpretations understand *doxa* more narrowly than the dialogue may require. They also miss out on asking a crucial question: whether and in which sense thoughts about the future are true. A compelling proposal on the

truth/falsity of anticipatory pleasure must ask what kind of *doxa* is involved specifically in future-directed attitudes. Prediction might be such an attitude. A future state of affairs is envisaged. But the kinds of agency-imaginings Plato discusses are not predictions.³³ Rich does not think 'I will be rich', making a true or false prediction. Rich does what psychologists today describe with a range of terms: imagining, anticipating, day-dreaming, forecasting.³⁴ That is, the doxastic side of pleasure resides in imagination.

Suppose that this proposal takes care of premises (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). A future-directed kind of doxastic attitude has been identified: agency-imagination. Agency-imagination fits the wide notion of *doxa* introduced earlier, by reference to Schleiermacher. It is not a judgement, and not true or false in the sense in which judgements are. It is a mental representation of a future state, tied to affective attitudes. With respect to this kind of imagination, truth and falsity are on a par. It is quite unclear how the truth-predicates apply to imaginings. This is an advantage of my proposal. If the metaphysics of pleasure/pain is taken seriously, truth should not be any easier to understand than falsity.

The success criterion, (v), is meant to answer the question in which sense agency-imagination is true/false. It is true if that which is envisaged comes about. But whether it does depends on (vi), whether the agent is a good person. What notion of a good person is invoked in this context? The framing questions of the dialogue provide guidance. They suggest that we are talking about agents who aim to lead a good life, and who aim to understand what a good human life looks like.

With this in mind, let me fill in some detail about Rich. As Socrates remarks, a person may imagine herself as rich quite often. Perhaps it is Rich's tried and trusted means for falling asleep soundly: he lies down, closes his eyes, and imagines the wonderful vacations he would take with all that money, the soft breeze in palm trees at far-away beaches, and so on. And yet, as he imagines some of the details of that life, Rich may realize that, if he really became rich, say, winning the lottery, he might lose his current context in life, which on reflection he admits he likes a lot. Luxurious vacations would take him away from work he cares about, from friends who do not live wealthy lives, and so on. Thus he may conclude that, in fact, becoming rich is not his 'dream'. He has other goals in life.

Imaginings help agents figure out what they want. In imagining future scenarios, agents do not 'deliberate', or not in the sense in which this term tends to be used, inspired by the Aristotelian tradition. They do not weigh reasons for and against possible courses of action. They may imagine something that, for all they know, is not in their power to bring about. These imaginings have an affective side.

As one entertains them, one registers pleasure or pain, thus noting whether one likes what one sees. Moreover, it seems one can be better or worse in employing imagination as a means of discovery. One may lack the imagination to come up with a rudimentary picture of the sea-urchin's mental life, or to ask in the first place what it is like to be a sea-urchin (21c-d). Or one fails to fill in the details. Imagining that such creatures are in continuous 'pleasure-now' states, perhaps one thinks this is just fine, just as Rich, before he fills in the picture, may think that continuous cocktail-sipping is his dream. Agency-imagination may be something that good agents are good at, similar to the way in which Aristotelians think that good agents are good at deliberation.³⁵

Socrates and Protarchus employ imagination as they develop an account of the good human life. Contrary to Aristotelian views on how one comes up with a conception of the good life, the *Philebus* suggests that, among other things, one must have imagination. One must be able to imagine what it would be like to be a sea-urchin, what a life without pleasure would look like, or what it would be like to win the lottery; and one must take guidance from one's pleasure/pain reactions to these imagined scenarios. If a good agent is someone who is good at the kinds of activities involved in figuring out how to live, and in pursuing that kind of life, the good agent of the *Philebus* needs agency-imagination. Thus some light is shed on (vi), what it means to be a good agent. And this helps with (v), the success criterion. Imaginative agents will be those who dream of things that they can take some steps to bring about, and that not only seem pleasant from afar, but indeed bring pleasure if realized.

4. Conclusion

I began by saying that hopes, according to earlier ancient thinkers, have three negative features. Hopes are empty or false. They are typical of those who do not have a good grasp of their situation. And they do not make a positive contribution to planning. All three assumptions, according to the *Philebus*, are misguided. Hopes can be false. However, they can also be true, namely if imagination enables the agent to identify a pursuit that does not just look as if it will be enjoyable, but that she can take some steps to bring about, and that in fact she will enjoy. Agents who are good at hope have a realistic grasp of their situation. Otherwise they don't know what to hope for.

Moreover, hopes are thought experiments: reactive attitudes to future scenarios help agents understand what a good human life looks like.

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² Solon, fr. 13.36.

³ The *locus classicus* in Thucydides is *Histories* 5.103, in the so-called Melian Dialogue. The Melians declare their intention to hope that the Spartans will come to their aid and that the gods will look after them because their cause is just. The Athenians respond that hope is comforting but useless, if not dangerous. It encourages people to make decisions against their own best interests. This assessment relates to a larger theme in Thucydides, namely that people make decisions based on wishful thinking, rarely having a good grasp of their situation. I am grateful to Neville Morley for discussion of these matters.

⁴ Today, hope tends to be seen as a good attitude, perhaps even a virtue, and philosophers engage with it in these terms. Philosophy of motivation tends not to address hope. A notable exception is Martin (2011) 148–73.

⁵ I engage specifically with Delcomminette (2003), Evans (2008), Frede (1985), Harte (2004), and Thein (2012). Cf. Evans for further references to recent discussions, and Delcomminette on early engagement with the issue, reaching back as far as Theophrastus.

⁶ My translations are indebted to Dorothea Frede's translation in John Cooper

(ed.), *Plato's Complete Works* (Indianapolis 1997); Frede's German translation in Ernst Heitsch (ed.): *Platon Werke. Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Band 3,2: *Philebos*, translation and commentary by D. Frede (Göttingen, 1997); and to Friedrich Schleiermacher's translation, reprinted in *Platon Werke 7* (Darmstadt 1972). Schleiermacher's translation is somewhat of an exception among his Plato translations: it is almost unreadable, staying very close to the Greek and reflecting closely the difficulties of the dialogue. Nevertheless, or perhaps in part because of this, it is worth consulting on matters of dispute.

⁷ In different dialogues, Plato explores at least two different notions of *doxa*: (i) *doxa* as 'mere' belief and inherently deficient, to be contrasted with knowledge; and (ii) *doxa* as belief or judgement. Cf. Vogt (2012). The *Philebus* may offer a third notion. *Doxa* is not analysed as deficient, and/or concerned with lesser kinds of entities as compared to knowledge, and it is not clear that the term is used to refer to something like judgement. I explore this latter point below.

⁸ Of course, it is not unthinkable that someone, say, acquainted with extreme drugs, aims for a state of mind that is radically about 'living in the moment'. It is possible that, in antiquity, Aristippus advocates this kind of hedonic presentism, a term I borrow from David Sedley (ch. 5 in this volume).

⁹ Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγγχερεῖν γίγνθ' ἐκάστοτε; (38b12–13). In Schleiermacher's translation: 'entsteht uns jedesmal die Vorstellung und das Bestreben, durch Vorstellung zu unterscheiden'. Frede translates *diadoxazein* as 'the attempt to come to a definite judgment'; Thein as 'decide among beliefs'. Both renderings seem modelled after the *Theaetetus*.

¹⁰ Dorothea Frede's English and German translations understand *doxa* along the lines of judgement.

¹¹ Schleiermacher translates 'Vorstellung', not just in the *Philebus*, but also in the *Theaetetus*. It is hard to imagine how much current interpretations of these dialogues would have to be modified if his translation was, on the whole, preferable to translations along the lines of belief/judgement.

¹² Cf. Delcomminette (2003), who makes much of the comparison with the *Theaetetus*, without calling into question whether *doxa* is well understood in the *Philebus* if it is taken to refer to judgement.

¹³ Schleiermacher's verb is 'vorstellen'.

¹⁴ Though I disagree with the way in which Thein sees agreement and continuity between the *Philebus* and the *Theaetetus*, I think he rightly observes the following: 'In the *Philebus*, whose subject-matter offers a broader view of human concerns than the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, it [the *Theaetetus*' picture of thinking] is adapted to suit the richness of the everyday thought-processes in their modal and counterfactual dimensions' (2012, 109).

¹⁵ Cf. Vogt (2010).

¹⁶ The question of whether one would choose a life without pain calls for more reflection. Perhaps one would intuitively say 'yes', and only after imagining what it really would be like—to not have available, say, the warning mechanisms that pain affords, as when one pulls back one's hand because otherwise it would burn—one would realize that one wouldn't choose a life wholly without pain.

¹⁷ Harte (2004) captures this point (if a person reports that she is in pleasure, she is in pleasure) by saying that pleasure is 'factive'. I shall refrain from using this term, which tends to be used for knowledge and perception, referring to the idea that, say, if S knows that p, p is the case. This isn't precisely the point here. Rather, the idea is that the fact that someone experiences pleasure is not in dispute when one asks whether a given pleasure is true or false. Cf. Delcomminette (2003, 218), who is clear about this point.

¹⁸ Desire has a pain-aspect to it, namely the perception of a disintegration such as getting hungry or thirsty; and it relates to the opposite of this condition, namely future filling. Thus, desire is a pain/pleasure conglomerate. Its pain/pleasure composition depends on one's presumed prospects for attaining that which is perceived as lacking. One can lack something, but anticipate that one gets it, such that the desire has a pain- and a pleasure-aspect. Or one can be in twofold pain, lacking something and anticipating that one won't attain it (36a–b).

¹⁹ Harte (2004) says it does not matter whether one takes an example of anticipatory pleasure or present pleasure; that Plato just takes the former because it is the easier case for what he aims to say; and that we can follow him and assume that whatever is said about anticipatory pleasure can be extended to all pleasure. But she does not point out why: because *all* pleasure is future-directed.

²⁰ I choose this expression in order to avoid the controversial formulation that pleasure/pain is 'about' something.

²¹ Socrates compares the case of diagnosing whether one is in pleasure or pain to a case of judging whether a figure under a tree is a person or a statue (38d–c). The object can be misperceived; and the observer may carry in himself the possibly mistaken thought that 'a man is under the tree' for a while, when he no longer actually sees the figure (38e). The point of the comparison may be that we find ourselves in a certain kind of distance from physiological processes: we are only aware of them in psychologically translated versions. Thus we may make mistakes in identifying something perceptible as something else, say, tiredness as dehydration, or the other way around. And we may carry this thought in us for a while, and be motivated accordingly; say, seeking to get some rest rather than seeking to get something to drink.

²² Cf. also later in the text: pleasure and pain arise in the same domain, namely the domain of limit-unlimited combinations (31c). They belong to the class of the unlimited (41d).

²³ Discussion of these matters starts right at the beginning of the dialogue, at 12c–14b. Socrates argues that pleasures are not just 'many', but manifold in the sense of ποικίλον. They are unlike each other, sometimes to the extent that they are opposites. This means, or so it is argued at this early stage, that all one may be able to say about all pleasures is that they are pleasures. But one cannot further characterize them (along the lines of 'all pleasures are...'), given how deeply they differ. For present purposes controversial questions of interpretation can be set aside. What matters is the general picture of pleasure/pain as difficult to measure and to categorize, due to its metaphysics.

²⁴ Cf. the Wong Baker Faces Pain Rating Scale or the Pain Smiley Face Chart.

²⁵ I assume here that pain and pleasure are symmetrical, such that whatever phenomena are found in pain are also present in pleasure; and such that an explanation that applies to one applies to the other. This assumption is controversial, but I shall not address it here.

²⁶ They thereby consider the *Philebus* as continuing a project that is crucial to the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus*: the explanation of falsity. But this may be too quick. Given the metaphysics of pleasure, true pleasure must be at least as difficult to understand as false pleasure.

²⁷ Warmth and cold are also Plato's examples in the *Theaetetus*. Plato asks whether present tense reports such as 'I am cold now' are always true. On the premises of the *Philebus*, that kind of proposal must fail. Pleasure/pain involve temporal extension, memory, and future-related thought. For discussion of the relation between the *Philebus* and Protagorean relativism in the *Theaetetus*, cf. Mooradian (1996).

²⁸ Delcomminette (2003, 225) explains imagination simply as the production of

images.

²⁹ Cf. *Laws* 644c4–d3.

³⁰ Well-known passages, say, in the *Republic*, suggest that Plato considers love of money lowly. Similarly, the *Philebus*' later discussions of good lives make it clear that values other than money inspire worthier pursuits. Still, Rich is not identified as a misguided person with a false hope.

³¹ The opposite idea, namely that the gods are envious and take away goods from those who they see prosper, figures in early Greek thought too. Clearly, this is not something Plato endorses or invokes.

³² Evans thinks that another component is crucial, namely the pleasure/*doxa* comparison in (40c). But he reformulates it misleadingly, as if the text said that false pleasure is false on account of the same feature(s) on account of which false *doxa* is false. Socrates makes a different point. If pleasure is bad, its badness must be its falsity, just as in *doxa*, when it is bad, its badness is its falsity.

³³ The point that attitudes involved in motivation are different from prediction was famously made by Elizabeth Anscombe. Anscombe points out that we provide evidence for predictions, but not for intentions (*Intention*, 6).

³⁴ Psychologists tend to distinguish these activities from mere mind-wandering, where the latter is unintended or occasioned by external triggers.

³⁵ Aristotle scholars tend to translate *phantasia* as used in the *De anima* with 'imagination.' It is customary, however, to flag that this is by no means ideal. And yet a better translation is hard to come by. According to the *De anima*, *phantasia* plays a role in human action and in the things other animals do (for some famously difficult passages cf. 428b30–434a). The notion of imagination I employ in this chapter is not equivalent with imagination/*phantasia* in the *De anima*, and it would go far beyond my purposes to compare them here. My proposal is that, when Aristotle discusses the kinds of agential reasoning that figure in a good life in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in particular in Book VI, he does not include anything like excellence at imagination. If one were to develop further the ideas I discuss in this chapter, this is where one would end up: with an account of what it means to be good at agency-imagination.

3

Freedom and Will

Graeco-Roman Origins

Richard Sorabji

1. Freedom as a Rare Invulnerability (The Stoics), or as the State of God (Aristotle), both Compatible with Kinds of Necessity

I shall first illustrate, without attempting to be comprehensive, the great diversity among ancient concepts of freedom.¹ Isaiah Berlin's famous lecture on two concepts of freedom distinguished negative and positive freedom. He never said that these were the only two types, and in any case many different types seem to be included under the positive heading. Stoic freedom is only one of the positive types, but Berlin in his lecture classed it as sour grapes rather than freedom: we don't want what we can't get.² I think it was a genuine freedom, but rare.

The Stoics were discussing what it is to be a free person and treating it as an exceptional achievement. This freedom was illustrated in Epictetus (c.55–c.135 CE) only by Diogenes and Socrates. I formerly illustrated it by Admiral Stockdale and more recently by Gandhi.³ The freedom consists in being one's own agent (*autopraxia*), which is compatible with political subordination or enslavement (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 7. 121), or imprisonment in the case of Stockdale and Gandhi. Epictetus' discourse on freedom

(*eleutheria*) explains how through careful adjudication of desires you can be freed from inner and outer tyrannies (*Discourses* 4.1.86–7), so that you are enslaved to nothing, not to house, farm, horses, clothes, furniture, family. As if writing for academics, he adds books (4.4.1–2), and, finally your own body. That is why you can tell the external tyrant that he cannot put *you* in chains, only your leg, 1.1.23. This is how Gandhi remained freer than the viceroys when he was put in prison, and how Admiral Stockdale remained freer than his captors when they tortured him and put him in solitary confinement. Not only does Epictetus regard this freedom as compatible with compulsion; he views it as so obviously compatible with the Stoic belief in determinism, that is, with the idea that whatever happens has all along been necessary or inevitable,⁴ that he does not even mention deterministic necessity throughout his discourse on freedom. The right adjudication of one's desires gives rare people a certain invulnerability. Invulnerability is not the free person's *motive* for adjudicating desires the right way, but the resulting invulnerability is the reason for the person's being described as 'free'.

In Aristotle (384–322 BCE), the idea of the free man had been in this respect similar when he spoke about the order and the governance of the universe. He compared the invariant activity of the highest thing in the universe, God, with the restrictions on permissible behaviour for the free householder and contrasted that with the indiscipline of slaves, *Metaph.* 12.10, 1075a19–23. Human freedom was thus seen as calling for *more* restriction, in imitation of God.

It should be added that Epictetus speaks not only of certain things being *free*, but seven times brings in the idea that certain things are free *by nature* (*eleutheron phusei*).⁵ The term alternates twice in one passage, *Discourses* 1.9, with 'free', but the qualification 'by nature' can be understood, and 'free by nature' does not mean the same as 'free'. Two of the passages say that what is *up to us* is free *by nature*.⁶ Epictetus had narrowed down the concept of what is *up to us* compared with his predecessors to a small range of psychological acts or attitudes that no tyrant could take away from you, indeed not even Zeus, as he says at 1.1.23 in his very first discourse, which is on what is *up to us*. Two passages pick out as free *by nature* our *prohairesis*, which might very loosely be paraphrased as 'our will' and a still further one speaks of what is under the control of our will (*prohairesis*) as free *by nature*. Of the first two passages, which treat what is *up to us* as free *by nature*, the one from *Handbook* 1.2–3 gives more information:

What is up to us is *free by nature*, unpreventable, unimpedable, but what is not up to us is weak, slavish, preventable, alien. So remember that if you think that what is slavish by nature is free and that what is alien is your own, you

will be impeded, grieved, disturbed, you will blame both gods and humans. But if you think only what is yours to be yours, and what is alien to be alien, as it is, no one will ever compel you; no one will prevent you, you will blame no one, you will not do a single thing involuntarily, you will not have an enemy, no one will harm you, for neither will you suffer anything harmful.

Evidently to call something free *by nature* is not to call it free, but to *qualify* the claim that it is free. So to understand it, we need to keep in mind what he means by freedom itself (*eleutheria*). That suggests that what is free *by nature* is not freedom, but what *would* give you Epictetus' rare kind of invulnerability, if you would set your heart only on the right psychological attitudes that are up to you, in the sense that no tyrant could take them away from you.

Epictetus does say something else about the particular choices of *everybody*, but it falls short of saying that they are *free*. He says that they are *not compelled*, except by their *other* choices. He is talking of acts of willing (*prohairesis*). He says that even if you act under the threat of death, nothing compelled that in you which is capable of *prohairesis*. Rather, what happened was that one desire (*hormē, orexis*) for survival, defeated another desire to do the right thing, and specifically, one *prohairesis*, or act of willing, was subjected to necessity by another *prohairesis*, 1.17. 23–6.

The Stoics use certain other terms which might loosely be translated as 'free'. Choices are *up to us*, according to the Stoic Philopator, because we give our *assent*.⁷ Again, they are under our own control (*autexousion*). This too would be true of choices under the threat of death, and in connexion with the Stoics, I think it would be clearer not to translate these terms as 'free'.

2. Epicureans, Cicero, Alexander: Freedom Connected to Liability to Blame and Hence to Absence of Necessity

So far the Stoics and Aristotle have both been speaking of a free *person*, and making no requirement of freedom from the more obvious kinds of necessity. But when we turn to the atomist Epicurus (born 341, school in Athens from 307 BCE) and to the exposition of Epicureanism by the Roman poet Lucretius (c.99–c.55 BCE) the account of freedom is very different. Epicurus, shortly after the death of Plato and Aristotle, seems to have paid attention to Plato's picture of reincarnation and of souls choosing their next lives. This picture

connects *responsibility* with the absence of *necessity* and also brings in some concept of *freedom*. Plato imagines that you will be bound to your next life by necessity once you have chosen, but since you have a choice (*haireisthai*), the responsibility (*aitia*) is the chooser's, and God is not responsible (*anaitios*). This may suggest that you are not bound by necessity before the choice, although he goes on to explain how strongly your choice of next life is influenced by your previous one. Moving to the topic of freedom, he says that virtue has no master—it is *adespoton*, his word for freedom. But people have more or less of virtue (*pleon kai elatton autēs hekastos hexei*), so the (unnecessitated?) choice gives responsibility, but only varying degrees of freedom.⁸

Epicurus uses the same terminology for freedom, when he says that some people think that Fate is master, or rather mistress (*despotis*). But only some things come about by *necessity*, others because of us (*par' hēmas*) and, while necessity cannot be called to account (*anhupeuthunon*), what is because of us has no master (*adespoton*), and to it attach blame (*to mempton*) and the opposite.⁹ An important change here is that the concept of *freedom* has been connected by Epicurus unmistakably to that of *accountability* or *liability to blame*, whereas in Plato the two concepts may have been used to make different points. On another matter, Epicurus confirms something that was at most hinted in Plato, that *necessity* needs to be avoided if some things are to come about *because of us*, and so be liable to *blame*, because he opposes coming about by *necessity* to coming about *because of us* and connects coming to be because of us to *blame*. No further light is thrown on how or why necessity is to be avoided by his further remarks on the source of responsibility in the surviving fragments of *On Nature* 25.¹⁰ There he says that our behaviour is not caused by our original physical constitution (*ex archēs sustasis*), nor by the environment, because developments (*apogegennēmena*) subsequent to our original constitution carry some of the causal responsibility (*aitia*),¹¹ and we contribute to those developments.¹² This gives a *role* to us in the development of our constitution, but tells us no more about how and why *necessity* is to be avoided.

What Lucretius says in his exposition is not found in the extant writings of Epicurus whom he followed. For he bases freedom on a swerve of the atoms at no fixed (*certus*) place, direction, or time, and in no fixed sequence. He speaks of free willing (*voluntas*), and he connects this freedom of willing with the absence of a certain kind of necessitation. *Voluntas* is not an agent in its own right, but a capacity or act of *animus*, the central part, seated in the heart, of the physical soul, *anima*. For it is *animus* which does the willing.¹³ I hesitate to translate *voluntas* as 'will' not for this reason, but because it is not a rational enough desire, since it is found in horses (2. 261–93). He

opposes free willing not to necessitation itself, but to a Fate or Fates (*fatum, fata*) that operate from indefinitely far back, when he asks how there can be free *voluntas*, if cause follows cause *from infinite time*, and if every motion is always connected and a new motion arises from an old one in fixed order, without a swerve, 2. 250–60. He also rejects the idea that each thing (*res*, or according to an optional emendation of the text, each mind, *mens*, 2. 289–90) undergoes an internal necessity (*necessum intestinum*) in all it does, as if conquered (*devicta*) and compelled (*cogatur*) to undergo things and suffer them. After Lucretius, but later in the same century, Cicero (106–43 BCE) echoes Lucretius' terminology and interest in the whole of time, when he complains that those (the Stoics) who introduce an *everlasting* (*sempiterna*) chain of causes rob the human mind of free willing (*voluntas libera*), and bind it in the necessity of Fate, *On Fate* 9.20.

Lucretius puts his point about fate and free willing as follows:

In short, if every movement is always linked and the new movement arises from the old in a fixed (*certus*) sequence (*ordo*), and the primordial (atoms) do not by swerving make a certain start of movement to break the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite (time), whence arises this free willing (*libera voluntas*) for animate beings throughout the earth, whence, I say, this willing wrested from Fate, by which we move forward where pleasure leads each of us, and we too swerve our movements at no fixed time, nor fixed direction in space, but where the mind itself has carried us?...But that a thing (*res*, or *mens*, the mind) does not have an internal necessity in all the things it does, and is not overcome (*devicta*) and as it were forced (*cogatur*) to undergo and suffer, this is brought about by a tiny swerve of primordial atoms in no fixed direction of space and at no fixed time.¹⁴

The reference in Lucretius and Cicero to necessity from infinite or everlasting time reflects the rise of the opposing Stoic view that things have indeed been fated for the whole of time. Aristotle also, even before the Stoics, had confined himself, in his rejection of determinism in *On Interpretation* ch. 9, to opposing everything's being necessary 10,000 years ago or for the whole of time, without deciding how far back in time necessity should be ruptured. But Lucretius seems to presuppose further requirements about timing, even though there have been different views about when the swerve is supposed to rupture necessity. It may be before every choice or action (once the commonest interpretation), or earlier in our lives,¹⁵ possibly at the time when our initial constitution is undergoing developments (*apogegennēmena* in Epicurus) to which we contribute,¹⁶ or at times in our lives on which he has not decided, but still within each individual life.¹⁷ But I discuss elsewhere the question of the rupture's *timing*.¹⁸

Aristotle's greatest defender Alexander of Aphrodisias, head of the Aristotelian school in Athens around 200 CE, goes further in

connecting freedom with the absence of necessity. For when he says that what is up to us is free, he glosses this by saying that what is up to us is in control of the choice and doing of opposites in the same circumstances.¹⁹ ‘Opposites’ may be an exaggeration, because only doctors know how to cure as well as to kill. It would have been enough for Alexander to say ‘choosing *or not*, doing *or not*’. Alexander’s gloss on freedom seems later to be explicated by Nemesius, the fourth-century Christian bishop, when he says that what is up to us would be free only if in the same circumstances it would be up to us now to be impelled, now not to be impelled.²⁰ The point that we can choose or do different things in the very same circumstances had been made by Alexander twice.²¹

We shall come to freedom of will in Augustine below. It is a freedom to avoid sin enjoyed by the first two humans, Adam and Eve, but through their sin, humans have all lost this freedom and can no longer by their own efforts avoid doing wrong, only by God’s grace. We shall see that in an early work, before he had taken account of this loss, Augustine described us as having been given by God a good will, and yet as doing wrong only because of that will and despite its initial goodness. He thus wants to explain why we deserve God’s punishment, although he is not trying to counter any theory that everything that happens is necessary or inevitable. In his later work, what is inevitable is that we will do some wrong things or other, because of a biologically inherited transmission from the first human sin.

I shall now turn from freedom to a subject I have discussed before: the will.

3. Will: Four Characteristics

In discussing the will elsewhere I have acknowledged my debt to Charles Kahn’s point that there are a number of different strands in the idea of the will.²² Among the strands, as the idea came to be developed, I have distinguished the following.²³

- (i) **Rationality.** Terms that might be translated as ‘will’ are defined by a good many authors as in some sense involving *rationality*. A clear case is provided by the Stoics saying that *boulēsis* is rational and exists only in the sage. Before the Stoics Aristotle moves to the idea, at least by the time of *On the Soul*

3.9, 432a18–b7, I believe, but not everyone agrees,²⁴ that *boulēsis* as a desire is conceptually distinct from reason, but, 3.10, 433b 13–16, is a desire in *accordance* with reason (*kata*). This is not necessarily correct reason; it may be incorrect reason, as implied by Aristotle’s further claim (in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.4, 1113a22–6) that *boulēsis* is desire only for the *apparent* good, except in good people (*spoudaioi*). *Desire in accordance with (correct or incorrect) reason* is one version of the idea of *boulēsis* as rational. But this is not always Aristotle’s view. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13 he was still taking a more Platonic view, assigning functions elsewhere connected with *boulēsis* to reason or to the rational part of the soul, rather than to a rational form of *desire*. He there said that it was the *rational form of soul* that exhorted (*parakalein*) people aright and to the best, not something conceptually *distinct* from rationality. Furthermore, this rational form of soul might be opposed by an irrational form of soul, which however could listen to reason and was capable of obeying it, and was to that extent a *rational* form of soul.²⁵ Such a view had still earlier been expressed by Plato. Reason has its own desires, perhaps for the pleasures of learning.²⁶ There is a *rational* form of soul,²⁷ which can draw the soul back and prevent it from doing something suggested by the appetitive form of soul.²⁸ This sort of view is some of the time taken much later by Augustine. He does sometimes suggest that will, *voluntas*, belongs to the *rational* soul.²⁹ But he also sometimes suggests instead, like Lucretius, that what wills is the *mind* (*animus*), although for Lucretius this had been the central, but not necessarily rational, part of the soul.³⁰ Augustine further holds that there is a carnal will that opposes the spiritual will (*voluntas* in both cases).³¹ The carnal will is presumably not rational except in Aristotle’s sense, probably unknown to Augustine, of being able to listen to reason (*katēkoon*), just as Plato had made the common citizens in his *Republic* listen to the martial class (*hupēkooi*).³² So there are exceptions which recognize non-rational will, and similarly there were debates in the twelfth century about will being superior to reason and overriding it.³³ But the idea that will is in some sense *rational* is a highly typical strand in the idea of the will, as it came to be developed.

- (ii) **Freedom.** Various forms of desire falling under the names *voluntas* in Latin or *prohairesis* in Greek can be called ‘free’. But these names have various meanings, so we need to consider which can be translated as ‘will’, on which more below, and

we have just seen that ‘free’ has very different senses as well. The idea of the will as something that may or may not be *free* is a further strand in the idea of will.

- (iii) **Will power** is a very important idea. At least three people, George Kerferd, F. Dirlmeier, and David Sedley, have seen this in the *thumos* of Plato’s *Republic* Book 4, 440b–d. A key factor is that Plato makes *thumos* distinct from reason, but normally (except in Book 9, 586c7–d2) *allied* with reason in enforcing reason’s judgements and wishes, just as will is often thought of as not reason, but an ally of reason.³⁴ Secondly, Jaap Mansfeld has argued that the idea of will power is in Posidonius, the Stoic who (on Galen’s evidence which I have supported)³⁵ went back to Plato’s tripartite soul.³⁶ Posidonius explains (ap. Galen *PHP*, 4.7.36–39) why we sometimes shed tears or cease to, contrary to our *boulesthai*. This is because the emotional movements (*pathētikai kinēseis*), probably those in the soul which the Stoics regarded as a physical pneumatic gas, press so hard (*sphodra enkeisthai*) that they are not overcome (*krateisthai*) by *boulēsis*, or have so completely ceased that they are no longer aroused by it. I would add, thirdly, that the *voluntas* of Lucretius exercises power. In the very same passage where Lucretius calls it free, 2.261–93, the *voluntas* of each person’s mind gives a start to his movement, and from it the movements flood through the limbs. But when the starting gates are opened (as illustrated in a Sicilian mosaic)³⁷ in a horse race, the eager might of the horses cannot burst out as suddenly as their minds desire. For it takes time for *voluntas* to rouse the whole mass of matter throughout the limbs, starting from the heart. Conversely, when we are pushed forward by a blow, all the matter of our body is moved against our wishes (*inviti*) and it takes time for *voluntas* to rein it back by use of what is in our breast. There is a further passage, 4.883–91, in which Lucretius refers again to *voluntas* causing us to start moving, and says that the mind (*animus*), which he conceives as physical, is what wills (*velit*),³⁸ and when it does so, it strikes (*ferit*) the force (*vis*) of the soul (*anima*), and the soul in turn strikes the body, until the whole mass is moved. Mind is here the central part of the soul seated in the control centre in the heart and since it does the willing, *voluntas* is a capacity or act of *animus*, rather than a distinct agent in its own right.
- (iv) **Will perverted by pride**. A fourth influential idea is that of Plotinus, that the lower orders of reality were created through intellects and souls breaking away by distancing themselves (*apostasis*) from the Supreme Father, the One, through an act

of pride (*tolma*), willing (*boulesthai*) to belong to themselves alone, and enjoying things being under their own control (*autexousion*), 5.1.1 (1–22); 3.8.8 (32–6); 3.7.11 (15–16). This influenced Augustine’s idea of a will perverted by pride.

All four of these ideas about can be found assembled in Augustine, but each originated in different earlier thinkers. In Augustine the will is *rational* to the extent that it belongs to the rational soul,³⁹ and sometimes it is said to be the mind (*animus*) that wills,⁴⁰ although elsewhere the will seems to be spoken of as an agency in its own right. By saying that the will belongs to the rational soul, he may mean no more than that it is a form of desire involving judgements, correct or incorrect. The will is *free* when the whole will wills something,⁴¹ but it lost its freedom when lust stopped obeying it in order to punish our ancestor Adam for committing the first sin, and Augustine prefers to speak of it as having free choice (*arbitrium*), rather than as being free. Now it must try to regain control by exercising will *power*.⁴² Adam’s sin was due to a will perverted by *pride*.⁴³ Augustine uses the phrase *Free Choice of the Will* in the title of an early book written just after his conversion to Christianity and before he had worked this theory out. In this inchoate version, we shall see, he ignores Adam’s loss of free will, and holds that we are all created with a free will, without insisting that we must all lose it.

Because each of these strands in the idea of will had arisen separately before Augustine, I concluded in my earlier treatment that it may be better not to ask who discovered the will, but rather to trace the different contexts in which the various components were thought up, and when they were first (in Augustine) all assembled.⁴⁴ But Michael Frede has argued for some very different views in his wide-ranging posthumous book, *A Free Will, Origin of the Notion in Ancient Thought*, delivered as Sather lectures and sadly unfinished, but beautifully edited by Tony Long. His theses are both original and daring. The titles of his first three chapters reveal a first theme about the *will*, the titles of the last five a second theme about *free* will. About the *will* he argues that Epictetus already had in *prohairesis* a concept of will⁴⁵ and that *he*, not Augustine after him,⁴⁶ nor Aristotle before him,⁴⁷ was the first to do so. But I shall come back to that and will start with the question of *free* will. For Frede also locates the origin of the idea of a *free* will in Epictetus.

4. Epictetus as Inventing the Idea of Free Will?

Frede interconnects the themes of will and free will, and in the chapters on *free* will he puts an argument that Epictetus anticipated Augustine's concept of *will* as permeating cognition.⁴⁸ He presents this as a criticism of an earlier set of Sather lectures by Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*. There Dihle found first in Augustine what he calls, as Frede notes, 'our modern concept of *will*'.⁴⁹ Frede, however, describes the book as an attempt to answer the question of when the idea of *free* will arose, and says that Dihle assumes the notion of will is a notion of *free* will. This is not how Dihle normally described his book, but as editor, Long finds a passage in which Dihle says that Augustine makes free will exist in its own right, and Dihle would certainly have been right to say that Augustine discusses free will as well as will.

When Frede locates the origin of the idea of a *free* will in Epictetus, he does so by appealing to Epictetus' view (discussed in Section 1) that our *prohairesis*, translated as 'will', is free *by nature*. He does not cite any of Epictetus' seven passages on freedom *by nature*. But he says that the ability for everyone to make their will not only free by nature, but, like Diogenes and Socrates, also *free*, which implies invulnerable, is allowed for by Epictetus in his account of God's constitution of humans.⁵⁰ On this account, humans start until the age of rationality, usually set by the Stoics at 14, as neither free nor unfree, because not yet rational. By that time, however, the bad influence of society has led them to make misguided choices, so that they turn out *unfree*. However, God's providential constitution of humans has allowed a couple of humans, Diogenes the Cynic and Socrates, to struggle their way to actual freedom of the will.

I see this Epictetan account of free will, however, not as anticipating Augustine's account, but as being very unlike it. For Augustine, we saw, the first human, Adam, was in Augustine's different sense free. But because of his sin and Fall, no humans now have fully free will, but are bound to go wrong except insofar as they enjoy God's grace. However, we are still morally *responsible* for what we do, because we can make free *choice* of the will. Frede, however, appeals not to Augustine's developed theory, but to his inchoate account in *On Free Choice of the Will*, which ignores mankind's loss of free will through Adam's sin. There Augustine says that we were perfectly constituted by God for a good life and were given a good will, but that nothing else makes the mind (*mens*) a companion of cupidity but one's own will (*voluntas*) and free choice. The mind is not made the slave of cupidity except by its own will, since it cannot be compelled (*cogi*) to this by anything higher or lower than itself. It is

this inchoate account that Frede finds anticipated by Epictetus' idea of a will that is *by nature* free.⁵¹ Even closer might seem to be Epictetus' statement that nothing overcomes one *prohairesis* but another *prohairesis*.⁵² But not only does Augustine quickly supersede this account by his theory of our permanent loss of free will. In any case, the spirit of his inchoate theory is different from that of Epictetus. It gives us a good will from birth, without saying that it must in everyone get corrupted, and without urging that if it is corrupted, anyone might by their own efforts regain it. By contrast, Epictetus hopes that at death, not at birth, he may still be trying to make his will free by his own efforts, as two people have done in the past.

If the Stoic Epictetus is a hero in Frede's narrative so far, the Aristotelian Alexander, who opposes Stoicism, is an anti-hero. In four pages, Frede describes him as being in a hopeless tangle. I discuss elsewhere whether Alexander's reputation might not be salvaged, so I will not say more about that here.⁵³

5. Epictetus as Inventing Idea of Will?

I shall turn now to Frede's other theme, from *free* will to *will*. One good point that Frede urges in favour of Epictetus anticipating Augustine's idea of *will* is that Epictetus already makes *prohairesis* ubiquitous in all action.⁵⁴ Augustine also thinks that even when his carnal will overcomes his spiritual will, he has control (*potestas*) over his action because the effect still follows his (incomplete) will.⁵⁵

I am less convinced by a second argument Frede makes, that Epictetus also anticipated Augustine in making will ubiquitous in all *cognition*,⁵⁶ because what Epictetus makes ubiquitous in cognition is the *assent of reason* and this can be assent to such appearances as, for example the appearance that a stick is straight or bent. But this assent is not on the face of it the same as *prohairesis*, which is what Frede identifies as will. *Prohairesis*, at any rate, and desire in general, is regarded by the Stoics as merely *one* kind of assent, assent (or a disposition to assent) to an '*impulsive*' (*hormētikē*) appearance, that is to a *motivating* appearance that directly leads you to *act* by setting a value on something.⁵⁷ Frede briefly suggests that Epictetus' will can have a wider sense and can include the ability to give assent to *non-impulsive* impressions as well, although without supplying details on what he has in mind.

It is true that for one specific case of cognition, namely faith

(*credere*), Augustine says that one has faith if one wills (*volere*) and having faith is consenting (*consentire*) that what is said is true. He speaks of the will (*voluntas*) by which we have faith, and says that consenting and dissenting (*consentire, dissentire*) are a matter of one's own will (*voluntas*). It is only by consenting that the soul can accept (*accipere*) God's gift of the will to believe, but the acceptance is our own.⁵⁸ Unless one has faith in God, and persists in willing to accept (*in accipiendi voluntate*), he does not accept God's gift of the Holy Spirit by which good works can be done.⁵⁹ Faith, then, for Augustine does involve consent or assent. However, it is not the Stoic assent of reason, but assent of the *will*.⁶⁰ Furthermore, when Augustine brings the idea of *assent* into faith, he is drawing not on Epictetus, but on Stoics earlier than Epictetus.

But in far more cases of cognition, as discussed in *On the Trinity*, Augustine's will (*voluntas*) performs the function not of *consent* but of directing *attention* towards or away from something. It unites perception with the perceptible, memory with internal vision and intellect with objects taken from memory, but it can separate these pairs as well as unite them. In imagination the will also draws on memory, and unites or separates what it finds there to bring before imagination's gaze a black swan or four-footed bird.⁶¹ Emotions are also acts of will (*voluntates*) and are perverted if the will is perverted.⁶² In none of these cases, the great majority, is Augustine's analysis of cognition in terms of will drawing on the Stoic idea of *assent*.

Frede, however, has a third argument for Epictetus being the first to have a concept of will, which seems to be that Epictetus' *prohairesis* adjudicates between possible desires or assents.⁶³ Adjudication, on this view, might be seen as another possible strand in an idea of will. Adjudication was not earlier a role of the will, he argues, because it was a function given by Plato, and I would add Epicurus, to *reason*, not to will, while in Aristotle, Frede urges, we do not see adjudication so much as one desire defeating another.

I have three possible doubts here. Talking of acts of *prohairesis*, Epictetus says that even if you act under the threat of death, nothing compelled that in you which is capable of *prohairesis*. Rather, what happened was that one desire (*hormē, orexis*) defeated another desire, and specifically, one *prohairesis* was subjected to necessity by another *prohairesis*, 1.17.23–6. There is not much adjudication in this context. Your reason just assented to one motivating appearance, that it was appropriate to comply, rather than to another, that it was appropriate to die. It might be only the Stoic sage from whom we could expect adjudication always to replace mere defeat of one motive by another. Moreover, secondly, this much, adjudication in the wise, I think, we

would find in Aristotle's wise person (*phronimos*) too. His wise person *phronimos* is always adjudicating the right thing to desire or do in particular situations. Admittedly, the adjudication is between the claims of different virtues, and admittedly the adjudication is made by an intellectual kind of perceptivity, *nous*, *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) 6.11, 1143a35–b5. But in Aristotle's wise person, that *nous* is in its turn guided in its adjudications by a *boulēsis* (sometimes mere *wish*, but here closer to *will*) whose aim is based on a correct view of the goals that matter in life, EN 3.4. And the correct view appears only to someone who is good, EN 6.12, 1144a28–b1.

I would add a third doubt: why should one think that adjudication is a normal role of the will? In Augustine, when his carnal will conflicts with his spiritual will, it does not sound as if his will *adjudicates*. The law in his limbs may rather lead him captive (*captivum ducere*), the wrong course ties him in knots (*vincire*). Although the better course is approved and persuades and is seen as certainly better, it is not his *will* that is said to take this view, but he himself, or the inner man (a phrase used in Plato's *Republic* 589a7 for reason regarded as the true self), and in any case the approved course does not prevail.⁶⁴ Again, the mind (*animus*) commands itself to will but does not will, or at any rate not entirely (*ex toto*), even if it must have willed partially in order to give the command.⁶⁵ Elsewhere he says that he does not act with his *full* and *free* will in such cases.⁶⁶

To return to the account of the will that I prefer, I have so far said that strands in Augustine's later idea of will are to be found in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoic Posidonius, the Epicurean Lucretius, and the Neoplatonist Plotinus, all but the last earlier than Epictetus. But I should now say why, in addition to not thinking of Epictetus as the first to exhibit any of these strands, I think of him as in some ways rather distant from the concept of will, as it was to develop after him and particularly in Augustine. Curiously, I have in two writings translated Epictetus' *prohairesis* as 'will',⁶⁷ but each time I apologized that this was not a very satisfactory translation. I have been suggesting that the best approach may not be to seek for someone who first had the concept of will. But since Frede's work renews the search and makes a claim for Epictetus, I will mention four reasons for my hesitation about this selection.

- (i) The consideration, already hinted at, that originally deterred me was that Epictetus makes the connection of *prohairesis* with reason almost too close. The problem arises not from an act of *prohairesis* being a desire that has the assent of reason, and dispositional *prohairesis* being a disposition to choose such desires. This fits well enough with the idea that will is a kind

of desire that *conforms* with reason, although I believe that Aristotle framed that conception before Epictetus. Rather, the question is whether it is conceptually distinct enough from reason for comfortable comparison with other concepts of will. To take the case where one *act* of *prohairesis* subjects another to necessity, not only is the constraining *prohairesis* equated with a desire (*hormē*) to comply rather than to die, but—and this is an intellectualist conception—the desire is equated with an *opinion* (*dogma, dokein*) that it is better to comply than to die.⁶⁸ This fits with the treatment of desire which I believe had been the main Stoic view since Chrysippus in the third century BCE, that desire is a *judgement* of reason. This goes further than Plato's view that makes reason partly desiderative by giving it desires of its own. It also goes further than Augustine, who did not mean that acts of will are judgements of reason when he put will in the rational part of the soul. I agree with Frede in his book co-edited with Gisela Striker, *Rationality*, that Plato makes reason desiderative and that Aristotle may at first follow him, although I have argued (in Section 3 (i)) that in *On the Soul* 3.9–10, Aristotle comes eventually to differentiate desire from reason. But, granted that Plato makes reason desiderative, this is different from making desire a ratiocination. Epictetus makes desire a ratiocination in the sense of making it into an evaluative *judgement* or a disposition for evaluative judgement on the part of reason. I say this not to criticize this Stoic view—I have elsewhere treated it sympathetically up to a point—but to say that this intellectualism was not a precedent for later treatments of will, but was instead offering retrospective support for Socrates' intellectualism.

- (ii) A second hesitation in associating Epictetus with will was that Epictetus does not mention the will *power* that is so important to Augustine. This was no accident, for Stoics do not have to grit their teeth in order to endure and stay calm. Their resistance is entirely due to a change of intellectual attitude. They reconsider whether circumstances are really as good or bad or responses as appropriate as appearances might suggest. It would not be Stoic to think circumstances bad but resist them by will power. This is not to deny that great intellectual effort is called for if we are to change our attitude, but it is an intellectual effort, not the kind of effort that we associate with will power. By contrast we have found some idea of will power in Epictetus' predecessors, Plato and Posidonius, and of the power of *voluntas* in Lucretius.

- (iii) It is true that Epictetus does have the idea of *prohairesis* being *free*, but this important, but rarely achieved freedom, is compatible with things having all along been inevitable and with every attempt at duress. It is very different from the freedom of *voluntas* invoked before Epictetus by Lucretius and Cicero, and, as we shall see Frede has pointed out, from the freedom of the will found in his Christian successors.
- (iv) Finally, we should not expect Epictetus to have the idea of a will perverted by pride, which was an important strand in Augustine's idea, but which emerged only after Epictetus in Plotinus.

The four strands carry different weights. The idea of will as a desire that accords with reason comes close to being a definition of some conceptions of will, except for the complications I have mentioned such as carnal as opposed to spiritual will, or later debates about will being superior to reason and overriding it. Other strands are ones which are so prominent in the Christian tradition at least from Augustine onwards that one might hope to find some of the cluster if one was seeking an earlier discoverer of the will.

6. Epictetus' Influence on the Idea of Free Will

Although I have not been persuaded about Epictetus having *anticipated* later concepts of will, none of this speaks against the very interesting finding about Epictetus' *influence* on later Greek Christians on the other topic of *free* will. Susanne Bobzien has illustrated this for Justin Martyr (d. 169), Michael Frede for Justin's pupil Tatian and Michael Frede and his editor Tony Long for Origen (c.185–253/4).⁶⁹ This influence concerns the idea not of will, but of *free will*. The three ancient Christians borrowed Epictetus' terminology of *free prohairesis* to express a completely different idea of freedom, not that of an invulnerable will shared by few, but that of a free will enjoyed by *all* humans to act in *alternative* directions, in order that God's reward or *punishment* after death might be justified. Origen, Frede showed, used for the same Christian purposes Epictetus' terminology of *autexousion* as well as *prohairesis* in his *On First Principles* Book 3, [Chapter 1](#). *Autexousios* in Epictetus had not meant an ability to act in opposite directions that would justify punishment or reward. It had meant having or being under one's control and it was only indirectly

connected with free *prohairesis*, in that whether you achieved this rare freedom of *prohairesis* was one of the things under your control, 4.1.56. Long, in editing Frede's argument, pointed out that in another work Origen spoke also of humans being *autexousioi*, having things under their control, by having free *prohairesis*, *Fragments on John (in catenis)* 43.7. By his idea that that some things were under our control, *autexousion*, Epictetus meant, I believe, that no one *else* could obstruct us, although it took exceptional effort and was very rare not to obstruct oneself.

The adaptation of the idea of free *prohairesis* and of *autexousion* to refer to an ability to act in opposite directions shifted the meaning by 180 degrees. Such radical shifts are not uncommon. A parallel case is that of the Stoic theory of how to avoid emotional agitation being transformed into a Christian theory of how to avoid temptation.⁷⁰ Indeed, the latter transformation involved not only Evagrius, whom Michael Frede credits for it, but also before Evagrius Origen, whom he credits only for the adapted Christian idea of free will. Epictetus' terminological influence on later Greek Christian ideas of free will does not mean that he already had that later Christian concept, as both Bobzien and Frede make clear in their discussions of *freedom*. What I want to say is that equally he did not have the concept of *will* in any sense familiar to us from the later Christian developments.

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¹ I thank the editors and the readers of the Oxford University Press for suggesting improvements throughout.

² Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 1958, first printed in his *Four Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford 1969), reprinted with revision in Berlin (2002): sour grapes, p. 186 in the last volume. He retracts in the Introduction to the last volume, pp. 31–2.

³ Sorabji *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*, Oxford University Press, (2000) 225–7 (on Admiral Stockdale); Sorabji (2012) ch. 3.

⁴ The Stoic Chrysippus singled out certain senses of necessity that did *not* imply inevitability. I have discussed these in Sorabji (1980) ch. 4, but I did not think they removed the necessity that worried the indeterminist, and I am not aware of them being invoked by Epictetus, or other later Stoics.

⁵ Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.19.7; 2.2.3; 2.15.1; 3.22.42; 4.7.8; 4.13.24; *Handbook* 1.2.

⁶ Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.2.3; *Handbook* 1.2–3.

⁷ This was brought to light by Bobzien (1998b) 378–87, comparing Alexander, *On Fate* 13.182.16–19; 14.183.22–3; 184.12–13; Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* 105.9–12, Morani.

⁸ Plato, *Republic* 617e.

⁹ Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* in Digenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 10.133. I have left out for present purposes Epicurus’ reference to a third possibility of things coming about by chance (*tuchē*).

¹⁰ Sedley (1983) 11–51; Bobzien (2000) and (2006).

¹¹ Epicurus, *On Nature* 25, in Laursen (1997). (Arrighetti (Arr.) 34.21–2 and 26–30, trans. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (LS), *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1987), 20 B and C.)

¹² Epicurus, *On Nature* 25, Arr. 34.22; LS 20B 5–7; Arr. 34.26; LS 20C1; Arr, 34.31.

¹³ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 2.270; 4.886.

¹⁴ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 2. 251–60; 289–93.

- ¹⁵ Furley (1967).
- ¹⁶ Bobzien (2000) 314–15, referring to Epicurus *On Nature* 25, in Laursen (1997) 5–22; (Arrighetti (Arr.) 34.21–2 and 26–30, LS20 B and C); Epicurus *On Nature* 25, Arr. 34.22; LS 20B 5–7; Arr. 34.26; LS 20C1; Arr, 34.31.
- ¹⁷ Mitsis (1988) ch. 4.
- ¹⁸ Sorabji (2017).
- ¹⁹ Alexander, *On Fate* 19.189.9–12.
- ²⁰ Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, 105–6, Morani.
- ²¹ Alexander, *On Fate* 15.185.7 ff.; *Mantissa* 174.3 ff.
- ²² Kahn (1988).
- ²³ Sorabji (2000) ch. 21, ‘The Concept of Will’.
- ²⁴ I should acknowledge that Irwin (1988, 595 n. 2) has argued that *On the Soul* 3.9, 432a18–b7 rejects only a *spatial* division of soul parts. But I think the question raised concerns both spatial and conceptual (*logōi*) divisions, a20, and once explicitly, b3, and other times implicitly, speaks of an excess or wrong choice of *conceptual* (*logōi*) divisions arising from the division of the soul into two or three parts.
- ²⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13, 1102b13–1103a3.
- ²⁶ Plato, *Phaedo* 114e.
- ²⁷ Plato, *Republic* 439e; 440e.
- ²⁸ Plato, *Republic* 439b; c.
- ²⁹ Augustine, *City of God* 5.11.
- ³⁰ Augustine, *Confessions* 8.9; Lucretius 2.270; 4.886.
- ³¹ Augustine, *Confessions* 8.5; 8.9–10.
- ³² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. 1.13, 1102b31; Plato, *Republic* 440d.
- ³³ Kent (1995) ch. 3, ‘Voluntarism’.
- ³⁴ Conversation with George Kerferd; Dirlmeier (1964) 327–8 n. 3; Sedley (1991).
- ³⁵ Sorabji (2000).
- ³⁶ Mansfeld (1991).
- ³⁷ In the Piazza Armerina mosaic in Sicily the starting gates are based on those in Rome, although four-horse chariots have somehow managed to pass through them.
- ³⁸ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 4.886, cf. 2.270.
- ³⁹ Augustine, *City of God* 5.11.
- ⁴⁰ Augustine, *Confessions* 8. 9; *On Free Choice of the Will* 1.11–12; 3.1.2.
- ⁴¹ Augustine *On the Spirit and the Letter*, 31.53.
- ⁴² The will’s loss of freedom is discussed by Augustine in passages assembled in Sorabji (2000) ch. 26, from his extensive late controversies with Bishop Julian. Its need to use will power is exemplified in those passages and in the passages cited below about the conflict between carnal and spiritual will.
- ⁴³ Augustine, *City of God* 14.13.
- ⁴⁴ Sorabji (2000) ch. 21, ‘The Concept of Will’.
- ⁴⁵ Frede (2011) 46.
- ⁴⁶ Frede (2011) 156–9.
- ⁴⁷ Frede (2011) 24–6; 46.
- ⁴⁸ Frede (2011) 156–9.
- ⁴⁹ Dihle (1982), with discussion in Frede (2011) 5, and note 4 by A.A. Long.
- ⁵⁰ Frede (2011) ch. 5.
- ⁵¹ Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* 1.11; 1.12; recapitulated 3.1.2, some of it cited by Frede (2011) 156–9. I am very grateful to Tomas Ekenburg for pointing out to me the inchoate nature of this text and Frede’s reliance on it.
- ⁵² Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.17.23–6.
- ⁵³ Frede (2011) 97–101; my defence of Alexander will be in Sorabji (2017).

- 54 Frede (2011) 46.
- 55 Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* 31.53.
- 56 Frede (2011) 156–9.
- 57 Stobaeus, *Eclogae*, bk. 2, p. 86, ll. 17–18, Wachsmuth.
- 58 Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* 31.54; 34.60.
- 59 Augustine, *Exposition of Certain Propositions from the Letter to the Romans*, ch. 60.
- 60 Even if the will is a desire in the rational part of the soul, and even if it is sometimes called the assent of the mind (*animus*), we shall see that Augustine does not, like the Stoics, identify it so closely with reason as to make an act of will a *judgement* of reason. He does not even necessarily think that all acts of will are *in accordance* with reason, to use Aristotle's term, because of the complication already mentioned, that he believes there is a carnal as well as a spiritual will.
- 61 Augustine, *On the Trinity* 11.2.5; 11.3.6; 11.6.10; 11.7.12; 11.8.15; 11.10.17.
- 62 Augustine, *City of God* 14.6.
- 63 Frede (2011) 24–6, 46.
- 64 Augustine, *Confessions* 8.5.
- 65 Augustine, *Confessions* 8.9.
- 66 Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* 31.53.
- 67 Sorabji (2006) 194–5; Sorabji (2012) 63.
- 68 Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.17. 23–6. I have discussed the mainstream Stoic account of various desires from Chrysippus onwards in Sorabji (2000), esp. ch. 2.
- 69 Bobzien (2006) 345, on Justin Martyr *Apology* 1.43, 80e, cf. Bobzien (1998a) 133; Frede (2011) 102 on Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos* 7.1, and p. 113, where the editor, A.A. Long supplies the reference to *Fragmenta in evangelium Joannis (in catenis)* 43.7, where we are *autexousioi*, in control, by having free *prohairesis*.
- 70 This was my subject in Sorabji (2000).

4

Survival and the Self

Materialism and Metempsychosis—Ancient Attitudes, Modern Perspectives

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For as long as there has been such a thing as human anxiety, human beings have worried about the fate of the individual at and after physical death. The prospect of post-mortem survival in some form or another has been an animating principle of most religious traditions, although there is little agreement among them as to what form that survival might take, and whether or not it might be desirable. And the Greeks were no exceptions to this general rule. But, being Greek, they were more inclined than any before (and depressingly many since) to subject these ideas to rational analysis and reasoned argument. Chris Gill has been in the forefront of a renewed interest in recent years in exploring ancient conceptions of the self. The philosophical investigation of questions of continuant personal identity has long been an interest of mine. So I am delighted to have been given this opportunity of reflecting on these issues of the title as I see them playing out in antiquity, informed to some extent by my own views as they have developed in the course of engaging with more modern debates on the matter ('modern' in its standard, antique, philosophical sense). I shall be concerned with both 'synchronic' and 'diachronic' questions, both with what it is that constitutes a self at any given moment (which has been the main focus of Chris's interests), and with the conditions under which such a self persists over time; and while I shall spend more time specifically on the latter, they are inextricably linked, any answer to one having fundamental implications for the other.¹

1. Pythagoras and Experiential Memory

Homeric souls² seem to have been a sort of internal breath, which abandons the body at death; at all events, the *psuchai* of the slain in the *Iliad* are standardly described as going gibbering off to Hades, which seems to imply a belief in an afterlife of sorts. But if Odysseus' *nekuia* of *Odyssey* 11 is anything to go by, this was not much of a prospect. Even if one managed to avoid the torments of Sisyphus and the rest in Tartarus, the ghosts, even of the 'blessed', lead a shadowy, zombie-like existence; Odysseus has to sacrifice an animal and pour its blood into a trench so that the exsanguinated souls can drink and attain a momentary state of consciousness (11.23–50). As the briefly revived Achilles says, better to be the lowest slave in the meanest household on earth than a king of men in Hades (11.488–91). This is survival of a sort; but one of only limited, intermittent, and even then rather depressing consciousness.

We should not read too much into that, of course. But it does show at least that from the earliest recorded times, the Greeks had a notion of both what it would take to survive physical death, and what would make such survival worthwhile—or not.

Pythagoras is almost as mythical a figure as Achilles; but a body of doctrine aggregated around his name, central to which was a commitment to reincarnation, or metempsychosis.³ Souls could take up residence in other animals as well as humans, and perhaps even in vegetables; Empedocles, another eminent Presocratic palingenesist, claimed to have once been not only a boy and a girl, but also a fish, a bird, and a piece of shrubbery (31 B 117 DK; cf. B 115, 126, 127,⁴ 146, 147). Pythagoras is said (humorously no doubt, but the humour is pointed) by Xenophanes (21 B 7 DK) to have upbraided a man for beating a dog, since he recognized in the dog's cries the voice of deceased friend. Pythagoras also, supposedly, claimed to have been a variety of people in the past, including one Pyrrhus, a Delian diver, a particularly alluring courtesan, and Euphorbus, a minor Trojan hero. It is the last case that is the most interesting, since a story survives, in several forms, of how Pythagoras contrived to support the claim.

It is of course easy enough to make such assertions—and many do. It is much harder to find principled ways of determining whether they might be true. It is not enough that they be sincerely professed, or even that those making the claims appear otherwise sane. There are

all sorts of ways in which someone might come to form such false beliefs. The more intriguing version of the Euphorbus story, as found in Diodorus, 10.6.1–3,⁵ demonstrates a sensitivity to the empirical conditions that need to be satisfied in order to confer any plausibility on such tales. Visiting a temple in Argos, Pythagoras is said to have noticed, mounted on a wall, a shield he said he recognized: it had been his when he had been Euphorbus the Trojan hero. Euphorbus had been killed before Troy, and his arms stripped, taken back to Greece, and dedicated to the gods, as custom dictated. But the important detail in the story is that, allegedly, this information had been lost to the depredations of time—no one knew anything about the provenance of these spoils. In the face of understandable scepticism, Pythagoras then said that he could prove the truth of his claim: the shield had his name inscribed on the back. Such votive objects were supposed to remain forever undisturbed, but so striking was Pythagoras' contention that special dispensation was obtained to take the shield down and examine it; and sure enough, engraved on the back in archaic letters was the name 'Euphorbus'.

Thus Pythagoras was privy to a piece of information that no one else possessed; and the only plausible way in which he could have come by it was as a result of personal experience in a previous life. This suggests a general condition on the acceptability of such assertions:

(GCA) The claim of some individual *I* to have experienced an earlier life *L* is acceptable if and only if *I* is in possession of some (independently verifiable) information about *L* that *I* could only have obtained as a result of living *L*.

So formulated (note the 'could only'), (GCA) is a difficult, perhaps impossible, condition to satisfy. It may however be weakened in various ways; for example

(GCA*) The claim of some individual *I* to have experienced an earlier life *L* gains plausibility to the extent to which *I* is in possession of some (independently verifiable) information about *L* that it is reasonable to suppose that *I* could only have obtained as a result of living *L*.

Other weakenings are possible; but what matters is the implicit commitment to some version of a memory-criterion of personal identity. If I genuinely remember doing something, then I did it. But care is required here. It is obviously not enough to establish *a*'s identity with *b* merely that *a* remember *b*'s doing something. I may remember with disapproval your kicking your cat—that surely does not imply that *I* kicked your cat in a fit of self-loathing. Rather, we require a notion of experiential memory, of what one remembers oneself doing 'from the inside', which I shall label '*e-memory*'. E-

memory may be provisionally characterized as follows:

(EM) *a* e-remembers experience *e* if and only if *a* remembers *e* and *a*'s memory of *e* presents *a* as being the subject of *e*.

With that on board, here is a stab at formulating a suitable principle of memory-criteriality:

(EMC) if *a* e-remembers *b*'s experiencing *F*, then *a* is the same person as *b* (or $a = b$)⁶

At best (EMC) supplies a sufficient condition for continuant personal identity, since the converse relation cannot be allowed to hold: just because I forget having done something doesn't mean I didn't do it (although this is a consequence of Locke's version of the 'memory-criterion', which he bravely, if perhaps ill-advisedly, acknowledged and accepted: *Essay* 2.27.22, 1690/1975, 48). As Reid pointed out, identity (strictly construed) is a transitive relation, whereas that expressed by the antecedent of (EMC) is not. If *a* is the same person as *b*, and *b* the same person as *c*, then *a* is the same person as *c*; but *a* may remember *b*'s experiences, and *b* *c*'s experiences, without it being the case that *a* can remember *c*'s, and this is true in perfectly ordinary cases. Reid offered a celebrated example: a brave young officer remembers, while fighting a battle, being beaten for stealing apples as a boy; later, as a retired general, he remembers fighting the battle as the young officer, while having completely forgotten the apples incident. Thus, if memory maketh man, the officer is the boy and the general the officer, but, absurdly,⁷ the general is not the boy.

We also need to be careful, in at least two distinct ways, about how we characterize the notion of remembering. First of all, the memories in question had better be genuine; my merely *thinking* I remember sitting glumly on a horse in Belgium, in June of 1815, with my right hand stuck up my vest, doesn't make me Napoleon. We use memory language in two different ways: either as entailing that the thing remembered actually happened, or simply as referring to a state of consciousness that manifests itself as a memory. The latter, non-veridical sense of 'remember' is clearly not relevant here; yet it is not as easy as it might appear at first sight to characterize just what constitutes genuine experiential memory ('g-memory').⁸

Let us make a further distinction, within the category of e-memory. Call any psychological state which purports to be an e-memory (purports, that is, to represent the previous occurrence of an experience) a *p-memory*; and label that subset of them which do so veridically (that is, the experiences they purport to represent were genuinely experienced, and experienced as represented) *v-memories*.

Again the distinction seems intuitively clear enough: I can have false as well as true memory-traces. But in what does their falsity consist? Of course if there never was any such experience corresponding to the report, then obviously the memory is false—it is a mere p-memory. But there are cases where a p-memory does accurately represent a past experience (and hence qualifies as a v-memory according to the above stipulations), and yet it is at the very least unclear whether it should count as genuine. There exist cases in which satisfying the following conjunction of conditions

- (C1) *a* has a (clear and accurate)⁹ p-memory *p* of experiencing, as *b*, *F* at *t*;
- (C2) *b* really did experience *F* at *t* (and hence the p-memory is also a v-memory),

may not be enough to ensure that the memory is a real one, and hence that *a* = *b*. For no matter how closely *p* reproduces the contours of the *b*'s original experience, it may be simply a happy (or unhappy, depending on your point of view) accident that it does, being the product of some random brain-disturbance. More exotically, we might imagine that *b*'s memory had somehow been transferred to *a*, but as an isolated case: *b* (or some suitable successor of *b*) still exists independently of *a*, and whether or not *b* continues to remember *F*-ing at *t*, it seems we should still want to say that it was *b*, rather than *a*, who did it; all the more so if *b* actually *does* remember it, at least dispositionally.¹⁰ Even the supposition that *b* dies in the interim, while *a* retains the p-memory-trace, should have no tendency to make us suppose that somehow *F*-ing at *t* has now become part of *a*'s past experience.¹¹ We might consider strengthening the C-set by adding a counterfactual requirement

- (C3) If *b* had not *F*-ed at *t*, *a* would not now have the p-memory of *b* *F*-ing at *t*.

That certainly rules out the randomly generated memory-trace case; but it will not eliminate the transferred memory suggestion, since *ex hypothesi* the memory so transferred is, at least until the moment of transfer, a v-memory. Thus its origination and continued existence supports (C3); moreover, if *b* had not *F*-ed at *t* there would have been nothing (or not the same thing) to transfer or copy, and so *a* would indeed not now have the p-memory (or at least *this* p-memory) of *b* *F*-ing at *t*, congruently with (C3).

Here it is tempting to suppose that, in the case of a genuine memory, there must be a continuity of the physical structure in which the memory-trace inheres. That is, the condition-set needs to be supplemented with

- (C4) *a* and *b* share the same continuant physical structure.

That too is insufficiently precisely expressed, and susceptible of importantly different expansions and precisions. Are we talking of the whole physical structure, i.e. the whole body? Some suitable part of it, e.g. the brain?¹² And what in any case are the conditions for such continuities? But even if these demands for precision can be satisfied, (C4) is still not enough, as John Perry has shown.¹³ Consider the following case. Jones observes a green cube at t ; subsequently a massive electric shock caused by faulty wiring wipes this event from his memory. As part of the ensuing legal settlement, the Electric Company pays to have a type-identical memory-trace induced in Jones by hypnosis. It still seems reasonable to deny that Jones genuinely remembers the incident, even though he satisfies not only (C4) but (C3) as well, since the company paid for the p-memory insertion only because Jones actually did have the experience in question, the ‘memory’ of which they are thus legally obliged to reconstitute.¹⁴

What is needed is some specification of just how the original experience (and the laying-down of the original memory-trace) are to be related to the subsequent (occurrent or dispositional)¹⁵ p-memories to ensure their status as genuine memories, something Perry calls a ‘linking condition’. This is fairly uncontroversial (at least within the context of psychological accounts of identity-criteria). What is not is how such a condition is to be specified. Here Parfit’s concept of q-memory is relevant:

I am q-remembering an experience if (1) I have a belief about a past experience which seems in itself like a memory belief, (2) someone did have such an experience, and (3) my belief is dependent upon this experience in the same way (whatever it is) in which a memory of an experience is dependent upon it.

(Parfit (1971/75) 209)

(1) and (2) effectively characterize my notion of a v-memory; and (3) is an admittedly vague candidate for some sort of linking condition. But Parfit explicitly denies that q-memories must (in my terminology) be g-memories, since he insists that it is logically (and perhaps actually) possible that one q-remember someone else’s experiences.¹⁶ Everything turns on (3): what is ‘the same way’? How loosely or tightly are the conditions of sameness to be construed? In a later formulation,¹⁷ he insists that the dependence be causal; but even that condition may not be enough, at least not without further qualification. I return to these issues at the end of the chapter.

2. Survival of the Soul

Personal survival after bodily death is often characterized as the survival of the soul. But there is no agreement as to what that might mean. ‘Soul’ here renders the Greek ‘*psuchē*’; but it is no part of the basic Greek concept of the *psuchē* that it be immortal (or even be capable of surviving some physical deaths: cf. *Phaedo* 86e–88b), or that it be some incorporeal Cartesian substance. As is evident from Plato’s *Phaedo*, such claims needs arguing for; and although we will not be further concerned with those famous, indeed famously bad, arguments, that mere fact is important. For, at its most general level, at least in the classical and immediately pre-classical period the *psuchē* is just whatever it is in virtue of which living things are alive. It is a further question what that ‘whatever it is’ actually is. Nor is it obvious, as it might seem to the unwary brought up on some religious notion of the soul, that the persistence of whatever that is necessarily entails the persistence of the self: indeed, this is explicitly denied by Locke (*Essay* 2.27.6, [1690/1975](#), 36–7).

The arguments of the *Phaedo* are carried out at too high a level of generality, and presuppose too much dubious metaphysics, to have any tendency to promise *personal* survival (although Plato seems to suppose that personal survival is at issue: 64a–68b, etc.).¹⁸ Indeed, such concerns are notably absent from the discussion; death supposedly frees the soul from the baggage of its mortal interests (66b–67b), allowing it to resume a pure, untrammelled existence, but one disjunct from precisely those concerns, including memories and anticipations, which give an ordinary human life the structure that it has. An exception may be found in Plato’s *Apology* (40c–41c), where Socrates certainly envisions (as one of two alternatives, the other being a perpetual sleep untroubled by dreams) the possibility of conversing with the great and the good in the afterlife, which certainly seems to imply personal survival. But the details and implications of such a survival are nowhere subjected to any analysis. Equally the Myth of Er at the end of the *Republic* (614b–21b) presupposes a survival of sorts (the disembodied souls choose their subsequent lives, and so at least have the faculty of choice, and one directed to some future existence, as well as apparently remembering their previous incarnations: 617d–20d); but says nothing at all about what this might entail (and less about why one might entertain the possibility of any such eventuality). Moreover, none of these souls retain any awareness of their previous incarnations, at least when they are incarnate (although apparently they do when waiting to be reborn: 614e–15a); only Er himself, rather like Pythagoras in his story, does not drink from the River of Oblivion after traversing the Plain of

Forgetfulness (620e–21a).¹⁹ Equally, it is an obvious presupposition of the Recollection Argument, in both *Phaedo* (72e–76d) and *Meno* (80d–86a), that ‘recollectors’ have no e-memories of their pre-incarnate learning experiences, although equally obviously they have latent, dispositional memories of what they have learned. *Something* survives from one incarnation to the next, but it is hard to see how it could be a *self*. So while the persisting, Platonic immortal soul-substance might look initially promising as a potential vehicle for personal survival in the Lockean manner (of which more later on), on closer inspection it can apparently fulfil no such function.

3. Survival and Harmony-Theory

In the *Phaedo*, Plato’s substantial and dualist (one might say Cartesian) conception of the soul is contrasted with a view that makes the soul a matter of *harmonia* or attunement,²⁰ introduced by Simmias as a possible objection to the idea that soul can survive the destruction of its physical vehicle:

One might say the same thing about the tuning of the strings of the lyre, namely that the tuning is invisible and incorporeal and perfectly good and divine, while that of which it is the tuning, the lyre and the strings, are bodies and corporeal, composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. But if someone were to break the lyre, or cut or snap the strings, then if one were to rely on the same argument as you did, the attunement must still exist and not have been destroyed, since by no means should it happen that lyre and the strings, having a mortal nature, should still exist when the strings are broken while the attunement, which is similar in nature and akin to the divine and immortal, should no longer exist...[so] the very same attunement must still exist somewhere...we²¹ suppose the soul to be something of this kind: our body is tuned and held together by hot and cold and dry and moist and things of this sort, and our soul is a mixture (*krasis*) and attunement of these very things, whenever they are properly and moderately combined with one another. So if the soul really is a sort of attunement, then clearly whenever our body is loosened or tightened immoderately as a result of disease or some other evil, it must immediately be destroyed, even if it is divine, just as other attunements are.

(1: Plato, *Phaedo* 85e–86c)

Tunings are derivative of and dependent upon what it is which has been tuned; destroy the instrument and you destroy the tuning. Much of Plato’s response to the objection is irrelevant to our purposes, as indeed is Simmias’ argument, precisely because he thinks (and Socrates agrees) that it is impossible for a soul to be an adjustment of

some vehicle and yet for it survive that thing. But if Pythagoreans (or at least some of them) really do believe in the soul's survival of physical death, and they are also committed to some version of the tuning-theory, they will need to find some way of finessing this objection (as well as the others which Socrates ranges against it).

In rebuttal of the theory, Socrates gets Simmias to acknowledge that while attunements are matters of degree, being a soul is not; then he further secures agreement to the proposition that some souls are better than others (93a–c). But how could this be? If being a soul is an all-or-nothing thing and is to be identified with a particular attunement, then to have a soul will be to have just that attunement:

What will those who posit that the soul is some sort of harmony say that these things are in the soul, namely excellence and badness? That it is some other tuning or lack of tuning, and that the good soul is in tune, and has within in itself, as an attunement, another attunement, while the other is out of tune and does not have within itself another?

(2: Plato, *Phaedo* 93c).

This possibility is simply dismissed as incoherent; Socrates re-emphasizes the claim that souls, if they are to be attunements, must all be identical in character and hence equally good (93c–94a), which consequence is taken to invalidate the original hypothesis (94a–b). Simmias accepts Socrates' implicit claim that a second-order 'attunement of an attunement' is an absurdity, which perhaps it is. But a defender of *harmonia*-theory might hold that the conditions for satisfying the human attunement are flexible: to be human is to have tunings at a certain range of tensions between certain key elements (or alternatively that there be realized a certain minimum number of such attunements).²² Suppose the species-attunement (answering in effect to the Aristotelian species-form) is a matter of some suitable relation's obtaining between various component parts and their functions; these can be more or less fine-tuned by reference to some ideal tuning (specifiable presumably in terms of suitable integral ratios).²³ This would allow for the possibility that some such attunements (or sets thereof) can be better, more finely tuned, than others. This is exactly what we find in the analogous case of the humoural theory of human physiological constitution.²⁴

Of course, questions would still remain about how such a balance of constitutive elements could itself be the vehicle for mental properties, as they do for any fundamentally emergentist theory (supervenience makes things even more mysterious). Still, insofar as the theory relates to the possibility of survival, the following points are worth pursuing. First of all, the possibility of there being better and worse attunements at least allows for how a particular

attunement, within the specifically human range, may be unique, and thus a candidate for being a (metaphysical) criterion of individual identity. That is, the following Individual Attunement criterion is satisfied:

(IA) For each individual I , there is a unique attunement a , which is such that I is constituted by a , and (x) (x is constituted by $a \rightarrow x = I$).²⁵

Thus a soul can be an attunement, and hence, as Socrates emphasizes, in a sense subordinate to the physical components of which it is a tuning, and yet still possess coherent conditions of individual identity.

This in turn suggests how such an individual attunement might be supposed to survive the destruction of the physical components upon which it is realized, since nothing appears to prevent a 's being re-instantiated in a different physical vehicle: all that is required is that the precise numerical relations that make it up be reconstituted. Thus the unique attunement that is Pythagoras may have animated Euphorbus—and possibly other animals, or even plants, although this would obviously entail abandoning the necessity of the preservation of a particular species-attunement for there to be continuant identity.²⁶

But this is to move too rapidly. To see why, we need to return to the modern discussion.

4. Epistemic and Metaphysical Criteria and The Limits of Thought Experiment

'Metaphysical criteria' of identity, in the sense I used the term earlier, are implicitly contrasted with epistemic criteria for such survival. The distinction, briefly, is as follows. A 'metaphysical criterion' is whatever condition (or set of conditions) is such that, when satisfied, an individual is the individual that it is (such criteria may be construed both synchronically and diachronically); by contrast, an epistemic criterion is something by means of which we may recognize that such conditions are in fact satisfied. It is one thing to know (or express) *in what* identity consists; something else entirely to know *that* such an identity exists in any particular case. And the two need not (perhaps must not) coincide.

Butler criticized Locke's empiricist account of personal identity on precisely these grounds: 'one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot

constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge...can constitute truth, which it presupposes.’²⁷ That is, he accuses him of confusing an epistemic criterion (a *sign* of continued existence and hence identity, namely e-memory of past experiences) with what it is that *constitutes* that identity. Butler muddies matters somewhat by insisting that in the case of animal or vegetable identity (a tree’s being the same as it was fifty years ago), we are not supposing that something remains the same ‘in the strict philosophical sense of the word’ (i.e. that of material congruence). We might have an idea of substantial continuity (and identity) which does not require or reduce to the persistence (in the ‘strict’ material sense) of anything, without resorting to positing some immaterial substance. Aristotle had such a view, for all the difficulty he had in articulating it; and so did Locke, as regards living things in general (*Essay* 2.27.4–5).²⁸ Even so, it is worth considering Butler’s claim that ‘the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another’ (101). For even if that is couched in an antique metaphysical mode (albeit one also employed by Locke), the issues underlying it are still pressing.

To see why, let us turn to a celebrated modern thought experiment in the discussion of personal identity.²⁹ It is, to all intents and purposes, simply Locke’s example of the Prince and the Cobbler (*Essay* 2.27.15: 1690/1975, 44) transposed into a modern register. Suppose you want to go to Mars. You live in a science-fiction future world, where there are two options for making such a journey. You can either do it the old-fashioned way, by rocket-ship, or you can take the new, high-tech route of tele-transportation. In the latter case, you enter a machine on earth which takes a complete scan of all of your physical and psychological states, digitally encodes them, and sends the resulting information to Mars, where another machine downloads them, and constructs a physical individual from the blueprint on some suitably advanced 3D printer. At the same time, your original body is destroyed.

Since *ex hypothesi* all your mental states are encoded, the figure stepping from the unit on Mars will be thinking ‘that’s great! Amazingly quick and painless. Here I am already; much better than the old slow route’. However, as Parfit has emphasized, this confidence may be misplaced. Suppose the earth-bound device malfunctions, and your original body (along with its mental states) is not destroyed. Then, presumably, there would be one ‘you’ on Mars celebrating the success of the procedure, and another (the original?) on earth, angrily demanding its money back. From this point on, of course, there would be two separate individuals, leading very different and rapidly diverging lives; but crucially they would exactly share an early history. Parfit then asks: who is who? The issue, for him,

concerns the supposed transitivity, reflexivity and symmetry of the identity relation. If diachronic personal identity is really a matter of *identity*, strictly construed in the logical sense (albeit obviously not in Butler's material-congruity sense), then we seem to have an incoherent result: Mars-you is the same as pre-transport you; earth-you-now is the same as pre-transport you; but Mars-you and earth-you-now are clearly distinct.

Parfit holds that there is no real reason to prefer one candidate over the other for continued you-hood, and so the best solution is to think of them both as continuant selves of the original you, and to ditch the notion of strict (and philosophical) identity. Personhood can be branching. This is because he holds, in a neo-Lockean vein, that what matters in personal survival is the holding of certain psychological relations of connectedness and continuity which need not (and in the experimental circumstances do not) coincide with identity. But perhaps there is a different moral to be derived from the story. Other writers, notably Bernard Williams, have questioned the psychological account of personal identity, favoured though it is by intuition and by popular fable through the ages.³⁰

Williams (1970/1975) begins by acknowledging the account's appeal, and then proceeds brilliantly to undermine it with an ascending series of thought experiments. Two people, A and B, are told that the consciousness of each is about to be transferred to the body of the other. They are then told that one will be tortured and the other presented with \$100,000. Refer to the post-operative individuals (so as not to beg any questions) as 'the A-body person' and 'the B-body person'. Which, prior to the operation, would they choose to be? Williams acknowledges that it is natural to suppose that A would not want to suffer torture as tomorrow's B-body person, while B would welcome the prospect of safety in A's body. But our memories are selective, and drugs can make us forget things. It surely wouldn't be much comfort for A to be told that although he was going to be tortured, he would be made to forget having been told about it; equally, it would not seem to be comforting to be told that he would forget not only the torture but everything else as well (since we suppose total amnesia to be both a possibility—an unwelcome one, generally—and something that could happen *to us*). The same seems to be true if he is told that he will also be equipped with a completely factitious set of p-memories of some other (fictitious) 'life' (since we can imagine becoming delusional, but still in great pain). No better (or so Williams contends) even if he is told that the p-memories will completely fit another actual person (B)'s past, and indeed that these will result from his brain states being copied and up-loaded into A's body, and hence count as q-memories: since why should they be more

than *mere*, non-identity-involving q-memories? Finally, why should it make any further difference if A's states were simultaneously introduced into B's body?³¹

Williams' strategy is simple, effective, and soritical. He takes us through a sequence of graduated operations, after the first of which the resulting person seems unequivocally still to be us, and which is such that the difference between each successive case and its predecessor seems insufficient to make a difference to identity. I (or an ancestor-self of mine) used to think (for roughly Parfitian reasons, ironically, since I now no longer fully endorse them) that it was the penultimate feature, the parking in the individual's brain of information which was causally dependent on and connected with the experience of some distinct person, that made the crucial difference, and that this was the stage at which one could make a principled case for the person now occupying the A-body no longer being A, but at least a successor of somebody else, namely B. And that might indeed be the appropriate thing to think.

But more important for our purposes is the fact that, in the 'mind-swap' cases (to use question-begging language in a non-question-begging way, courtesy of the scare-quotes), it is hard to distinguish between the survival of the same individual and the production of an exact replica. Certainly in the partially failed tele-transportation case, it seems the surviving disgruntled earthbound individual has a better claim to be the continued original; after all, he has survived in a perfectly ordinary and straightforward way, and it makes little sense to think of him as simply a copy of the man who bought the transporter ticket, while in the case of the Mars-individual, that looks to be an eminently sensible way of describing matters. Which in turn suggests, since the same causal story applies to the surviving individual in the case of the 'successful' transportation where the original body is destroyed, that here too we should think of the Mars-individual as a replica of the original rather than as a continuant of it (and hence that it involves the death of the original earth-individual). And this in turn suggests that we implicitly suppose bodily continuity (construed in something like the Lockean manner) to be a necessary metaphysical condition³² of continuant identity. To be sure, if we were to experience regular cases of transportation and the like, then our concepts would have to evolve to accommodate the new factual situation; and perhaps there would, indeed should, be a serious discussion (moral as well as metaphysical) about how to deal with the new reality. But I'm inclined to think that a good deal of what would occur would simply be evolutionary (and possibly culturally relative), and that we simply can't say in advance how things would go under those circumstances.³³

With all of that in view, I now turn to another ancient camp, that of the Epicureans. Their views are radically opposed to those underpinning the Pythagorean story, yet intriguingly they rely on some of the same crucial considerations. Where they differ is in their assessment of the relevant empirical facts.

5. Epicurus and the Conditions for Identity

Epicurus had a particular concern with the metaphysics of identity: he wished to argue against the possibility of personal survival. According to him, human unhappiness consisted in distress caused by fear, and a major (perhaps the major) source of it was the fear of death. His attitude is encapsulated in the famous slogan ‘Death is nothing to us’, literally nothing, since we cannot experience it, and hence nothing in the sense of nothing to worry about:³⁴

Death is nothing to us, since all good and evil lie in sensation and death is the absence of sensation. Hence a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding infinite time, but by ridding us of the desire for immortality. For there is nothing fearful in living for one who genuinely grasps that there is nothing fearful in not living. Therefore he speaks idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful in anticipation. Since if something causes no distress when present it is pointless to be pained by the expectation of it. Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when death is present, we no longer exist.

(3: Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*, 124–5, = 24A(1)–(5) LS)

This meshes closely with Epicurus’ hedonism: the pleasures to be sought are not the violent ones of excessive desire satisfaction, but the quiet ones deriving from the satisfaction of genuine needs and the removal of pain. Moreover, ‘infinite time and finite time contain equal pleasure if one measures the limits of pleasure by right reasoning’ (*Key Doctrines* 19 = 24C(1) LS); pleasure is properly (rationally) measured not by duration but by completeness and security (ibid. 20–1, = 24C(2)–(3) LS). The sensible course is neither to fear death nor to wish for it (*To Menoeceus* 126–7; = 24A(6)–(8) LS).

Lucretius makes the same points (3.830–94): death is nothing to us once we understand and accept the mind’s mortality (830–1, = 24E(1) LS); but he also adds some further considerations. First, an argument from symmetry: no human is concerned about not having

existed prior to birth; but since equally we will not be conscious after death severs our soul from our body, there is nothing to be concerned about there either (3.832–46, = 24E(2)–(3) LS). Lucretius sensibly does not seek to establish a general symmetry between past and future considerations: after all, the fact that I have no apprehension about my past visits to the dentist surely does not suggest I should not fear them in the future. Rather, he suggests that the *reason* why we are (rightly) unconcerned about prior non-existence is that we do not suppose we were conscious then; and so if he can establish that there will be no post-mortem consciousness, then we should equally not be fearful of that.

There are pressing issues here;³⁵ but we can let them pass. At any event, it is consciousness (in particular the ability to experience sensations and to feel pleasure or pain) that he fastens upon, and in such a way as to at least suggest that he endorses (partly; see extract 4) a psychological criterion of continuant identity. In a human soul, the atoms the aggregates of which account for the various soul-properties (sensation, movement, thought, etc.) are thoroughly interlinked into a functional whole, whose continuing integrity is guaranteed by the integrity of its container, the body (Lucretius 262–87, = 14D(1)–(3) LS; cf. 3.417–24, = 14F(1) LS). Once the body is sufficiently ruptured so as to allow the dispersal of the relevant atoms, sensation, the power of movement, and thought will no longer persist, since they require this aggregation in order to function (Epicurus, *To Herodotus* 63–6. = 14A(1)–(6) LS; cf. Lucretius 3.881–5 = 14E(2) LS).

Indeed, if the capacity for sensation is partly constitutive of what it is to be human (and hence the continuity of that capacity is required for continued identity), then even if *per impossible* the soul-atoms were to remain aggregated, sensation, since it requires physical organs (eyes, ears, etc.), would no longer be possible, and the person would not long survive (Lucretius 3.624–33 = 14G LS). Finally,

Even if the nature of our mind and the power of our spirit do have sensation after they are torn from our bodies, this is still nothing to us, who are constituted by the conjunction of body and spirit.

(4: Lucretius 3.843–6 = 24E(3) LS)

The argument is concessive ('even if'), and Lucretius need not endorse all of it. But it suggests a conjunctive criterion for identity: we are the union of our soul with our body, Aristotelian compound substances (DA 2.1, 412a1–13a10; cf. *Metaph.* 7.3, 1028b25–29a33), which makes post-mortem survival even less conceivable. But still perhaps not (yet) impossible. The passage continues:

(i) Suppose that after our death the passage of time will bring our matter back

together and reconstitute it in its present arrangement, and the light of life will be restored to us: even that eventuality would be of no concern to us, (ii) once our self-recollection (*repententia*) was interrupted. (iii) Nor does who we were in the past concern us now; we feel no anguish about them. (iv) For when you look back at the entire past span of measureless time, and then reflect how various are the motions of matter, you could easily believe that the same primary particles of which we now consist have often in the past been arranged in the same order as now. (v) Yet our minds cannot remember it. (vi) For in between, life has been an interrupted, and all the motions have been at random, without sensation.

(5: Lucretius 3.847–60 = 20E(4) LS)

This passage contains a variety of interwoven strands, and the logical structure of the argument is complex. But several things should be noted. First, (i) and (iv) exemplify the central Epicurean idea that in an infinite time all possible combinations of even an infinity of atomic constituents will be realized. But even if such a reconstitution does occur, surface grammar notwithstanding ('the light of life will be restored to us'), such a 'reconstitution' will not count as resurrection: the newly constituted individual who shares all my physical (and hence psychological) features will not be me. Lucretius here glances at a material-constitutive account of the sufficient conditions for physical identity:

MCS: If (a) material aggregate *A* is composed of all (and only) the same (token-identical) component parts as *B*, and (b) those parts are arranged in the same order, then $A = B$.

MCS represents a relatively strict notion of material identity of composition, which suggests that such accounts were on the Greek market of ideas; puzzles of material constitution go back at least to Heraclitus, whose remarks (22 B 12, 49a, 91 DK) about the impossibility of stepping into the same river twice imply some such material-constitutive account of identity, although his example of the barley-gruel which retains its consistency only when it is being stirred (B 125) tells equally in the other direction. That Greeks of the time were familiar with such issues is also evidenced by a fragment of the comic poet Epicharmus, in which a debtor seeks to evade his responsibility to repay by pointing out that he is no longer (materially) the same as the individual who incurred the debt yesterday (23 B 2 DK).³⁶

Lucretius rejects MCS. What is required, 5(ii) suggests, is a continuity, and not just of material, functional organization, but also of consciousness, anticipating Locke (2 27.9), which in turn suggests, again with Locke (2 27.5–6) and indeed Aristotle, that continuity of functional organization is the criterion of continuant animal identity, an issue given vivid life in antiquity by the puzzle of Theseus' ship.

Briefly, the ship Theseus sailed in to Crete to slay the minotaur was preserved in Athens for ceremonial reasons;³⁷ gradually every part of the original ship was replaced due to wear and tear; but (in one version) the old timbers and rigging were kept in store, and eventually reconstituted into a complete (if rather battered) ship. The question then arises: which is 'Theseus' ship?³⁸ One answer will favour identity of functional continuity, the other identity of original material composition.³⁹

Lucretius opts for functional identity of a particular kind: since 'our self-recollection was interrupted' (ii), and 'our minds cannot remember it' (v), the putatively reconstituted human beings, even if they share type-identical physical and psychological traits with their predecessors, as presumably they must for an atomist if all the relevant token atoms are re-aggregated, cannot be us. The (empirical) fact that we cannot recall any such past existences is enough to show that we cannot be they. Lucretius does not consider the p-memory possibility that we may *appear* to remember past lives; but presumably the fact that 'in between there has been an interruption of life, and all the motions have been at random, without sensation' (vi) would be enough to show that such p-memories could not be genuine. Nor can they be Parfitian q-memories either, since however they are formed, they do not have the right connection with the original experience they purport to recall: being the result of mere random re-aggregation, they lack a suitable 'linking condition'.

6. Continuity, Connectedness, and Identity: Some Tentative Conclusions

Lucretius thus adumbrates a psychological, functional-continuity approach to the question of the criteria for continued selfhood. The impossibility of interrupted conscious embodiment is not metaphysical, but physical: there simply cannot be the sort of physical, causal connection between scattered soul-atoms of the type necessary to ground such things as memory-traces. What he does, in effect, is to deny the very possibility of genuine trans-incarnation e-memories of the sort Pythagoras purported to possess; and given any straightforward physicalism, such a denial is surely plausible. Of course, the proponents of transmigration may simply argue in the opposite direction, from the existence of such 'memories' to the implausibility of physicalism, as, albeit with importantly different

premises (his ‘memories’ being the latent ones of the theory of recollection), does Plato: *Phd.* 91e–92c. But the question will still remain: why suppose that such p-memories are in fact veridical? What are the conditions under which they would qualify as q-memories, and hence as potentially good enough to underwrite continuity and survival (if not necessarily identity)?

Let’s return briefly to the tele-transportation case. In the case of the ‘failed transportation’, where there were two surviving competing candidates for identity with the man who entered the ‘transporter’, intuition favours the candidacy of the disgruntled survivor on earth.⁴⁰ That in itself may not be conclusive; there can be good reasons for revising received views, even deeply entrenched ones. Whales, after all, aren’t fish. We should start by asking whether there is anything (other than custom and habit) in favour of the intuition. One obvious reason is that the individual stranded on earth is linked to the man who bought the transporter ticket in the ordinary way, by the continuity of a physical basis for the putatively connected states, whereas Mars-man is not. And given the nature of Mars-man’s construction, does it not seem more plausible, particularly since earth-man is there as well, to think of him as a *replica* of the original, and not continuous with it, or if continuous with it in some way then still not identical with it? For the material constitution of Mars-man is clearly a replica—so why aren’t the embedded mental states, including the p-memories?

Consider again Parfit’s third condition defining q-memory: ‘my belief is dependent upon this experience in the same way (whatever it is) in which a memory of an experience is dependent upon it.’ ‘Whatever it is’ is artfully vague, but it is tempting to think that conditions of normal memory preservation may be salient. Of course, if ‘tele-transportation’ were to become the norm (or at least a regular occurrence), our views of what counts as normal might well change, entailing a corresponding modification in the operative definition-conditions for the concepts involved (this is the sort of evolution I mentioned earlier).⁴¹ More strongly, one might argue that we *should* (for any one of a number of reasons) adopt different criteria of relevant continuity, even to the point of abandoning the (strict) notion of identity (this is effectively what Parfit does). But in the latter case, we will need to rely on more than merely facts about how the concept *now* seems to behave under thought-experimental conditions.

The issue boils down to whether we can distinguish between mere exact similarity and genuine identity. Locke is concerned to insist, against Descartes, that what matters for personal identity, continuity of consciousness, need have nothing necessarily to do with the persistence of a particular ‘mental substance’, however that is to be

understood. The mind, the substrate for mental attributes, might be a Cartesian, immaterial, non-extended substance; but there is no reason to suppose that the same consciousness need invariably inhabit the same substance. It might; indeed he thinks it likely that there will always be a single substrate for the same continuant consciousness (although not *vice versa*); but if true, that is a contingent fact about human beings and their persons. But, since he believes that mental attributes need a mental substance (even if this turns out to be merely a type of physical substance) in which to inhere, he owes us an account of why and how such identities can stretch across distinct substrates, and one which will serve to distinguish between identity and exact similarity. And it is not easy to see how this can be done. If you are (as Locke is: 2 27.5) committed to the idea that for A to be the same animal as B, then A must be part of the same continuant functional organization as B, then again it is tempting to suppose that the only appropriate sort of continuity is spatio-temporally continuous functionality, which makes bodily continuity, at least of some part which is the physical basis for such properties, a necessary condition of personal survival (unless one does indeed adopt the view that there are immaterial mental substances—which Locke allowed to be a possibility, indeed a probability, but irrelevant as such to the issue of personal identity—but then it is difficult to see how they can be non-stipulatively identified).

One final possibility is suggested by Parfit's 1984 variant on his condition (3): that there should be a causal component involved in making an e-memory a q-memory. But this is less helpful than it might appear. At the very least, we will want to say that it is the fact that A experienced *F* at *t* that makes it the case that B e-remembers the *F*-experience at *t*¹. But that is not much help; and mere counterfactual dependence won't do the trick. Indeed, we can build in a lot more than that without getting the differentiation we require. In the transportation case, there is clearly a causal connection between the prior existence of the set of brain states and the particular configuration of the scan, and between that configuration and the subsequent embodied Mars-states, just as there is in the Perry electric-company case. In other words, it looks as though we need more than just *any* causal connection—we need *the right kind* of causal connection. And again it seems reasonable to think that that should be the *normal* one, one that allows us to distinguish in a principled way between the claims of earth-you and Mars-you; and normality in this case involves the persistence of the body.⁴² And if that is right, then it may be so much the worse after all for any attempt to make transmigrational personal survival a coherent possibility within the framework of harmony-theory.⁴³

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¹ A version of this article was presented at the conference; I am grateful to several members of the audience, and in particular David Sedley, for their comments and suggestions, and to some remarks and queries from an anonymous referee. This is a (necessarily) abridged version of a much longer project, and while I have tried to make the connections of thought, and the thought itself, as clear as possible, some shortcuts have been taken.

² I render *psuchē* as 'soul'—all the usual caveats apply. In Homer, it seems often

to mean not much more than 'life'.

³ On Pythagoras' views on the soul, see Barnes (1979) ch. 6, to which the following account, even where it diverges from it, is much indebted.

⁴ According to this report, it is preferable to be reincarnated as a lion (if an animal) and a laurel (if a plant).

⁵ Diogenes Laertius 8.4–5 offers another, in which it is said that Hermes offered him any gift except immortality, and he chose uniquely to be able to retain memories across distinct incarnations.

⁶ I am provisionally assuming that strict numerical identity is what matters in personal continuity, which is precisely what Parfit famously denies..

⁷ Reid (1781/1975) 114–15.

⁸ It might be supposed that a g-memory could be characterized as any e-memory (as captured by EMC) where it is also true that $a = b$; but, as I will demonstrate, this is inadequate.

⁹ These conditions would require further specification and justification in any fully worked-out theory; clearly, the accuracy condition cannot be construed so strongly as to imply an exact accord between the contours of the actual experience and of the p-memory.

¹⁰ On the distinction between occurrent and dispositional memory, see n. 16.

¹¹ This suggests, rightly I think if vaguely, that part of what is required for continuant personhood is some more or less well aggregated and connected set of experiences and recollections.

¹² Which would allow, at least in principle, for brain-transplants to preserve g-memory: see Wiggins (1967) 50; cf. Parfit (1971) §I.

¹³ My account here is indebted to—indeed is an abridged version of—that of Perry (1975b) 143–52; the addition of (C4) roughly characterizes what Perry calls (stipulatively) 'recollection'.

¹⁴ See Perry (1975b) 145–6. If we draw the continuity condition tightly enough, such that continuity is satisfied only if there is an uninterrupted, laid-down, accessible memory-trace that persists from a to b in a single body, then this counter-example can be ruled out.

¹⁵ The e-memories in question need not be actually occurrent in order to underwrite continuant personhood, otherwise, absurdly, it would only be when I was actually recalling some experience of a past self that I would be identical with that person. What is needed is some dispositional sense of memory, such that I could recall it if I felt like it, or would do so under the impact of suitable stimuli; but making that precise is also fraught with difficulties.

¹⁶ Thus, a g-memory may provisionally be characterized as any q-memory where it is also true that $a = b$.

¹⁷ See Parfit (1984).

¹⁸ As perhaps did others: in Callimachus' famous epigram (53), Cleombrotus is said to have jumped to his death after reading the *Phaedo*. But epigrams are not history; and at the very least this one is ironic in view of Socrates' famous arguments against the acceptability of suicide towards the beginning of the dialogue (61c–62c). An anonymous reader drew my attention to this, and also to the fact that Cato read the dialogue before killing himself. He too may have been misled; but equally he may only have been interested in *Phaedo*'s central claim that the philosophical life is essentially a preparation for death: 63e–69e.

¹⁹ One might argue that in the discarnate condition, the souls' consciousnesses really do become reunified, and so at least then there is a continuous, unitary person; and this in turn might form the basis of constructing an integrated total person, on the basis of the holding of derivative connections (see e.g. the account of Grice (1941/1975)). This seems to me to be at least a step too far, since unless the

incarnate souls either remember (something of) their past lives (or discarnate existences) or have genuine anticipations thereof, at least while they are being lived, these lives are discrete and distinct, and hence the lives of different individuals.

²⁰ Strictly speaking, the usual description ‘harmony-theory’ is a misnomer.

²¹ ‘We’ here is usually taken to mean ‘we Pythagoreans’, following Burnet (1911) 86, who relates the idea to the fifth-century Pythagoreanism of Philolaus (on whom see Huffman (1993)), of which Simmias and Cebes apparently were adherents: *Phd.* 61d–e.

²² Suppose that there are n appropriate tuning ratios that may obtain in the case of the overall human tuning—then it could be stipulated (or perhaps even discovered) that one might still count as human even if, say, only $n - 2$ of them were actually satisfied, in the same way as one can still be human without having, e.g., two functioning legs, even though to be a human is to be a biped.

²³ On the Pythagorean, indeed Philolaan, obsession with numbers in general (and the mathematics of musical intervals in particular) see frs 44 B 2–7 DK, from his *On the World*, in particular B 6b, on the musical intervals.

²⁴ For a developed account, see Galen, *Mixtures*, esp. I 535–51 Kühn; note the use of *krasis* in 1.

²⁵ This second conjunct ensures that *I* is the only thing constituted by *a*.

²⁶ This worried Galen, who found Platonist dualism hard to swallow, partly because he was drawn to the idea that some sorts of animal structures were simply not capable of supporting the sort of mixture that constituted the rational soul: *The Soul's Dependence on the Body* IV 774 Kühn.

²⁷ Butler (1736/1975) 100. Thomas Reid (1785/1975) 109–10 makes a similar point.

²⁸ ‘[O]ne plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to the sort of plants’ (*Essay* 2.27.4).

²⁹ Famously discussed in Parfit (1984).

³⁰ Stories of such metamorphoses are as old as humanity (a particularly good example is Apuleius’ *Golden Ass*; Shakespeare could do it too; Ovid composed hundreds of lines of verse about them); and they almost all involve the idea that the individuals have swapped bodies rather than exchanging consciousnesses; as indeed do numerous bad films. Quinton (1962/1975) offers an amusing modern philosophical fable involving a thin, ascetic Scotsman and a ‘fat, apolaustic Pole’.

³¹ See Williams (1970/1975) 183–6 and 190; he first describes the case in first-person language, then, in slightly more formal detail, in the third person, arguing that this should make no difference to our reaction to the case.

³² Shoemaker (1959/1975); see also Perry (1975b) for some incisive remarks about the possible confusion of the two types of criterion.

³³ A problem for thought-experimental procedures both here and elsewhere (contemporary epistemology comes to mind) is that the method is intended to test the boundaries of concepts when stretched to their limits, while concepts that have developed in actual use (such as ‘person’ and ‘knowledge’) may simply not have the degree of elasticity that the procedure demands. In other words, it is perhaps no bad thing that we don’t know what to say in some of the more outlandish cases: the concept simply breaks down under the stress of finding itself in such exotic surroundings. On this and related issues, see Wilkes (1993) ch. 1.

³⁴ For modern perspectives on the Epicurean view, see Furley (1986) and, more generally, Nagel (1970/1979).

³⁵ Most notably, whether the only thing to fear is fearful future experience; Nagel

(1970/1979) expresses trenchant doubts on the matter.

³⁶ For a discussion of the philosophical importance of Epicharmus' fragment, and its relationship to Pythagoreanism, see Barnes (1979) 83; cf. 87. The comic point, of course, derives from the absurdity (to the ordinary way of thinking) of the debtor's contention—Epicharmus is an inaugurator of the venerable tradition of poking fun at philosophy.

³⁷ It was the ship that was sent every year with offerings to the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos; in its absence no death sentence could be carried out in Athens; its delay as a result of adverse winds in 399 was responsible for the postponement of Socrates' execution: *Phd.* 58a–c.

³⁸ See Plutarch, *Thes.* 23; for a discussion of the example and an illuminating application to Aristotle's views on continuant identity, see Frede (1984).

³⁹ Intuitions on this vary sharply. One may elaborate two distinct criteria of identity ('functional' and 'antiquarian'), each of which will favour one alternative at the expense of the other. It is a further, metaphysical, question which if either of them is the 'right' one; indeed, both may (depending on context and interest) be applicable.

⁴⁰ A fact which lends weight to Williams' contentions.

⁴¹ See Nagel (1971/1975) and Wilkes (1993) ch. 1.

⁴² Which is another reason to mistrust the 'results' of concept-stretching thought experiments.

⁴³ Particularly if, as in Pythagoras' case, the ability to e-remember past lives is unique: DL 8.4, see n. 5.

Epicurean versus Cyrenaic Happiness

David Sedley

Epicurus opens his short surviving ethical work, the *Letter to Menoeceus*, with the following exhortation (122):

Let no one either delay philosophizing when young, or weary of philosophizing when old. For no one is under-age or over-age for health of the soul. To say either that the time is not yet ripe for philosophizing, or that the time for philosophizing has gone by, is like saying that the time for happiness (*eudaimonia*) either has not arrived or is no more. So both young and old must philosophize—someone young so that as he ages he can be made young by his goods, through his thankfulness for things past, someone old so that he can be at once young and aged, through his fearlessness towards things future. Therefore we must rehearse the things which produce happiness, seeing that when happiness is present we have everything, while when it is absent the one aim of our actions is to have it.

Although it might be unwise to press this rhetorical opening for too much precise theoretical content, some prominent features are worth noting. First, even for a hedonist like Epicurus it is *eudaimonia*—or ‘happiness’, as I shall be calling it henceforth—rather than pleasure that is here, in the final words of this opening passage, presupposed as the goal of life. We will see shortly that, in the context of contemporary debate with the Cyrenaics, this already represented a doctrinal choice on Epicurus’ part. At the same time, however, it provides a reassuring continuity with assumptions familiar to us from Aristotle. That happiness is the goal is, for Epicurus as before him for Aristotle, a near-truism which he can safely invoke at the outset. What happiness *consists* in, on the other hand, is a theoretical question which can be broached only in due course and with the support of argument. When, as more often,¹ Epicurus specifies pleasure or painlessness as the goal, it is this latter question that he is addressing.

Second, we must note that happiness is indissolubly bound to philosophizing, indeed, to the theory and practice of Epicurean philosophy. In this regard we are far from the Aristotelian approach, prefigured in Book 4 of Plato's *Republic* and dominant in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which the happiness described and prescribed is that of the good citizen, not the philosopher in particular. Epicurus is in this regard taking sides with an alternative tradition, classically captured by Books 7–9 of Plato's *Republic*, and just briefly glimpsed in the final book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, one which regards philosophy as the only route to true happiness. Epicurus will of course go further, and insist that it is Epicurean philosophy alone that can deliver happiness.

A third feature of the passage is a favourite motif of Epicurus': temporal symmetry. Happiness is equally attainable from early or late in one's life, because every case of ageing is also a case of rejuvenation. From an early start, you build up a constantly growing store of past memories which you can gratefully revisit; from a late start, as you near death you face it with a youthful confidence reminiscent of the young. However informally, this theme prefigures a major preoccupation of Epicurean ethics, the need to be able, from any point in a happy life, to appreciate and actively enjoy the whole of it.

Viewed as a goal, happiness and its apparent synonym 'blessedness' (μακαριότης) present a very particular problem for the hedonists of the early Hellenistic age. As had already been the case for Aristotle,² for them too it appears to be axiomatic that happiness is a property of a life³—being, precisely, the property that makes that entire life worth living. Since for hedonists the only good is pleasure, and pleasure is easily assumed to function as a good only at the times at which it is being enjoyed, it is no easy matter to work out when if ever *happiness* can be enjoyed. That is, while there is no obvious problem about enjoying each moment of your life when it comes, the danger is that there may be no such thing as enjoying your life as a whole, where that whole is taken to be something more than, and perhaps also better than, the sum of its parts, enjoyed severally.

My expression 'the hedonists of the early Hellenistic age' refers not just to Epicurus and his associates, but also to the Cyrenaic school. Although within a generation or so of its founding by Epicurus Epicureanism had eclipsed Cyrenaicism, to the extent that the latter apparently vanished from the scene, there is good reason to think that Epicurus originally developed his hedonism in debate with this rival school. The supposition is strengthened by the way the twin ethical doxographies that have come down to us for the two schools amount at many points to a systematic confrontation between the two

hedonisms. My strategy in this chapter is, accordingly, to start out by examining them in a direct comparison.

The Cyrenaic school traced its origins back to Socrates' associate Aristippus the elder, but if not its foundation at least the developed formalization of its positions is likely in reality to derive from his grandson, unsurprisingly known as Aristippus the younger. The grandfather, according at any rate to a wealth of anecdotes,⁴ espoused a day-by-day style of hedonic living, refusing to sacrifice present pleasure for the sake of future pleasure. According to Aelian (VH 14.6 = SSR 174, part),

Aristippus...advised people not to pain themselves either in memory of what is past or in anticipation of future events (μήτε τοῖς παρελθοῦσιν ἐπικάμνειν μήτε τῶν ἐπιόντων προκάμνειν)....His advice was to keep one's thought focused on the day, and in fact on that part of the day in which one was carrying out this or that action or thought. For only the present is ours, he said, unlike what is already over and what is still awaited, of which the former has perished, while with the latter it is unclear whether it will be.

There is a tendency in the modern literature to attribute that same live-for-the-moment policy to the grandson too, and through him to the Cyrenaic school.⁵ Hence it is often said that the Cyrenaics reject future-planning. I believe that to be mistaken. Rather, or so I will be arguing, the school's mainstream position on the temporality of pleasure amounts to a philosophical *reinterpretation* of Aristippus the elder's fabled live-for-the-moment policy, an attempt to extract its underlying ethical meaning, which amounts to a thesis that can be termed 'hedonic presentism'. And hedonic presentism does not, it turns out, include any recommendation not to plan for future pleasures.

The formal thesis about happiness attributed to the Cyrenaics (sometimes retrojected onto the elder Aristippus too, sometimes not) is as follows:

They believe too that an end (τέλος) differs from happiness (εὐδαιμονία). For, they say, individual pleasure is an end, whereas it is the complex (σύστημα) of individual pleasures, including both past and future ones, that is happiness. They say that individual pleasure is choiceworthy for itself, while happiness is choiceworthy, not for itself, but for the individual pleasures.

(DL 2.87–8)

We can take this at face value as meaning the following: happiness, being the sum of past, present, and future pleasures, is not something that can be enjoyed as an ensemble, a complex whole. We can only aspire to enjoy, one by one, the pleasures that constitute it, each at the time of its occurrence. Hence happiness has no value, and is not a *telos*, over and above those individual pleasures. To value happiness is

nothing more than to value each hedonic moment in your life for its own sake when it comes. The successive pleasures in your life are transient and episodic, not in any sense cumulative.

Put in the school's own jargon, this hedonic presentism is the Cyrenaic doctrine that pleasure is 'unitemporal' (μονόχρονος). It is very naturally read as a philosophical interpretation of Aristippus the elder's pragmatic advice to concentrate on the moment. Rather than recommending an improvident lifestyle, his Cyrenaic followers seem to have said, he was making a simple logical or conceptual observation about the temporality of pleasure:⁶ if a pleasure occurs at t , it can be enjoyed only at t . Alternatively, or additionally, a psychological point is at stake: 'Nor, they say, is pleasure brought about through memory or expectation of goods, as Epicurus held: for the motion of the soul is obliterated by time' (DL 2.89–90). I take this to mean that although you can, implicitly, derive mental pleasure now from a bodily pleasure you are likewise enjoying now, the mental enjoyment is eliminated when you are temporally separated from the bodily pleasure, whether it lies in the past or the future.⁷

It hardly needs pointing out that you could take such a view without concluding that it is never worth planning for future pleasures. I cannot enjoy tomorrow's pleasures today, but there is no reason why I should not plan for them, even being motivated to sacrifice a smaller pleasure today in order to enjoy a larger one tomorrow. And what applies to tomorrow's pleasures can just as well apply to next month's and next year's. It is not obvious why Cyrenaics should not plan for their own future pleasures. Only if they entertained serious doubts about their enduring identity would that kind of forward planning be endangered, but the attempts that have been made to locate some such thesis of the discontinuity of identity in Cyrenaic ethics remain deeply controversial.⁸

So future-planning is not discounted. Not only is this a coherent consequence to draw from the unitemporality thesis, but it is demonstrably a policy that the Cyrenaics in general⁹ adopted and recommended. Friends are said to be valuable at least partly on grounds of utility (DL 2.91, 97), an assertion that makes little sense unless forward planning is envisaged. Prudence (φρόνησις) too is described as instrumentally valuable for its consequences,¹⁰ and that too can only refer to the securing of future pleasures. Most important, the Cyrenaics were well-known advocates of *praemeditatio mali*, 'pre-rehearsal of evil', the policy of expecting the worst in order to mitigate the pain if it does occur, and enjoy the relief if it does not.¹¹ None of this makes much sense unless there is at least an implicit recommendation to plan ahead for future pleasures and pain-avoidances.

This degree of future-concern can nevertheless fall well short of trying to structure your entire life into a greater hedonic whole, and in fact a report at DL 2.90 suggests that to do so would be counterproductive:

even though pleasure is choiceworthy for itself, the means to some pleasures are often counterproductively irksome, so that the process of accumulating the pleasures, if it does not¹² bring about happiness, seems to them most disagreeable (δυσκολώτατον).

Both text and interpretation are disputed, but a natural reading is that those who attach independent value to attaining happiness, understood as a lifetime's ensemble of pleasures, risk blighting their lives by the short-term sacrifices they make, potentially for no hedonic return if happiness fails to result. Implicitly, those who simply plan for enjoying individual pleasures piecemeal, as and when they can, without subsuming these under a eudaimonistic master plan, have a better chance of success.

Not only, then, is happiness in reality nothing more than the sum of one's individual pleasures, as we saw, but if mistakenly treated as a goal in its own right it can become a source of extreme disquiet. The lesson is that future pleasures are worth planning ahead for, but only for their own individual sake, and not for any added value they may mistakenly be supposed to acquire by their accumulation over a lifetime.

What is Epicurus' response to all this? First of all, he starts out much closer to the Aristotelian model of happiness, in that he requires pleasantness to characterize, not merely this or that moment, but a complete life. The stipulation of a complete life comes to the fore in an intimately interlinked group of sayings: *Key Doctrines* 19–21.

[19] Infinite time and finite time have equal pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning. (ὁ ἀπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ)

[20] The flesh took the limits of pleasure as infinite, and it would have required an infinite time to provide it. But the mind, by taking cognizance of the flesh's end and limit, and dissolving the fears about eternity, provided the complete life (τὸν παντελῆ βίον), and there was no longer any need for infinite time. Yet neither did it shun pleasure, nor, when events were providing departure from life, did it die in the belief that it had fallen short of the best life

[21] One who knows the limits of life knows that what removes the pain due to want, and what makes the whole life complete (τὸν βίον ὅλον παντελῆ καθιστάν), are easily procured. As a result, he has absolutely no need for competitive activities.

These are densely packed remarks, the three of them evidently meant to be read in conjunction. For present purposes we can pick out just

one or two threads.

In view of his talk in *KD* 21 of ‘what makes a whole life complete’, it seems that by a ‘whole’ (ὅλος) life Epicurus simply means the entire span of one’s life, understood in an evaluatively neutral way, whereas a ‘complete’ (παντελής) life is one for which nothing more could be desired, at least in temporal terms.¹³

The dominant theme of the three sayings is clearly the quantification of pleasure over a lifetime, and the relation of this to the finitude of life. That focus on temporality is present even in the final sentence of 21, ‘As a result, he has absolutely no need for competitive activities’, since competitive activities are those one undertakes for the sake of self-protection, primarily owing to the unfounded fear of death. Hence it is one who sees no reason to fear death who ‘has absolutely no need for competitive activities’. And not to fear death is, in the present context, precisely not in any way to regard the finitude of one’s life as something bad.

What then is Epicurus’ position here on the relation of life’s finitude to the maximization of pleasure? Since antiquity the words of *KD* 19, ‘Infinite time and finite time have equal pleasure’, have been interpreted as saying that the duration of pleasure makes no difference whatsoever to its pleasantness. Thus, Cicero (*Fin.* 2.87) says to his Epicurean adversary Torquatus, ‘As you yourself were saying, Epicurus asserts that *not even length of time makes any contribution to living happily*, and that no less pleasure is captured in a short space of time than if it were everlasting.’¹⁴ Cicero’s words are often cited as *confirming* the interpretation that pleasure is not increased by duration, but in fact he is relying exclusively on Torquatus’ remarks at 1.63, and all Torquatus did there was to quote *KD* 19 verbatim, without adding the interpretation in question.¹⁵ It seems clear that Cicero, followed in this by almost all modern scholars,¹⁶ has over-interpreted the saying. Significantly, *no* other Epicurean text confirms the same paradoxical claim that duration makes no difference to the quantification of a pleasure.¹⁷

What then is meant by ‘Infinite time and finite time have equal pleasure’? Those who fear death whenever it may come implicitly would prefer *never* to die, i.e. they desire to live forever. To them Epicurus is retorting that an infinitely extended life would in fact be no pleasanter than a finite one.¹⁸ In itself, such a remark is entirely compatible with the intuitive view, which underlies most hedonic reasoning, that an hour of pleasure is better than half an hour. A conference paper which went on endlessly would not thereby be better than one that decently reached a conclusion after 45 minutes, but from that it certainly does not follow that a 45-minute conference paper is not preferable to a 45-second conference paper. Most of us

would go further and say that the 45-minute paper had advantages over both alternatives,¹⁹ in having a beginning, a middle, and above all a conclusion, perhaps even on rare occasions a cogently defended one.²⁰

This theme that a life acquires its value as a structured and properly concluded whole is also present in the opening of Epicurus' famous deathbed letter to Idomeneus (DL 10.22). That opening has, again at least since Cicero (*Fin.* 2.96), been translated more or less as follows: 'I wrote this to you on that blessed day of my life which was also the last.' In fact, though, a philologically more credible construal was pointed out by André Laks in 1976,²¹ but has remained all but unnoticed in the following thirty-eight years:

I wrote this to you while I was spending, and at the same time bringing to its close, that blessed day which is my life [literally 'the blessed day of my life'].²²

In keeping with such clichés, ancient²³ and modern alike, as 'twilight years' and 'the evening of one's life', a blessed life is here viewed as if it had the integral structure characteristic of a single day—a day, above all, with its own proper closure.²⁴ This largely unnoticed theme is vital for a proper understanding of Epicurean happiness. Although Cicero missed the point, Lucretius seemed to understand it when he wrote 'Even Epicurus died, when the daylight of his life had run its course' (*ipse Epicurus obit, decurso lumine vitae*, 3.1042).

We now face a problem. From the fact that Epicurus evaluates a life, his own included, as a rounded whole, should it not follow that he would regard the danger of a premature death, which might render one's life incomplete, as an evil to be feared?²⁵ We must hope not, since such an inference would run entirely contrary to the celebrated Epicurean arguments against the fear of death. Rather, we should recognize that he is maintaining a delicate balance between two temporal considerations.

Of these, the first is his opposition to anyone who advises that early death may actually be welcome (*Ep. Men.* 126–7):

Much worse, again, is he who says 'It is a fine thing not to be born, and, if one is born, to enter the gates of Hades as soon as possible' [Theognis 425–8 Allen]. For if he believes what he says, why is he not taking his departure from life? If it were his firm decision, it is open to him to do it. Or if he is saying it in jest, it is pointless talk and falls on deaf ears.

This, I suggest,²⁶ is a response to a specific contemporary Cyrenaic, Hegesias, known as the 'death-persuader' (ὁ πεισιθάνωντος). According to this pessimist (DL 2.93–6) happiness—which we may assume to mean a lifetime's predominance of pleasure over pain—faces so many

obstacles as to be altogether unattainable. Hence for the wise, death may even emerge as the hedonically better choice. One can conjecture Hegesias' evaluation to have been at least in part positively motivated—an alternative means of eliminating the fear of death, by fostering the thought that death is if anything something to look forward to. But, at all events, Epicurus in the quoted passage subjects it to a treatment in the spirit, even if not in the form, of a self-refutation argument,²⁷ along the following lines: anyone who recommends death as the prudential choice is, by the very fact of being still alive to make the recommendation, disavowing sincere belief in it.

For our present purposes, the important lesson is that Epicurus is inclined, in general at least, to reject any hedonic calculation which implies that pleasure can be better maximized by dying now than by dying later. This need not mean that there are no possible circumstances in which an early death is hedonically preferable to available alternatives, for example to the distress of betraying a friend (Epicurus did reportedly say that it might be appropriate to die for a friend).²⁸ But prolonging life where possible, rather than hastening its end, will at the very least be Epicurus' default option.²⁹ This strongly suggests that a life in which pleasure predominates is pleasanter and more choiceworthy for being longer, in line with the common-sense hedonic calculation I mentioned earlier. The alternative, paradoxical idea that for Epicurus greater duration of pleasure does not add to its pleasantness, is not only unsupported by the evidence but also, we can now clearly see, contrary to the spirit of his advice.

Thus we should expect Epicurus to discern some positive hedonic gain in extending a normal life into maturity and even old age. The positive value attached to making an already pleasant life 'complete' appears to be among the background assumptions to this. It seems that the pleasantness of a fully rounded life exceeds the cumulative pleasantness of its constituent episodes. And no single feature of a life is more important than how one dies. The way that one handles one's own 'departure from life', captured by Epicurus in *KD* 20 with the virtually technical Hellenistic term ἐξαγωγὴ ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν, is an essential part of that life's shape, as his own deathbed letter itself served to remind us a moment ago.

The first item in the delicate balance to which I referred earlier is, thus, the positive desirability for an Epicurean of extending the duration of pleasure, if possible to the natural length of a full human life. I now turn to the second item. Although staying alive longer is recommended, and may well enhance the blessedness of one's life, Epicurus is equally committed to the converse principle that dying sooner is in no way an evil. Contrary to a widespread assumption, it could not be an evil, for the simple reason that pain is the only evil,

whereas being dead is painless, and therefore hedonically neutral, lacking pleasure and pain alike. It is natural to fear what you consider bad, but not to fear what you consider value-neutral.³⁰

The tension between these two temporal considerations provides, I suggest, the immediate background to Epicurus' talk of 'what makes a whole life complete'. In *KD* 21, as we saw, he insists that what does this is 'easily procured'. Why so? I take the starting assumption here to be that, as conventionally understood, a complete life is one like Epicurus' own, one in which you live through all the main stages and into old age, rounded off with an appropriately serene death.³¹ What is added in *KD* 21 is that there is a short cut to a complete life. In the context of *KD* 19-21, this short cut can be assumed to consist in the ability to die well. Anyone who has internalized the Epicurean ungrudging acceptance of the finitude of life has, by that very fact, made it impossible for their life, taken as a whole, to be incomplete. *Whenever* they may die, their life is set to end serenely as Epicurus' own did, in pleasant reminiscence of past pleasures and without fear or resentment of what lies ahead. We might try calling this a 'surrogate' completeness.³²

Now that we have a better idea of the 'complete' life to which Epicureans aspire, we are ready to ask how they can enjoy that life as a whole. Recalling that this Epicurean quest to enjoy one's life as a whole is just what the Cyrenaics deny is possible, we can develop the theoretical divide between the two schools as follows.

Cyrenaic pleasures are, as we saw, unitemporal. The primary pleasures are those of the body, and you simply cannot enjoy eating, drinking, or having sex other than at times when you are indulging in those activities. It is for this reason that a lifetime's quota of pleasures can be enjoyed only piecemeal, and not as an ensemble.

This restriction, we may infer, is of the utmost importance to Cyrenaic *praemeditatio mali*.³³ If I cannot enjoy tomorrow's pleasures today, it can be thought to follow by parity of reasoning that I cannot suffer tomorrow's pains today either. Even if there were a distinct mental pleasure in thinking anticipatorily about tomorrow's expected lunch, and similarly a distinct mental pain in thinking anticipatorily about the pain of going hungry tomorrow,³⁴ these could not compare with the corresponding bodily pleasures and pains themselves, respectively those of actually eating and actually going hungry. Thus, the mental act of accustoming yourself to the prospect of future hunger has real palliative value. In doing so you do not subject yourself to the pain of hunger, since pains are just as unitemporal as pleasures; and, we might hypothetically add, any minor mental pain it did incur would be counterbalanced by the minor mental pleasure of relief when tomorrow's lunch does in fact arrive. Yet by making that

future hunger, should it materialize, less of a shock to the system, you protect yourself against its impact. This is not precisely the profound pessimism of Hegesias, who taught that happiness is actually unattainable. It is an alternative, strictly therapeutic pessimism: by lowering your hedonic expectations, you cause yourself minimal present pain, while potentially disarming the impact of severe future pain.

Epicurus in a way agrees with the Cyrenaics on the primacy of bodily pleasure and pain, but interprets its significance differently. On the one hand, all mental pleasures and pains are ultimately dependent on bodily ones.³⁵ Consider two examples. (1) The greatest mental pleasure is freedom from fear, above all from fear of god and death; and the fear of these is fear of the bodily pain that either or both might inflict on us. (2) On his deathbed Epicurus derives mental pleasure from recalling past philosophical conversations with his friends: 'Strangury and dysentery had set in, with all the extreme intensity of which they are capable. But against this was set the joy in my soul at the memory of our past discussions.'³⁶ Those conversations were moreover, even at the time of their occurrence, a source of mental, not bodily, pleasure. Nevertheless, those original mental pleasures arose from the removal of some previous puzzlement or anxiety about the world, intellectual failures which had threatened to leave Epicurus less than perfectly certain as to his own invulnerability. And that acquired or strengthened confidence in invulnerability is, in the last analysis, once again fearlessness towards bodily suffering.

On the other hand, the primacy of bodily pleasure and pain does not stop Epicurus, as it does the Cyrenaics, from rating mental pleasures and pains greater than their bodily counterparts.³⁷ The fundamental Epicurean thesis that lies behind this disagreement with the Cyrenaics is precisely that pleasures are *not* unitemporal, but can actually in some sense be enjoyed in retrospect and prospect too.³⁸ The retrospective and prospective enjoyment of a bodily pleasure is itself not bodily but mental. Although it can be assumed not to be as intense as the bodily pleasure itself was or will be, mental pleasure has the benefit of a much greater temporal range. You can enjoy in retrospect and prospect a complete Epicurean lifetime of pleasures.

What kinds of pleasures are at issue here? As is well known, the Epicureans make two fundamental distinctions. First, there is the distinction we have already met, between bodily and mental pleasures. Second, there is a distinction between those, called *katastematic* pleasures, which consist in the absence of pain, and those which consist in a movement or change. The latter, called *kinetic* pleasures, may be either restorations of the painless state, such as drinking when thirsty, or additions to it, such as drinking when not

thirsty.

The mistakes familiarly made by non-Epicureans consist largely in errors about how to quantify katastematic and kinetic pleasures relative to each other. They tend to assume that kinetic pleasures are incremental, so that the more luxurious delights you can cram into your day, the pleasanter the day will be. Actually, the Epicurean retort runs, once you have eaten enough to ward off hunger, and dealt similarly with thirst and any other physical pains, you have reached the highest possible state of bodily pleasure; beyond that, any luxuries added during or after the process will not further increase the pleasure, but just ‘vary’ it. The same applies to mental pleasures: the katastematic pleasure of pure Epicurean tranquillity, the blissful state of fearing nothing that the world may have in prospect for you, is the highest possible state of mental pleasure; it can be varied, but not further increased, by the kinetic mental pleasures that arise from, for example, philosophical conversations with friends.

This effective equation of painlessness with the highest pleasure has been greeted with incredulity by Epicurus’ critics since antiquity, starting with the Cyrenaics, for whom the mere absence of pain is a neutral state, not any kind of pleasure. In reply, it is important to point out that Epicurean painlessness is not, as some critics have suggested, no better than the state of a stone. As Epicurus says, all good and bad lie in *aisthēsis* (*Ep. Men.* 124); hence katastematic pleasures consist, not in the mere absence of pain, but in *perceiving the world* in a pain-free way. Just as the greatest mental pain lies in perceiving the world as threatening, and at worst in anticipating infinitely many years of torture after death, so too the greatest mental pleasure lies in contemplating the world, through an Epicurean lens, as welcoming and unthreatening. Lucretius’ proem to Book 3 is a brilliant illustration of how this can be achieved. Thanks to Epicurus’ teaching, when Lucretius contemplates the world his intellectual gaze penetrates beyond the heavens and into the infinite void. In doing so it picks out a Homeric Olympus where the gods rest content with their own tranquillity, while below the earth there is no hell to be seen. This unthreatening panorama thrills him with a pleasure that resembles that of the tranquil gods themselves.³⁹

We may now ask, when Epicureans advocate the eudaimonistic merits of mentally enjoying the memory of past pleasures and the prospect of future ones, does this practice focus on katastematic pleasures, kinetic pleasures, or both? The Epicurean love of temporal symmetries, it seems to me, risks obscuring a certain imbalance that lies just below the surface. Cicero’s Epicurean Torquatus says ‘Just as we are delighted by those pleasures which we anticipate, so we rejoice in those which we remember’ (*Fin.* 1.57), and the same past–future

symmetry recurs in other sources too.⁴⁰ That symmetry really is, I shall argue, recognized by the Epicurean theory, but only so far as concerns kinetic pleasures.

To appreciate this, we must turn to a fragment of Epicurus' major ethical treatise *On the End* (Περὶ τέλους) that was seized on and constantly used against him by his critics.⁴¹ I quote it in Cicero's version (*Tusc.* 3.41):

For my part I cannot conceive of anything as the good if I remove the pleasures perceived by means of taste and sex and listening to music, and the pleasant motions felt by the eyes through beautiful sights, or any other pleasures which some sensation generates in a human being as a whole. Certainly it is impossible to say that mental delight is the only good. For I have come to know a delighted mind by its expectation of all the things I just mentioned—the expectation that our nature will acquire them without pain.

Later, according to Cicero (*Tusc.* 3.42), Epicurus referred back to this passage, reiterating that if the pleasures listed in it were removed there would be no goods left at all. It was easy for his critics to understand him as saying that bodily kinetic pleasures, as listed here, are the only goods. But such a view is so contrary to his ethical system, and even to one further passage cited from the very same work,⁴² that we must rather assume him to mean that bodily kinetic pleasures (especially it seems those that are not removals of antecedent pain) are *indispensable* to the existence of goods as a whole. Thus understood, he will turn out to be making a most illuminating point.

Mental delight is explained in this passage as the anticipation of future sensory kinetic pleasures. Epicurus is describing a paradigmatic case—it is from such anticipations that he has 'come to know' what a delighted mind is.⁴³ He is not, we must assume, necessarily limiting the class of mental pleasures to these future-looking ones. A person looking forward to future gratification through the bodily senses—a sexual encounter, a concert, a visit to an art exhibition—encapsulates the nature of mental kinetic pleasure, but surely does not exhaust it. For among the other objects of mental delight will undoubtedly be *past* pleasures. The joyful recollection of these is a major Epicurean preoccupation in our sources, Epicurus' deathbed letter included.

The key point to emerge from this controversial text is that when the mind relives and anticipates pleasures, those pleasures must be mainly of the kinetic variety. Epicurus even speaks here of the 'pleasant *motions* felt by the eyes through beautiful sights'. We know from Athenaeus' report of the same passage that the word used here was κινήσεις, indisputably a reference to kinetic pleasures. It is these alone that the mind can fully enjoy in retrospect and prospect. This

makes obvious sense. The greater power of mental pleasure lies, as we have seen, in its ability to range over past and future time. But it is hard to see how reliving, or looking forward to, merely day after day of painlessness could count as a successful application of that power. By itself katastematic pleasure, for all its intensity, seems too unvaried for the mind to roam over long temporal stretches of it. Even Lucretius, for all the thrill he felt at contemplating the world without fear, as described above, was unlikely to differentiate, and relive one by one, the numerous past occurrences of that thrill on different days. But kinetic pleasures, although as I noted earlier they cannot increase the pleasure of painlessness, do vary (ποικίλλειν) it. And we can now see that that variety is essential to the construction of a pleasant life. Only a tranquil life additionally textured by a variety of kinetic pleasures can be enjoyed as a whole from any chosen temporal viewpoint, thanks to the mind's capacity to roam over its variegated contours and enjoy its constituent episodes one by one. Here we are very close to the heart of the Epicurean eudaimonistic enterprise: the ability to enjoy a complete life from one's present temporal vantage point.⁴⁴

Down to this point, with the focus on kinetic pleasure, temporal symmetry has been maintained: past and future kinetic pleasures are equally and indifferently available for surveying and enjoying in thought. But when we turn to katastematic pleasure, a new asymmetry intrudes. Tranquillity (ἀταραξία), the highest katastematic pleasure, is in its very nature forward-, not backward-, looking. And this capacity to contemplate the world without fear, above all without the fear of death, is the primary hallmark of an Epicurean happy life.

Consider, first, someone enjoying Epicurean happiness late in their natural lifespan. They may, like Epicurus on his own deathbed, be in severe bodily pain, in which case the recollection of past kinetic pleasures will, again as it reportedly did for Epicurus, play a vital part in offsetting that pain. But there is unlikely to be any scope for the anticipation of future kinetic pleasures, only for the recall of past ones. In relation to the future, there is instead the blissful tranquillity of knowing that in one's imminent state of death there will be no suffering of any kind—just the kind of rounding off that completes a life well lived.

Indeed, some such picture seems to be embodied in the text of Epicurus with which I opened:

So both young and old must philosophize—someone young so that as he ages he can be made young by his goods, through his thankfulness for things past, someone old so that he can be at once young and aged, through his fearlessness towards things future.

That is, if you attain happiness when already old, it may be too late to compile a treasury of Epicurean memories to enjoy retrospectively, and instead your main gain is forward-looking: fearlessness in the face of death.

On a little further reflection it becomes clear that *ataraxia* in general, at any age, is a pleasure essentially focused on enjoying the present and the future, not the past.⁴⁵ As Epicurus wrote (*Sent. Vat.* 33),

The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. For someone in possession of these things, and expecting to continue to be so, could compete even with Zeus in happiness.

Recognizing the absence of any insurmountable suffering in the part of your life that still lies ahead is the basis of Epicurean tranquillity. Moreover, the pleasantness of this confident state is intimately bound up with the virtues it reflects—virtues which are themselves forward-looking. As Epicurus wrote (*Ep. Men.* 132),

It is not possible to live pleasurably without living prudently, nobly and justly, nor prudently, nobly and justly without living pleasurably. For the virtues are naturally linked with living pleasurably, and living pleasurably is inseparable from them.

Unlike the Cyrenaics, who typically regard virtue as no more than an irksome means to a pleasant end, Epicurus considers virtue an intrinsically pleasant state. Those states of mind that put us in control of appetites and fears are the very ones that also embody a confident and calm attitude towards whatever the future may have in store for us.

We are now at last in a position to say how an Epicurean complete life is enjoyed synoptically, and not just episodically in the manner of a Cyrenaic life. The pleasurable episodes of one's life prior to conversion, it should first be mentioned, are unlikely to be considered constitutive of one's happiness, or to be recommended for enjoyment in retrospect, since it is axiomatic that any non-Epicurean lives in mental pain. One's Epicurean life, on the other hand, is in its entirety accessible in thought and available to enjoy. That enjoyment takes the primary form of the 'joy', a kinetic mental pleasure, that arises in recalling and anticipating kinetic pleasures which themselves serve to 'vary' the tranquil enjoyment of an Epicurean life. This can be done from all temporal perspectives within an Epicurean lifetime, with the obvious proviso that as age advances a growing proportion of the target pleasures move into the past, until finally they are all there, providing a storehouse of memories that can, if the need arises, help offset even the most intense bodily pain.

This final phase of one's life also brings into sharper focus a second kind of pleasure, the enduring katastematic pleasure of feeling altogether tranquil at the possibility of unavoidable pain and certainty of ultimate death. That tranquillity as death approaches is the final hallmark of a complete life well lived. Although in the natural course of events such closure belongs to old age, the evening of one's life, in a secondary or surrogate sense *anyone* who has reached a similar state of fearlessness towards death already has a 'complete' life available to enjoy.⁴⁶

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¹ e.g. Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 128, 131; *Cic. Fin.* 1.42. Cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda 32 II 3–III 1, where his topic is announced as '...what is happiness (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) and the ultimate object that our nature desires?', and it is answered by specifying that pleasure is the *telos*. The same transition is already foreshadowed in the opening of his ethical treatise, 29 I 143–II 3.

² See esp. *EN* 1.7, 1098a18–20, 1.9, 1100a5, 10.7, 1177b25; *EE* 2.1, 1219a38.

³ For the attribution of 'blessedness' to one's life, rather than to any particular time in it, see Epicurus, *Ep. Pyth.* 84, *Ep. Men.* 128, 134, *KD* 27, fr. 219 Usener, Philodemus, *De morte* 36.29 (Henry (2009)), and also the interpretation of Epicurus' deathbed letter advocated below.

⁴ e.g. *SSR* 4A 53–4, 96, 99. I am here concerned only with the figure of Aristippus in the eventual Cyrenaic tradition, not with the historical figure, on whom see esp. Tsouna-McKirahan (1994) 367–91.

⁵ A notable example is O'Keefe (2002).

⁶ Cf. Athenaeus 544A–B: 'This includes the so-called Cyrenaic sect, which drew its origin from Aristippus the Socratic, who inherited the tradition of pleasurable living and said that this was the end and that happiness lay in it. He said that pleasure is untemporal. *Much like profligates*, he considered neither the memory of past enjoyments nor the expectation of future ones to matter to him, but judged the good purely by the present, considering past and future enjoyments of no account to himself, on the ground that the former no longer is, and that the latter is not yet, and is unclear. *That is like the experience of those who live sumptuously, seeing fit to act well for the present.*' The italicized passages, I suggest, reflect a reinterpretation of Aristippus' present-focused lifestyle as emblematic of a doctrine of hedonic presentism.

⁷ The point cannot be simply the *fading* of pleasures with time, since that would not apply to future ones. Rather, future pleasures are 'unclear' ('the latter is not yet, and is unclear', see n. 6), which presumably makes them harder to anticipate in any detail.

⁸ Irwin (1991); cf., for a modified version, Zilioli (2012), esp. 163–4. *Contra*, Tsouna-McKirahan (2002), 464–89; Graver (2002) 162–3; Warren (2001) 167–8; Warren (2014) 191–3.

⁹ I am leaving aside, for example, the Cyrenaic Theodorus, whose ethical position seems to have been distinctively different (DL 2.98).

¹⁰ DL 2.91, cf. 2.92 on wealth, and *Cic. Off.* 3.116.

¹¹ *Cic. Tusc.* 3.28–9. The tension between *praemeditatio mali* and interpretations of the Cyrenaics as disavowing any future-concern is well explored by Graver, *art. cit.*

¹² I follow Dorandi in reading μη ποιοῦντα at the end of 90 with BFΦ.

¹³ This impression that παντελής includes some such evaluative connotation sits comfortably with Epicurus' *Letter to Pythocles* 116, where god is described as ζῶν παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτημένον, 'a living being in possession of complete happiness'. For a fuller and richer discussion of a 'complete' life than I can undertake here, see Warren (2004) ch. 4.

¹⁴ 'quem ad modum tute dicebas, negat Epicurus diurnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate

temporis, quam si illa sit sempiterna.’

¹⁵ ‘optime vero Epicurus quod exiguum dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari, *neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse quam ex hoc percipiatur quod videamus esse finitum.*’

¹⁶ e.g. Gosling and Taylor (1982) 355–6; Furley (1986) 81; Annas (1993) 345; Warren (2004) 114–15, albeit with an important qualification at 130–1; Konstan (2009), ‘pleasure, Epicurus maintained (KD 19), is not augmented by duration’. It is a major presupposition of Rosenbaum (1990), who (n. 8) cites many others who have made, and faced up to the difficulties generated by, the same interpretative assumption. A too-muted protest against this interpretation voiced in Long and Sedley (1987) 1.154 seems to have gone unnoticed.

¹⁷ See n. 32 for further confirmation. Philodemus, *De morte* 13.3–6, sometimes cited in this context, says nothing more or less than KD 19 does. *De morte* 3.36–9 might be thought to say that once one knows the limits of pleasure one can immediately possess the same amount of pleasure as an infinite time offers (cf. Warren (2004) 143–4 for comment). That would indeed imply that living longer cannot add further pleasure. But, as Henry notes *ad loc.*, these lines are paraphrasing KD 20, not 19: hence ἀπολαβεῖν (37–8) does not refer to the acquisition of pleasure but to the flesh’s mistaken perception of pleasure as limitless.

¹⁸ Lucretius 3.944–9 makes a related point: after a certain time you will have experienced all varieties of pleasure; prolonging life further will bring nothing new, even if you were to live on through all future ages (presumably meaning ages of our world, which itself will however eventually perish), and all the more so if you were to be altogether immortal, i.e. live on for infinitely many years (949, ‘atque etiam potius si numquam sis moriturus’).

¹⁹ For Epicurus, however, a well-lived and well-concluded life is not superior to, but equal in value to, an infinitely extended life like that of the gods (e.g. *Ep. Men.* 135). Cf. Warren (2000).

²⁰ Cf. Striker (1988) 325–6, who uses the example of an opera.

²¹ Laks (1976) 23 and 91. The significance of this reading is noted by Warren (2000) 134 n. 51.

²² τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευτῶντες ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. A number of editors have emended τελευτῶντες to τελευταίαν, to conform more closely to Cicero’s translation, “‘cum ageremus”, inquit, “vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec....” For the unlikelihood of a single day, rather than a whole life, being called ‘blessed’, see n. 3.

²³ Cf. Plato, *Laws* 770a6; Ar. *Poet.* 1457b22 ff., himself citing Empedocles (B152), and cited *ad loc.* by Laks; Cleanthes in SE M 9.90; Diog. Oen. 3 II 7–8 Smith.

²⁴ For an alternative metaphor, cf. Philodemus, *De morte* 39.17–18, where a life is treated as if it were a written sentence, with death its closing punctuation mark.

²⁵ This is a major focus of discussion in recent literature on the Epicurean attitude to death, and I cannot do more than touch on it here. See esp. Warren (2000) ch. 4 for a comprehensive treatment.

²⁶ I have not encountered this suggestion in the literature, but would be a little surprised if it turned out never to have been made before.

²⁷ For Epicurean use of self-refutation arguments, see Castagnoli (2010) chs 9–10.

²⁸ DL 10.120.

²⁹ Cf. Philodemus, *De morte* 13.36–14.14: it is sensible to wish to live on long enough to attain one’s natural goals. Cf. Tsouna (2007) 239–311 for the full Philodemian context of this passage, which is itself there quoted on p. 273. See also [Philodemus, *On choices and avoidances*] xxii–xxiii (ed. G. Indelli and V. Tsouna-

McKirahan, Naples 1995), where the Epicurean is described as staying alive if he can and making provisions on the assumption that he will do so.

³⁰ Philodemus allows that the prospect of premature death may naturally cause in a still developing Epicurean, ‘pangs’ or ‘bites’ of grief, but insists that these are amenable to consolation by attending to the goods that outweigh them. See Tsouna (2007) 258–9, 274–5.

³¹ This is, more or less, what Warren (2000) 121–2 calls the ‘narrative model’ of a complete life.

³² Cf. Philodemus, *On Death* 38.14–19, ‘Someone with good sense, once he has attained the whole of what suffices for a happy life (πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον), from that point on walks around as one laid out for burial, and reaps the benefit of that single day as if it were an eternity.’ Note that this last clause echoes *KD* 19, while presenting the additional day as a net benefit—possible further evidence against any reading of that dictum as a denial that duration is relevant to the amount of pleasure obtained.

³³ Cic. *Tusc.* 3.28–9, ‘The Cyrenaics do not think that distress is caused by every evil, but by unexpected and unforeseen evil. That makes no small difference to increase in distress. For all things that come out of the blue seem of greater seriousness....Hence this pre-rehearsal of future evils mitigates the onset of those things whose approach you saw far in advance.’

³⁴ The evidence is unclear. On a natural reading of *DL* 2.89–90 (quoted above) no mental pleasure can be taken in future pleasures; on the other hand, Aristippus is said to warn against προκάμνειν, ‘suffering in advance’, in relation to the future (Aelian, quoted earlier at n. 5).

³⁵ Cic. *Fin.* 1.55, ‘animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus.’ Cf. also Plut. *Non posse* 1089E.

³⁶ στραγγουρικά τε παρηκολούθει καὶ δυσεντερικά πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. Since on the Laks reading I have advocated Epicurus is here speaking of the happiness of his life, not of this particular day, there is no longer much reason to stick to the traditional translation of ἀντιπαρετάττετο as ‘counterbalanced’, which goes beyond the natural meaning of the military metaphor, ‘ranked against’. Epicurus need not be claiming explicitly that this actual day involves a predominance of pleasure over pain, just that his life as a whole does. (I am grateful to Sarah Broadie for prompting this thought.)

³⁷ Cic. *Fin.* 1.55, *DL* 10.137.

³⁸ The Cyrenaics apparently oppose this Epicurean position to the extent of holding, not just that recalling past bodily pleasures is not a mental pleasure, but that, worse, it may well cause pain, by stirring up desires which cannot now be satisfied. For this reason (Plut. *Non posse* 1089A) they recommend having sex in the dark, to avoid acquiring any visual memories that will stir up painful desires when recalled.

³⁹ Lucretius 3.14–30, with specific reference to the ‘godlike pleasure’ (*divina voluptas*, 28, already identified as *katastematic* ‘peace of mind’ at 24) that this intellectual vision inspires. He is of course emulating Epicurus’ pioneering projection of thought, praised in his opening proem (1.62–79).

⁴⁰ e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.95.

⁴¹ See fr. 67 Usener for other citations of this fragment as a stick with which to beat Epicurus.

⁴² Epicurus fr. 68 Usener, τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιωτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις, cited by Plutarch, *Non posse* 1089D, and credibly argued

by Usener *ad loc.* to be from the Περὶ τέλους.

⁴³ 'I have come to know' translates the Latin *novi*. I suggest that the usage corresponds to Epicurus' ἐγνώκαμεν, as in *Letter to Menoeceus* 129: 'For this [i.e. pleasure] we have come to know [ἐγνώκαμεν] as our first and congenital good'. In both passages he is referring to no more than the origin of the concept. Cicero picks up Epicurus' *novi* in his immediately ensuing comment, 'atque haec quidem his verbis, quibus ut intellegat quam voluptatem *norit* Epicurus'. J.E. King (Loeb edn.) translates Epicurus' *novi* as 'I *understand* by...' (followed in this by Long and Sedley), and Cicero's *norit* as '...what Epicurus *understands* by pleasure', but this is not an attested usage as far as I can establish.

⁴⁴ Cf. Plut. *Non posse* 1089C, an Epicurean sage develops special skills in the recall of past kinetic pleasures.

⁴⁵ Cf. Woolf (2009) 157.

⁴⁶ My thanks for discussion at conferences at St Andrews, May 2012, and Exeter, July 2013, and with Katharine O'Reilly, Voula Tsouna, and James Warren. The chapter is dedicated to Christopher Gill with warm affection and deep admiration.

Cicero on Imperialism and the Soul

Malcolm Schofield

The political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have little to say about imperialism, something that might surprise and disappoint a reader turning to these thinkers after a reading of Thucydides. It certainly does not figure in their writings as a major concern. Things are very different with Cicero's *On the Commonwealth* (*De Re Publica*), the ambitious philosophical dialogue he composed in the late 50s BCE to give Romans a theory of politics that would emulate and indeed outdo the achievement of Plato's *Republic*.¹ The work now survives in a fragmentary condition. For centuries only its final section, the so-called dream of Scipio, was available as continuous text, thanks to the late antique writer Macrobius, along with fragments and summaries in Cicero himself elsewhere and in other Roman writers of the imperial period, notably Lactantius and (particularly important for present purposes) Augustine. Then early in the nineteenth century a palimpsest was discovered in the Vatican Library, in which long stretches of Books 1 and 2, some pages of Book 3, and a few isolated passages from Books 4 and 5 could be made out. The palimpsest confirmed the evidence already available that in the first of the two central books (Book 3)—at the heart of the whole work—Cicero staged a debate about justice between associates of the great second-century BCE statesman Publius Scipio Africanus, the principal speaker in most of *On the Commonwealth*.

Is justice an objective value or purely a matter of convention? And whatever the answer to that question, can the *res publica*—public affairs, the business of the state, the commonwealth itself—be conducted without it? Or does the truth lie in the opposite direction: must wisdom be prepared to resort to *injustice* for successful government? These were the principal questions they tackled. And

imperialism turns out to have been a key preoccupation of the discussion. The case for valuing prudence more highly than justice (whether a conventional or an absolute value) was put by Lucius Furius Philus, who is represented as anxious to make it clear that he advances it *argumenti causa*, not out of conviction. Gaius Laelius, closest to Scipio of all his friends, then made a reply. For Laelius justice is part of the fabric of the world itself; and he would argue that good government cannot be conducted without justice. Philus may well have devoted the last few sections of his speech to what he may have regarded as the clincher for his own argument: to acquire and hold on to an empire, there is no alternative to committing injustice—and that is precisely what the Romans have done.² Laelius did not shirk the challenge of rebutting this charge. His case for justice—which is unfortunately much less well preserved than Philus’ speech—evidently ended with a tour de force making the argument that empire is one of the forms of naturally just rule, which is how the Romans have historically conducted government. That argument exploited an analogy with the rule of the soul over the body and the reason over the passions. And it is that analogy and its use for political purposes that I want to examine in my contribution to this volume.³

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It is Augustine who supplies us with the key items of evidence we need to look at in attempting to get to grips with the Ciceronian material: some individual passages of the debate survive in the palimpsest of *On the Commonwealth*, but for its overall structure we have to turn to later authors who quote from it or summarize its main lines of argument. The relevant material for present purposes is to be found in Book 19 of the *City of God* and in Book 4 of the tract against the Pelagian bishop Julian, both works written—perhaps around the same time, in the early 420s—late in his life. Scholarship has tended to focus mainly on the *City of God* report. I shall begin with the *contra Julianum* passage: it is a lot clearer, and has the advantage of quoting rather more of Cicero’s original. The challenge will be to understand how it fits with what Augustine tells us in the *City of God*.

The *contra Julianum* text goes as follows:

T1

sed si haec tanquam minora bona defendis, in quae non debet a supernis animus inclinari, non quia libido uitium est, sed quia infimum bonum, audi manifestiora quae dicat in eodem ipso libro de republica tertio, cum ageret de causa imperandi.

an non, inquit, cernimus optimo cuique dominatum ab ipsa natura cum summa utilitate infimorum datum? cur igitur deus homini, animus imperat corpori, ratio libidini iracundiae quae et caeteris uitiosis eiusdem animi

partibus?

iam ne saltem docente isto has, quas bonas esse defendis, uitiosas partes animi confiteris?

adhuc audi. paulo post enim: sed et imperandi et seruiendi, inquit, sunt dissimilitudines cognoscendae. nam ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini: sed corpori, ut rex ciuibus suis, aut parens liberis; libidini autem, ut seruis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit. sic regum, sic imperatorum, sic magistratum, sic patrum, sic populorum imperia ciuibus sociisque praesunt, ut corporibus animus: domini autem seruos ita fatigant, ut optima pars animi, id est, sapientia, eiusdem animi uitiosas imbecillasque partes, ut libidines, ut iracundias, ut perturbationes caeteras.

habes ne adhuc quod contra nos de saecularium litterarum auctoribus garrias?

Augustine, contra Julianum 4.12.61 (PL 44.767.43–768.6)

But if you are defending these things as lesser goods to which the soul should not be diverted from higher goods, assuming not that lust is a vice but a low-grade good: then pay attention to the rather clear statements made by Cicero in the same Book 3 of *On the Commonwealth*, where he was arguing the case for empire: ‘Do we not observe’, he says, ‘that dominion has been granted by nature itself to everything that is best, to the greatest advantage to what is low-grade? For why else does God rule over man, the soul over the body, reason over lust and anger and the other vicious parts of that same soul?’

Will you now concede, given that it is he after all who is author of the teaching, that those parts of the mind that you defend as good are vicious?

Keep listening—for a bit later we get: ‘But of both ruling and subjection’, he says, ‘we must distinguish different kinds. For while the soul is said to rule the body, it is also said to rule over lust. But it rules over the body as a king governs his subjects or a parent the children, whereas it rules over lust as a master rules his slaves – because it restrains and breaks it. The kinds of rule kings, commanders, magistrates, senators, and peoples exercise over citizens and allies are like the rule of the soul over the body. But masters wear down their slaves in the same way that the best part of the soul, i.e. wisdom, wears down the vicious and weak parts of that same soul, such as lust, anger, and other disturbances.’

I take it you have no trivia you can find in secular writers to contradict us?

We know the context of the extracts from Laelius’ speech reproduced in *Against Julian* thanks to the better-known passage of Augustine in the *City of God* (CD 19.21). Here he reports the gist of what he represents as a debate between an argument for injustice (i.e. the rationality or wisdom of injustice) and an opposing argument for justice—and in sketching the case for justice he cites some of the very same words as are reproduced in the *Against Julian* passage. Now we know quite a bit about this debate, principally from another late source, Lactantius’ *Institutes*.⁴ Among other things Lactantius gives us the information, confirmed by the lacunose palimpsest of Book 3 of *On the Commonwealth* itself, that it was L. Furius Philus who made the case for injustice, and G. Laelius that for justice. So what Augustine must be reporting in Text 1 is part of Laelius’ speech. Our initial focus will be not on the broader argumentative context (we shall come to

that in due course), but on the actual extracts quoted by Augustine in Text 1.

It has long been noticed that the second and longer of the two extracts stands in particularly close relationship with a section of Aristotle's discussion of natural slavery in Book 1 of the *Politics*, particularly the passage from [Chapter 5](#) of the book I reproduce here as Text 2, and particularly those elements in it that I highlight in bold:

T2

τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἔστιν (καὶ αἰ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δ' ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον)· ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἓν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διηρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις·

ἔστι δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῷ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν ἢ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν. πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῳοῖς ὡσαύτως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίῳ τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεσθᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διὰκείνται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσαν ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν), καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγῳ [αἰσθανόμενα] ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ.

Aristotle, Politics 1.5, 1254a21–32, b2–24

For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule. **And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects—for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work);** for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality, deriving from nature as a whole, exists in living creatures.

At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional

and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. **For he who can be, and therefore is, another's** and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, **is a slave by nature.**⁵ Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts.

Trans. B. Jowett

Thus, Aristotle too had observed that there are different kinds of ruling and being ruled (Cicero's *imperandi et serviendi*); and that in animal psychology one can distinguish the rule of mind over body from that of intellect over desire (as in Augustine's second extract from Cicero). He too founded on these contrasts his opposition between kingly or political rule as against that exercised by a master over his slave. And he too made the claim (as in the first of Augustine's extracts) that rule exercised in these ways is a natural dispensation, advantageous for the ruled. It is hard not to believe that Cicero is relying on Aristotle, whether directly or through some intermediate source. Paul Moraux argued in 1957 for reliance through such a source on Aristotle's lost dialogue *On Justice*, largely on the strength of Aristotle's reference at 1254a33–4 (not quoted above) to 'exoteric writings' (cf. *Pol.* 3.6, 1278b30–1279a1). Jean-Louis Ferrary in *Philhellénisme et Impérialisme* (1988) took a similar view. Jean Christian Dumont, writing in 1983, and author of the best study in print of the Cicero material, was tempted by the more economical hypothesis of knowledge, direct or indirect, of Text 2 itself. While that possibility cannot be excluded, I am inclined to think one of the exoteric works by whatever route more likely: in *Politics* 3.6 Aristotle says that he has 'often' discussed the distinctions between different forms of rule in these writings, and it is likely enough that the phraseology he employed was more or less recycled in these various contexts.⁶

Aristotle and Cicero alike want to extract from discussion of psychology mileage for political theory. But as the commentators point out, Cicero models the hierarchies of rule the opposite way round to Aristotle. He compares political or kingly rule (in Aristotle's terminology) to the mind–body relationship, to which Aristotle

notoriously assimilates a master's rule of his slave. For Cicero rule over a slave is to be understood as resembling the rule of reason over the passions and appetites, which is how Aristotle had interpreted political or kingly rule, the forms of rule he was to invoke in commenting on the householder's rule over his wife and his children (*Pol.* 1.12, 1259a37–b4). Aristotle's idea is that the mind simply tells the body what to do, whereas reason attempts to guide the appetites and the passions, making them more rational. He has his eye on the sorts of communication mind or reason can engage in, whether in the psychology of the individual or in government of city or household. And in [Chapter 5](#) of Book 1 of the *Politics* the key point is that naturally slavish persons are psychologically incapable of education: the barking of orders is the only thing they can respond to. As Paul Moraux pointed out,⁷ Cicero is looking to a different question, as a further text from Augustine indicates:

T3

nonne Cicero in libris de re publica, cum de imperiorum differentia disputaret et huius rei similitudinem ex natura hominis adsumeret, ut filiis dixit imperari corporis membris propter oboediendi facilitatem; uitiosas uero animi partes ut seruos asperiore imperio coherceri?

Augustine, de Civitate Dei 14.23 ll. 26–30 + 30–2 (PL 48)

Surely when in his books *On the Commonwealth* he was discussing the different forms of rule, and drew an illustration of the distinction from human nature, Cicero said that the parts of the body are ruled like children because they readily obey, whereas the vicious parts of the soul are constrained by a harsher rule like slaves?

Cicero is asking himself: how much resistance is there to mind or reason in its injunctions? The body willingly obeys orders, as children do their father (and as ideally his subjects obey the king), whereas the passions and appetites have to be restrained or constrained by reason—Cicero is presumably thinking of how it will point out the dire consequences of disobedience, taking that as the right model for the master-slave relationship. Jean Christian Dumont observes that his handling of the master-slave relationship not only captures its coercive character, but also avoids the dehumanization of the slave that threatens Aristotle's account (and indeed which Aristotle himself found difficult to deal with, as notably when discussing whether friendship with a slave—who after all is conceived as nothing more than a tool or instrument owned by a master for his use—is a possibility).⁸

On the other hand, the application of the mind–body analogy to politics, and the treatment of political subjects as comparable with children in the family (and soldiers in the field), might suggest a

highly authoritarian and paternalistic conception of government, carrying the consequence that citizenship should consist in automatic compliance with orders made by magistrates. That is certainly the way Dumont reads Laelius' stance. He speaks of an 'un extraordinaire autoritarisme'.⁹ Here however we should notice that Laelius is talking only about conceptions of rule: *imperandum*. The analogy bears only on that notion, not on the idea of government more broadly conceived. In the account of the best practicable form of political system elaborated by Scipio at the end of Book 1 of *On the Commonwealth* (*Rep.* 1.69–70; cf. 2.57, and also *Sest.* 137), which Laelius is represented as receiving with enthusiasm (*Rep.* 1.71), *imperium* exercised by magistrates is only one ingredient in the mixed constitution. It is balanced by *consilium* from the leading citizens who constitute the deliberative body, and by the people's exercise of *libertas*, as for example in elections and law making and in recourse to *provocatio*, the Roman equivalent of habeas corpus.

So politics is more than the executive decisions and orders of magistrates with *imperium*. Other citizens have much greater real say in how the *res publica* operates—whether in that ideal system or in the historic Roman polity, in which according to Scipio it was realized—than focusing only on *imperium* might lead one to think. Nonetheless, when the system works as it should do, citizens could indeed be expected normally to submit to *imperium* unquestioningly (just as we would ordinarily expect to comply with the law of the land without question). That is the authority Cicero thinks *imperium* should carry, and is presumably what he has in mind when in both *On the Commonwealth* and *On Laws* he speaks of *imperium* as something 'regal' (*regale*) (*Rep.* 1.60, 1.69, 2.56, *Leg.* 3.8). When things are not in good shape, resistance to those with *potestas* is in order, or in extreme circumstances overthrow of the regime. Scipio elsewhere in *On the Commonwealth* has a whole further instalment of theory about a figure he calls the *rector rei publicae* ('director of the commonwealth') where he countenances such a measure, with Lucius Junius Brutus given as a star instance of a private citizen who took responsibility for the *res publica* in its entirety when he enabled the citizenry to bring down Tarquin the Proud and put an end to Roman kingship (*Rep.* 2.46, 51).

*

But I digress from discussion of Cicero's distinction between two species of ruling and being ruled. It is time now to ask why he has Laelius make the distinction at all in the case he is making for justice. A straightforward explanation suggests itself: Laelius must be introducing it in an attempt to disable an argument Philus has been

putting. As we have noted, Augustine in Book 19 of the *City of God* reports Philus as advancing the thesis that empire cannot be conducted without injustice. And he indicates how appeal to the notion of slavery figured within it:

T4

cum prius ageretur pro iniustitiae partibus contra iustitiam et diceretur nisi per iniustitiam rem publicam stare gerique non posse, hoc ueluti ualidissimum positum erat, iniustum esse, ut homines hominibus dominantibus seruiant; quam tamen iniustitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa ciuitas, cuius est magna res publica, non eam posse prouinciis imperare.

Augustine, de Civitate Dei 19.21 ll. 35–49 (PL 48)

When the case was argued earlier on the side of injustice against justice and it was said that a commonwealth cannot exist and be conducted except through injustice, the following was laid down as the strongest support: that it is unjust for humans to be related to humans as those enslaved to masters—yet without pursuing such injustice no imperial state whose public affairs are on a grand scale can exercise empire over its provinces.

So how are we to suppose Laelius envisaged that his distinction in Text 1 could draw the teeth of Philus' contention that empire requires enslavement, yet it is wrong that humans should be enslaved to humans?¹⁰ A first key point must have been to indicate that if Philus had seen that *seruire* was not a univocal term, he would or should have realized that his argument was altogether too simplistic. It is presumably significant that in his reply Laelius ends up talking not of forms of *dominandi*, 'exercising mastery', but of *imperandi*, 'ruling', and then going on to contrast *domini*, 'masters', with rulers of a different sort. In effect he makes *dominare* in the strict sense just a species of *imperare*, with the corollary that the sort of *seruire*, 'being enslaved', that Philus was talking about is similarly just one species of the generic *seruire* that corresponds to Aristotle's generic ἀρχεσθαι, 'being ruled'.¹¹ *Seruire* comes in different varieties: Philus makes the mistake of treating all subjection as enslavement.

That point alone is not sufficient to outflank Philus. Laelius needs to show how his distinction relates to the issue of imperial rule. I think he means to do precisely that by making *imperia civibus sociisque*, 'the kinds of rule exercised over citizens and allies', a category he contrasts with the master's rule over his slave. With the reference to allies as well as citizens within this single phrase, Laelius is undoubtedly assimilating imperial rule to the rule exerted by magistrates and the Roman people as a body over the citizens of the republic. 'Allies' in Cicero's general usage sometimes identifies just one group among several different subject communities controlled by the Romans. But sometimes—to quote Myles Lavan in his recent book *Slaves to Rome*—it functions 'as an umbrella category for all Rome's

non-citizen subjects'.¹² That, I submit, is the natural way to take the expression here, with the implication (presumably) that all such non-citizen subjects of an imperial power are being effectively viewed and treated as allies, whether or not in some more fine-grained treatment they might be differentiated as allies, provinces (*provinciae*), client princes (*reges*), free states (*liberae civitates*), etc.: an implication, of course, involving a heavy dose of political spin on Laelius' part. For Laelius seems to be putting all political forms of rule—that is, all legitimate forms of political rule—into one basket, and setting them against the master-slave relationship, which is construed quite literally: as referring to those with the juridical statuses of master and slave. So to take him as employing *socii*, 'allies', in the most general and generic use of the term is the natural reading in the present context. The text extends no invitation to suppose that there are or could be some subject peoples who are legitimately enslaved by some imperial power. Its talk of masters and slaves sounds very much as though it is conceived in the first instance in terms of the household.

One objection that Philus might have wished to put at this point might have gone as follows: Suppose we grant that you have identified a way a people might exercise rule over other peoples—as its allies—legitimately, without injustice. But could any people ever acquire a really substantial empire that way—without in effect conducting an enslavement project? It is not hard to work out how Laelius might have responded. We know that in Book 3 Cicero developed the theme of the just war, as the only kind of war the best sort of state would embark upon,¹³ and (according to Nonius: 498.18) claimed that 'our people has acquired its control of all the earth now by defending our allies' (M. Tullius de re publica III: *noster enim populus sociis defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus est*). These views were presumably articulated in Laelius' speech. Neglect of the rights of Rome's allies is something of which Laelius accuses Tiberius Gracchus in the final words of the speech (which the palimpsest does preserve: *Rep.* 3.41). Such evidence as we have thus points to the conclusion that Laelius consistently represented Rome's historical acquisition and conduct of empire as protection of its allies throughout his argument. Moreover when in *On Duties* Cicero came to discuss again the Romans' imperial behaviour, he repeated the claim: the empire was originally more truly described as a 'protectorate to the whole world' than as empire (*Off.* 2.27), although he then presents an indictment of its subsequent perversion into rapacious oppression. That striking piece of rhetoric rounds off a narrative in which the defence of provinces (*provinciae*) and allies (*socii*)—the two are here twinned together—has been identified as the sole motive originally recognized by Romans as legitimizing the pursuit of glory:

T5

quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et refugium senatus, nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent.

Cicero, De Officiis 2.26–7

As long as the imperial rule of the Roman people was maintained through generosity, not injustices, wars were conducted either on behalf of our allies or to maintain our rule; they were settled leniently or as necessity dictated; the senate was a safe harbour and refuge for kings, peoples, nations; while our magistrates and commanders were intent on winning glory by one thing alone: by defending provinces and allies fairly and faithfully.

The emperor Augustus availed himself of the same ideology when he celebrated his own achievements in the *Res Gestae*:¹⁴

T6

omnium provinciarum populi Romani quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parerent imperio nostro fines auxi. Gallias et Hispanias provincias, item Germaniam, qua includit Oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi. Alpes a regione ea quae proxima est Hadriano mari ad Tuscum pacificavi nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato.

Augustus, Res Gestae 26.1–3

I extended the territory of all those provinces of the Roman people on whose borders lay peoples not subject to our imperial rule. I brought peace to the Gallic and Spanish provinces as well as to Germany, throughout the area bordering on the Ocean from Cadiz to the mouth of the Elbe. I secured the pacification of the Alps from the district nearest the Adriatic to the Tuscan sea, yet without waging an unjust war on any people.

Trans. P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore (adapted)

It is hard to avoid concluding that the main thrust of Laelius' reply to Philus was pointed in the direction I have been sketching. But was that all there was to it? After all, one might ask, what about the peoples the Romans had to overcome in order successfully to defend their allies. Even if wars waged against them were just wars, did some of them end up enslaved—held in that kind of subjection—in order to keep allies secure? Is not that something which 'necessity' might 'dictate'? At this point one might recall some of the things Cicero says about empire elsewhere. Here he is in the *Catilines*, for example, saying in passing that enemies of Rome are 'either crushed into servitude or, being received into our friendship, consider themselves bound to us by the favour' (*Cat.* 4.22). On Cicero's own admission there, imperial rule was not all of a piece—and some of it was enslavement. Is there any hint of any similar admission in Laelius'

Some have thought that evidence for that can be found in Augustine's report in Book 19 of the *City of God*, in the section where he tells us how Philus had argued that without injustice a great *res publica* could not exercise imperial rule over *provinciae* (Text 4). His text then continues with a summary of Laelius' reply, which concludes with an abbreviated version of the passage about forms of natural *dominium* he cites more fully in *Against Julian* (Text 1). I first translate the relevant sentence, glossing it as I think it should be interpreted. I then give my own commentary, before presenting the rival view, which reads Laelius as justifying enslavement of *provinciae*. I conclude the discussion by giving my reasons for rejecting that reading. Here, then, is Augustine's account of Laelius' reply:

T7

responsum est a parte iustitiae ideo iustum esse, quod talibus hominibus sit utilis servitus, et pro utilitate eorum fieri, cum recte fit, id est cum improbis aufertur iniuriarum licentia, et domiti melius se habebunt, quia indomiti deterius se habuerunt; subditumque est, ut ista ratio firmaretur, ueluti a natura sumptum nobile exemplum atque dictum est: 'cur igitur deus homini, animus imperat corpori, ratio libidini ceteris que uitiosis animi partibus?'

Augustine, de Civitate Dei 19.21 ll. 35–49 + 49–51 (PL 48)

The reply on the side of justice was that it [namely, the institution of slavery] is just because for such humans [namely, the enslaved] enslavement is advantageous,¹⁵ and that it is instituted for their advantage, when it is rightly instituted, that is when the power and opportunity to commit injustices is removed from the wicked, and they will be better off being subjugated because they were worse off unsubjugated. And to bolster this reasoning a noble illustration is added, supplied—as one might say—by nature. It was articulated as follows: 'For why else does God rule over man, the soul over the body, reason over lust and anger and the other vicious parts of that same soul?'

As the square brackets in this translation indicate, I am taking the reference of the phrase 'such humans' (*talibus hominibus*) to be 'the enslaved'. On this reading Laelius is responding to the basic general proposition Philus is said to have enunciated, viz. that it is unjust for humans (*homines*) to be enslaved to humans (*hominibus*) as their masters. He will be saying nothing yet about empire, but making the equally general rejoinder, couched in terms once again of what is due to *homines*, that such servitude is just when it is rightly instituted; and articulating the equally general condition needing to be satisfied if it is to count as rightly instituted—viz. that the wicked will then be deprived of power and opportunity to commit injustice, and will be better off in subjection than they were when unsubdued. Laelius

appears to have in mind by the wicked not simply persons who habitually commit injustices, but recidivist criminals who cannot do otherwise. This is suggested by a fragment reproduced by Nonius, best located¹⁶ in this section of his argument (Nonius 109.2):

T8

M. Tullius de re publica III: est enim genus iniustae servitutis, cum ei sunt alterius qui sui possunt esse; cum autem hi famulantur...

Nonius 109.2

M. Tullius in Book 3 of *De Re Publica*: ‘There is a kind of unjust slavery, when those who have the capacity to be independent belong to another; but when there are in servitude those...’

Such recidivists—presumably the topic of the comment Laelius was about to make in the clause truncated in Nonius—are like Aristotle’s natural slaves naturally programmed for living lives dependent on others for rational direction (see Text 2: *Pol.* 1.5, 1254b20–2). This is not (as in Aristotle) because of their mental inability to make strategic choices, but presumably—if the analogy with the soul drawn at the end of Text 1 may be invoked here—because thanks to their uncontrollable passions and appetites they cannot meet elementary standards of social behaviour required of human social animals. In modern Western societies they would be locked up and deprived of most of their citizen rights (our system of penal incarceration). Laelius would have them deprived of all such rights and coerced as slaves by masters to do whatever those masters choose.

If that was the core of the first instalment of Laelius’ reply to Philus, he concerned himself there with defending and clarifying the general claim that, while enslaving others is sometimes indeed unjust, there are circumstances in which it is something just, and something advantageous to the enslaved. He has not yet at this point in his argument addressed the more specific claim that Roman imperialism was an unjust enslavement project, and that it could not otherwise have ruled its subject peoples.

But *prima facie* it would be not unnatural to understand Text 7 differently, as picking up on Philus’ preoccupation specifically with the ‘provinces’ (*provinciae*: see Text 4), and to assume—as, for example, does Peter Garnsey¹⁷—that Laelius means to concede that Rome’s *provinciae* are indeed enslaved, but only to their own advantage. In other words, on this alternative interpretation Laelius will effectively mean ‘*provinciis*’ when he says ‘*talibus hominibus*’. And he will be recognizing a distinction between categories of subject peoples (here *provinciae* as against *socii*) of the same sort as is implicit in the *Catilines* passage cited in my discussion of Text 6. Nor will he be

denying that the Romans enslaved some of their subject peoples, but rather defending the justice of their doing so in the case of the *provinciae*. About their allies (*socii*) he will go on to tell a different story: Ruling and subjection come in different forms. The allies are not enslaved. They are ruled as subjects no differently from the way Rome's own citizens are ruled. Defending them and their rights is the prime purpose of Rome's imperial enterprise.

This ingenious construal of the surviving textual material relating to Laelius' speech has its merits. One thing it rightly makes much of is the contrast between Philus' reference (as Augustine summarizes him) to *provinciae* in contrast to Laelius' stress on *socii* both in Text 1 and in other surviving extracts from his speech. For making the case that empire is enslavement, a focus on *provinciae* makes a lot of sense. By Cicero's time the rapacity and cruelty of those members of the Roman governing elite who took up governorships of provinces had become notorious. One has only to think of Verres in Sicily, whose prosecution Cicero undertook in a famous trial of 70 BCE. It is no wonder that Laelius preferred to talk about *socii* and Rome's commitment to defending them in making the opposing case. But there are of course different ways of interpreting what exactly he meant in so talking. He might have been more or less explicitly recognizing the sort of distinction between *provinciae* and *socii* that Myles Lavan assumes:¹⁸ between the lucrative parts of the empire governed directly by Rome and other peoples with whom she had a variety of treaty or other mutually agreed arrangements. And he might then, as Lavan again supposes, have admitted (rather as in the *Catilines* passage (*Cat.* 4.22) we have mentioned) that the former were effectively enslaved while insisting that the latter had a status akin to that of Rome's own citizens.

However it is also conceivable that Laelius' substitution in his discourse of *socii* for Philus' *provinciae* represented more an attempt to suppress all thoughts of *provinciae* as a distinct class of imperial subject than to make an explicit distinction acknowledging that the Romans treated different subjects differently. And that, I suggest, makes for the more likely interpretation. For as I have argued already, the natural way to take the reference to allies in the extract from his speech quoted by Augustine in Text 1 is as denominating—sweepingly and without differentiation—all non-citizen peoples of an imperial power. And we have noted that in the later *On Duties*, where Cicero does not have the same motivation to drop talk of provinces as in Laelius' speech in *On the Commonwealth*, when provinces are mentioned it is not in contradistinction from allies, but coupled with them in one breath, as having received exactly the same kind of protection from Rome (*Off.* 2.26–7).

There is also a consideration of another kind in favour of taking the reference of ‘such humans’ (*talibus hominibus*) in Text 7 to be ‘the enslaved’, not (as with Garnsey and Lavan) ‘provinces’. If we try and combine the information given in Text 1, our extract from *Against Julian*, with Text 7 so interpreted, something like the following picture of Laelius’ overall line of argument seems to emerge:

Philus (a) is intent on representing empire as unjust, on various grounds, (b) one of which is that it enslaves people—(c) an unjust practice. Laelius responds by tackling the various elements in what Philus has to say on empire in reverse order. First he argues against (c) as an unqualified principle (Text 6). Then (Text 1) he rejects (b), by distinguishing species of *servire* and arguing that the species found in properly conducted empire—as historically by the Romans—is that characteristic of rule over allies who are being supported and defended like citizens not slaves (implicitly, not even justly enslaved slaves). The subsequent development (indicated in further texts) of the theme of defence of allies seems to have maintained that in properly conducted empire such defence—contra (a)—respects norms of justice: e.g. only just wars are declared and fought, treaties with allies are always respected.

Although Augustine in Text 7 mentions only the (c) element of Laelius’ speech, it is to be seen—as would generally be agreed—as [Chapter 1](#) of the reply to the entire sequence (a) to (c) in Philus’. On my construal of Laelius’ argumentative strategy, saying anything at all about (c) is strictly speaking a redundant ingredient in his defence of empire: his argument against (b) does the essential work.¹⁹ But I take it that as rhetoric, rejecting (c) was a very good point to make and to begin with. After all, Philus has apparently been made by Cicero to take what in antiquity was an extreme position on the justice of slavery, viz. that it was unjust without qualification. All of Cicero’s readership would have been slave owners. So a defence of slavery as justified (when it is justified) would play to their prejudices: designed—one might suppose—to undermine sympathy for Philus’ line of thought from the outset.

This interpretation of Laelius’ reasoning, as reported by Augustine, has him taking throughout the broadest possible view of enslavement. So understood, he focuses on placing enslavement as such within a general theory of rule and subjection, which is itself grounded in appeal to human nature considered both in relation to the divine and in its own psychological structure. As noted above, Cicero has turned principally to Aristotle for the construction of the theory. And on this reading, he follows Aristotle in making no explicit reference in the arguments recorded in Texts 1 and 7 to any specific sphere—whether domestic or imperial—in which rule of masters over slaves is or

should be exercised, even if the vocabulary might most naturally be read by his Roman readers as applicable primarily to the domestic context. In short, the entire run of the argument makes a lot of sense if taken as an attempt to discuss the conditions under which enslavement is an appropriate practice as a quite general question.

On the alternative reading, as a sequel to a claim that enslavement of provinces is justified because they need to be restrained from committing injustice, Laelius simply wanders away from that subject, never to return to it—certainly not in the stretch of reasoning reported by Augustine in Text 1, nor in any of the other surviving fragments of his speech. It seems altogether more likely that Laelius never conceded to Philus (as the alternative reading supposes) that Rome acquired and maintained her empire by enslaving provinces as he alleged: a concession for which there is no evidence at all apart from the questionable assumption that ‘such humans’ (*talibus hominibus*) in Augustine’s summary refers to provinces. After all, Laelius’ crucial move was to distinguish with Aristotle different forms of rule, and to make it clear that most species of rule have nothing in common with enslavement. What we know—and do not have to conjecture—is that in making that distinction he assimilated rule over allies to rule over citizens, and went on to talk of empire as protection of allies. There can be little doubt that this argument constituted the main burden of his reply to Philus on empire.²⁰ The whole tenor and direction of the reply seem designed to get Philus to stop thinking of enslavement at all in this context.

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Unfortunately, the extant fragments of Philus’ speech include none giving examples of the way the Romans did enslave other peoples in establishing their empire—to which Laelius might then have been expected to respond in some way. Perhaps no such examples were volunteered by Philus. After all, what he was trying to establish (according to Augustine in Text 4; cf. *Rep.* 2.70) was the strong thesis that ‘a commonwealth cannot exist and be conducted except through injustice’. And examples might help to give it some plausibility, but could never of course clinch a negative existential proposition, let alone the negation of a possibility. It is conceivable that he contented himself with the general claim that acquisition of empire would be impossible without unjust enslavement of other peoples by the imperial power. Certainly those extracts of the case for the impossibility of imperial rule without injustice that survive are couched in entirely general terms. Thus, Lactantius tells us:

et inferebat haec argumenta: omnibus populis qui florerent imperio, et Romanis quoque ipsis qui totius orbis potirentur, si iusti velint esse, hoc est si aliena restituant, ad casas esse reddendum et in egestate ac miseriis iacendum.

Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones 5.16.4

To prove his case he added that if all the people who did well out of empire, including the Romans themselves who controlled the whole world, were anxious to be just, that is, to give back other people's property, they would have to go back to wattle and daub and lie in want and squalor.

Trans. Anthony Bowen

A counterfactual such as this is precisely the kind of argument Philus needs to make—although how he would secure its truth is the problem he then faces. Elsewhere he resorted to an argument from likelihood, again a form of argument appropriate for the case he is trying to make. A passage preserved in the palimpsest itself concludes with the question:

T10

sed quoniam de re publica loquimur—sunt illustriora quae publice fiunt—quoniamque eadem est ratio iuris in utroque, de populi sapientia dicendum puto, and iam omitto alios: noster hic populus, quem Africanus hesterno sermone a stirpe repetivit, cuius imperio iam orbis terrae tenetur, iustitia an sapientia e minimo omnium < maximus factus? >

Cicero, De Re Publica 3.24

But since we are talking about the commonwealth (things that are done in public are more perspicuous), and since the rationale for justice is the same in either case, I think I should speak about peoples. And to set other peoples aside: our own people, whose history from the beginning Africanus [i.e. Scipio] discussed in yesterday's conversation, whose rule now controls the whole world—do you think that it was through justice or wisdom that it grew from something tiny to the greatest of all?

Trans. J.E.G. Zetzel (adapted)

In any event, it looks as though Cicero decided that for Laelius to deal adequately with Philus' representations about empire, the major element in the rejoinder must consist in arguing that what is allegedly not possible—here imperial rule without injustice—has actually happened. Too much of Laelius' speech is lost for us to be able to reconstruct the detail. But that is the general direction we see Cicero taking again in his later *On Duties* (cf. Text 5) in his portrayal of the empire as historically more 'a protectorate of the whole world than an empire' (*Off.* 2.27). Nor was he alone among Roman writers in presenting Roman history as a record of justice in its dealings with other peoples. Sallust sketches a similar narrative in the introduction to his *Bellum Catilinae* (*Cat.* 6–13). For Sallust the turning point—when Romans in their public and private lives alike started to succumb to vices—came with the destruction of Carthage (in 146 BCE), and the full realization of that process with the dominance of Sulla (87–81

BCE). That view of Sulla's ascendancy agrees with Cicero's assessment (*Off.* 2.27), and (not inconsistently with the trajectory Sallust indicates) he makes Laelius at the very end of his speech already talk of Tiberius Gracchus' violation of the rights of the allies (133 BCE), and speak with foreboding about Rome's future (*Rep.* 3.41). Perhaps it is significant that the one example we know Philus to have supplied of unjust imperial conduct on the part of the Romans relates to an incident dated to 140 BCE (the behaviour of Quintus Pompeius in the matter of a treaty he made with the Numantines of northern Africa: *Rep.* 3.28).

My conclusion is that Laelius' reply to Philus on imperialism is not so lacking in adroitness and force as is often supposed. But whether or not I have convinced the reader of that, I hope I have shown that the grounds for thinking that Laelius' speech contained 'a defence of empire as a form of just enslavement'²¹ leave something to be desired.

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¹ See the useful edition of this text in English translation supplied in Zetzel (1999).

² Evidence for the way Philus' speech was constructed is confusing, and its reconstruction a continuing matter for controversy: recent discussions are Hahm (1999) and Glucker (2001). I am attracted to the ordering of the surviving material adopted in the OCT (Powell (2006)). But nothing in the argument I am making depends on that.

³ I am most grateful to Myles Lavan for probing scrutiny of a first version of this piece, which has prompted significant redrafting and reorganization of the argument. It is a pleasure to be have been afforded this opportunity to offer a chapter in the present volume to the honorand, a colleague and friend for many decades. While his major contributions to our subject have been devoted to ancient philosophical treatments of the soul, he has also written important studies on political philosophy and on Cicero. So I hope he will find congenial an essay focusing on an intersection between these three concerns.

⁴ That Lactantius is not an entirely reliable source, particularly in what he identifies as the original author and the targets of Philus' arguments, is well known: see particularly Glucker (2001). But there is no reason to suspect the accuracy of the information supplied by him that I use in this chapter.

⁵ This claim by Aristotle is picked up by Cicero not in Text 1, but in Text 8 (an extract quoted by Nonius).

⁶ See Moraux (1957) 69–77 (cf. 23–31); Ferrary (1988) 365 n. 55, 371; Dumont (1983) 113–14, with n. 7; 127–8. Barnes (1997) 44–59 provides the best available treatment of Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle, and concludes that it was probably on the whole confined to the exoteric works, with the possible exception of the *Rhetoric* among the existing treatises (but he does not discuss T1). On Laelius' speech and its likely sources more generally, see the sceptical discussion of Ferrary (1988) 363–81 (also Ferrary (1974)). A reader for the Press wondered whether its marrying of Stoic to Aristotelian elements pointed to Antiochus. But Antiochus, like other late Hellenistic thinkers in the Peripatetic tradition (on whom see Hahm (2007)), does not appear to have focused closely on Aristotle's text as does Cicero or his source (if he relied on an intermediary at this point) in T1: see e.g. Chiaradonna (2013) 28–37.

⁷ Moraux (1957) 72; so also Dumont (1983) 124–5. Ferrary (1988) 378 puts the point that Cicero was capable of revising Aristotle's scheme himself without reliance on an intermediary source.

⁸ Dumont (1983) 125–6. For Aristotle's difficulty, see *EN* 8.11, 1161a30–b8.

⁹ Dumont (1983) 127.

¹⁰ It has rarely been observed how Cicero makes Philus subscribe without qualification—even if only like the rest of his speech *argumenti causa*—to the view, seldom encountered in Greek or Roman literature, that slavery is an unjust

institution (thus, the passage is not included in the collection of comparable texts in Garnsey (1996) 75–86).

¹¹ See further Lavan (2013) 78.

¹² Lavan (2013) 49; in private communication Myles Lavan comments to me: ‘the *cives: socii* dyad is very common and normally very broad in scope’. For an excellent overview and analysis of the use of the word *socii* in Cicero and elsewhere, see the entire section devoted to the topic in Lavan (2013) 35–53.

¹³ For presentation and exemplary discussion of the evidence see Barnes (2015).

¹⁴ I am grateful to the Press’s reader for drawing the parallel to my attention. For discussion of the Augustan ideology of war and peace see Gruen (1985).

¹⁵ Augustine initially makes it sound as though Laelius was made to claim that all enslavement (or all the enslavement he has in mind) is advantageous. But as his report continues it becomes clear that he held that it is advantageous—for both society at large and slaves themselves—only if it is rightly instituted.

¹⁶ Here I follow e.g. the Loeb, Powell’s OCT, and Zetzel’s translation; but scepticism on the point is inevitably a possibility: see Dumont (1983) 116 n. 23, 118–19.

¹⁷ Garnsey (1996) 38; so also Lavan (2013) 116. My impression is that this is how the text is very generally read: for other examples, see Ferrary (1988) 370–1, Pagden (1995) 20.

¹⁸ Lavan (2013) 117–18. But see n. 12 to this chapter.

¹⁹ I am grateful to Myles Lavan for pressing this point.

²⁰ This is a point made by Garnsey (1996) 42.

²¹ Lavan (2013) 117.

Maximus of Tyre on God and Providence

Gretchen Reydam-Schils

The injunction to ‘become like god’, a theme famously derived from Plato’s *Theaetetus* (176a–177a), is ubiquitous in Middle Platonism (the label assigned to the phase of Platonism from Antiochus of Ascalon to Plotinus). This injunction creates complications for any notion of self that is operative in the texts of this period: what precisely is the connection between the human and the divine, and where exactly is the boundary between them, as exemplified in the relation between human souls and demons or the World Soul? A number of other questions arise in the wake of these two, such as what kind of god humans are supposed to emulate. As I have argued elsewhere (1999), because the Middle Platonist notion of the divine combines Platonic and Stoic features, this form of Platonism displays a strong tension between the noetic and relational aspects of god (the latter referring to notions such as god’s ‘care’ for the cosmos, or divine Providence, in one form or another).¹ This tension, in turn, has implications for the relation between the so-called contemplative and active lives, for virtue and the virtues (particularly justice), and, I would argue, for the kind of self that emerges from these accounts, especially for its rapport with others. If there is a connection in Stoicism between social ethics and the role of the divine principle, then it makes sense to examine if and how this connection is also operative in Middle Platonism, which is shaped by both an ongoing polemic against the Stoics and attempts at co-opting a number of their key tenets.

In this context, I will focus on only one relatively small area of this complex web of issues and reexamine a striking case of a Middle Platonist account of the divine that betrays a strong influence from Stoicism, one by Maximus of Tyre.

The central text for my purpose here is this passage from Maximus’

...ἐρώμεθα τὸν Δία τίς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν πατήρ καὶ χορηγός...ἡ τούτων μὲν πέρι οὐθὲν δεῖ τὸν θεὸν ἐνοχλεῖν, αἰσθανομένους τῆς χορηγίας καὶ ὀρῶντας τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ συνιέντας τὴν πηγὴν καὶ τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν εἰδότας, τὸν οὐρανοῦ ἀρμοστήν, τὸν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἀγωγέα, τὸν κορυφαῖον τῆς τῶν ἄστρων περιφορᾶς καὶ δινήσεως καὶ χορείας καὶ δρόμου, τὸν ὥρῶν ταμίαν, τὸν πνευμάτων οἰκονόμον, τὸν ποιητὴν θαλάττης, τὸν δημιουργὸν γῆς, τὸν ποταμῶν χορηγόν, τὸν καρπῶν τροφέα, τὸν ζῶων γεννητὴν, τὸν γενέθλιον, τὸν ὑέτιον, τὸν ἐπικάρπιον, τὸν πατρῷον, τὸν φυτάλιον, οὗ ὁ νοῦς ἀρραγῆς ὢν καὶ ἄτρυτος καὶ ἐπὶ πάσας ἐξικνούμενος φύσεις ἀμηχάνῳ τάχει, ὡς προσβολὴ ὄψεως, πᾶν κοσμεῖ ὅτου ἂν ἐπαφήσεται, καθάπερ καὶ αἱ παρ' ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες προσπεσοῦσαι τῇ γῇ λαμπρύνουσιν αὐτῆς τὸ καταληφθὲν πᾶν. τίς δέ ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ἐπαφῆς ταύτης τρόπος, ἐγὼ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχω, ἠνίξαστο δὲ αὐτὴν ἡρέμα Ὅμηρος...ὁμοῦ δὲ τῷ Διὶ νεύματι γῇ ξυνέσθη καὶ ὅσα γῆς θρέμματα, καὶ θάλασσα ξυνέσθη καὶ ὅσα θαλάττης γεννήματα, καὶ ἀήρ ξυνέσθη καὶ ὅσα ἀέρος φορήματα, καὶ οὐρανὸς ξυνέσθη καὶ ὅσα ἐν οὐρανῷ κινήματα. ταῦτα ἔργα τῶν Διὸς νευμάτων· μέχρι τούτων ἀδεῆς εἰμι χρησμοδίας, καὶ Ὅμηρῳ πείθομαι καὶ πιστεύω Πλάτῳ καὶ οἰκτεῖρω τὸν Ἐπίκουρον.

Let us...ask Zeus, who is the father and provider of human goods...[about the oracles]. Or do we in fact have no need to bother the god over this matter, since we are well aware of this provision, and see its origins, and understand the source, and know the Father and Maker for ourselves, the harmonizer of the heaven, the director of the sun and the moon, the leader of the swiftly whirling orbits of the dance of the stars, the steward of the seasons, the regulator of the winds, the creator of the sea, the maker of the earth, the provider of rivers, the nurturer of crops, the begetter of living things, the god of procreation, the god of rain, the god of fruitfulness, the paternal god, the fostering god,³ whose mind, adamant and unwearying, pervading the whole of creation with extraordinary speed, like the glance of an eye, brings order and beauty to all that it touches, just as the rays of the sun when they fall on the earth illuminate every part of it that they reach. I cannot myself tell you the nature of this touch, but Homer hints subtly at it [*Iliad* 1.528].... At Zeus' nod the earth took form, and all that is nourished on the earth, and the sea took form and all that is born in it, and the air took form and all creatures that ride in it, and the heavens took form and all that moves in them. This is the work of Zeus' nod. Up to this point I need no oracle; I believe Homer, I trust Plato—and I pity Epicurus.

(trans. Trapp, slightly modified)

The designation of god as the Father and Maker refers us immediately to Plato's *Timaeus* (28c3), yet Maximus' rendering goes far beyond the role which the *Timaeus* assigns to the Demiurge. To claim that this divinity reigns in heaven as the 'harmonizer' of heaven, 'the director of sun and moon', and 'the leader of the swiftly whirling orbits of the dance of the stars' need entail no more than that his power manifests

itself first and foremost in the heavens, just as Xenocrates talks about Zeus reigning in heaven (F15 Heinze).⁴ In what follows, however, Maximus makes clear that he sees this divine agency as intimately involved in all aspects of the cosmos. The seasons, the winds, the sea, the earth, and the rivers clearly encompass the sublunary realm as well. This god is even connected to the process of fertility in crops and animal life. In a poetic flourish, Maximus captures the extent of this god's involvement with a long list of epithets that express agency and leadership: πατήρ καὶ χορηγός (father and provider), πατήρ καὶ ποιητής (father and maker), ἁρμοστής (harmonizer), ἄγωγεὺς (director), κορυφαῖος (leader), ταμίης (steward), οἰκονόμος (regulator), δημιουργός (maker), τροφεύς (nurturer), γεννητής (begetter).⁵ Five other epithets directly describe this agent as the 'god of', in a list that elsewhere also occurs in Stoic sources or sources influenced by Stoicism: ὁ γενέθλιος (the god of procreation), ὁ ὑέτιος (of rain), ὁ ἐπικάρπιος (of fruitfulness), ὁ πατρῷος (the paternal god), ὁ φυτάλιος (the fostering god).⁶ The literal rendering of Providence, *pronoia*, is absent from this list, but the notion is certainly implied, as parallel passages demonstrate (as in *Or.* 5). In another speech, Maximus also calls this god a 'lawgiver' (6.5), or even the law itself (as in 11.12).

The manner in which this divine agency manifests itself merits our attention, too. The mind of this god is said to reach the entire cosmos with extraordinary speed, like the glance of an eye or the rays of the sun. These metaphors, like Maximus' reference to the Homeric nod of Zeus (as also in *Or.* 4.8), are ambivalent: one could read them in a Platonic incorporeal sense—after all, the Platonists themselves frequently use sun imagery—or can read them in a more Stoic, physical sense. I submit that this ambiguity is deliberate on Maximus' part, so that he can play on both registers simultaneously. But note that the function of the gaze and the rays is not merely cognitive; this function allows the god not only to be aware of what takes place in the universe (as in *Or.* 11.9), but also to bring about order and beauty, resulting from a divine 'touch' (ἐπαφήσεται, ἐπαφής) that is 'hard to explain in words'. In this context, we should take note of a second potential tension between a god who, on the one hand, is the cause and source (πηγή,⁷ also as in 11.11) of order and goodness and as such above the cosmos (see also *Or.* 2.10) and, on the other, is somehow intimately involved in this order. Maximus also uses the image of the cosmos as a musical instrument and its order as a harmony that begins from god (*Or.* 13.3) and speaks of god as providing an initial impetus in a mechanism that is then passed on by its different parts (13.4). In addition, he uses the image of the Great King in Persia and his satraps, to whom he delegates his rule (ἄρχῃ) in

a clearly hierarchical structure (*Or.* 11.12).⁸ So the tension manifests itself within the analogies that Maximus uses.

In the ps.-Aristotle *De Mundo*, by contrast, the point is made explicitly and repeatedly that god does not concern himself directly with all aspects of the universe, but passes along his power (*dunamis*) through a hierarchy of intermediaries (Opsomer (2005) 59–63).⁹ If one wants to understand the manner in which god maintains the universe, we are told, one should focus on god's power (*dunamis*) and not on his essence (*ousia*, 397b19–20). In other words, the author explicitly draws a distinction between divine essence and divine power. Time and again (397b–end), the author emphasizes the *distance* between the highest god and the lower levels of the universe that this god preserves: he is situated at the highest point of the heavens and imparts a simple, effortless motion to heaven in its entirety and to the heavenly bodies closest to him. This motion is passed along from one level in the universe to another and becomes diversified in the process according to the nature of each being. Maximus, on the other hand, even though he uses some of the same analogies as the author of the *De Mundo*, emphasizes the divine *involvement* in the *cosmos* (in a manner that is not burdensome, of course, nor exposes the divine to contamination). Moreover, the notion of power (*dunamis*) is not central to his notion of the divine.

That the same analogy can be made to serve opposite purposes can easily be illustrated by another telling example: whereas the author of the *De Mundo* compares divine governance to the manner in which the soul rules the body (399b) to underscore his point that god is not directly involved in all aspects of the world, Cicero in his *De Natura Deorum* uses the same analogy to emphasize the ease with which, according to the Stoics, the divine principle can govern all things (*ND* 3.92). But then, as we know, the Platonic–Aristotelian tradition sees the relation between soul and body quite differently than the Stoics, who, just as they posit that the divine principle permeates the entire cosmos, also let the soul extend through the entire body, even if its ruling principle is, according to the majority view, located in the heart (Gill (2006)).

In Maximus, the divine names of the 'god of x' type are embedded in a context with many agency words for this divinity; the author of the *De Mundo*, who uses a similar list of 'god of x' names, prefers a linguistic register that talks about other things 'following' the divine lead, just as human beings 'follow' a law, without this law being directly concerned with them (as in 399a18–30; 400b10–25). If I am correct in detecting this difference in how the two authors describe divine agency, what is at stake in this difference?

1. God, Demiurge, and Providence

At least three features are essential to the Stoic notion of Providence: that there is a unified notion of the divine, that its agency is all-encompassing, and that the god is directly involved with physical reality. We can detect all three features in Maximus' account of the divine, although, as we have seen, he hedges his bets on the third. But, crucially, such a rendering of divine agency as we find in Maximus is in many respects very different from Plato's picture of the Demiurge in his *Timaeus*. In other words, while the Stoics based their notion of Providence on their adaptation of the *Timaeus*, it is also the case that quite a number of philosophical steps needed to be taken to get from the Demiurge to a full-fledged Providence. One can try to connect the dots by looking at sources, such as examining how other accounts of Plato, such as the *Laws*, may have helped to shape the notion of Providence; if and how the notion was pre-figured by the Old Academy (much more minimally than has been assumed, see Reydam-Schils (2013)); or how much of it has been anticipated in the *Epinomis* or by Xenophon's account, in his *Memorabilia*, of Socrates' views. But that is not the line of inquiry I want to pursue here; instead, I will focus on the philosophical moves in the transformation from Demiurge to Providence in the Stoic sense.

To say that Plato's *Timaeus* does not present a unified notion of the divine is an understatement. One of the main puzzles with which it leaves its readers is how its different factors of order are related. We have Being as the model that the Demiurge uses (and which most likely refers to the Forms, even if in a relatively thin variant, as Broadie has recently argued (2012, ch. 3)), the Demiurge himself, the younger gods, the traditional Olympian gods, and the World Soul. Related to this question of the different divine factors at work in the universe is the issue of the extent to which the Demiurge himself, whatever he stands for, is involved in this ordering activity. The Demiurge makes the World Soul and the rational part of the human soul, and imposes order and a more definite, geometrical structure on the so-called traces of the elements that then become the basic building blocks of physical reality. But all other tasks, which include the making of the other living beings, are delegated to so-called younger gods. The Demiurge literally takes his distance from many aspects of the physical universe in order not to become responsible for negative outcomes (which I here leave deliberately vague for the moment). That being said, it is striking that in the later part of his account, Plato often reverts to a single 'god', or 'the divine' in the singular (Maximus does the same in *Or.* 41.5). So for readers such as the Stoics, this locution could have opened the door to a more unified

notion of divine agency.

In general, the providential aspect of divine agency is limited in the *Timaeus*,¹⁰ by which I mean not merely that the terminology related to *pronoia* is hardly in evidence, used only once in connection with the Demiurge (30c1).¹¹ This limitation is most evident in the role of the World Soul. Whereas later interpreters keep expanding the role of Providence, for instance, by creating three levels of Providence (Sharples (2003)) or a chain of being in which each link has its own providential role assigned,¹² Plato's World Soul does not have this function (contrary, for instance, to the so-called good cosmic soul in Book 10 of the *Laws*, for which terms of care, *epimeleia*, abound).¹³ In the *Timaeus*, the World Soul is the expression of the order brought about by the Demiurge, and its activities are described merely in cognitive terms: how, with the circle of the Same, it relates to the intelligible realm and, with the Other, to the perceptible realm (36e–37c). But it does not play an active role in caring for and maintaining the order of the universe.

In contrast to Plato in the *Timaeus*, Maximus has a strongly unified notion of the divine (see also *Or.* 11.5; 26.7), and he explicitly borrows the Stoic approach of interpreting the plurality of gods as aspects of one and the same divine agent (*Or.* 4.8; see also 2.5).¹⁴ Arguably, this god, as in Stoicism, has also absorbed, at least to some extent, the role of the World Soul in that Maximus' Zeus, in the passage with which we started, reaches out to the sublunar realm as well; importantly, the move of transferring functions of the World Soul to the higher god is the reverse of attributing a demiurgic function to the World Soul. In these two respects, Maximus has truly co-opted fundamental traits of Stoic theology and physics.

But where does such a view of divine agency leave the Forms? It is striking that with the exception of the Form of Beauty, which lends itself to expositions about *erōs* (as in *Or.* 21), the Forms are not prominent in Maximus' expositions. We could resort here to the traditional explanation that Maximus' mode of discourse does not easily lend itself to complex and technical metaphysical reflections, and there is some truth to that claim. Yet it is also the case that Maximus tends to understate the noetic aspects, in the Platonic sense, of his god, in spite of this god's being an intellect.

To establish a connection between the Forms and god, Maximus adopts a solution that we find in many Middle Platonist contexts: the Forms become the 'thoughts of god' (*Or.* 11.8). Yet this very notion became a very interesting vehicle for the rivalry between Stoics and Platonists. This dynamic, I would submit, roughly developed as follows: In the first phase, Platonists adopted this notion in order to establish a clearer connection between the Demiurge and the model of

Being in the *Timaeus*, but they may have done so already under the influence of the Stoic seminal *logoi*. In a second phase, we find later Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus claiming and adapting the notion of the ‘thoughts of god’. A Platonist such as Maximus, in turn, uses both the standard version and its Stoic counterpart.

Let us unpack this point in greater detail. As Alcinous demonstrates (ch. 10), considering the Forms to be the thoughts of god can yield a divinity that, as pure intellect and along the lines of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, thinks the Forms as merely thinking itself. For Alcinous, this concept of the divine then creates considerable tension with the demiurgic function (cf. also Opsomer (2005) 62). (Let us also recall here, for instance, that Numenius’ second level of the divine slips into a third, lower level when this mind turns its attention to the order of the cosmos and is, strictly speaking, demiurgic only at that lower level, F22 des Places, cf. also F11.) In the Stoic usage of ‘the thoughts of god’, on the other hand, Zeus, when he is by himself and has in the phase of conflagration reabsorbed the entire universe into himself, thinks about his governance of the world (Seneca, *De Vita Beata* 8.4, *Ep.* 9.16–17; Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.13.2–7). This mode of divine thinking, unlike the first one, is inherently relational and providential. One could perhaps push this point a little further by claiming that for the Stoic active principle, to think itself means thinking about the order of the world, if we assume that the divine *logos* at all times contains the physical seminal *logoi* that make up the actual physical structure of the world, whether unfolded or not.

Plato’s *Timaeus*, as already noted, leaves the issue of divine thinking underdetermined. The Demiurge looks at the paradigm of Being and makes decisions about how to bring about the order of the world. Maximus, for his part, includes both aspects of this divine thought: on the one hand, he accepts the doctrine of the Forms as the ‘thoughts of god’ (*Or.* 11); on the other, his god also thinks about his governance of the world, presumably in light of the Forms. Even the notoriously idle Sardanapallus, Maximus claims in a standard polemic against Epicurus, ‘took thought for (ἐβουλεύετο) the safety of Nineveh and the happiness of the people of Assyria’. God, a fortiori—like a steersman for his ship, a general for his army, and the lawgiver for his city and country—would ‘take thought for (βουλεύεται; literally “deliberate about”) heavens and earth and all the other divisions of the cosmos’ (*Or.* 4.9, cf. also 8.8, 11.5, 15.6: as part of a discussion of the relative merits of the active and the contemplative lives, see the following paragraph). In Maximus, then, the providential, relational aspect of his divinity dominates over the purely noetic aspect. This Stoic tendency is underscored by the number of passages in which Maximus ascribes providential agency to

Nature (as in *Or.* 31.4) and by his very strong alignment between divine reason as fate and human reason (*Or.* 13.4), which, he claims, ‘flows from divine reason’ (ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἀθανάτου ἀπορροῆς τὸν νοῦν λαμβάνοντι, *Or.* 33.7).

The manner in which Maximus defines divine agency and interprets the notion of the ‘thoughts of god’ also affects how he sees the relation between the active and the contemplative lives for human beings. In a typical rhetorical exercise, he argues for the superiority of each of these lives in turn (*Or.* 15 and 16). But the second option, the contemplative life, does not merely win out: Maximus, while falling short of subsuming both the theoretical and the active lives under a *bios logikos* as is attested for the Stoics (DL 7.130), nevertheless proposes a true compromise. The contemplative life is superior because it is related to the rational part of the soul, whereas the practical life goes with spirit (*thumos*) as the natural ally of reason, but both partake of the Good. Moreover, different lives may be suited to different people, and philosophers can combine an active phase earlier in life with a focus on contemplation when they get older. (Maximus derives this latter idea from Plato’s *Republic*, but transposes it to the historical examples of Plato, with his voyages to Sicily, and of Xenophon, examples that are mirrored in *Or.* 15.9.) Third, Maximus emphasizes, again in keeping with the *Republic*, the contributions to the common good, to virtue, and to justice as anchored in truth made by the devotee to the contemplative life (in a fictional defence speech that he puts in the mouth of Anaxagoras). And last but not least, Maximus here defines the vision of the philosopher less in Platonic noetic terms (for which, see *Or.* 11.10) than as an observation of the order of the universe, the governance of which the philosopher’s soul can be said to approximate: his soul ‘travels everywhere’, to every corner of the universe and ‘all but joins Zeus in the administration and disposition of reality’ (μονονουχὶ τῷ Διὶ συνοικονομοῦσα τὰ ὄντα καὶ συντάττουσα, 16.6, emphasis added; there are many parallel passages to be found in Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius for this idea, cf. Reydam-Schils (2010) and Bénatouïl (2013)). Just as the relational function dominates over the purely noetic function in Maximus’ Zeus, Maximus has also shaped his notion of the contemplative life for human beings in such a way as to direct it to the cosmos rather than to the radically transcendent and purely intelligible realm of the Platonic Forms.

2. Matter and Evil

So far, we have seen that Maximus has a unified notion of the divine and that he emphasizes the providential role of this divine agent in its relation with all aspects of the order of the universe, an emphasis that also shapes his view of what the contemplative life would entail for human beings. But how far does this divine agency extend, and are there aspects of reality that escape its control? For the answer to these questions, we need to return to *Oration* 41, which is, after all, dedicated not so much to the notion of divine Providence as to the problem of evil (the MS title is ‘Good being the work of God, whence comes Evil’):

οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς δυοῖν ἐστίαιν τὴν μὲν ἁμοιον ἡγητέον κακῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἁμοιῶν ἐπιμεμιγμένην, ἥ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἐπίρρυτα ἐκ τῆς ἐτέρας, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐξ αὐτοφουσ μοχθηρίας ἀνίσταται. διττὴ δὲ αὕτη, ἡ μὲν ὕλης πάθος, ἡ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐξουσία.

Of the two dwellings constituted by heaven and earth, we must believe that the former has no contact with evil, while the latter is compounded of good and evil both, having the goods that flow down to it from the other, and the evils that arise from its own innate imperfections (ἐξ αὐτοφουσ μοχθηρίας). These imperfections are themselves of two kinds, those deriving from affects (πάθος) of physical matter, and those deriving from the license enjoyed by the human soul.

(41.4, trans. Trapp, slightly modified)

Maximus’ explanation of evil appears to start from a rather stark dualism between heaven and earth and the latter’s ‘innate imperfections’ (see also Plato, *Theaetetus* 176a). Those imperfections, in turn, are due to two factors, the one pertaining to matter, the other to human behaviour. A close parallel to this analysis can be found in Stobaeus, as attributed to the Stoic Hierocles (*Ecl.* 2, 9, 7, 181.8 ff. Wachsmuth). But this kind of dualism would be odd for a Stoic, so either Hierocles deviated from the main Stoic line on this issue or the attribution needs to be called into question (Long (1996)). Maximus, however, goes on to nuance this initial dualism considerably, relying precisely on views also attested for the Stoics:

ὕλην ὁρᾷς ὑποβεβλημένην δημιουργῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἥς τὸ μὲν κοσμηθὲν ἡκεῖ παρὰ τῆς τέχνης, εἰ δέ τι ἀκρατῶς ἑαυτῶν τὰ ἐν γῇ ἔχοντα πάσχει πλημμελές, ἀναίτιόν μοι τὴν τέχνην τίθει· βούλησις γὰρ οὐδεμία τεχνίτου ἄτεχνος, οὐδὲ γὰρ νομοθέτου ἄδικος· ὁ δὲ θεῖος νοῦς ἀνθρωπίνης τέχνης εὐστοχώτερος. Καθάπερ οὖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν τεχνῶν χειουργίαις τὰ μὲν ἡ τέχνη προηγουμένως δρᾷ, στοχαζομένη τοῦ τέλους, τὰ δὲ ἔπεται τῇ χειουργίᾳ, οὐ τέχνης ἔργα ἀλλ’ ὕλης πάθη, σπινθηρές τε ἐξ ἄκμονος καὶ ἐκ βάνου αἰθαλώσεις, καὶ ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλης πάθος, ἀναγκαῖον μὲν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ, οὐ προηγούμενον δὲ τῷ τεχνίτῃ· οὕτως ἀμέλει καὶ ὅσα περὶ γῆν

πάθη γίνεται, ἃς καλοῦμεν κακῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐμβολάς, ἐνταῦθα ἡγήθεον ἀναίτιον {καί} τὴν τέχνην, εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου δημιουργίας ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπομένας φύσεις. ἃ δὲ ἡμεῖς καλοῦμεν κακὰ καὶ φθοράς, καὶ ἐφ’οἷς ὀδυρόμεθα, ταῦτα ὁ τεχνίτης καλεῖ σωτηρίαν τοῦ ὅλου· μέλει γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦ ὅλου, τὸ δὲ μέρος ἀνάγκη κακοῦσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου.... ὁρᾷς οὖν τὰ πάθη, ἃ σὺ μὲν καλεῖς φθοράν, τεκμαιρόμενος τῇ τῶν ἀπιόντων ὁδῷ, ἐγὼ δὲ σωτηρίαν, τεκμαιρόμενος τῇ διαδοχῇ τῶν μελλόντων; μεταβολὴν ὁρᾷς σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως ἀλλαγῆν, ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον... διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς βίου καὶ μεταβολὴν σωμάτων, καινουργίαν τοῦ ὅλου.

(a) What you see around you is matter that has been subjected to the efforts of a good craftsman: the element of order in it derives from his art (τέχνη), but if earthly things experience any disharmony in their inability to control themselves, then I would beg you to absolve that art (τέχνη) from any blame. No craftsman can form an intention (βούλησις) that counteracts his science, any more than a lawmaker can form an intention that is unjust; and divine intelligence (νοῦς) is surer in its aim than human art (τέχνη).

(b) Just as in the exercise of the crafts, art (τέχνη) itself produces some effects directly as it aims for its objectives, while other consequences (τὰ δὲ ἔπεται) follow from its activity, not as effects of the art itself, but as affects (πάθη) of matter, like sparks from the anvil and gusts of heat from the furnace, and other modifications of other forms of matter, which are necessary to (ἀναγκαῖον) the work done, but not produced directly by the craftsman himself; of just the same kind is the genesis of those earthly events we call the assaults of human ill. Here too we must believe that the science itself is blameless, and that those effects are so to speak the necessary and natural consequences (ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπομένας φύσεις) of the crafting of the whole.

(c) What we call evil and ruin, the things we lament over, the craftsman calls the preservation of the whole. His concern is precisely for the whole, and it is necessary for the part to suffer in the interests of that whole. [...number of examples...]

(d) You can see then that these events, which you call destruction, judging by the passing away of what is lost, I call preservation, judging by the succession of what follows on. What you behold is change in physical bodies and the alteration of things coming into being, a ‘road up and down’ in Heraclitus’ words, and again [quote on elemental transformations]. What you see is a chain of life and a cycle of change in physical bodies, in which the whole is renewed.

(41.4, continued, trans. Trapp, slightly modified)

The opening move of this explanation (a) transfers the famous claim from the *Timaeus* that god is blameless (*Timaeus* 42d–e; see also *Or.* 5, 13.8) to the art of the Demiurge. An art qua art is infallible, and a divine maker, because he is intellect, would be much more certain to reach his objectives than a human artisan. But how much more certain? To say that the Demiurge carries out his intention(s) completely—which presumably the comparative form used by Maximus (εὐστοχώτερος) leaves open—could lead to ambiguity, if not equivocation. We can allow for a Demiurge who can do so, while

(i) still admitting that there are intrinsic limitations to what he can accomplish and imagining a divine agent who aligns his intention(s) with such limitations. Moreover, (ii) such a position is also compatible with limitations still being operative in the ordered world, as we now experience it, as an irreducible remainder of chaos. Not to rehearse other arguments, the mere fact that the cosmos is an image or copy of the original intelligible paradigm, and as such requires a medium, entails an ontological deficiency that the Demiurge can do nothing about. The Stoics, by contrast, do not analyse the cosmos in terms of the distinction between a paradigm and an image or copy.

It seems, in the second part of Maximus' exposition (b), that even a divine Demiurge runs up against necessity and consequences of his activity. But what a Platonist and a Stoic mean when they talk about 'necessary and natural consequences' is altogether very different (see also Philo, *Prov.* 2.42 ff.). We need to remind ourselves here of a fundamental unresolved tension in Plato's description of the receptacle in the *Timaeus* (only one of many complications with this account): the receptacle represents both absolute neutrality in the absence of order (50a–51b) and a factor of chaos and active disorder (52d–53b). It is the latter that led to the traditional dualist reading of aligning a residual disorder with the receptacle/matter resisting the order imposed by the Demiurge. The Stoics, by contrast, as I have argued elsewhere (1999: 41–83), developed the first alternative by positing matter as a passive principle that is completely amenable to the ordering activity of the divine principle.

This stance also accounts for Chrysippus' interpretation (*SVF* 2.1170, Aulus Gellius 7.1) of the making of the human head in a fragment that bears some striking resemblances to Maximus' passage (Soury (1942) 69–70).¹⁵ Plato's Demiurge faces a dilemma: whichever choice he makes will have a trade-off. If he makes a thicker skull, human beings will be more slow-witted and dim; if he opts for a thinner cover, however, they will be more vulnerable and thus won't live as long (but cognitive acuity is more important, of course, than longevity). Chrysippus' god (Nature) does not face such a dilemma: the structure of the human head, as it is, is good, but given the order in nature, certain phenomena tend to occur together. This is the Stoic theory of consequences, or *parakolouthēsis*. Nature and necessity do not have negative connotations for a Stoic. Plato, by contrast, does not talk about consequences or side effects of a certain ordered structure—how certain features *go together* in nature—but about a fundamental, necessary *incompatibility* between sturdiness and sensitivity (75b1–2: οὐδαμῇ προσδέχεται... ἄμα; b4: εἴπερ ἄμα συμπίπτειν ἠθελησάτην—counterfactual; 75c6–7: μὲν/δέ construction).

In Maximus' account, the Demiurge accepts natural and necessary consequences for the sake of the whole (c). A Platonist would also be familiar with this line of reasoning from Book 10 of Plato's *Laws* (903 b4–d3): if human beings complain about troubles to which they are exposed, they should remember that they are merely a part of the whole, and that the part exists for the sake of the whole, not the other way around.

But here, too, two fundamentally different attitudes could follow from the realization of the order of the whole. One, which Maximus mentions first, is that the good at the macro-level sometimes requires evils at the human and micro-level (κακοῦσθαι). The Stoic position, however, is much stronger: if we have the correct view of Nature and Providence, nothing is, strictly speaking, evil.¹⁶ The order of the whole entails and is inextricably linked to the order of the parts. This order may at times be uncomfortable from a human point of view, especially if one has a wrong (read 'non-Stoic') value system, but as it stands, including the processes of change, it is a good order, through and through. In Aulus Gellius' Latin rendering of the necessary consequences of certain structures (*per sequellas quasdam necessarias*; compare to Maximus' ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀναγκαίαις καὶ ἐπομέναις φύσεις), Chrysippus talks about 'inconveniences' (*incommoda/incommoditas*), not 'evils' (*mala*).

Near the end of his analysis (d), Maximus leans towards this stronger position, quoting Heraclitus, who, as we know, was also claimed by the Stoics as an influence: what we may be inclined to call destruction is in reality preservation, though he concludes again with the notion of the preservation of the whole. Thus, on the issue of the connection between matter and evil, as in his discussion of the divine, Maximus oscillates between more Platonist and more Stoic leanings.

In Maximus, therefore, we witness a high point of a full-fledged doctrine of Providence in Platonist thinking that reveals a considerable Stoic influence—a stance that is not equally present in all so-called Middle Platonist authors (as briefly noted regarding Alcinoüs and Numenius). In a subsequent phase, Platonism moved away from this position: demiurgic activity, precisely because it is highly relational and connected to the physical universe, tended to move increasingly down the ontological ladder, that is, to become removed from the highest god; this in turn makes the notion of Providence much more problematic and harder to locate. In this analysis of how the divine operates according to Maximus of Tyre and in other related accounts, however, we have only briefly touched on the repercussions these questions could have for the self of human beings, whether in the relation between the human soul and body or the best type of life for humans to live.

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¹ See now also Powers (2013). A first version of this chapter was originally presented at a conference on ancient cosmologies at St Andrews University, organized by Alexander Long and Karla Pollmann. In addition to the conference organizers, I also would like to thank James Wilberding for his response at that event, and Gábor Betegh for his comments. Finally, I would like to thank the audience at the event in honour of Christopher Gill at Exeter University. Christopher Gill's own work has been an ongoing source of inspiration for many years.

² On this text see now also O'Brien (2015) 120–4.

³ Cf. also Cornutus 9.14 ff. ed. Lang, *Dio Or.* 12. 75–6, which includes the epithet *epikarpios* for Zeus (cf. 1.39); cf. also Aristides, *Or.* 43 (*Zeus*) 29–end Behr. A discussion of the ps.-Aristotle, *De Mundo* follows.

⁴ John Dillon (2003, 102–7) interprets the Xenocrates passage as referring to immanent divine agency, with the claim that thus the Old Academy already anticipated key aspects of Stoic physics, but the text does not need to be interpreted in this manner; cf. his own previous analysis (1986) and Reydams-Schils (2013). See also Maximus, *Or.* 8.8; compare with 11.12.

⁵ For a similar list of agency nouns, see Aristides (*Or.* 43, *Zeus*, 29–30 Behr).

⁶ See n. 2.

⁷ This image is particularly prevalent in the writings of Philo of Alexandria; see e.g. *Opif.* 21; *Leg.* 2.87–8; *Cher.* 86; *Post.* 69; *Ebr.* 32; *Fug.* 97; 197; *Decal.* 81.

⁸ For a recent assessment of this image in its different usages and contexts, see Van Nuffelen (2011, 122–46).

⁹ See also Betegh and Gregoric (2014) and Thom (2014, 114–19).

¹⁰ Pace Johansen (2004) and Sedley (2007, ch. 5); this interpretation of the *Timaeus* goes back to articles such as Morrow (1965).

¹¹ At 44c7, the notion is used in the plural and applied to the (plural) younger gods; at 44e4, the notion, in the singular this time, again refers to the activity of the younger gods.

¹² As e.g. in Calcidius' commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, ch. 31, on the providential role of the World Soul.

¹³ Compare also with *Philebus* 29a9–30d8 and *Cratylus* 400a8–10.

¹⁴ Trapp (1997) indicates that Maximus may have deviated from the Stoic position by extending Poseidon's influence over earth as well as water; but Maximus merely allegorizes the traditional Homeric epithet of Poseidon as 'earth-shaker', which he mentions explicitly in this context. Cornutus (ch. 4), who includes the same epithet, claims that Poseidon is the force that produces moisture in and around the earth. In connection with *Or.* 2.5, Van Nuffelen (2011), 103, claims that 'Maximus offers a "horizontal" alternative to the "vertical" solution of the hierarchy [of gods, in other accounts]'. But this insight, in turn, should have implications for how Maximus uses the image of the Great King and his satraps (which Van Nuffelen discusses in a subsequent chapter, 125–33), and it could lead to a tension that Van Nuffelen acknowledges in his chapter on Dio (152 and ff.).

¹⁵ On this topic, cf. also Bryan (2013). Contrary to Bryan, who aligns Plato's and Chrysippus' points of view, I emphasize the differences. Chrysippus, I would argue, rewrites Plato's account to make it fit with his own views on matter and Providence. Note, for instance, how Plato does not talk about consequences or side effects of a certain ordered structure, but about a fundamental incompatibility between sturdiness and sensitivity. Another example of Chrysippus' *rewriting* Plato would be his interpretation of the alignment between human and divine reason, DL 87–8.

¹⁶ For a recent reassessment of Zeus' industriousness according to the Stoics, cf. Bénatouil (2009).

The Indeterminate Self and its Cultivation in Plotinus

Nicholas Banner

φυγή δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.

This flight is assimilation to god insofar as is possible; and this assimilation is becoming just and holy through wisdom.

Plato, *Theaetetus* 176b

ἀλλ' ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι.

Our concern, however, is not be without sin, but to be god.

Plotinus, *On Virtues* (Enn. I.2[19]6.2–3)¹

The first quotation above, from Plato's *Theaetetus*, was a favourite locus for Platonists in the context of their quest for 'divinization'. The second quotation, from Plotinus, comes from a commentary on this Platonic passage. Plotinus removes the limits from Plato's account: whereas the passage from the *Theaetetus* qualifies the quest for divinization with the words 'insofar as possible', Plotinus emphasizes the sublime heights to which the human being may aspire in assimilation to the divine. For Plotinus, not only is the divinization of the human self possible in the most literal sense, but it is possible to the highest degree.

As Christopher Gill has argued, ancient Platonist concepts of the self can be characterized as 'objective-participant' rather than 'subjective-individualistic';² that is to say, when these philosophers explored their inner landscape they believed they were delving into a

shared world, rather than plunging ever further into the subjective. This insight is an essential starting point for approaching Plotinus' theory of the self. But Plotinus' account of the self is especially fascinating in that it shows a deep cognizance of precisely the kind of subjective, individualized aspects of human consciousness typical of modern, Western conceptions of selfhood, and *integrates* them with an objective-participant account of the self.³ The nature of this objective-participant self, moreover, is not limited to the individual soul, but potentially identifiable with the highest realities in the universe—in short, the human self, as well as potentially incorporating the subjective, individual 'personality', potentially incorporates universal, divine principles. The Plotinian self embraces in its nature a scale of realities reaching from the 'lowest' aspects of human personality and embodied, temporal action, to the 'highest' universal reality, the timeless, infinite, ineffable One beyond being.

This chapter sets itself two tasks. First, I propose a theoretical model, new in some respects, for understanding Plotinus' theory of the self as a whole, integrating the subjective and objective aspects of the Plotinian human being under a single rubric. The understanding of the Plotinian self proposed is a *transformational* and *indeterminate* one: transformational, in that the nature of the Plotinian self is best expressed not in terms of a static ontological scheme, but in terms of the transformations of realities into one another; and indeterminate, in that the nature or essence of the Plotinian self is not fully determined in Plotinus' text. The second section turns from theory to practice, addressing the question of Plotinian self-cultivation, the practical means by which the philosopher proposes that human beings may come to express the highest and best aspects of their own indeterminate nature.

1. The Theory of the Self in Plotinus

For Plotinus, it is well known, the universe is a scale of realities or hypostases.⁴ All that exists has its ultimate origin in the One or Good, which is ineffable, infinite, and beyond being itself. The One gives rise to *nous*, the divine intellect that contains the Forms, and universal *nous* gives rise the hypostasis of Soul, which in turn generates the World Soul or Soul-of-All, whence come the individual souls of human beings and other creatures.⁵ It is Soul which gives rise to extension

(viz. time and space) and particular qualities (ποιότητες), which do not exist at the higher levels of reality.⁶ At the bottom of the chain of being, lurking as it were beneath the level of Soul, we find matter, a formless lack of being which, becoming imprinted with the reality of the Forms in *nous*, gives rise to the world of the senses.⁷

The human being has a lower self which arises through the soul's attachment to matter; this self or pseudo-self, called by Plotinus the 'we' (ἡμεῖς), adds a subjective, temporal dimension to the self as a whole.⁸ Whether the 'we' should be interpreted as a true aspect of the human self or not is debated,⁹ but it is clear that it comprises most of what we would call, in modern terminology, the 'personality': it is the 'we' which has memories, attachments, and emotions.¹⁰

The philosopher's highest aspiration is to leave the lower self behind, ascending the chain of being step by step, through contemplation of each of the realities in turn, until he reaches the One itself.¹¹ This philosophic ascent involves much more than contemplation in the sense familiar to post-Kantian philosophy: it involves nothing less than the philosopher's transformation into each of the higher realities in turn. At the same time, the individual soul's identity does not disappear in the process of transformation.

The summary I have offered is intended only to set the stage for the tentative formulation of an overarching model of the Plotinian self outlined in Section 1.1. Such a model will need to be sufficiently general to account for the self in all its manifestations: as individual soul attached to a body, as divine, universal intellect, and even as the primordial One beyond being. In each of these iterations, the self is transformed, and each transformation, I will argue, brings with it a paradoxical situation wherein the soul ceases to be what it was and becomes something else, and yet retains something, difficult to name, by virtue of which it remains 'itself'. The model must thus embrace paradox in a certain way. Finally, any such model must have explanatory power; if successful, it will incorporate detailed scholarly analyses of each element of the Plotinian chain of being and its relation to the problem of self in Plotinus while serving as a basis for future synthetic approaches which attempt to understand the Plotinian self in its full scope.

Scholars differ on many points of interpretation vis-à-vis aspects of Plotinus' metaphysics of the self, and it is hoped that the model propounded below will in some measure allow for these divergences of opinion while remaining generally useful. Where, however, I have sided with a given interpretation or brought forward an idea of my own I have tried to note the fact explicitly.

A *caveat* is in order at this point. Schematic models such as the one

laid out in Section 1.1 are unpopular in Plotinian studies, both because they accord ill with Plotinus' style of philosophizing and have a tendency to iron out the particularities of different aspects of his thought. This will pertain especially to any attempt to consider the lower and higher realms of Plotinus' thought simultaneously, as each hypostasis has as it were a specific 'language' appropriate to it.¹² This problem becomes acute when the ineffable first principle, the One or Good, is under discussion. There are few unqualified statements which can be made about this reality; Plotinus denies it any attributes, even being (οὐσία) and, in some discussions, reality (ὑπόστασις) itself.¹³ Even its conventional names, drawn from Plato, of 'one' and 'good' are denied more than conventional and conditional validity.¹⁴ This being the case, we cannot say what the One 'is'; it is formally ineffable, and, indeed, it cannot be conceived of in thought, since it is beyond being and perfectly simple.¹⁵ At the same time, Plotinus does not shy away from trying to expound in some fashion the One's nature, and neither should scholarship. Throughout Section 1.1, the reader should keep in mind the apophatic principle that all statements made about the One should be read with the Plotinian οἷον in mind: that is, as intimations of a reality which is never fully encompassed by discourse.¹⁶

1.1 Towards a model of the Plotinian theory of the self

I propose five interpretative propositions with a view of enabling discourse about the Plotinian self in all its iterations. These are:

1. Each reality (hypostasis) is typified by a mode of knowing.
2. Ontology and epistemology cannot fundamentally be separated: knowing is being.
3. There is only one world, which may appear as multiple worlds or levels of reality depending on the ontological/epistemological level from which it is viewed and described.
4. To engage in the mode of knowing proper to a level of reality is to *be* that level of reality during (but only during) the act of knowing in question. However,
5. The moment of transformation of one hypostasis into another is irreducibly indeterminate in Plotinus' account.

Let us consider these propositions in turn.

1. With the first proposition, that *each level of Plotinian reality is typified by a mode of knowing*, I argue that each primary hypostasis has a state of consciousness or act of cognition which typifies it. The term ‘knowing’ here is used due to a lack of sound alternatives.¹⁷ As the following discussion makes clear, the term really only applies in its normal sense at the level of Soul. Nevertheless, each primary hypostasis engages in an activity which might be said to belong to the realm of epistemology.

The mode of cognition characteristic of the soul is διάνοια, or discursive thought.¹⁸ Discursive thought is limited with regards to its truth-claims, because it cannot grasp realities in their wholeness, but must deal with them analytically.¹⁹ It is the everyday mode of thinking in which human beings engage.

Noēsis, by contrast, is the faculty exercised by *nous*. This is the faculty by which truths are comprehended;²⁰ its ‘objects of thought’ are the Forms themselves.²¹ This act of intellection cannot in my view properly be termed ‘thought’,²² in that ‘thought’ generally implies a thinker, an object of thought, and an act of thinking, but in *noēsis* as Plotinus explains it these three elements are resolved into a single act,²³ which, occurring beyond time and space, cannot be said to ‘occur’ at all, in the normal sense of the term. Note that, for Plotinus, *nous* is its act of *noēsis*; the importance of this identity of knower and act of knowing will become clear in the light of the following proposition.

Turning to Plotinus’ primary hypostasis, the One, the question of whether it has any aspect which might be termed cognitive requires some scrutiny.²⁴ In an early treatise the One is said to exercise *κατανόησις*: ‘Its *κατανόησις* of itself is itself, something like an eternally stable self-consciousness and a *noēsis* different to that of *nous*.’²⁵ In later treatises Plotinus takes a more rigorously apophatic approach to the question of attributing consciousness to the first principle,²⁶ but is still willing in a relatively late treatise to attribute to it ‘awareness and hyper-intellection’.²⁷

Faced with these contradictory accounts, and aware that Plotinus’ apophatic treatment of the One will necessarily alternate between affirmation and denial,²⁸ a way forward can be found by looking at the One’s relationship to the cognition of *nous*. There is something in the One which gives rise to the *noēsis* in *nous*, a pre-noetic act of the One.²⁹ We can say of this pre-noetic act, whatever its precise nature, that it stands at the top of the chain of epistemology, while standing outside of the realm of knowing. We may, then, attribute a ‘hyper-epistemological’ activity to the One. Another way of understanding

the mode of 'knowing' attributed to the One in Plotinus is by examining the phenomenological side of the problem: I return to Plotinus' narratives of contact with the One below, arguing that the hyper-knowing of the One, and Plotinus' phenomenological descriptions of the self's encounter with it, should be considered as two approaches to the same thing, namely a transcendent mode of hyper-knowing typical of the first principle or of the self assimilated to the first principle.

2. The second proposition, that *ontology and epistemology cannot fundamentally be separated in Plotinus*, is a strong statement of a fact noted by many scholars, namely the difficulty in drawing a clear line between the two realms in Plotinus' thought.³⁰ It is not that ontological and epistemological language are inappropriate for discussing Plotinus' philosophy, but that we should understand them, as I feel Plotinus does, as partial, complementary ways of describing the same phenomena.

The identity of the realms of knowing and being is clear at the level of Plotinus' *nous*, wherein knowing (νόησις) is being (οὐσία);³¹ this should alert us immediately to the inadequacy of the terms 'ontology' and 'epistemology' for understanding Plotinus' world-view, if these terms are understood as describing completely separate fields of knowledge.

At the level of *nous* this conceptual overlap is very clear; but I would argue for a thoroughgoing parallelism of ontological and epistemological aspects of reality at all levels of the Plotinian universe. Soul is typified by discursive thought, διάνοια. At the level of *dianoia* thoughts move sequentially in time from topic to topic, and admit of error; similarly, the bodily nature is subject to change and decay, unlike the eternal, pure beings which are its archetypes, the Forms. The soul attached to the body thus both cognizes and exists partially. True, the being of the embodied soul is not identical with its cognition, as it is in *nous*. I would argue, however, that the two conceptual realms cannot be fully separated even at the level of the individual soul, since the parallelism between Soul's typical mode of cognition and typical mode of being derives from and expresses, imperfectly, the perfect identity of the two realms in *nous*. Further support for this position will be given where I discuss the way in which the type of cognition chosen by a soul determines its ontological state, meaning that epistemology determines ontology in a direct causal relationship.

In the case of the One, the parallelism between epistemology and ontology is again evident. The One, as we have seen, possesses a type

of apprehension which is not apprehension but which gives rise to the cognition in *nous*. Similarly, the One is beyond being but the cause of being. In both cases, then, the One stands at the top of the chain of reality, transcending both epistemology and ontology. As a perfectly simple entity (or non-entity), separate hyper-ontological and hyper-epistemological aspects cannot be attributed to the One; hyper-being is thus hyper-knowing.

Throughout the Plotinian universe, then, epistemology and ontology overlap, and, in the case of *nous*, are two approaches to a single reality. The key importance of this proposition for Plotinus' theory of the self will appear in the following section, where his practical methodologies for transformation are discussed, since the Plotinian self seeking to rise through the chain of reality could approach the problem from either side of the question, seeking either an ontological transformation (through purification, for example) or a cognitive transformation (such as that attained through the exercise of the noetic faculty), but the realities of the transformation thus entailed will in either case partake of both the ontological and the epistemological.

3. The third proposition is that *there is only one world for Plotinus, which may appear as multiple worlds or levels of reality depending on the ontological/epistemological level from which it is viewed and described*. That is to say, the universe is understood as a series of levels of reality by a soul attached to a body; viewed noetically, *sub specie aeternitatis*, it appears as a unity which nevertheless contains otherness or multiplicity;³² for the One, there is nothing but the One, which transcends all attributes.³³ Thus, although we are forced by the discursive nature of language and thought to discuss Plotinus' universe as a kind of metaphysical chain, the reality to which language points is to be understood as an unbroken continuum.

These three metaphysical propositions lead cumulatively to a fourth and fifth, which should be taken together as expressing what I believe to be a central and irreducible paradox in Plotinus' theory of the transformational self. Before approaching these, however, it will be useful to explore in more detail the way in which the transformative ascent of the soul is thought by Plotinus to occur. Keeping Propositions 1 and 2 in mind, we may divide Plotinus' explanations of the ways in which transformation occurs into two main types—transformation through a faculty of consciousness, or transformation of ontological state—remembering that these apparently different approaches in fact describe the same metaphysical events.

How is it possible that the discursive thought of the soul should

partake of the timeless knowing of truth which is Plotinus' *noēsis*? Sometimes Plotinus posits a human mediating faculty—*phantasia*—which allows the insights of *nous* to be 'translated' into temporal terms.³⁴ Elsewhere, the *noēsis* exercised by the individual is described as an act proper to soul—whether some kind of subsidiary *nous* or a trace (ἵχνος) of *nous* in the soul.³⁵ But Plotinus also makes the ontological claim that soul, when it engages in *noēsis*, is *nous*.³⁶ He says of *noēsis*: 'That is why we make use of it and do not make use of it—whereas reason we always use—and it is ours when we use it, but when we do not use it, it is not ours.'³⁷ Note, for the moment, that the soul's participation in *noēsis* may be described either as a *nous* which is not *nous* (being a faculty of the soul), or alternately a state in which the soul becomes *nous* and is no longer soul.

Let us turn to the way in which *nous* relates to the One. The One, as we have seen, is beyond any form of apprehension or cognition; how, then can *nous* apprehend it? Plotinus at times theorizes a highest level of *noēsis*, a faculty capable of bridging the ontological divide between the properly noetic 'knowledge' of the Forms and the One itself. Plotinus speaks in several passages of a 'higher intellect',³⁸ as well as a 'highest point of *nous*' to which the philosopher's self may travel and establish itself.³⁹ But he also describes a pre-noetic principle within the One itself, or a 'multiple one' which comes after the truly simple One and bridges the 'gap' between non-being and being.⁴⁰ In other accounts, again, *nous* contemplates the One by a '*nous* which is not *nous*',⁴¹ sometimes described as a seeing⁴² or even a touching⁴³ rather than as *noēsis*. Plotinus also uses in this context words denoting cognition of sorts, but foreign to the Platonist tradition,⁴⁴ seeking, one assumes, ways to describe an apprehension which is not an apprehension by avoiding the usual terms for describing cognitions.⁴⁵ When *nous* does not see the One, it is *nous*, but when it does see, it is no longer *nous*. On the one hand, then, there is some kind of faculty residing in either the One or in *nous* which allows the apparent divide between them to be bridged, while on the other, *nous*, to apprehend the One, must cease ontologically to be *nous*, and its mode of apprehension must cease to be *noēsis*.

4. This brings us to the fourth proposition, that, for Plotinus, *to engage in the mode of knowing proper to a level of reality is to be that level of reality, during (but only during) the act of knowing.*

This proposition implies a negative corollary: since, in order to engage with the One, *nous* must cease to be *nous*, and in order to engage fully in *noēsis*, soul must cease to be soul, we can say that *to engage in a mode of knowing/being proper to a given level is to cease (temporarily) to*

know/be in the mode proper to a lower level, during (and only during) the act of knowing in question.⁴⁶ The relevance of these temporal terms to atemporal transformations is addressed below.

5. Proposition 4 must be balanced with Proposition 5: *the moment of transformation of one hypostasis into another is irreducibly indeterminate in Plotinus' text*. We have seen, at the junctures between the hypostases, transformations of state of being (soul becoming *nous* and ceasing to be soul; *nous* becoming the One and ceasing to be *nous*) and we have also seen a number of different models of faculties of cognition, sometimes vaguely defined and sometimes defined in contradictory ways, by which lower realities may contemplate higher ones and thereby transcend the limitations of their mode of cognition.

The modes of knowing dance across the hypostatic borders: *noēsis* may be described as a faculty of soul or of *nous*, just as the highest *noēsis* of *nous* may be described as a pre-noetic *noēsis* in the One which bridges the border between the two realities. Similarly, the changes in ontological state undergone during the ascent seem to straddle the realities: a soul may be *nous* yet not be *nous*; the highest point of *nous* may equally be described as a 'multiple One'.

Plotinus emphasizes the continuity of his realities by blurring the edges between them in his text, allowing a conceptual bleed whereby Soul and *nous* overlap at their 'borders', as do *nous* and the One; in a formulation which partakes of the *Sorites* paradox, there is never a metaphysical 'moment' at which we can say: 'Soul has now becomes *nous* and ceases to be Soul.'⁴⁷ The realities seem to flicker in their essential state of reality like quantum particles.⁴⁸

Plotinus seems at various points to locate human identity in the 'we', the individual soul, in the higher aspects of Soul, in the Intellect, or even in the One itself. Can we say, then, where the human self resides? I would argue that we cannot, if by so doing we fix the identity of the self in the ontological/epistemological framework. The Plotinian self, globally understood, is a spectrum of potentialities for epistemological/ontological transformation, all of which represent, *in potentia*, possible identities for the human soul.

However, finally and paradoxically, while the identity of the self may be totally transformed, *the identity of the individual self is never lost*. In a radical *détournement* of Aristotle's description of a friend as 'another self', Plotinus applies this epithet to *nous*;⁴⁹ selfhood, if we may still use that term, is not lost through identification with Intellect. Even in union with the One, the soul finds not an emptiness or a loss of self, but 'the self itself'.⁵⁰ The ineffable union or contact with the One is, paradoxically, the ultimate affirmation of self-unity,⁵¹ which,

however, may also be expressed as an absolute loss of self.⁵²

2. The Cultivation of the Self in Plotinus

Turning from the theoretical to the practical, the theory of the self outlined above begs several questions. First of all, how do we find ourselves in the state of being unrealized gods, or God? The majority of mankind, for Plotinus, live their lives without realizing their potential divinity. Plotinus follows Platonic precedent in an elitist view of humanity: the majority will never be philosophers, and only the philosopher, the σπουδαῖος, possesses the ability to rise above the sensory world, step by step, towards divinization.⁵³ In turning to the question of method, we should keep in mind that the practical divinization which is the true good of the soul for Plotinus is limited, by the facts of human nature as Plotinus sees them, to a minute fraction of the human population.⁵⁴

But, even granting this peculiar fact of human nature, the philosopher faces a further predicament in that, even when he has concretely realized his essential godhood, he still finds himself attached, in the end, to the material human body. Plotinus expresses bafflement at this state of affairs:

Often, awakening to my self from the body, and becoming separate from all other externals, going within myself (ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ εἶσω), I have seen an extraordinarily marvellous beauty. Convinced then that this was far the better portion, I actually lived the best life, and was assimilated to the divine (ζῶην τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θεῷ εἰς ταῦτόν γεγεννημένος). Establishing myself in that, I came to that noetic reality above all others and established myself there. After this establishment in the divine, having descended from intellect to discursive reasoning, I am baffled by how I have now come down, and how my soul has ever come to be within the body, when it has shown itself to be of such [a nature] by itself (τοῦτο οὕσα, οἷον ἐφάνη καθ' ἑαυτή), even when in the body.⁵⁵

This famous passage illustrates one of Plotinus' great strengths as a philosopher: he does not shy away when theoretical points become problematic in relation to the lived experience of the philosopher's self.

Plotinus describes here a sojourn in *nous*. This is not presented as a metaphorical description: the philosopher 'actually lived the best life'. How does this experience, theoretically atemporal and thus, one

would think, in some way eternal, come to be followed by a return to the body and to temporal, sensory reality? Plotinus also describes his ‘establishment’ in the higher *nous*, which borders on the One itself. At this level of knowing/being, the philosopher is at the indeterminate edge of being and knowing, beyond which there is only a reality about which nothing may properly be said. Plotinus would seem to be baffled with good reason.

I would like to adduce to this passage Porphyry’s description of Plotinus’ encounters with the supreme reality of the One:

And so, often strongly spurred on by this spiritual light [δαμονίῳ φωτὶ, i.e. Plotinus’ presence to *nous*] toward the first and transcendent god in his thoughts, and according to the ways of ascent taught in Plato’s *Symposium*, that god appeared which has neither shape nor Form, but is established above *nous* and the entire noetic [reality]. And I, Porphyry, declare that I once drew near and was united (ἐνωθῆναι) to it, in my sixty-eighth year.⁵⁶ So the goal appeared to Plotinus, being not far removed. For his end and goal was to become one with and to draw near to the god which is above all things. And it happened four times, when I was in his presence, that he [attained to] this goal, not only *in potentia*, but in ineffable actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ ἀρρήτῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμει).⁵⁷

In both Plotinus’ and Porphyry’s narratives, the higher states of being/consciousness are depicted *sub specie temporalitatis*; they are described as temporary states of elevation which subsequently fade or ‘wear off’, returning the sage to the bodily existence of the ‘we’. From the point of view of the lived human life, then, there is some justification in the old-fashioned description of the Late Platonists as ‘mystics’, if by this we mean people engaged in seeking after non-ordinary and elevated states of consciousness. But, quite apart from the methodological limitations of the concept ‘mysticism’,⁵⁸ we should remember the first proposition of the Plotinian theory of the self formulated above: the quest for divinization is seen by Plotinus not as a search for higher states of consciousness alone, but for higher states of consciousness/being. The transformation sought is epistemological *and* ontological. The theory of the self outlined above rules out the model of the philosopher’s self engaged in a kind of ‘jumping’ into temporarily heightened states of awareness,⁵⁹ since *noēsis* and the union with the One are not temporal events; But, taking Proposition 3 into account, these states may justly be described as temporary from the limited point of view of the embodied soul.

2.1 Towards a Plotinian methodology for philosophical ascent

Porphyry's reference to 'the ways of ascent taught in Plato's *Symposium*' points us towards the question of method. The 'ascent' referred to, the ἀναγωγή, has its *locus classicus* in the 'mysteries of Diotima' in Plato's *Symposium*,⁶⁰ but, while it may be possible to interpret Plato's text as describing a purely epistemological ascent—the intellectual discipline of induction—we can be confident in describing the Plotinian ἀναγωγή as a step-by-step ontological/epistemological transformation. There can be no question of its being merely a 'conceptual' ascent, due to the unity of being and knowing in *nous*. The use of the term ἀναγωγή in contemporary philosophico-magical literature to describe the adept's ascent through successive astral levels towards the superlunary realms⁶¹ is instructive in this regard: the ascent in both cases is theorized as not conceptual, but practical. Plotinus' descriptions of his travels through the noetic world towards its summit⁶² indicate a similar ontological commitment, and we must be wary of interpreting them as metaphorical, without giving strong reasons for believing that Plotinus intends them as such.

Is there a practical method which Plotinus recommends for attaining to this transformative ascent through the levels of reality? Plotinus himself tends to leave the practicalities of life unvisited in his writings, but we are able, with judicious culling of comments from Porphyry, to draw up an incomplete model of Plotinian spiritual practice.⁶³

Porphyry describes Plotinus' daily regimen, which we might characterize as a moderate asceticism.⁶⁴ This asceticism is contextualized by Porphyry as a means for separating the attention from the body and of maximizing the philosopher's presence to *nous*. Porphyry describes this presence as a kind of focused vigilance which Plotinus exercised with exceptional intensity: 'He was present both to himself and to others, and he never relaxed this self-directed attention except in sleep; and this he reduced by taking little food—often he ate not even a piece of bread—and by his constant turning (ἐπιστροφή) towards his intellect.'⁶⁵

The picture painted by Plotinus' biographer is of a sage who, even while engaging in day-to-day activities, is present to *nous*, and who practises a programmatic sleep-deprivation in pursuit of this focused presence. There is thus no contradiction, in Porphyry's eyes, between the coexistence of the embodied self, the 'we', with the transcendental, noetic self. Perhaps this is a concrete picture of what Plotinus means when he says, 'For we are not cut off from it [sc. *nous*], even now.'⁶⁶ This passage depicts, I would argue, a basic regimen of philosophical conduct meant to be conducive to the ascent of the Platonist self, as well as perhaps illustrating the way in which the indeterminate self may exist 'in the world but not of it'.

Plotinus himself discusses the cultivation of the presence of *nous* in practical terms. The philosopher is exhorted to ‘move towards’ *nous*; to leave behind the world of *dianoia*, and to ‘turn inward’ towards the noetic universe, therein to dwell, contemplating the eternal verities.⁶⁷ In some passages, as we have seen, Plotinus says that the soul, in focusing its consciousness in *nous*, becomes or is unified with *nous*. Reading Porphyry and Plotinus together, the practice of noetic transformation, put into its everyday context, would seem to mean that the philosopher may be simultaneously the ‘we’ and the divine intellect; ‘simultaneously’, that is, when viewed by an observer like Porphyry, whose observations come from the temporal perspective of the ‘we’.

Other day-to-day points of practice may be adduced. Plotinus of course sees the practice of the virtues as essential for the philosophic life. Drawing on discussions in Plato, he recognizes two main types of virtues, *politikai* and *katharseis*, the latter of a higher nature than the former.⁶⁸ The higher virtues are often described in terms drawn from mystery-cult, a fact which emphasizes their preliminary, but essential, nature: just as the Eleusinian mysteries proper could not be experienced without the ritual κάθαρσις, so the higher ‘initiations’ of philosophy could not be entered into by those who had not first purified their souls of gross attachments and spiritual vices.⁶⁹ We may take it, then, that a code of virtuous conduct was presupposed before the ascent could commence in earnest, and that this code was conceived as having a practical effect vis-à-vis the ascent: that is, it allowed for higher transformations of the self by purifying the soul from attachments to the material and the sensory (again, a practical rather than a ‘conceptual’ purification).⁷⁰

But both of these types of virtue are inferior to philosophic virtue proper; this is the elite code to be followed by those undertaking the ascent in full earnest.⁷¹ The late antique Platonist way of life involved the pursuit of dialectic in the company of other philosophers. One might presume that this would be merely a conceptual activity, it being unclear how discourse might move one beyond the constraints of *dianoia*. But in fact Plotinus theorizes two forms of dialectic: a purely discursive form, which perhaps corresponds to the introductory levels of the Platonist curriculum,⁷² and a higher level which partakes of noetic truth and, eventually, transcends *dianoia* entirely. The relationship between the discursive and non-discursive components of the journey is discussed at the opening of Treatise 20, *On Dialectic*:

What skill or method or practice leads us up (ἀνάγει) to where we need to go? We may take it that where it is we need to get to—the good and the first principle—is agreed, and demonstrated by many proofs. And, indeed, this process of proof was a kind of ascent (ἀναγωγή τις ἤν).⁷³

Plotinus goes on to describe the aspirant's entry into *nous*, expressed topographically, and traversal of the noetic territory to its 'highest point', nearest to the One (Il. 13–18). At this stage of the process *dianoia* has been left behind (although the moment of its abandonment is indeterminate), and Plotinus' qualification of his school's dialectical proofs as ἀναγωγὴ τις should be read as just that: 'a kind of ascent', rather than the ascent in its truest form. The ascent begins as a conceptual movement; once its proper momentum is achieved, however, it becomes fully epistemological/ontological. We may say, then, that the exercise of the properly philosophic virtue, the contemplative life, is a higher propaedeutic for the ascent into the noetic, but does not itself constitute that ascent: with regard to virtue, the concern of the philosopher is always ultimately 'not be without sin, but to be god'.⁷⁴

The methodological picture being drawn is of a progressive educational process whereby the conceptual gives way to the noetic. In his multiple approaches to describing the experience or reality of *nous*, Plotinus also divides the ascent into grades: we have seen a *nous* which acts somehow 'within' *dianoia* (perhaps an individual intellect), *nous* proper, and a higher noetic faculty which shades off into the hypernoetic, the 'summit of *nous*' (or a somehow 'multiple' one). The process of 'ascent' is always depicted in this step-by-step manner by Plotinus, and the method of Plato's *Symposium* is of course the paradigm for the approach. Plotinus' concept of *erōs* also relies heavily on the *Symposium*. It is *erōs* for the good which drives the soul towards its ultimate principle.⁷⁵ The graded ascent, driven by *erōs*, from specifics to *generalia*, and finally to the ultimate cause is the method of Plato's *Symposium* which Porphyry attributes to Plotinus.

It is very difficult to descry specific methodologies for the ascent above the level of soul. This should not be surprising, as the events 'there' cannot fully be encompassed by the discursive thinking which we use to reason about them 'here'. However, Plotinus gives us many indications as to how the noetic ascent proceeds. Overall, the ascent mirrors the structure of reality, each level of knowledge/being transforming in turn into the level 'above' it in the chain of reality; it reverses the process of ontogenesis, in fact, as the soul moves back along the causal chain through which it came to be. The ascent is sometimes described as a process of progressive 'unification' (ἔνωσις), whereby the soul identifies itself progressively with the World Soul, then the hypostasis Soul, followed by *nous* and, at last, the One.⁷⁶ It may also be depicted negatively as a process of ἀφαίρεσις, the progressive *removal* of all that which is not the entity which the soul wishes to know/be: the soul will shed the body and sense-perception in its movement towards *nous*, and eventually shed *nous* itself and all

multiplicity in its movement towards the pure simplicity of the One.⁷⁷ Ἀφαίρεσις has ontological and epistemological aspects, or it may be that, as with dialectic, Plotinus views it as a process with two phases: a first phase, the removal of false concepts, a mainly epistemological phase which takes place at the level of *dianoia*,⁷⁸ and a later, concrete phase of epistemological/ontological transformation wherein, eventually, all multiplicity and otherness present in the soul is stripped away.⁷⁹ The classic description of this method occurs in Treatise 49. Passing beyond discursive descriptions, and even *nous* itself, in approaching the One, the soul suddenly ‘takes light’ (φῶς λαβῆ),⁸⁰

and being enlightened, it has what it sought, and this is the true goal of the soul, to touch that light and to see it through itself, not through another light, but it itself, by which it also sees. For that by which it is enlightened is that which it must see; for neither is the sun [seen] by the light of another. So how does this happen? Take away everything (ἄφελε πάντα)!⁸¹

It may seem that the discussion has strayed from the subject of practical method, but this is in fact not the case. The higher aspects of the ascent take place in the higher realities themselves, or, put another way, *as* the higher realities themselves; i.e., I would argue, the philosopher’s self, inasmuch as it becomes pure *nous*, is no longer the individual self, the ‘we’ of the embodied soul.⁸² It is no wonder that neither Plotinus nor Porphyry describes these processes of transformation in seemingly everyday terms. And yet, as we have seen, Porphyry contextualizes even the supreme transformation of the philosopher’s inner self in terms of the everyday philosophic life: Plotinus’ bodily nature did not disappear when he was united with the first principle, nor did the philosopher find himself permanently freed of matter, despite his extensive sojourns in the noetic realm. In fact, Plotinus’ bafflement at embodiment may seem to signal an insoluble problem. But several further points deserve highlighting which may help to clarify this seeming tension at the intersection of theory and practice.

3. Dilemmas and Conclusions

The problems of evil, of ignorance, indeed, of existence at all, are recurring themes in Plotinus’ philosophy. Many scholars would argue that some or all of them are never solved satisfactorily. Why does the perfect, self-subsisting One give rise to a world of seeming change,

and why, if our place in that universe is potentially that of gods and, indeed, of some form of ineffable unity with the One itself, do we find ourselves mired in seeming and becoming?

I would suggest, first of all, that taking into account Plotinus' philosophy of knowing/being, with the constraints it places on the lower rungs of the hierarchy of realities, it makes perfect sense that no fully satisfactory account of reality should be attainable by embodied souls engaging in philosophic writing. In other words, Plotinus does not believe that the *Enneads* will ever give a complete account of reality, which arises from an ineffable reality and is fundamentally reducible to that reality. Secondly, I feel that by embracing the pervasive strategies of indeterminacy employed by Plotinus we are better able to understand Plotinus' account of reality. Reality, for Plotinus, is not what we say it is, but rather 'what *it* says it is',⁸³ and he wants to remind us of this as forcefully as he can.

The human self, as an integral part of this unknowable reality, is *ipso facto* in part unknowable: the theory of the indeterminate self allows Plotinus to tell us many things about the self, while simultaneously reminding us of our own divine, transcendent potential without devaluing that potential by reducing it to the strictly describable. I would argue further that the indeterminacy of the transition-points of the hypostases remarked upon throughout this chapter (the shading off of *nous*, for example, into a not-*nous* which may also be described as a One-which-is-not-One) should be seen as another strategy for expressing the continuity of reality, and the self's universal place within that reality. Rather than multiplying the intermediary entities in his scheme of reality, an approach which Plotinus condemns in his Gnostic opponents,⁸⁴ or reducing his continuum into discrete pockets of reality, Plotinus textually blurs the edges of the hypostases. In the continuum of Plotinian reality, no reality stands apart from all the other realities in an absolute sense, and even the transcendence of the One may be described as a paradoxical immanence.⁸⁵

Focusing more narrowly on the problem of embodiment and temporality, we might return to the dilemma of embodied existence which haunted Plotinus in the passage cited from Treatise 6, and which underlies many of the treatises of the *Enneads*. Specifically, we might enquire, in the spirit of Christopher Gill, if Plotinus' philosophy of the indeterminate self has anything to tell us about our own lived existence. At first glance, the answer would seem to be negative. The emphasis on metaphysics in the discussion above presents one problem for the dominant paradigm of the modern West: it would seem that, if one did not accept Plotinus' picture of reality, one would have no reason to accept his recommendations for the care of the self,

and immaterial realities seem to be disappearing from Western world-views. Again, Plotinus' picture of the transcendent destiny of the realized self would seem to denigrate, or at least to place very little importance on, the self as we commonly understand it: the 'person', the 'individual', the 'character' are all exalted in the modern Western world-view but viewed by Plotinus as accidental, temporary, and of fundamentally lesser reality than the hypostases. This is not to say that he does not try to understand this personal self; on the contrary, his account of the 'we' represents an unprecedented attempt in ancient philosophy to account for the self as subject. But he wishes, ideally, to go beyond this self, and exhorts his readers to do the same. Modern psychologies generally aim to 'improve' the self rather than to transcend it.

One possible approach to the Plotinian theory of the self is to attempt to 'rescue' it from metaphysics. Some such attempt, arguably, lies behind some of the 'postmodern' uses which have been made of Late Platonist metaphysics.⁸⁶ Another possible approach is to embrace Plotinus' metaphysics in the face of a modern social reality which largely denies their validity. This seems to be a rare approach nowadays, especially in an academic context, but by no means an impossible position to take.

In the end, the test for the Plotinian theory of the self would be to live the Plotinian way of life, and attempt the Plotinian ascent. While it is difficult to imagine exactly what form this would take in a modern context, it should not be a priori impossible. If we think of Porphyry's portrayal of Plotinus' day-to-day life, and the seamless inclusion of the highest states of spiritual transformation within that picture, and then remember what we know of the tumultuous, venal, and violent third-century Rome within which this life was lived, it perhaps becomes easier to envisage a modern Plotinian path. Such a path would never be for the majority, but this is exactly as it should be by the premises of Platonist philosophy itself.

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¹ References to the *Enneads* are to the *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer (1964–83) by *Ennead*, Number [Chronological order of treatise], Chapter, Lines. Otherwise-unattributed references are to the *Enneads*, and otherwise-unattributed translations are my own. This chapter has benefited greatly from the comments of Prof. John Bussanich.

² See Gill (1996) 11–12 *et passim*.

³ The modern term 'self' brings with it psychological assumptions foreign to ancient thought in general, and perhaps especially so to non-naturalistic Platonist conceptions of the human being (cf. Remes (2007) 3–4). What this chapter means by the term will emerge in the course of the discussion.

⁴ The doctrine of the three primary hypostases is laid out most clearly in the polemic Treatise 33 (II.9.1–2); cf. e.g. V.1[10].

⁵ The hypostatic Soul is capitalized in what follows, in distinction to the individual soul.

⁶ There is no time in *nous*: e.g. IV.4[28]1.11–14; VI.7[38]1.40. Indeed, hypostasis is by definition free of extension: VI.9[9]6.10–12; VI.3[20]8.35 ff. See Rist (1961) 161; Anton (1977) 258 n. 2. Qualities arise through thinking, when discursive thought (proper to soul rather than *nous*, as discussed below) grasps the Forms and produces imitations of them: II.6[17]3.10–20.

⁷ II.4[12]15; III.6[26]7.9.

⁸ On the Plotinian ἡμεῖς, see O'Daly (1973); Oosthout (1991) 31–42; Aubry (2008).

⁹ O'Daly (1973) gives a positive account of the 'we', attributing to it a good degree of what we might call 'selfhood', noting that, for Plotinus, the 'we' is a ruling

principle (e.g. 29–31, citing IV.7[2]1.22, IV.4[28]18.14). By contrast, Bréhier (1958) 72–3 sees it not as an entity, but as an activity, an approach followed by Aubry (2008), who defines it as a coupling between the soul proper and the lower self rather than an entity per se, and denies that it is a locus of identity (Aubry (2008) 108).

¹⁰ I use the modern term ‘personality’, which has no precise ancient Greek equivalent, to indicate the set of characteristics which Plotinus refers to most commonly as ἡθῆ (see Sleeman and Pollet (1980) s.v.).

¹¹ See e.g. IV.8[6]1.1–11; V.1[10]1–2, 4; I.3[20]1 *et passim*; II.9[33]17.32.

¹² For an appreciation of the ways in which Plotinus speaks from the ‘points of view’ of different hypostases (often mingling these points of view), see Bussanich (1996) 53–5. This literary technique will be an important avenue of future interpretation of Plotinus.

¹³ Nothing may be predicated of the One: II.9[33]1.5–8; III.7[45]2.6–7; the One beyond being: e.g. V.1[10]6.2–8; VI.8[39]19.12–19. Aubenque (1971) is a good introduction to Plotinus’ conceptualization of the One as ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. The One not hypostasis: VI.8[39]7.46–7; 10.27–8.

¹⁴ VI.9[9]5.38–42; V.3[11]23–4; III.8[30]9.16–18; cf. V.5[32]6.26–30; II.9[33]1.1–8.

¹⁵ Ineffable: VI.9[9]4.11–12: οὐδὲ ῥητὸν οὐδὲ γραπτὸν, citing Pl. *Ep. VII.* 341c5; V.3[49]13.1: ἄρρητον. Ineffable because beyond being: V.4[7]1.9–11; VI.9[9]3.1–3, 51; III.8[30]8.31, 9.12; VI.7[38]15–16, 41; V.3[49]11. Ineffable because utterly simple and partless: V.3[49]17.21–25; cf. VI.8[39]8. See Hoffmann (1997) 343.

¹⁶ See VI.8[39]13.47–50 for the methodology of qualification of statements about the One: λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ οἶον ἐφ’ ἐκάστου. See Heiser (1991) 63.

¹⁷ ‘Knowing’ is not a good translation of *noēsis*, as discussed below (cf. Bussanich (1988) 6, where ‘intellection’ is preferred). I keep the term, however, since my argument is framed in terms of epistemology and ontology, and ‘knowing’ is the best term by which the whole range of phenomena falling under the rubric of epistemology can be indicated. This extended usage should be taken into account throughout this chapter.

¹⁸ For διέξοδος, ‘discursivity’, see V.9[5]7.9–11; VI.2[19]21.27–8; V.8[31]6.7–12; VI.6[34]16.23; cf. III.7[45]11.22–5. Both διάνοια and λογισμός are forms of discursive thought typical of soul and absent in *nous*: V.1[10]8.27; IV.3[49]18.1–19. See Blumenthal (1971) 100–11. Cf. Oosthout (1991) 83–4.

¹⁹ There is no need for discursive elaboration in *nous*, which is ‘prior to reasoning’ (VI.7[38]9.9–10). Cf. V.8[31]13.3, with regard to the One.

²⁰ For Plotinus, famously, ‘Truth is what it says it is’ (V.3[49]5.25; cf. 10.35). On this ‘identity theory of truth’, see Emilsson (1996) 238–9; cf. Rappe (2000) 28; Emilsson (2007) 13.

²¹ See in particular V.5[32].

²² See e.g. VI.9[9]6.52–5. The debate about what, if anything, Plotinian *noēsis* would mean in modern terms is a lively one, but unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.

²³ V.3[49]6.7–8: νοῦς γὰρ καὶ νόησις ἓν· καὶ ὅλος ὅλῳ, οὐ μέρει ἄλλο μέρος; V.9[5]5.7–48, 8.3–4; V.4[7]2.46–51; VI.9[9]5.14–15V.1[10]4.21; V.3[49]5.21–48; I.8[51]2.16. See Sorabji (1982) 310–11; Sells (1994) 23; Hoffmann (1997) 342.

²⁴ On the problem of the One’s consciousness, see Rist (1967) 36–52; Schroeder (1987); Emilsson (2007) 71–2.

²⁵ V.4[7]2.17–19.

²⁶ E.g. III.9[13]9; III.8[30]11.13–15; VI.7[38]41.26–7.

²⁷ VI.8[39]16.32: ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὑπερνόησις.

²⁸ See Sells (1985); Sells (1994) 14–33; Bussanich (1996) 63.

29 VI.8[39]18.21–2.

30 Cf. Mortley (1975) 370; Rappe (2000) 25–44; Mazur (2010) 33.

31 See e.g. Plotinus' many citations of Parmen. fr. B3 DK: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι: V.9[5]5.29–30; V.1[10]8.17–18; V.6[24]6.22–3; VI.7[38]41.18; I.4[46]10.6; III.5[50]7.51.

32 See e.g. VI.9[9]6.52–5.

33 VI.7[38]39.19–33.

34 IV.3[49]30.1–16: *Noēsis* is constant, but 'we' are not aware of it until the faculty of φαντασία gives us its ἀντίληψις.

35 *Noēsis* in souls may be described as a subsidiary *nous* to the 'nous above' (V.3[49]2), known as 'dividing intellect' (μερίζων νοῦς, V.9[5]8.20–3, cf. 9, 1–2), the 'inner intellect' (ὁ ἐνδον νοῦς, V.3[49]14.14–15), or the soul's own intellect (νοῦν οἰκεῖον ἐχούσης [sc. ψυχῆς], V.2[11]2.9–10; V.3[49]3–4). Plotinus elsewhere proposes a model whereby the absolute truths of *nous* are 'filtered' through discursive thought, resulting in a fragmented 'trace' (ἵχνος) of *noēsis* at the level of soul (e.g. V.3[49]3.10–12).

36 e.g. VI.5[23]12.16–25; IV.4[28]2.27–30; VI.7[38]35.4; V.3[49]4–5. See Bussanich (1996) 56. Plotinus elsewhere describes the function of *noēsis* in discursive thought as a 'state' (ἔξις) of the soul, which seems a related idea (I.1[53]8.2. Cf. V.9[5]3.21–4, 33–7; V.3[49]2.14–25).

37 V.3[49]3.26–9, trans. Oosthout.

38 VI.9[9]3.26–7;; V.5[32]8.22; VI.7[38]35.19–24; V.3[49]14.15. On this 'higher nous' in Plotinus see Rist (1964a); Schroeder (1985); Mazur (2010) 7–8.

39 I.3[20]1.16–18; IV.8[31]1.1–11.

40 Pre-noetic principle: VI.8[39]18.21–2. 'Multiple one': VI.7[38]8.18–20.

41 V.5[32]8.22–3.

42 I.6[1]7.9; VI.9[9]7.20, 9.56; V.8[31]11.2; V.5[32]8.10–12; VI.7[38]34.13, 36.20.

43 'Touching' or contact with the One: e.g. VI.9[9]4.27, 7.4, 9.55, 11.24; V.6[24]6.21–35; VI.7[38]39.15–19; VI.8[39]11.10–13; V.3[49]10.41–4, 17.25–34. See Trouillard (1961) 434; Sorabji (1982) 312; Hoffmann (1997) 357–60.

44 E.g. VI.7[38]35.19–23: ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ; cf. III.8[51]9.21–2: ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρόα. Ἐπιβολή and παραδοχή are both outside the standard lexicon of Plotinian terms for cognition: see Rist (1973) 81–2.

45 Cf. Sorabji (1982) 313.

46 Cf. Aubry (2008) 120; O'Daly (1973) 22.

47 Other interpretations are of course possible. O'Daly (1973, 50–1) seeks for example to solve the problem of distinguishing the 'nous of the soul' (V.3[49]2.14) from *nous* itself with reference to I.1[53]8.1ff., the single reference in Plotinus to *noēsis* in the soul as a 'state' (ἔξις). This argument, and others like it, must fasten on a given instance of Plotinus' description of transformation and attempt to make sense of the diverging accounts given elsewhere; I prefer a reading which makes sense of the fact of these divergences and sees them as a strategy of intentional indeterminacy.

48 Plotinus' theory of the 'undescended soul' is, for reasons of space, conspicuously absent from this discussion; a separate essay will be devoted to the implications of interpreting this theory in the light of strategies of textual indeterminacy.

49 V.1[10]11.9–13: οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν.

50 VI.9[9]11.38–9: οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτήν.

51 Cf. O'Daly (1973) ch. 4; Remes (2007) 250.

52 See n. 78.

53 On the σπουδαῖος in Plotinus, see Heiser (1991) 6, 76–8.

⁵⁴ Instances of programmatic ‘philosophic elitism’ in Plotinus include V.9[5]; IV.8[6]1.37; I.3[20]3.1.6–10, 2, 9.3.1; II.9[33]9.6–11; I.1[53]3.2–3. Cf. Porph. *Plot.* 7.

⁵⁵ IV.8[6]1.1–11. Cf. V.3[49]6.13–18.

⁵⁶ Or ‘I, Porphyry, now in my sixty-eighth year, etc.’.

⁵⁷ *Plot.* 23 7–18. The final καὶ οὐ δύναμι may be a later gloss (see Henry and Schwyzer (1964–83) 31).

⁵⁸ See e.g. Katz (1978) 26; see 25–46; Janowitz (2002) xv–xvii; Mazur (2010) 7–8; Proudfoot (1985) 2–40.

⁵⁹ I follow Bussanich (1997) 5322–4 in disputing the common model of ‘temporary states’ (supported by e.g. Dodds (1965) 78; Hadot (1986a) 241–5; Rist (1989), 185–7).

⁶⁰ Pl. *Symp.* 201d–212a.

⁶¹ On ἀναγωγή in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, which partakes of both ritual and ‘spiritual’ aspects, see Majercik (1989) 30–45.

⁶² e.g. I.3[20]1.16–18; IV.8[31]1.1–11.

⁶³ The following discussion is indebted especially to the pioneering work of Pierre Hadot (1981, 1986a, 1986b). Rist (1964a) 87–112 is another important discussion of the Plotinian ἀναγωγή.

⁶⁴ Cf. Hadot (1986a) 231.

⁶⁵ Porph. *Plot.* 8 19–23. Cf. Plotinus’ discussion of *ascesis* at I.4[14]21–2.

⁶⁶ VI.4[22]14.21–2.

⁶⁷ V.1[10]12.13–14.

⁶⁸ See esp. *Enn.* I.2[19], *On the Virtues*. Cf. esp. Pl. *Phd.* 69b–c.

⁶⁹ See Sleeman and Pollet (1980) s.v. κάθαρσις.

⁷⁰ See VI.7[38]36.2–9.

⁷¹ See I.2[19]6.

⁷² Cf. Rist (1964b) 89–90.

⁷³ I.3[20]1.1–5.

⁷⁴ Cf. Hadot (1986b) 7: ‘Il ne s’agit pas là...d’un itinéraire théorique, parcouru par le raisonnement, mais d’une transformation ontologique.’

⁷⁵ On the longing of each soul for the good, see I.6.[1]7.1–2; V.9[5]2; I.3[20]1–2; IV.4[28]16.26–7; V.5[32]12.7–9; VI.7[38]21–2; VI.2[43]11.24–5. On *erōs* in Plotinus see Rist (1964a); Stern-Gillet (2000).

⁷⁶ e.g. VI.9[9]4.22–8.

⁷⁷ See e.g. VI.9.7.12–20; 11.8–16. This last passage particularly emphasizes the epistemological/ontological nature of this process of transformation: having no discursive thought, intellection, nor even *itself* (οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις νόησις οὐδ’ ὄλως αὐτός), the soul ‘stands still and becomes a kind of rest.’ Cf. III.8[30]1; V.4[7]1. See Remes (2007) 248.

⁷⁸ Examples include IV.7[2]10.30; VI.9[9]4.7–10, 4.33, 6.51–2, 7.17, 18–20, 9.50–52, 11.8–11; III.8[30]9.32, 10.31; V.8[31]11.4, 11.11; V.5[32]7.31–2, 13; VI.8[39]19.4. On this method in Plotinus, see Whittaker (1969); Hadot (1981) 188; Mortley (1986) 2.45–62.

⁷⁹ Cf. Hadot (1981) 188; Mazur (2010) 36.

⁸⁰ V.3[49]17.21–8.

⁸¹ V.3[49]17.34–8.

⁸² Cf. Hadot (1986b); Bussanich (1988) 128–9; Bussanich (1997) 5314–20.

⁸³ See n. 20. The point here is that noetic truth is self-validating, but discursive statements partake of truth only in a fragmented manner, and cannot fully capture the synoptic apprehension of *nous*.

⁸⁴ II.9[33]1–2.

⁸⁵ Cf. Trouillard (1976) 313.

⁸⁶ See e.g. Franke (2008), Derrida (1987).

The Essence of Rage

Galen on Emotional Disturbances and their Physical Correlates

P.N. Singer

As is well known, Galen makes a strong claim about the dependence of the soul upon bodily mixtures, and gives a detailed account of the capacities of the soul understood in their physiological function, located in specific organs in the body.¹ He does those two things in two of his most philosophically interesting and better-known writings—*Quod animi mores* and *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*—and among Galen’s works it is these that have attracted probably the most scholarly attention and philosophical analysis in recent years.

In this chapter I aim to explore the related area of how, for Galen, emotional states—the soul’s affections, or *pathē*—are connected with bodily states. I shall be doing this largely on the basis of texts which are much less well studied—even among Galen scholars—than those just mentioned, and in particular ones which are not overtly works of ‘psychology’ or soul theory at all. In the process I shall be focusing on one particular group of common, we might say everyday, mental or emotional disturbances which Galen discusses, in some detail, in relation to their physical correlates. It is, indeed, striking that most of the detailed material that Galen offers in this area—most of the discussion of this particular set of disturbances—appears, not in his specific work on the affections of the soul, *Aff. Pecc. Dig.*, nor in the other most obviously psychological works, *PHP* or *QAM*, but in a range of more general, medical works on disease, health, and diagnosis.²

1. The Essence of Rage

In a passage in his great work on health, Galen makes the following statement about rage (*thumos*):

ὁ μὲν γε θυμὸς οὐδ' ἀπλῶς αὐξήσις, ἀλλ' οἷον ζέσις τίς ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν θερμοῦ—διὸ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ δοκιμώτατοι τοιαύτην εἶναι φασί—συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐστίν ἢ τῆς ἀντιτιμωρήσεως ὄρεξις.

Now, rage is not simply an increase, but as it were a kind of boiling of the hot in the heart; which is why the most reputable philosophers state that this is its essence; for the appetite for revenge is an incidental feature, and not the essence, of rage.

(*San. Tu.* II.9, 61,24–8 Koch, VI.138 Kühn; translations are my own unless otherwise stated)

The statement here that ‘the boiling of the hot in the heart is the essence of rage’ raises a number of questions. Among them: who are ‘the most reputable philosophers’ to whom Galen attributes this view; and, conversely, who are the polemical targets of the latter part of the sentence—those who, by implication, believe, rather, that ‘appetite for revenge’ is the essence of *thumos*?

But, more fundamentally, what is at stake in the claim itself: that ‘the boiling of the hot in the heart’, and not ‘appetite for revenge’, is the *essence* of rage?

From a modern philosophical point of view, Galen seems here to be taking a stand on a substantive issue in the philosophy of mind, regarding mental states. Mental states, Galen appears to be saying, must be defined in terms of their physical features, rather than experiential or intentional ones. Clarification of the precise nature of this claim will be of considerable interest, both in terms of the philosophical analysis of a particular ancient view in the philosophy of mind and in terms of its ramifications in Galen’s own medical and psychological thought. The view in question looks like a reductionist one; we might, further, be tempted to consider whether, in modern philosophical terms, it represents some kind of type identity theory, or a variety of epiphenomenalism or supervenience theory.

But let us look at both the language of the claim, and its immediate context, more closely.

Galen is using terminology which is, at least at some remove, Aristotelian. The term *ousia* is used very widely in Galen, and there is a range of meanings. He quite frequently uses the term to refer to various kinds of physical matter in the body—‘substance’ in something like the modern everyday English sense, rather than any Aristotelian one.³ But, fairly clearly, this is not the relevant sense here. Here, the

sense seems similar to that which one finds in other logical or analytical contexts.

ἀπ'αὐτῆς χρὴ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος ἐξευρίσκειν τὰ προσήκοντά τε καὶ οἰκεῖα λήμματα...ἐν οἷς Χρύσιππος ἐπισκοπεῖται περὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον εἰπόντας ὑπὲρ οὗ ζητοῦμεν πράγματος ἐκείνῳ χρῆσθαι κανόνι τε καὶ σκοπῷ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀπάντων.

one should find the fitting and appropriate premises in the actual essence of the matter under enquiry...when Chrysippus considers the subject of the leading part of the soul, we should state the account of the essence of the matter we are enquiring about, and use this as a yardstick and aim for all the individual [points].

(PHP II.3, 108,27–31 De Lacy, V.219 Kühn)

μακρὰν ἴσως σοι δόξω λέγειν τὴν ἐξέτασιν ἀλλ'ἀληθὴ γε παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξ αὐτῆς τε τοῦ ζητουμένου τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἀποδείξεως ἐλέγετο.

You may perhaps think that the examination that I am recommending is a long one; but at least it is truthful, above all things, taken as it is from the very essence of the subject under enquiry, as discussed in my work on *Demonstration*.

(Temp. II.2, 53,4–7 Helmreich, I.592–3 Kühn)

These two passages, I think, make fairly clear what is meant by *ousia*. One could, to be sure, add further relevant ones: one might consider, for example, a passage in *QAM* 2 which links the *ousia* of something inextricably with its capacities (*dunameis*) and activities (*energeiai*),⁴ or one at the beginning of *Diff. Feb.* which asserts the importance of making the distinctions between different types of fever according to their *ousia*, rather than according to *sumbebēkos*.⁵

To talk of something's *ousia*, in the relevant sense, is for Galen to talk of the essential nature of that thing, or of what it is according to its true definition. And *ousia*, essence, in this sense (e.g. in the *Diff. Feb.* text just mentioned) is crucially distinguished from *sumbebēkos*, which we might provisionally translate 'non-essential property' (but more on this below).

Now, the reference to Aristotle is relevant to the first question I raised above, the identity of 'the most reputable philosophers'. It seems, on the basis of fairly clear verbal echoes (as I have argued elsewhere⁶), that this is in fact a reference, however indirect, to Aristotle, and to what Galen takes to be his view in the well-known passage of Book I of the *De anima* about the relationship between the different accounts which a *phusikos*, or student of nature, and a

dialectician will give of the affections of the soul.

διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὀρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικός ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργή τί ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπῆσεως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιαδί, εἰ ἔσται...

So a *phusikos* and a dialectician would define each of them [sc. the affections of the soul], such as what anger is, differently: the latter [would define it as] the appetite for retaliation, or something of that sort, while the former would define it as the boiling of blood or of the hot around the heart. Of these, the one gives the matter, the other the form and rationale [*or* definitional account]. For the rationale is the form of the thing, and this must be [realized] in a certain kind of matter, if it is to be...

(*De anima* I.1, 403a29–403b2)

If that is the case, it would also seem to be the case that Galen misremembers, distorts or—to put it at its weakest—strongly interprets the passage. Aristotle presents the ‘appetite-for-revenge’ definition, that of the dialectician, as corresponding to the *form* and *logos* of the emotion, and the ‘boiling-of-the-hot’ definition, that of the *phusikos*, as corresponding to its *matter*. Though the terminology of *ousia* is not used at this point, the Aristotelian talk in terms of *eidōs* and *logos* seems to bring us close to what Galen would mean by *ousia*: it would seem to be the dialectician, here, who has the more central, or definitional, account. To the extent, then, that Aristotle’s conception of the ‘form/logos’ account may be assimilated to Galen’s conception of the account in terms of *ousia*, Galen has in effect reversed the terms of Aristotle’s dichotomy, equating the material explanation with this dialectician’s ‘form/logos’ account rather than with that of the *phusikos*.

It is, moreover, an important feature of Aristotle’s discussion, in the passage closely following that cited here (403b7–9), that *both* the matter and the *logos* are needed for a full account; and this perception is lost in Galen’s version.

I am not, however, directly concerned here with Galen’s relationship with Aristotle, let alone with the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the soul in relation to the body. The latter is, of course, a notoriously difficult question, and one which has attracted far more philosophical discussion than the equivalent question for Galen.⁷

We are here seeking to shed light on Galen’s own intellectual framework. Returning to the passage from *De sanitate tuenda*: we have

so far clarified that by the ‘*ousia*’ of rage, he means what rage is in its proper definition, or what it most fundamentally is. The further implications of this view of rage remain to be examined.

Now, this must depend partly on how we understand the term opposed to *ousia*, that is, *sumbebēkos*. Again, the heritage of the term is undeniably Aristotelian. There is, however, here too, a range of possible usages. Although the broad thrust of an *ousia*–*sumbebēkos* opposition is clear—the former will correspond to something in some sense prior and central, the latter to something in some sense subsidiary—the question, in *what* senses, precisely, remains to be determined. What, exactly, does Galen mean by describing the ‘intentional’ definition of rage (appetite for revenge) as a *sumbebēkos*?

Within Aristotle and Aristotelian writing, *sumbebēkos* refers to an incidental property of a thing: something, to summarize, which either does not belong to that thing in virtue of its true nature, is not essential to its definition, or is not its relevant feature in relation to a particular argument. It is, in some cases at least, explicitly stated that a *sumbebēkos* is something not necessary—something which may or may not be present. There is, further, a distinction between things which are *sumbebēkota* and which are *kath’ hauta*, in themselves. And something’s *sumbebēkota*, as well as its *pathē*, are things which a demonstration may show (rather than legitimate starting-points of a demonstration).⁸ On the other hand, there seems to be a distinction *within* the category of *sumbebēkota*, and at points an association of the notion of *sumbebēkos* with something ‘specific’ or ‘proper’ (*idion*) to a subject.⁹ The use of the term *sumbebēkos* in conjunction with *idiai*, perhaps significantly, seems to have its closest Aristotelian parallel, again, in the *De anima*. In a discussion of method, it is stated that one might think there to be:

μία τις...μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων ὧν βουλόμεθα γινῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἰδίων ἀποδειξίς.

a single...method in respect of all those things whose *ousia* we want to know, as also a demonstration of the specific attributes.

(I.1, 402a13–15)

The notion of the ‘specifically incidental’, or ‘specific attribute’ (Ross has ‘consequential attributes’) as closely associated with, though distinct from, *ousia*, as well as the idea that there can be demonstration in this area, is, as we shall see, closely paralleled in Galen’s writings.

Moving outside the Aristotelian corpus, furthermore, we find that the term *sumbebēkos* in later Greek philosophical writing seems to acquire a much more general sense of ‘attribute’; and, relatedly, that it can be taken as the starting point for a demonstration; and this

broader usage has undoubtedly been influential on Galen.

What Galen means by *sumbebēkos* in the *De sanitate tuenda* passage, in fact, seems to be clarified by another passage from *PHP*. In his presentation of the arguments about the location of soul-capacities in that work—the rational in the brain, the spirited in the heart, and the desiderative in the liver—Galen, as we have already seen, asserts the importance of starting one’s demonstration from the *ousia* of the subject in question. But, when it comes to the third part of the soul, he admits that the argument cannot proceed in quite the same way.

...προειπόντες ὥς οὐκ ἐξ ὁμοίως ἐναργῶν οὐδ’ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀντικρὺς τοῦ
ζητουμένου τῆς φύσεως ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔσοιτο...ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν τοῦτῳ
συμβεβηκότων ἰδίᾳ.

...we stated in advance that the demonstration would not be from equally
manifest things nor directly from the nature of the thing under enquiry...but
from its specific properties.

(*PHP* VI.3, 372,19–22 De Lacy, V.519 Kühn)

The term *sumbebēkota* seems here to require translation as ‘properties’ rather than as ‘incidental properties’, and indeed these are properties specific (*idiai*) to the thing in question, so it is not the case that they are incidental in the sense of their presence or absence being a matter of indifference. What Galen has in mind here with the term *sumbebēkota* is the properties of the liver and veins; arguments about these—which proceed on the basis of an analogy with plants, and of observed anatomical structures—are not based in the *ousia* of the subject being investigated, that is the desiderative soul, because we are not observing anything which could be expressed directly as a statement about the desiderative soul itself; but we are observing something about the anatomical features which, Galen hopes to persuade us, are intimately associated with it. So the term *sumbebēkos* here—coupled with *idiai*—seems to refer to something which always accompanies the *ousia* in question, something, indeed, which provides the basis for a substitute argument when arguments from *ousia* are not available.

This sense of *sumbebēkota*, in conjunction with some form of the word *idios*, to indicate something which is not itself the *ousia* of an object, but is in some indissociable way related to it, has parallels elsewhere in Galen too. For example, in [Chapter 4](#) of the *Ars medica*, Galen is talking about healthy bodies and the *diagnōsis*—recognition or distinguishing—of them. A twofold distinction arises:

τὰς διαγνώσεις δὲ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τε τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας
αὐτῶν λόγον χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτοις ἐπομένων

ἐνεργειῶν τε καὶ συμπτωμάτων, ἃ δὴ καὶ συμβεβηκότα καλοῦμεν ἰδίως.

One must carry out the *diagnōseis* of them on the basis of [a] things which belong to them in virtue of their fundamental *ousia*, and [b] the activities and symptoms which necessarily follow upon these—things which, indeed, we call ‘specific properties’.

(*Ars medica* 4, 282,18–283,3 Boudon, I.314 Kühn)

It is further clarified that what is understood under [a] is the best balance of the homogeneous parts in terms of hot, cold, dry, and wet, as well as (at the higher level) the appropriate structural excellences of the organic parts; while what is understood under [b], that is the *sumbebēkota idiōs*, are, at the lower level, the properties discernible by touch and sight and, at the higher, the overall balance and beauty of the bodily organs; at both levels, too, included under this latter heading are the excellences of the relevant activities. Here, then, properties, including activities, which *follow of necessity* from a particular *ousia* are described as *sumbebēkota idiōs*.¹⁰

A text from *De sanitate tuenda* further supports this understanding of *sumbebēkota*:

ἐν τρισὶ γὰρ τούτοις γένεσι πρῶτοις ἐστὶν ἡ ὑγιεινὴ πραγματεία, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θεραπευτική, σώμασί τε καὶ αἰτίοις καὶ σημείοις, σώμασι μὲν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν...σημείοις δὲ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐξ ὧν διαγιγνώσκεται, αἰτίοις δέ, ὑφ’ὧν ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς ὑγείας γίνεται.

For the study of health (as also that of therapy) consists in these three classes primarily: bodies, causes, and signs: the bodies are the actual healthy bodies... the signs are those incidental to them [*or* those which are properties of them], from which they are discerned; the causes are those by which the safeguarding of health comes about.

(*San. Tu.* I.15, 36,3–7 Koch, VI.78 Kühn)

Again, *sumbebēkota* are intimately connected with the phenomenon in question, in this case bodies and their health—so intimately connected, in fact, that one can use the *sumbebēkos* as a sign (*sēmeion*) by which that state of health can be discerned (even though, in this particular case, the terminology of *idios* is not employed).

Turning back to our original *De sanitate tuenda* text, we are, I think, now a position to rule out one thing that Galen might have meant by saying that appetite for revenge was *sumbebēkos*. The argument could, on one interpretation of *sumbebēkos*, have been taken to mean that one can be in a rage without having the mental experience of appetite for revenge. And such a view could then have had the further implications, (1) that ‘appetite for revenge’ is too narrow, or too vague a description, since the single item ‘rage’ (which, we must understand, is defined in terms of physical phenomena in the body) may be

accompanied by a range of different descriptions of personal experience; or even (more strongly) (2) that one may, in fact, be in a rage without knowing it, or while thinking that one is in the grip of some other *pathos*. Since its fundamental description is a physical one, it might happen to be the case that all the usual physical features were present in a person, but that that person did not feel that she or he was in a rage; in such a case, that condition would still be correctly defined as rage. The medical expert, but not necessarily the subject, will be the authority on when rage is taking place.

Now, I do not think that Galen is in fact making either of these claims. (He does, as we shall see later, discuss the possibility of being wrong about emotions—but only about other people's emotions.)

To the contrary, in fact, Galen seems very clearly, in the passages which we have just considered, to regard this kind of *sumbebēkos* as indissociable from, or inevitably following upon, the item to which it is related (Ross's 'consequential attribute'). In the last case cited, in fact, the participle is used adjectivally rather than substantively, and refers to *sēmeia*, 'signs'; the implication, though, is that a relationship of sufficient regularity is involved in this *sumbainein* on the part of the *sēmeia*, that they can, indeed, be used as signs of what is happening in the bodies. In the *PHP* text, the indissociability of *sumbebēkota* of this kind from the *ousia* to which they attach is such that these *sumbebēkota* can be used in a demonstration concerning that *ousia* (albeit not a demonstration of the most reliable kind); and in that from *Ars medica* the relationship is one of 'following of necessity'.

This, though, has hardly solved the puzzle inherent in Galen's peculiar form of expression. If he agrees that the 'appetite for revenge' will, in fact, always be present in cases of rage, what is at stake in claiming that this is an attribute or property, and not the essence, of rage?

Certainly he is asserting the priority of the physical description of rage. And doubtless, too, his statement here can be seen as belonging within the rhetorical framework which insists on the priority of the doctor's knowledge of what happens in the human being—including within the human being's soul.

Is Galen then claiming *causal* priority for the physical account (as one might think, for example, on the basis of the above *Ars medica* text)? In this case, we might characterize his philosophical position as a reductivist physicalist one, and probably indeed as a version of epiphenomenalism: the 'appetite for revenge' is then the epiphenomenon, but all that is happening in body and soul can be causally accounted for in physical terms.

Before deciding this, we need to look further, in particular at the

nature of the causal claims that are being made with regard to rage and its physical correlates. (We shall then return again once more to consider the question of Galen's relationship with modern positions in the philosophy of mind at the beginning of section 6.)

2. Physical Correlates of a Range of Soul Affections

In order to gain some clarity as to what is the nature, and importance to Galen, of his assertion of the priority of the physical description of the *pathos*, let us look, first at the broader context of the statement with which we started, and then at some other relevant texts from elsewhere in the Corpus.

Our first text appears in a treatise devoted to provisions for the maintenance of health. Within that, the rather distant starting point that leads into this passage is a discussion of exercise. Proceeding from that general area, *via* a classification of the different possible forms of increase of the innate heat, Galen finds himself (albeit briefly) characterizing the physical differences that arise in soul affections. This, then, is the context: different forms of increase of the innate heat. Alongside *thumos*, he identifies two other soul affections, *agōnia* and *aidōs*. These also involve increase in heat, but the specific manifestations are different in each case (although there is quite a close similarity between the physical manifestations in the latter two, shame and anxiety).

καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν μὲν ἀπάντων τῶν γυμνασίων, οὐ μὴν γε ἰδίον ἐστίν, εἴ γε δὴ τοῖς θυμωθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιάσασι καὶ τοῖς αἰδεσθεῖσιν αὐξήσις τῆς ἐμφύτου γίνεται θερμότητος. ὁ μὲν γε θυμὸς οὐδ' ἀπλῶς αὐξήσις, ἀλλ' οἷον ζέσις τίς ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν θερμοῦ· διὸ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ δοκιμώτατοι τοιαύτην εἶναι φασι· συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστίν ἢ τῆς ἀντιτιμωρήσεως ὀρεξίς. αὐξάνεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς αἰδεσθεῖσιν ἢ ἐμφυτος θερμότης, εἴσω μὲν τὰ πρῶτα συνδραμόντος ἅπαντος τοῦ θερμοῦ, μετὰ ταῦτα δ' ἄθροισθέντος ἐν τῷ βᾶθει, κάπνεται αὐξηθέντος καὶ διὰ τὴν ἄθροισιν μὲν τὴν ἐνταῦθα καὶ διὰ τὴν κίνησιν δὲ τὴν συνεχῆ. οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάζει τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν αἰδουμένων, ἀλλ' ἐνδον τε καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἵματος κυκᾶται πολυειδῶς, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγωνιόντων.

And this [sc. an increase in innate heat] is common to all exercises; but it is not specific to them, since, indeed, an increase in innate hotness arises also in those experiencing rage, anxiety, and shame. Now, rage is not simply an increase, but as it were a kind of boiling of the hot in the heart; which is why the best-reputed philosophers state that this is its essence; for the appetite for revenge is an incidental feature, and not the essence, of the rage. The internal

heat increases in those suffering shame too, as all of the hot courses together to the inside, and then gathers deep down, and then increases both because of that gathering and because of the constant motion. For the breath is not at rest in people in a state of shame, but is stirred about all over the place both inside and about itself along with all the blood, just as it is in people in a state of anxiety.

(*San. Tu.* II.9, 61,21–34 Koch, VI.138–9 Kühn)

So, we now have two more soul affections, and again an insistence on the particularity of their physical *differentiae*.

Galen tells us that he will say some more about ‘all such affections of the soul’ later in the work; and he does, in Book IV.

συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο διὰ κρύος ἢ ῥίγος ἢ πάθος ψυχικόν, οἷον φόβον ἢ λύπην ἰσχυράν ἢ ἀρχομένην αἰδῶ· μηδενὸς δὲ τούτων παρόντος, οὐκ ἂν ποθ' ὑπονοστήσειαν εἰς τὸ βάθος οἱ χυμοί, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπικαύσαιεν ἂν ποτε τὸ δέρμα βιαιότερον ὀρμήσαντες ἐπ' αὐτὸ χωρὶς τοῦ παθεῖν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ θάλαπτος ἄμετρον ἔξωθεν περιστῆναι τῷ ζώῳ. ὀργισθέντων οὖν ποτ' ἰσχυρῶς ἢ θυμωθέντων ἢ τὴν ἐκ τῆς αἰδοῦς οἷον ἄμπωτιν τῶν χυμῶν ἀναφερόντων, μὴ προσεχεῖν τὸν νοῦν τῇ χροίᾳ...

And this happens to them because of cold, trembling, or an affection of the soul, such as fear, violent distress or incipient shame; if none of these is present, the humours would never retreat back to the depth; similarly, the humours would never burn the skin by rushing towards it violently unless the soul were undergoing some affection, or an immoderate warmth were befalling the animal from outside. With people who have become violently angry or enraged, therefore, or when they are presenting the back-flow, as it were, of humours from shame, do not pay attention to the colour...

(*San. Tu.* IV.4, 112,6–13 Koch, VI.253–4 Kühn)

Here the context is the possibility of using the phenomena externally visible in a person, in particular colour, as indicators of the underlying disposition; but certain cases where the humours ‘retreat into the depth’ of the body will confuse this picture.

A picture is emerging of the physiology of mental or emotional disturbances—or at least of a particular distinct set them—and of their relationship with heat in the body; and this picture is elaborated considerably elsewhere.

Before proceeding to that elaboration, it is perhaps worth mentioning another question, albeit only to clarify that I am leaving it to one side in the present enquiry, namely that of the origins or intellectual forebears of Galen’s thought in this area. There are, it seems, parallels for some of his statements about the motion of blood within the body in relation to emotions, in the Aristotelian tradition.¹¹ This point—related as it is to the diverse origins of different elements of Galen’s intellectual framework—is, indeed, worth bearing in mind later on in our discussion, when we come to the question of the coexistence of different ‘models’ of the soul in Galen. For the moment,

however, the specifics of that question of origins must be left for further research.

The fullest account, overlapping with those we have already seen but adding considerable detail, appears in Book II of *De causis symptomatum*. The passage is of central relevance to our argument here; in view of its length, it is presented below as an appendix, while a discussion which aims to highlight the essential points follows here.

At the point where this passage begins, Galen has been discussing violent trembling, or ‘rigor’, and the way in which this is related to humoural phenomena, and in particular to heating and cooling, in different parts of the body. He introduces what follows as a continuation of the account of pathology in this particular area, and of its causes.

To summarize: fear draws the *pneuma*, or breath, and the blood inwards, causing cooling on the surface, while rage involves an opposite, outward motion. Anxiety (*agōnia*) involves a mixture of both these motions. Shame (*aidōs*) involves first an inward motion, then a sudden return to the surface. Distress (*lupē*) has the same physical manifestations as fear, but on a smaller scale. The above physiological processes which accompany fear can in extreme cases be fatal; and joy shares some of the same physical characteristics as fear, involving a dissipation of tension, and so can in extreme cases lead to sudden death in a similar way. Pain presents some of the same symptoms as very great fear.

We have, then, a remarkably detailed account of a number of distinct emotive experiences—fear, rage, anxiety, shame, distress, joy, pain: each has precise physical correlates, understood in terms of very specific phenomena of heat in the body.¹²

From this text it is even clearer that Galen is keen to demonstrate his ability to analyse the soul affections in physical terms: that he is, in some sense, asserting the priority of the physical account. But in what sense, exactly?

We considered one possibility already, and found it improbable: that Galen actually regards the experiential or intentional content of a mental state as a dispensable aspect of the description, i.e. that we might be experiencing anger without the intentional content which a traditional philosophical description has attributed to it: the desire for revenge.

It would in principle be possible to explore other possibilities, too, for example that Galen accepts the validity of an experiential or mental account of rage, but believes that this should take a simpler form, characterizing rather a ‘raw’ emotional state, without the specific intentional content that the traditional philosophical

definition entails. In other words, rage has a legitimate experiential as well as physical definition; but the specific one, ‘appetite for revenge’, is not it. (And in that case presumably similar arguments might apply in the case of shame, fear, etc.) Now, as I have already argued, I do not believe that this is in fact the sense of his characterization of ‘appetite for revenge’ as a mere *sumbebēkos*. But certainly, if that were the thrust of his approach, he does not give us enough to go on to develop it meaningfully.

What seems to be the case, indeed, is that Galen does *not* reject traditional, experiential accounts of mental states like *agōnia*, *thumos*, *phobos*. He mentions a particular intentional account of rage, as we have seen; and, in the passage just considered, one of shame, which may also be traditional (“the soul-capacity cannot endure the society of a much greater person”).¹³ But Galen is not problematizing this: it does not seem that he thinks that there will be any difficulty knowing when something is a case of fear, shame, anxiety, and so on.

Another possibility, as already suggested above, is that he asserts the importance of the physical correlates because he thinks the physical phenomena are *causally* prior. In this case, we might seek—if again we are looking for equivalents in the modern philosophy of mind—for an analysis in terms of epiphenomenalism.

But again, this does not seem to be what Galen is saying. The causes of an occurrence of shame, fear, anxiety mentioned by Galen are the obvious, everyday ones—the presence of a particular person, a threatening event. These are not presented to us as the results of a physical process of causation. One can, to be sure, look at the underlying causes of one person’s being more fearful, angry, or inclined to shame than another, and some of these might be understood as physical causes, along the lines further discussed for example in *QAM*. But such a causal framework is not explored at this point, in his discussion of disease aetiology and the relationship of symptoms to their underlying causes. The closest he here gets to consideration of such predisposing causes are expressions like the ‘inborn softness and timidity’ that lead to shame, or the ‘naturally weak little soul’ or ‘small-souled’ nature that lead to the risk of sudden death from fear and joy, respectively: terms which are vague in relation to any possible physical account of those natures.

3. Emotional Disturbance as Cause of Physical Disease

What is striking, in fact, is the extent to which the set of psychological affections that we have seen above recurs in Galen as *causes* of physical events, rather than as effects of them. Specifically, they are mentioned frequently in accounts of the aetiology of diseases.

Examples of this causative role—both a more generic role in changing bodily mixture, especially by heating or drying, and a more specific one in the genesis of fever—proliferate over the Galenic corpus. Typically, they occur in lists which include also more obviously physical causes. There are quite a lot of relevant texts here; again, the most relevant passages are quoted *in extenso* in Appendix 2, and summarized here according to the subheads of that appendix. (There is, however, considerable overlap between the topics here, and the effects described can be understood within a single framework, according to the effects of hot, cold, wet, and dry.)

3.1 A variety of descriptions of the physical effects of emotional disturbance

In Appendix 2 (A), a text from *De sanitate tuenda*, cases of rage, worry, and distress (*thumoi*, *phrontides*, *lupai*) appear, alongside baths, in a fairly general mention of things that affect mixture.

Appendix 2 (B), also from *De sanitate tuenda*, connects the excesses of motions connected with certain emotional responses (‘desires, arguments, and rages’) with excess bile, and their deficiency with excess phlegm, and also mentions some further medical consequences of these, as well as lifestyle prescriptions to avoid them.

The texts at Appendix 2 (C) and (D) give more pathological detail about emotional disturbances as provokers of disease, the former listing worry and rage among other drying causes, the latter offering a similar list—worry, rage, and distress—among the causes of excess yellow bile. And we have rage as a cause of heating, in particular of the blood, at (E). Excess heat, in Galen’s pathology, can lead to fever. It is here, surely, that we have the medical crux of the matter. Fever, a central disease category in Galenic medicine, represents the more serious end of the spectrum of these emotion-related outcomes; and this is borne out, too, by the frequency with which this connection is made in Galen’s medical works. Appendix 2 (F) gives a selection of texts from among the many instances where this phenomenon is described. Rage, anger, distress, and worry are among causes that can contribute to the inception of fever.

These texts, then, from Galen's medical works—works concerned with diseases, their classification, aetiology, and diagnosis—describe the physical consequences of a range of emotional disturbances. We see that the particular emotional disturbances under discussion are intimately related to changes in, and particular manifestations of, heat, and so also to a set of related concepts: *pneuma* or breath, the heart, blood, drying, yellow bile, and, potentially and most seriously, fever.

3.2 Cases where emotional disturbance has had fatal consequences

There are other texts which give an even stronger statement of the potentially dramatic effects of emotional disturbances, but without the same level of scientific explanation. These belong to a category which we might call either 'case-history' or 'anecdote'.

One of the main contexts for these is Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic *Epidemics*, Book VI. Galen is commenting on an aphoristic sentence¹⁴ which contains the word *gnōmē*, which might here, at least in Galen's interpretation of it, be taken to mean something like 'mental state'. He devotes three long pages, pp. 485–7 of the *CMG* edition of Wenkebach and Pfaff, to this single word. So, he says—and I paraphrase the German translation here of a text that is only extant in Arabic:

Those who get angry at anything often fall because of this into sickness, which it is difficult to save them from. Many die not because of the bad state of their illness but because of the bad state of their soul and worry. So, I know a large number of people who have been overcome by fear of death, first made ill by it and then died of it. Sometimes a dream was the initial cause, sometimes a perceived sign.

(*Hipp. Epid. VI*, 485 Wenkebach–Pfaff)

Specifically, there is the man from Mysia who worked as an augur, and saw a sign predicting his own death; he became distressed, yellow in colour, sleepless, worried; then started to have fevers, became confused in his mind; and died after two months (*ibid.*, p. 486). Another became distressed, then feverish, sleepless, and eventually deranged after a loss of money, also with a fatal result (*ibid.*, p. 486). And then there was the literary man who lost his books in the same fire where Galen lost his; here again distress leads to sleeplessness, and then fever, and eventually death (*ibid.*, 486). This last account parallels that now found at *De indolentia* 7, which probably, indeed,

refers to the same individual.¹⁵

Though the detail is less physiologically specific in these anecdotes than in the texts which we have previously considered, the accounts seem in general consistent with what is said about fevers in those. In most of these brief ‘case-histories’, fever is mentioned; some—such as the fearful account of the man whose fatal illness was caused by the inadvertent passing of wind in a public place—have ‘wasting-away’ without explicit mention of fever; but we can perhaps take it that this is the causal process implied.

In all these cases, then—both the more physiologically precise and the more anecdotal accounts—we have emotional disturbances seen as causes of medical illness, ranging from a slightly dried-out or overheated condition, through fever, to death.

The significance of the mental here, then, is that it may have quite specific, and dangerous, physical consequences. A relevant summation of the phenomena that we have been considering seems to be provided by another remark from *De sanitate tuenda*:

μὴ νομίζειν, ὡς φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ προσήκει πλάττειν ἦθος ψυχῆς· ἐκεῖνῳ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἕτερόν τι μεῖζον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ὑγείαν, ἰατρῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ῥαδίως εἰς νόσους ὑπομεταφέρεσθαι τὸ σῶμα.

one should not think that it is only the business of the philosopher to shape the character of the soul. Rather, it is his business to do it because of something greater, that is the health of the soul itself, while it is the doctor's business to do it so that the body does not readily fall victim to sickness.

(*San. Tu.* I.8, 19,28–30 Koch, VI.40 Kühn)

4. The Pulse Context and the Focus on Diagnosis

So, much of Galen's interest in a certain kind of mental disturbance is medical; and this helps explain his interest in the physical correlates. It is important to know precisely what is going on physically in a particular mental state, because this is likely to have medical implications. The concern here is not with the control of anger, fear, or anxiety considered in their own right: there is such a concern, and it is addressed in *Aff. Pecc. Dig.*; but that belongs as it were to a separate discourse. There, in an ethical treatise, ethical consequences, and particular ethical practices to correct the situation, are paramount, but the physical correlates and medical consequences are

scarcely considered; in the medical texts which we have been considering, the reverse holds.

But a further corollary of this is that it may be important to *diagnose* from a physical state what has been going on mentally, for precisely the same reason.

In this context, the close relationship of the pulse with the physical phenomena mentioned is of central importance. We have seen this to some extent in the texts already cited. It is, precisely, the condition of the heart, the innate heat, and the blood that determine the pulse; the pulse thus gives us pretty much direct access to those emotional states which, as we have seen, are intricately connected with them.

The passage already mentioned from *De crisibus*, Appendix 2 (F) (v), for example, which gives an account of the origin of a number of different kinds of fever, continues with an account of the effect that the diverse phenomena will have on the pulse:

ἄρξομαι...ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχικῶν παθῶν...φροντίδος καὶ φόβου καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ λύπης. εἰ μὲν δὴ μενόντων ἔτι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἢ ἐπίσκεψις γένοιτο, διὰ τῶν σφυγμῶν μάλιστα πειρᾶσθαι διαγινώσκειν...εἰ δ' αὐτὰ μὲν εἴη πεπαυμένα, μένοι δ' ἢ διάθεσις, ἀμυδρὸν μὲν τι κἂν τοῖς σφυγμοῖς εὐρήσεις γνώρισμα τῶν ποιησάντων τὸν πυρετὸν παθῶν, ἀποχρήσῃ δέ σοι καὶ χωρὶς τῶν σφυγμῶν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα.

I shall start...from the soul-affections...worry, fear, rage and distress. If these still remain when the examination takes place, you should try to make your diagnosis especially on the basis of the pulse...But if they have ceased, but the disposition remains, you will find, even in the pulse, an unclear indicator of the affections that caused the fever, but the rest will be sufficient.

(*De crisibus* II.13, IX.696–7 Kühn)

Specific relationships of particular affections of the soul to particular kinds of pulse—and the possibility of discerning the former from the latter—are given in the pulse treatises.

θυμοῦ μὲν ὑψηλὸς ἔστιν ὁ σφυγμὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ σφόδρος καὶ ταχὺς καὶ πυκνός...ἡδονῆς δὲ μέγας καὶ ἀραιὸς καὶ βραδύς, οὐ μὴν σφοδρότητί γε διάφορος...λύπης δὲ μικρὸς καὶ ἀμυδρὸς καὶ βραδύς καὶ ἀραιός...φόβου δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὑπογυίου καὶ σφοδροῦ ταχὺς καὶ κλονώδης καὶ ἄτακτος καὶ ἀνώμαλος, τοῦ δὲ ἤδη κεχρονισμένου οἷος ὁ τῆς λύπης...ἄλγλημα δὲ τὸ τρέπον τοὺς σφυγμούς...

In rage the pulse is big, vigorous, fast, and frequent...In pleasure: big, infrequent, slow, but not unusual in vigour...In distress: small, unclear, slow, infrequent...In fear which is sudden and violent: quick, agitated, disordered, uneven; in fear that has been there for a while: like that in distress...Pain, when it alters the pulse...

(*De causis pulsuum* IV.2–6, IX.157–61 Kühn)

The passage has been shortened in the interests of manageability; but one should note that most of the ellipses here correspond to quite detailed accounts of the physical processes that lead to these kinds of pulse in these cases.

Soul affections are among the things which can be distinguished by that most useful diagnostic tool, the pulse. And again, as we have seen in other contexts, these emotional disturbances are placed alongside physical ones as causes of the observed phenomenon.

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοὺς μὲν ὑψηλοὺς ἔν τε τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ πρὸ τῶν κρίσεων εὐρίσκω γινομένους...

But I find that high pulses arise in rage and before crises...

(*De causis pulsuum* II.13, IX.93 Kühn)

This quotation is followed, on pp. 96–7, by an account of how and why the pulse is high in those in rage, even if their condition is faultless.

As Galen emphasizes in a number of contexts, it is essential to successful diagnosis to have a clear conception of the natural state of the patient, against which to measure any departures from the norm. Such is the context of the next passage, from *De praesagitione ex pulsibus*: Galen spends some time discussing how one distinguishes acquired or temporary changes to the state of the body.

καὶ μὲν γε καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ μετὰ σφοδρότητος γίνεται, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλως λάθοι τὸν γε συνετὸν εἰς τε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν πρόσωπον ἀποβλέποντα. κατέχειν μέντοι καὶ κρύπτειν βουλομένῳ τὸν θυμὸν ἀνώμαλος ὁ σφυγμὸς γίνεται καὶ μᾶλλον ἀνώμαλός ἐστιν τοῖς ἀγωνιῶσί τε καὶ αἰδουμένοις.

That which arises from rage, too, occurs with vigour, and should not be impossible for an intelligent person to spot, if he observes the eyes and the whole face too. But in one who wishes to restrain and conceal his rage, the pulse becomes uneven; and it is even more uneven in those experiencing anxiety and shame.

(*De praesagitione ex pulsibus* I.1, IX.214–15 Kühn)

We notice here how rage is incorporated within a system of physical causes: there follows immediately after these lines an account of the effect on the pulse of semi-digested foods.

4.1 The pulse in patients who are concealing something

The reference here to *concealed* rage reminds us of a particular dimension of Galenic diagnosis: diagnostic tools can be used to get at information which the patient wishes to hide. It can, for example, be important to know whether a patient is self-medicating in the doctor's absence. The passage just quoted in fact proceeds to give just such an account. The question, in Galenic terms, is whether the increase in a patient's pulse was due to an access (*episēmasia*) of illness, a paroxysm, or whether it was due to his having taken a heating drug when Galen was not looking. Here, of course, precise technical knowledge—both in terms of the discernment of the pulse and in terms of the expected course of a disease in such cases—must be used in conjunction with external considerations, in particular the habits and character of the patient: his *ethos* and *ēthos*.

We are put in mind of the anecdotes (or 'case histories') from Galen's short, self-publicizing—as opposed to long and technical—work on such techniques: *Prognosis*. There, the well-known account of his encounter with the wife of Justus is precisely relevant to the specific diagnostic claims that we have been considering.¹⁶ Galen is called to the bedside of a woman whose known symptoms are sleeplessness and disturbed rest. He finds (presumably after taking a pulse, though this is not stated) that she has no fever, and that she is reluctant to answer any questions about the cause of her insomnia. On the basis of this first visit, he is left with two possibilities: that she has a melancholic depression or that she is distressed about something that she does not want to admit (ἡ μελαγχολικῶς δυσθυμεῖν ἢ τι λυπούμενην οὐκ ἐθέλειν ὁμολογεῖν, 102,1–2 Nutton, XIV.631 Kühn).

It is, of course, the pulse that will enable him to complete the diagnosis conclusively (even if there is, admittedly, considerable external input, too—not just in the woman's reluctance to speak with or admit him, but also in a maid's confirmation that this is indeed a serious case of *lupē*, 102,9 Nutton, XIV.632 Kühn). At a chance mention of the name of the dancer Pylades, Galen is able to observe the pulse, and finds it to have that uneven quality associated with disturbance of the soul, and anxiety in particular, that we have seen discussed (τὸν σφυγμὸν εὗρον ἀνώμαλον...ὅστις δηλοῖ τὴν ψυχὴν τεθορυβῆσθαι · ὁ αὐτὸς οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιώσι...συνβαίνει, 102,16–18 Nutton, XIV.632–3 Kühn).

Of course, as Galen pretty much admits, intelligent guess work, alongside the introduction of external information, were necessary both here and in the subsequent examples he gives of the discovery of concealed causes: a steward who is worried at the prospect of having to render an account when he knows money is missing (102,29–104,8 Nutton, XIV.633–4 Kühn) and a boy who is surreptitiously eating food

and thus sabotaging his recovery (104–10 Nutton, XIV.635–41 Kühn). But they do further reinforce the claim that some kind of diagnostic techniques, in particular that of the pulse, can be used to discern—or at least to help guess at—such hidden causes.

We have seen, then, a variety of contexts emphasizing the diagnostic dimension of the physical differences attendant on mental disturbance. It is this diagnostic dimension, I think, that gives us our best approximation to a clear answer to our original question. It would seem that such diagnostic possibilities lie at the heart of Galen's insistence on particular physical symptoms as *the essence* of the emotional disturbance. The emotional disturbance that a patient undergoes is a matter of fact, and it is a fact to which the doctor, especially through the diagnostic tool of the pulse, has access. The doctor's knowledge of the fact is something that may then be of concrete significance for therapy.

5. Models of the Soul?

We have looked at a number of emotional disturbances—*pathē* of the soul—which are discussed in detail in a variety of physiological and medical contexts, in a wide range of Galenic works. But here a problem arises. As we have already suggested in passing, there seems to be a striking lack of overlap between the kind of discussion of emotion that has been our main focus above—discussion in terms of heat, blood, *pneuma*, the heart, drying, yellow bile, fever—and those that appear in Galen's works purporting to give a dedicated discussion of the soul. There is, indeed, a work devoted specifically to 'affections of the soul' (*Aff. Pecc. Dig.*), and the terms of its discussion are quite different.

What is perhaps most remarkable is that the discussions of mental or emotional states which we have been considering are conducted almost entirely without mention of the rational capacity, or the brain; and, more broadly, without reference to interaction between the parts of the soul. We seem to have, (1) on the one hand, a form of discussion of *pathos* which focuses on the nexus of concepts, *thumos*—heat—blood—the heart, and which involves almost no mention of the function of the brain, or, more generally of internal interaction within the Platonic tripartite soul; (2) on the other, a form of discussion of *pathos* which focuses on the thumoeidic (heart-related) part of the soul mainly in terms of its relationship with the other parts, rational and

desiderative, and which makes almost no mention of physical correlates. In this latter context, what are most prominent are the capacity of the thumoeidic to be educated by reason; its role in allying with reason against desire; and, more generally, the fundamental role of early training and education. Purely as a shorthand, let me for the moment refer to these two forms of discussion respectively as the medical and the philosophical discourse of the *pathē*.

That apparent rift led Paola Manuli, in her ground breaking and thought-provoking work now nearly thirty years ago,¹⁷ to talk of the interference between different models in Galen. Her view was that *thumos* and other blood-related concepts belonged ultimately to a different model of explanation, with origins both in traditional Greek thought and in the medical tradition, and not readily or not successfully incorporated within the Platonic—and brain-centred—tripartite model which Galen adopts elsewhere.

Such analysis is complex and problematic—not least so because of the compartmentalized, or, perhaps worse, partially compartmentalized, nature of Galenic discussions: he himself does not give us the assistance we might like in understanding how or to what extent his discussions in different contexts can be seen as belonging within a single model of explanation.

Paola Manuli's approach is still, I think, worthy of consideration. It is also true, both that more work has been done in this area since 1988, and that more work needs to be done on a range of texts, in order to give a clearer answer to the problem that she raised. But let us say a little more about that problem, and about possible approaches to it.

If we consider the specific emotional disturbances that have been our focus above, worry (*phrontis*) and anxiety (*agōnia*) make very frequent appearances in medical contexts such as those that we have been considering; but they hardly appear at all in *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* There is no psychotherapy for anxiety, or worry—items which we might have expected to be fairly central to a psychotherapy. Other terms from our medical discourse, such as fear and distress, do, certainly, appear in the ethical works, *Aff. Pecc. Dig.*, *De indolentia* and (as far as one can tell through Arabic) *De moribus*, but without any stress on the importance of their physical correlates.

Galen could, of course, say that getting rid of excessive worry and anxiety—and indeed instances of fear too—will be the natural result of training the thumoeidic soul in the right way, and that this is precisely the focus of *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* and *De moribus*. That, in a sense, these are works addressed to giving the soul the right sort of training to avoid such disturbances ever arising—and so to avoid future

medical consequences. But certainly, there are specific everyday psychical affections, *phrontis* and *agōnia*—ones which, we have seen, can have severe physical consequences—receive no *direct* psychotherapeutic prescriptions.

Nor is this, as far as I can see, because Galen thinks that they can be addressed physically. The fact, elaborated above, that he insists on their physical correlates does not mean that they have a physical cure; rather, it means that one must be aware of them as potential causes of physical disease.

If we turn to *thumos*, it is surely true that it is talked of in very different ways in the medical and philosophical discourses. There are psychotherapeutic prescriptions for it in the philosophical discourse, but not in the medical; conversely, in the philosophical discourse there is no discussion of its possible medical implications. More specifically, the function of the thumoeidic soul as allied with reason against desire seems not to be significantly reflected in the medical discourse. Indeed, it could be said, more generally, that the desiderative soul and its affections do not find physical correlates in Galen's medical discourse in anything like the same way that the thumoeidic, heart-related, one does.

Can one characterize these differences as just a function of Galen's different focus in the different contexts? Or should one say, indeed, that in some sense different models are in play? As we have already suggested, evidence for the latter proposition might be seen in the particular conception of *thumos* in its specific relationship with certain physical items—heart, blood, *pneuma*, and innate heat—in the medical, but not the philosophical, discourse. (A possible counter to this perception would, perhaps, be to say that the works in the philosophical discourse simply do not need that level of physiological detail, and omit it as irrelevant.)

The situation is, indeed, still more complex than has so far been allowed. For there is another set of 'soul affections' discussed in the medical discourse, in addition to the heart- or heat-related ones considered above. I am thinking here of a range of mental disturbances which are, again, connected with the aetiology of hot and cold, but where the most important bodily location within that aetiology is that of the brain. In this case, then, as in the philosophical discourse, the rational capacity, or brain, is of central importance; but the description and management of these complaints, again, seem to have very little to do with the discourse on the health and rational training of the soul given in *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* and in *De moribus*.

What is at issue here is the category of more serious mental aberrations, as distinct from the more everyday ones which we have

looked at above. The discussion of this category is beyond my scope here, and indeed they would deserve a dedicated study in their own right:¹⁸ they include *phrenitis*, *paraphrosunē*, and *melancholia*—serious disturbances of the rational or hegemonic capacity. The most detailed discussions of this category of ‘brain malfunction’ occur in *Symp. Diff.* and in *Loc. Aff.* As already stated, they depend in particular on states of hot and cold, especially as they affect the brain. Here, too, we may point out that their analysis does not involve any appeal to the notion of the tripartite soul (of central importance in the philosophically conceived soul pathology): what are being described are problems with a single part, the brain or the rational.

Discussion in terms of heat, and of humours, seems absent from the philosophical works, just as the full tripartite Platonic scheme of explanation of soul affections seems absent from the works on pathology and the clinical context that we have been considering.

On the other hand, Galen might, if pressed, argue that at least some of the differences in analysis are due to the different context—that, in fact, the discussions are in a continuum. *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* and *De moribus*, he could say, are, precisely, telling you how to deal with *thumos* and its relatives in their own right, and focusing in particular on the importance of early habituation and education in this context. The works on diseases and diagnosis are telling you about what happens if they are left untreated, or if there is poor early education, or if they are allowed to have physical consequences.

He could, further, argue that at least distress, *lupē*, gets a specific treatment, with cognitive-therapy-style interventions, in *De indolentia*—a text which indeed, as we have seen, discusses not only that ‘therapy of the word’ but also, anecdotally, the terrible physical dangers of *lupē* not so treated. (This particular affection, moreover, has a prominence in *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* too, in a way which seems in a sense to take Galen outside the intellectual framework of Platonic tripartition.) He might further, as I’ve already suggested, say that other specific disturbances—shame, anxiety, worry, and fear generally—come under the general heading of thumoeidic passions in the Platonic sense, and so will be controlled by the Platonically correct discipline of that part.

And, what is more, he could point to at least one passage where he does indeed seem to give an account of the physical correlate of the interaction of reason and spirit as discussed in the works of moral psychology: see Appendix 1, where a part of the description of motions of the blood in *De causis symptomatum* (pp. 192–3) seems to do just that. (It would still have to be admitted, in this particular passage, that the *three* Platonic parts of the soul are not clearly identified, the distinction being between *logismos* and *to pathēton*.

This lack, indeed, seems to correspond to an absence of appearance of the Platonic *epithumētikon* in the medical-pathological contexts. The *thumoeides* seems to lend itself to detailed description within Galen's heart- and heat-based physiological system; desire, with its theoretical correlate of liver, much less so.)

To return to the original question here, and to Paola Manuli's 'interference between different models', I still feel that her intuition is sound, though it perhaps needs to be restated in qualified form. That there are different (though overlapping) vocabularies, due in part to different intellectual traditions (Hippocratic, later medical, Platonic) seems clear; clear, too, that—to put it at its weakest—terms are deployed differently, creating different conceptual schemes and raising different kinds of problems and solutions, in different works.

It also seems clear that Galen would probably have had some reply to make, if challenged, as to how his different works do belong within a single framework of explanation.

6. Treatment—and Physical Basis—of Mental Disturbances

We mentioned a little earlier that Galen does not suggest specific physical treatment for *phrontis*, *agōnia*, etc.; and that they do not feature—and least not clearly and explicitly—in his philosophical 'cognitive therapy' approach. What, then, if anything, does he suggest doing about them (apart, perhaps, from the broader approach in terms of educating the spirited part of the soul)?

Before I discuss the point in detail, let me digress here briefly to talk about the direction of causation in Galen more generally—a digression which will to some extent function as a summary of some of the issues previously raised. We have seen, amply attested, cases of mental disturbances having physical effects; and, as we know, in particular from *Quod animi mores* and *PHP*, physical mixtures and constitutions, and the central organs of the body, are of fundamental importance for the functioning of the soul. I do not think, in spite of the well-known claims of *QAM* in their stronger statement, that a completely straightforward or univocal picture emerges from Galen's writing, on the causal relationship between physical and mental states.¹⁹ Of relevance here are passages, in *QAM* and elsewhere, which assert the reciprocal relationship, in particular the possibility of virtuous circles coming about in soul-body relations.

ταῖς κράσεσι δ' ἔπεται κατὰ μὲν τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀγχίνοιαι τε καὶ μωρία κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον <κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον κινήσεις σύμμετροι ἢ ἄμετροι, καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον>· αἱ κράσεις δ' αὐταὶ τῇ τε πρώτῃ γενέσει καὶ ταῖς εὐχύμοις διαίταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, ὥστε συναυξάνειν ἀλλήλα ταῦτα. διὰ γοῦν τὴν θερμὴν κρᾶσιν οἱ ὀξύθυμοι γιγνόμενοι ταύταις πάλιν ταῖς ὀξύθυμίαις ἐκπυροῦσι τὴν ἔμφυτον θερμασίαν· ἐμπαλιν δ' οἱ σύμμετροι ταῖς κράσεσι συμμέτρους τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔχοντες εἰς εὐχυμίαν ὠφελοῦνται.

...it is on the mixtures that depend, in the rational, different degrees of shrewdness and foolishness (and, in the non-rational part of the soul, well-balanced or ill-balanced motions, also in different degrees).²⁰ And the mixtures themselves are consequent on the original formation and the well-humoured daily regimes, and these things mutually increase each other. So, to be sure, people who become sharp-spirited²¹ because of the hot mixture then fire up their innate heat by their sharpness of spirit; and those who are well-balanced in their mixtures, having well-balanced motions of the soul, are assisted towards good humour.

(QAM 11,78–9 Müller, V.821 Kühn)

We might digress at this point to attempt a summary on the question raised earlier in the paper, on the analysis of Galen's views in terms of the modern philosophy of mind. It seems to me (and I argue more fully elsewhere²²) that Galen does *not* commit himself either to physicalism or to epiphenomenalism, in spite of remarks which seem to commit him to some version or relative of mind–brain identity in QAM: the argument that appears to do this has to be understood as posed in a particular argumentative context, rather than representing Galen's final position.

Rather, passages such as that just quoted, taken in conjunction with some of those already discussed, especially from Appendix 2, which highlight the causative role of emotional disturbance in physical disease, suggest a picture which would more accurately be characterized as interactionist dualism. Certainly, passages such as that from *De sanitate tuenda* with which we started, as well as the fuller account from *De causis symptomatum* (Appendix 1) emphasize the regularity with which particular types of 'mental event' can be correlated with particular physical ones, and so suggest something like 'type identity'. In fact, however, Galen is not ultimately committed to an identity theory at all. (How could he be, when he explicitly and consistently throughout his work refuses to commit himself on the specific question of the substance of the soul?²³)

Important to bear in mind, here, is that Galen is not, in fact, a philosopher of mind—let alone one with access to twentieth- or twenty-first-century philosophical terminology. Tempting though it is to venture upon an analysis of Galen's 'philosophy of mind', it is essential to remember that his aim—albeit he takes on and engages with the second-century philosophical debate at some level—is to

present an intellectual account that makes sense of the complex medical and experiential phenomena in pragmatic terms, rather than one that aims primarily at philosophical definition.²⁴

I would add, though without space to justify the proposition, that this nuanced, pragmatic, enquiring—if, admittedly, not always easy-to-pin-down—approach that emerges from the texts which we have been considering seems to me in fact one of the great strengths and attractions of Galen's writing.

But I return to the question I posed a little earlier: how to cure anxiety and worry, to the extent that they are not dealt with in the works of moral psychology?

As has doubtless emerged by now, there is no one work of Galen's, nor even a range of works, devoted specifically to medical psychopathology, and his answers to questions of causation, pathology, diagnosis, and treatment in this area have to be gleaned from discussions, comments, and remarks scattered across a wide range of works.

Our best approximation to Galen's theory of the treatment of the kinds of psychic disturbance that we have been considering seems to be found in a few isolated remarks, in relation to specific case histories (case histories which in some cases have been doubted to be actual ones from his own experience), especially in his *Commentaries on Hippocrates' Epidemics*.

As a set of guidelines for therapeutic practice, one might say that they do not amount to a great deal; it would, perhaps, conversely, be possible to put a positive gloss on this by saying that Galen adopts a common-sense, non-doctrinaire approach.

We have already come across some of these examples from the *Epidemics Commentaries*, in the context where we were considering the potentially fatal consequences of such mental states. What possibilities does Galen suggest for treating them before such dire consequences arise?

First of all, Galen does show an interest in *identifying* the underlying anxiety, or other problem: what the patient says or does can be used as a *tekmērion*, an evidence, of what is going on in the soul. Such a process is described in the Commentary on *Epidemics* I.²⁵

But what follows on from such identification? Well, as far as cases of someone being in love are concerned, the medical intervention seems to end with the revelation: what to do about it is, presumably, up to the parties involved, within the limitations given by their marital and social status, and so on. (Perhaps there was some therapeutic value, at least, in getting it out in the open.)

In some cases of anxieties which take the form of an *idée fixe*, Galen

does discuss not just the identification of the anxiety but its removal.

Therefore the doctor must make it his business to know not just general tendencies of patient but things that affect his soul. For healing of a man whose cause of illness is in the soul can only be achieved through removal of the *idée fixe*, not through food and drink, baths, exercise and so on...

(*Hipp. Epid. VI*, 487 Wenkebach-Pfaff)

The insistence on removal of the *idée fixe*, presumably by some kind of cognitive therapy, as against any thought of dietetic approaches, is interesting indeed, in the broader context of Galen's work. He does not, systematically, tell one how to go about this.

He does, however, finally—and I fear these are the remarks most relevant to an answer to our question—give two anecdotal examples of how such an anxiety or *idée fixe* was removed by means of a trick played on the patient. In the Commentary on *Epidemics II* (208 Wenkebach-Pfaff), a doctor heals a patient who thinks she has swallowed a snake. The doctor pretends to go along with the delusion and gives her an emetic, throws a snake into the vomit surreptitiously at the moment that she throws up; and she is cured. (The 'cure' is not presented by Galen as his own, but attributed to Chrysippus, the teacher of Erasistratus.)

The same passage also recounts another similar trick—attributed this time to Erasistratus himself. The physician has a consultation with a man who believes himself to have heard a dead man address him from a graveyard. Again pretending to subscribe to the reality of the patient's delusion, he responds: it was I that addressed you from the graveyard. And I now refuse my help against your illness, just as you refused to come when I called to you on that occasion.

Both of the above tricks, we note, are attributed to doctors of a distantly previous generation. (Perhaps, while acknowledging the success of such an approach, Galen did not feel able to make such intellectual charlatanry part of his repertory. Or perhaps, more seriously, the paucity of real examples is due to a paucity of real therapeutic experience of this kind on Galen's part.)

There is not much material, then, on specific psychotherapeutic techniques in the case of chronic delusions or derangements; but there is, certainly, the acknowledgement of a difficult and important realm which is not accessible to cure by diet or drug therapy.

7. Anti-Stoic or Anti-Philosophical Polemic

I end with a rather more speculative and open-ended consideration. I raised at the beginning the question: whom does Galen have in his sights when he says rage is *not* defined as appetite for revenge? The cautious answer would be that it could be just about anyone in the philosophical tradition, since this was probably a pretty standard definition by late antiquity. There is some slight reason to associate what Galen says with the treatise by pseudo-Andronicus on *Affections* (now believed to be a Stoic text), because the precise term used by Galen for revenge, *antitimōrēsis*, is the same as that which occurs in that text's definition, and subtly different from Aristotle's *antilupēsis*. But one would not want to base too much on what was very probably a widespread, rather than a school-based, use of terminology.

But, more broadly, and of relevance to Galen's position in the intellectual market: there was a considerable discourse in moral psychology (largely but by no means exclusively Stoic) which was able to produce great subtlety in its discussion of individual psychic affections or *pathē*. The *Affections* of pseudo-Andronicus indeed, with its long list of individual items, exemplifies that discourse.

Galen is not interested in that complexity, and it is striking that in his own philosophical work on the *pathē* of the soul (*Aff. Pecc. Dig.*—and, as far as we can tell from what is a mutilated text, the same holds for *De moribus*), there is no great subtlety or sophistication in their description. (One may, for example, contrast the greater elaboration in this area that one finds in Plutarch, Epictetus, or Marcus Aurelius.²⁶)

Galen seems uninterested in detailed description of emotions, considered in their own right, of the sort engaged in by some philosophers. Is his approach here in fact related to the phenomenon which we have been considering above, namely his insistence on physical correlates? In other words, is he only interested in soul affections that can—as suggested in the quotation with which we started—be analysed also in terms of what happens in the body? For this analysis, of course, Galen, unlike his intellectual rivals (especially, perhaps, those who happen to be Stoic philosophers) has all the intellectual tools. The simplicity of Galen's language of soul-affection—its extreme *povertà lessicale*, again, something that was already noted by Paola Manuli—is in stark contradistinction to the extreme classificatory subtlety of which he is capable in other fields, for example the description of the pulse, the branches of health, diseases.

In that realm, he seems to be saying, you can divide as finely as you like; in the realm of physical causation, disease and diagnosis—the realm that really matters—I have the finer distinctions.

Appendix 1

De Causis Symptomatum on Emotional Disturbances

ἔστι δὴ τις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἡγεμονικωτάτων κινήσεων ἢ ἔσω τε καὶ ἔξω φορὰ τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας, ἐπὶ πολλοῖς πάθεσι γιγνομένη ψυχικοῖς, ἅμα δ' αὐτῇ δηλονότι καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα, ποτὲ μὲν ἔσω τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν φέρεται καὶ συστέλλεται, ποτὲ δ' ἐκτὸς ἀποτείνεται καὶ χεῖται. αὐτῆς μὲν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ' ἄλλην τινα πραγματεῖαν ἀποφίνασθαι τολμηρὸν, ἐν δὲ τῇ νῦν ἐνεστώσῃ πρὸς τῷ τολμηρῷ καὶ περιττόν. ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἢ τις ποτ' ἂν ἦ, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἥτοι πρώτοις ὀργάνοις εἰς ἀπάσας τὰς ἐνεργείας χρῆσθαι πνεύματι τε καὶ αἵματι καὶ τῇ θερμασίᾳ τῇ κατὰ θάτερον καὶ συναμφοτέρων, ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῦτοις ὑπάρχειν. ἐνεστι δὲ ἐναργῶς θεάσασθαι τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῆς ἐν ἅλλοις τε πολλοῖς καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ψυχικοῖς πάθεσιν. αὐτίκα φόβος τε καὶ θυμός, ὁ μὲν εἴσω τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν [VII.192 Kühn] ἀρχὴν ὑπάγει καὶ συστέλλει τό τε πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα σὺν τῷ καταψύχειν τὰ ἐπιπολῆς, ὁ δὲ ἀποτείνει τε καὶ χεῖ καὶ θερμαίνει. τὸ δ' ἀγωνιᾶν ὀνομαζόμενον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχον σύνθετον, ἀνώμαλόν ἐστι ταῖς κινήσεσι. καὶ τοῖνυν καὶ οἱ σφυγμοὶ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν τε καὶ τῆς καρδίας μικρότατοι μὲν καὶ ἀτονώτατοι τοῖς φοβηθεῖσι, μέγιστοι δὲ καὶ σφοδρότατοι τοῖς θυμωθεῖσιν, ἀνώμαλοι δ' εἰσὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιώσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰδοῦς εἴσω μὲν πρῶτον ἢ κινήσεις γίγνεται τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως, ἐπάνοδος δ' αὐτῆς ἀθρόα πρὸς τοῦκτὸς λαμβάνει· ὡς εἶγε μὴ ἐπ' ἀνέρχοιτο, φόβος ἐστίν, οὐκ αἰδώς. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰδώς ἐξαίφνης γίγνεται, μηδὲν τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως προσδοκῶσης κακόν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ὑπὸ μαλακίας τε καὶ δειλίας συμφύτου, μὴ φερούσης ἀνθρώπου πολὺ κρείττονος ὀμιλίαν, ἀλλ' ἀποδρᾶναι τε καὶ εἰ οἶόν τ' ἦν ἐκ ποδῶν γενέσθαι σπευδούσης. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνον ἀποχωρεῖ πρὸς τὸ βάθος, οἶον ἀποδιδράσκουσα χωρὶς τοῦ καταψύχεσθαι. τοῦ λογισμοῦ δ' ἐπεγεύροντος καὶ παρορμῶντος τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, [VII.193 Kühn] ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ φοβούμενόν τε καὶ αἰδούμενον, ἐπ' ἀνέρχεται τε καὶ κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἐν ὁμοίῳ μάλιστα τρόπῳ κινήσεως, ἐν οἷῳ περ ἂν ἐπὶ ψυχρολουσῆς θερμασίας ἐπανάκλησις γίγνηται. ἐν δὲ γε τοῖς φόβοις, ἅτε μὴδ' ὅλως ἐπεγεύροντός τε καὶ παρορμῶντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον κατασβέννυται τὸ θερμόν, ὥστε καὶ ῥιγοῦν ἐνίοις αὐτῶν. ὅπερ δ' ἐν φόβοις ἀθρόως, τοῦτ' ἐν λύπαις κατὰ βραχὺ πάσχουσι, μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότητι τῶν παθῶν, οὐχ ὅλῳ τῷ γένει διαφερόντων. καὶ τοῖνυν καὶ ἀπέθανον ἤδη τινὲς ἐπὶ φόβοις ἐξαφνιδίους, ὅταν ἀσθενὲς φύσει ψυχάριον ἰσχυρῷ πάθει κατασχεθὲν ἀθρόως κατασβεσθῇ τε καὶ καταπνιγῇ...θυμωθεὶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἀπέθανεν, ὡς ἂν μήτε τῆς θερμότητος καταψυχομένης μήτε τοῦ τόνου λυομένου· χαρέντες μέντοι μεγάλως ἐνιοὶ τῶν μικροψυχῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέθανον, ὥσπερ καὶ φοβηθέντες· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα τόνῳ καὶ ζέσει κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἡ ψυχικὴ [VII.194 Kühn] δύναμις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τούναντιόν, εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον εἶχε τόνου, τοῦτο νῦν ἐκλύει τε καὶ χαλᾷ· διαφορεῖται τοιγαροῦν, ὅταν ἐπιπλεῖστον χαλασθεῖσα φέρεται πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς. ὁ δὲ πόνος ἐναντίως κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναγκάζων ὅμοια τῷ μεγίστῳ φόβῳ φέρει τὰ συμπτώματα. καὶ γὰρ ἀχροοῦσι καὶ καταψύχονται καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ τρέμουσι καὶ μικροσφυκτοῦσι καὶ ἀσφυκτοῦσι καὶ τέλους ἀποσπῆσκουσιν ὡσαύτως τοῖς ἐκπλαγεῖσιν. ὑποφεύγει γὰρ κἂν τοῦτοις ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ ἐμφυτὴν θερμασίαν λυομένη θ' ἅμα καὶ κατασβεσμένη. ὅπου δὲ θάνατον ἐπιφέρει τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν παθῶν, οὐδὲν δήπου θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ λειποψυχίαν.

οὐκ οὐδ' ὅτι τὰ λειποψυχίας ἀκόλουθα συμπτώματα, τὰ τε ἅλλα καὶ ἡ ἀκούσιος ἔκκρισις τῶν περιττωμάτων ἔπεται οὐδὲν ἔτι χρὴ θαυμάζειν... ὅταν οὖν ἐπὶ θερμοῖς τε ἅμα καὶ δακνῶδεσι χυμοῖς γίνηται ῥῖγος, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστι καταψύχεσθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς ἅπαντα, τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ βάθος συννεούσης ἅμα τῷ αἵματι.

Indeed, the drive, both inwards and outwards, of the innate heat is amongst the primary and (as one might call them) most *hegemonic* motions; it arises upon many soul affections; and of course along with this motion *pneuma* and blood, too, are sometimes borne and dragged in towards the source, sometimes pushed outwards and diffused. Well, to make a declaration on the substance of the soul itself might perhaps be bold, even in some other work; in the present one it is not only bold but also superfluous. Whatever it actually is, one of two things seems to be the case: that it uses *pneuma*, blood and the heat that is in both of them as the primary instruments for all its activities, or that it subsists in those things. And it is possible to observe its motions manifestly in many other affections, but especially those of the soul. Fear and rage, to begin with: the former draws and drags in both the *pneuma* and the blood towards the [VII.192 Kühn] source, with a simultaneous cooling of the surface parts; the latter pushes outwards, diffuses and heats. But what is known as anxiety, being a composite of the two, is uneven in its motions. And, certainly, the pulses of the arteries and of the heart are smallest and slackest in those experiencing fear, largest and most violent in those experiencing rage and uneven in those experiencing anxiety. In shame, there occurs first a motion inward of the soul-capacity, but then a concerted return to the surface; if, then, it does not thus return, it is fear and not shame. For shame comes about suddenly, not because the soul-capacity is expecting any ill, but, as one might say, because of some inborn softness and timidity, whereby the soul-capacity cannot endure the society of a much greater person, but is eager to run away and, if at all possible, be somewhere else. Because of this it only retreats to the depth, as though running away, without the cooling. When the reasoning-faculty urges on and encourages the emotive part of the soul—[VII.193 Kühn] that which experiences fear and shame—it returns and moves to the surface in a similar manner of motion to that involved in the recall of heat after cold bathing. In fear, however, where the reasoning-faculty is not urging on and encouraging the emotive part of the soul at all, the hot is being constantly and increasingly extinguished, so that some of these even experience rigor. And what they undergo in fear in a concerted way, this they undergo to a small extent in distress: these affections differ from each other in size and violence, not in their overall kind. Indeed, there have even been cases of death resulting from sudden fear, when a naturally weak little soul is seized by a strong affection and is all at once extinguished and choked...No one has ever died as a result of rage, since neither is the heat cooled down nor the tension dissolved; but some small-souled individuals have died through great joy, as also through fear; for the soul-capacity does not move to the surface with both tension and boiling at once, [VII.194 Kühn] but, quite the contrary, it now dissolves and relaxes whatever tension it previously had; so, then it is dispersed when, having reached its maximal relaxation, it is borne towards the outside. Pain, which forces the soul to be moved in an opposite way, presents symptoms similar to the greatest fear. In such cases people lose colour, are cooled, experience rigor and tremor, small pulse and absence of pulse, and finally die in the same way as those who have been terrified. For in these latter, too, the innate heat retreats within to the source, being simultaneously both dissolved and cooled down. And since such affections can

cause death, there is, surely, nothing remarkable if they also causing fainting —nor, then, should we be surprised if the symptoms consequent on fainting, in particular involuntary evacuation of excretions, also follow...So, when rigor supervenes upon humours which are both hot and biting, there is nothing remarkable in the fact that all the surface parts are all cooled down, as the soul-capacity swims down to the depth together with the blood.

(Caus. Symp. II.5, VII.191–4 K.)

Appendix 2

Emotional Disturbances as Causes of Physical Disease

(A) καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι καὶ λουτρὰ καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ φροντίδες καὶ λῦπαι καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα μονονουχὶ καθ' ἐκάστην ῥοπὴν ὑπαλλάττοντα τὴν κρᾶσιν.

There are also baths, rages, worries, distress and all such things which pretty nearly transform the mixture through their every shift.

(San. Tu. I.5, 14,18–20 Koch, VI.28 Kühn)

(B) αἱ δ' ἄμετροι κινήσεις ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις τε καὶ διαλογισμοῖς καὶ θυμοῖς, αἱ μὲν υπερβάλλουσαι χολωδέστερον ἀποφαίνουσι τὸ ζῶον, αἱ δ' ἐλλείπουσαι φλεγματικώτερον καὶ ψυχρότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῖς μὲν προτέραις ἔξεσιν οἱ τε πυρετοὶ καὶ ὅσα θερμότερα πάθη, ταῖς δ' ἑτέραις ἐμφράξεις καθ' ἥπάρ τε καὶ σπλάγχνα, ἐπιληψία τε καὶ ἀποπληξίαις ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ συνελόντα φάναι, τὰ καταρροϊκὰ τε καὶ ρευματικὰ νοσήματα συμπύπτει πάντα. καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπους νοσοῦντας ὅσα ἔτη διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος ὑγιεινοὺς ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἐπανορθωσάμενοι τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν κινήσεων...οἷς αἱ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κινήσεις σφοδρότεραι γενόμεναι θερμότεραν τοῦ δέοντος ἀπειργάζοντο τὴν κρᾶσιν τοῦ σώματος...

Unbalanced motions within desires, arguments and rages make the animal more bilious, when they are excessive, and more phlegmatic and colder when they are deficient. Moreover, in the former conditions fevers and those affections which are hotter come about, in the latter, obstructions in the liver and internal organs, and epilepsy and apoplexy and anything else of that sort —to summarize, all diseases involving catarrh and flow. And we have restored health to people who were suffering for many years because of the character of their soul, by correcting the imbalance of the motions...[particular musical and exercise prescriptions are mentioned for] people in whom the motions of the spirited had become too vigorous and rendered the mixture of the body hotter than it ought to be should be...

(San. Tu. I.8, 20,4–17 Koch, VI.41 Kühn)

(C) The drying effect of emotional disturbances

ἐξηρασμένους ἢ ὑπὸ ἀγρυπνίας, ἢ φροντίδος, ἢ ἀφροδισίων, ἢ βρωμάτων, ἢ φαρμάκου ξηραίνοντος, ἢ θυμοῦ

...having been dried out by insomnia, worry, sex, foods, a drying drug, or rage...

(D) *Emotional disturbances generate yellow bile*

τὰ δὲ πρασοειδῆ μόνους τοῖς κακῶς ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ γεννᾶται. καὶ μὲν μὲν δὴ καὶ φροντίδες καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ λυῖται καὶ πόνοι καὶ γυμνάσια καὶ ἀγρυπνίαι καὶ ἀσιτία καὶ ἔνδεια πλείονα τὸν τῆς ξανθῆς χολῆς τοῦτοις ἀθροίζουσι χυμὸν, ὅτι καὶ πλείονα γεννῶσιν ἐν ἥπατι.

The leek-green substances are generated in the digestive cavity only by individuals who have performed coction badly. And indeed, worry, rage, distress, exertion, exercise, sleeplessness, fasting and deficiency cause the accumulation of more of the humour of yellow bile in these people, because they also generate more of it in the liver.

(*De temperamentis* II.6, 78, 6–11 Helmreich, I.633 Kühn)

(E) *Emotional disturbances as causes of heating*

διήρηται δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν σφυγμῶν πραγματεία τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα· νῦν δὲ ἀρκέσει τό γε τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἐξ ἀργίας μὲν καὶ διαίτης ὑγρᾶς ὑγρότερον ἑαυτοῦ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ αἷμα, πλενοεξία τῶν ὑδατωδῶν περιττωμάτων· ἐπὶ θυμῷ δὲ καὶ γυμνασίῳ, ἐγκαύσεσσι τε καὶ τρίψεσι, καὶ φαρμάκῳ θερμαίνοντι, καὶ τροφῇ τοιαύτῃ, καὶ οἴνοις ἀκρατεστέροις καὶ παλαιότεροις θερμότερον...

This has all been distinguished in the study of the pulse; it will be enough for now to say that blood becomes wetter than it was in idleness, wet diet, through excess of watery residues; but as a result of rage and exercises, excess heat and massages, a heating drug, nourishment of that kind, and wines of the older, less controlled type, it becomes hotter...

(*De plenitudine* 11, VII.579 Kühn)

...κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἀνώμαλος ἔσται δυσκρασία περὶ σύμπαν τὸ σῶμα, ποτὲ μὲν λιγνυώδους διαπνοῆς ἐπισχεθείσης, ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ γυμνασίων πλειόνων, ἢ πόνων αὐξηθέντων, τὴν θερμασίαν ἐπιτεινόντων, ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ θυμῷ, ζέσαντος ἀμετρότερον τοῦ αἵματος, ἢ δι' ἐγκαυσίν τινα, ἐξωθεν ἐκθερμανθέντος...

...in another manner the uneven bad-mixture will involve the whole body, sometimes through the retention of a smoky transpiration, sometimes from too much exercise, or increase in exertions, which extend the heat, and sometimes as a result of rage, where the blood boils in an immoderate way, or through some excess heat, when it is heated from without...

(*De inaequali intemperie* 7, VII.747 Kühn)

(F) *Emotional disturbances as causes of fever*

(i) καὶ γὰρ θυμὸς καὶ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ λύπη καὶ πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος φροντίς ἀγρυπνία τε πολλὴ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς γενομένη πυρετοῦς ἀνάπτουσι καὶ νοσημάτων μεγάλων ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὥσπερ καὶ τούναντίον ἀργὴ διάνοια καὶ ἄνοια καὶ ψυχὴ παντάπῃς ἄθυμος ἀχροΐας καὶ ἀποτροφίας ἐργάζεται πολλάκις ἀρρωστία τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος.

For, indeed, rage, weeping, anger, distress, worry which is more than it should be, as well as significant insomnia arising from them set off fevers, and become the starting-points of major diseases, as, too, conversely, an idle intellect, mindlessness and a soul which is completely lacking in spirit often

bring about lack of colour and lack of nourishment through feebleness of the innate heat.

(*San. Tu.* I.8, 19,31–20,1 Koch, VI.40 Kühn)

(ii) γυμνασθεὶς μὲν τις ἀμετρότερον ἐκοπώθη. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ θερμασίαν ἔχειν ἄμετρον ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις τὲ καὶ τοῖς μυσὶ πλείονα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν... καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐνταῦθα καταμείνειεν ἡ θερμὴ καὶ φθάσειεν λυθῆναι, πρὶν ἐπινεμάσθαι σύμπαν τοῦ ζώου τὸ σῶμα, κόπος ἂν οὕτω γε μόνον εἴη τὸ γεγονός· εἰ δὲ εἰς ἅπαν ἐταθείη τὸ σῶμα, πυρετὸς ὀνομάζεται τὸ νόσημα, τοῦ παντὸς ζώου θερμότης τις ἄμετρος οὕσα. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς, ζέσις τις ὧν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν θερμοῦ, διὰ κίνησιν ἄμετρον ὅλον ἐπινεμάμενος ἐνίοτε τὸ σῶμα πυρετὸν ἀνῆψε.

Someone who has engaged in immoderate exercise suffers fatigue. This is the same as having immoderate heat, beyond what is natural, in the joints and in the muscles...And if the warmth stays there and is dissipated before taking over the whole body, the result will be merely fatigue; but if it extends through whole body, the disease is called 'fever', this being an immoderate heat of the whole animal. So too rage, which is a boiling of the hot around the heart, sometimes, if it takes over the whole body because of an immoderate motion, gives rise to fever.

(*De causis morborum* 2, VII.4 Kühn)

(iii) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ κόποις, καὶ θυμοῖς, καὶ λύπαις, ἐγκαύσεσί τε καὶ ἐμψύξεσι, καὶ ἀγρυπνίαις, καὶ ἀπεψίαις, καὶ μέθαις, καὶ πλησμοναῖς, ὁρῶνται πυρέττοντες ἐνιοί, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἤδη τοῦτο γε πρόδηλον, ὑπ' αὐτῆς τοῦ πράγματος τῆς ἐναργείας δεδιδαγμένοις.

This much is already evident to all, on the basis of the manifest facts: that some are observed to suffer fever as a result of rage, distress, excess heat or chilling, insomnia, failure to digest, drinking, or excess fullness.

(*De differentiis februm* I.3, VII.279 Kühn)

(iv) ὁ δὲ γε θυμὸς οἷον ζέσις τις καὶ κίνησις σφοδρὰ τῆς θυμοειδοῦς δυνάμεως ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς καρδίας αὐτῷ καθιδρυμένης. συνεκθερμαίνεται δὲ αὐτῇ ποτὲ μὲν ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἔστιν ὅτε δὲ ἡ τοῦ αἵματος οὐσία, καὶ ἢν εἰπηθείως ἔχοντα τύχη πρὸς τὰ δεξάμενα κατασχεῖν ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν θερμότητα...διαμένει ταῦτα παρὰ φύσιν θερμά, κἄν τῷδε πυρέττειν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἄνθρωπον...ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ λύπαις οὐκέτι ζέσιν, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον· ὁ δ' ἐπὶ κόποις, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει κίνησιν πλείονα μυῶν καὶ νεύρων καὶ συδέσμων καὶ ἄρθρων, ἃ δὴ καὶ πρῶτα θερμαίνεται, διαδίδοται δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν καρδίαν ἢ θερμασία, κἄν τοῦτω πυρέττουσιν.

And rage is as it were a boiling and vigorous motion of the spirited capacity which is seated in the actual body of the heart. With this is simultaneously heated sometimes the substance of the *pneuma*, sometimes that of the blood, and if the receiving bodies happen to be in a favourable state for the retention of the heat for an extended period...these remain unnaturally hot, and in this case the person necessarily suffers fever...But that fever which takes place as a result of distress is not has as its source not boiling, but only motion; that as a result of fatigue also has as its source larger motion of muscles, nerves, ligaments and joints: these are heated primarily, but the heat is transmitted

from there to the heart by the connection, and in this process they suffer fever.

(*De differentiis febrium* I.4, VII.283–4 Kühn)

(v) αἱ προφάσεις δ' αὐτῶν τῆς γενέσεως ἀγρυπνία καὶ ἀπεψία καὶ λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ θυμὸς καὶ φροντίς, ἔκκαυσίς τε καὶ ψύξις καὶ κόπος καὶ μέθη καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα. πῶς οὖν...γνωρίζειν...διείμι · κοινῇ μὲν ἀπάντων ὁ σφυγμὸς εἰς τάχος ἐπιδίδωσι καὶ πυκνότητα...

The causes of generation of them [sc. fevers] are: insomnia, failure to digest, distress, fear, rage, worry, excess heat, chilling, fatigue and drinking and all those sorts of thing. How to discern these...I shall explain: in common to all of them, the pulse increases in speed and frequency...

(*De crisis* II.13, IX.696 Kühn)

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² Recent work on Galen's 'psychology' or soul theory has been voluminous, and of a high level of scholarly and philosophical sophistication; it has, however, tended to focus almost exclusively on Galen's works of 'philosophical psychology', largely ignoring the much larger corpus of his medical ones. To the three mentioned so far, *PHP*, *Aff. Pecc. Dig.*, and *QAM*, one may, in this context, add the *De moribus*, a work preserved only in an Arabic summary, and the recently discovered *De indolentia*. Prominent among such philosophical studies are García Ballester (1972), Donini (1974), (1980), (1988), (1992), (2008); Manuli and Vegetti (1977), as well as the papers assembled in Manuli and Vegetti (1988); Vegetti (1984), (1999a), (1999b); Manuli (1986), (1993), Lloyd (1988), Hankinson (1991a), (1991b), (1992), (1993), (2006); Singer (1992), (1996); Tieleman (1996), (2003); Gill (1998), (2007); Bazou (1999); van der Eijk (2009); Jouanna (2009); Rosen (2009); Schiefsky (2012). And a particular advance in philosophical analysis of the works mentioned above was represented by the monographic study of Galen's psychology in its philosophical context by the honorand of the present volume: Gill (2010). See now Singer (2013), both for discussion of *De indolentia* (as well as further bibliography on it), and for detailed analysis of and commentary on all the works mentioned above, except for *PHP*.

It is true that philosophical analysis has sometimes included such texts as *De usu partium*, *De temperamentis*, *De foetuum formatione*, and *De semine*; but even these are works largely devoted to physical or physiological theory, rather than to the clinical or diagnostic context. An important step in the study of a wider range of texts was made by Paola Manuli (1988), as further discussed below; and one should make particular mention of the work of Heinrich von Staden (e.g. 2000, 2011) as extending the range of Galenic texts studied beyond the realm of the purely philosophical: the latter article indeed is especially relevant to the theme of the present paper. There has also recently been some more wide-ranging work on Galen's discussions of mental illness: as well as the case studies assembled in Mattern (2008); see Boudon-Millot (2013), Holmes (2013), and Jouanna (2013), and now especially Devinant (forthcoming) and Singer (forthcoming).

³ Many examples could be provided; I give just four for the sake of exemplification: the underlying substance for the regenerative process (ἡ... ὑποβεβλημένη πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν... οὐσία) is menstrual blood, *De semine* II.2, 162,20 De Lacy, IV.611–12 Kühn; sometimes bodies depart from their natural state only in terms of the four qualities, with no other substance coming in from outside (μηδεμίας ἐξωθεν... ἐπιρρυσίσης ἐτέρας οὐσίας), *Caus. Morb.* 6, VII.21 Kühn; one particular kind of increase in the internal heat arises through the airy substance (ἀερώδους οὐσίας) alone having been heated, *Diff. Feb.* I.1, VII.276 Kühn; mixtures are responsible for bringing about the specific substance of the parts (τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν τῶν μορίων συμπληροῦσιν) in human or animal bodies, *De usu partium* I.9, i.18,25 Helmreich, III.26 Kühn.

⁴ *QAM* 2, 33,4–16 Müller, IV.768–9 Kühn (the passage is admittedly not textually unproblematic; see now Singer (2013) *ad loc.* for discussion).

⁵ *Diff. Feb.* I.1, VII.273 Kühn.

⁶ Singer (2014): 27–9.

⁷ A very selective, but high-level, representation of recent discussions would be that provided by the following essay collections: Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji (1979), Durrant (1993); Everson (1991); Nussbaum and Rorty (1995). More specific attention is paid to Aristotle's biological works and their contribution to this debate in e.g. Nussbaum (1978), Gotthelf and Lennox (1987), van der Eijk (2000).

⁸ See e.g. Arist. *An. Post.* I.21, 83a4–9 (the whiteness of a particular piece of wood, which is not a necessary property of the wood); I.4, 73b3–4 (the distinction

καθ'αυτὰ and συμβεβηκότα); I.6, 74b12 (τὰ...συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα); I.7, 75a42–b2 (*sumbebēkota* as points shown by a demonstration).

⁹ *An. Post.* I.22, 83b19–20 (some *sumbebēkota* are *kath' hauta*, some in a different way); cf. I.7, 75a42–b2, and I.6, 75a20–2, the latter also implying two different kinds of *sumbebēkos*; the text at *An. Prior.* I.31, 46b26–7, has the terms *sumbebēkos* and *idion* in parallel, and cf. the use of *idia* at *An. Prior.* I.27, 43b1–5.

¹⁰ Cf. also a somewhat similar usage, distinguishing the investigation of an organ's *structure* from that of the ἴδια συμβεβηκότα of its activity, at *De instrumento odoratus* 3, II.863 Kühn.

¹¹ One may, for example, point to somewhat similar accounts of shame and fear in the Aristotelian *Problems*: the physical correlates of *agōnia*, *phobos*, and *thumos* are distinguished in terms of heat and its location and/or motion at II.6, 869a2–8; II.31, 869b7–9; XI.32, 902b37–903a4 (mentioning also *aischunē*), and XI.53, 905a6–13 (distinguishing *aidōs/agōnia* and *phobos*); *thumos* and *phobos* are contrasted in terms of upward or downward motion of the blood/heat at XXVII.3, 947b24–34, with which cf. XXXI.3, 957b9–14, and XXXII.8, 961a8–13 (contrasting the motions of heat in anger and shame).

This consideration also raises a broader point. In assessing Galen's relationship with the Aristotelian tradition, it is not just his contact with and reaction to the earliest generation of texts that must be considered. Authors closer to Galen's own time, e.g. Philo of Alexandria (and that location, with its medical connections, might possibly be of particular significance for Galen), may shed light on the way in which the tradition has been interpreted between Aristotle (and indeed Plato) and Galen. I am grateful to the anonymous referee for pointing to the possible significance of Philo; future research on Philo and others in the Platonic–Aristotelian tradition may indeed shed further light on Galen's intellectual formation. Cf. on this point also Singer (2014).

¹² These English translations can of course only represent approximations to the values of these terms in the Greek socio-linguistic tradition; but it is hoped that they are at least not grossly misleading. The concept of *aidōs* is, as is well known, linked to a complex of Graeco-Roman societal notions to do with appropriate publicly viewed behaviour, and how one is scrutinized and valued. Terms which may seem more problematic in translation are *lupē*, which apart from a more or less technical sense in the philosophical tradition may also refer more straightforwardly to 'pain'. (On both these features of *lupē* see further below; but the straightforward sense of 'pain' is certainly not the central one in present contexts, this being covered rather by *ponos* or *algēma*.) 'Anxiety' seems the best translation of *agōnia*, with the proviso that a sense associated with public performance or competition is often—though not always—to the fore.

¹³ μὴ φερούσης ἀνθρώπου πολὺ κρείττονος ὁμιλίαν, *Caus. Symp.* II.5, VII.192 Kühn; for this and the phrases cited in the following paragraphs, see Appendix 1.

¹⁴ Ἔθος, δὲ, ἐξ οἷων ὑγιάνομεν, διαίτησι, σκέπησι, πόνοισιν, ὕπνοισιν, ἀφροδισίοισι, γνῶμη (V.352,8–9 Littré).

¹⁵ 4,6–8 Boudon-Millot and Jouanna: the person in question 'wasted away and died of depression' (ἀπὸ δυσθυμίας καὶ λύπης διεφθάρη συντακείς, Nutton's translation); on the probable identity of the two, and possible forms of the name, see Nutton, in Singer (2013) 79 n. 15, and cf. Boudon-Millot and Jouanna *ad loc.*

¹⁶ The account is at *Praen.* 6, 100,15–102,27 Nutton, XIV.631–3 K. A similar diagnostic success is attributed to Erasistratus, and mentioned both in this text (ch. 6, 100, 7–14 Nutton, XIV.630–1 K.) and at *Hipp. Epid.* II, 208 Wenkebach–Pfaff; but Galen claims that the specific intellectual procedure he followed with the wife of Justus was his own.

- ¹⁷ See especially Manuli (1988); relevant also are Manuli (1986) and (1993).
- ¹⁸ But see now Devinant ([forthcoming](#)); Singer ([forthcoming](#)).
- ¹⁹ On this point, especially in relation to the interpretation of *QAM*, see now Singer (2013), especially the introduction to *QAM* in that volume.
- ²⁰ On the text here, see Singer (2013) *ad loc.*
- ²¹ Or ‘quick to anger’: the word, in relation to Galen’s other terminology for anger, is discussed by von Staden (2011).
- ²² See Singer (2013), esp. introduction to *QAM*.
- ²³ On the consistency of this position, and for a summary of the passages in which it is stated, see Donini (2008) and now Singer (2013). (It appears, for example, in the lengthy passage in Appendix 1 below.)
- ²⁴ On the Galen’s attitude to philosophers, and to philosophy as a discipline, and on his problematic self-definition in relation to both, see now Singer (2014).
- ²⁵ ([sc. Hippocrates] εἰπὼν διανοήματα...ἐδήλωσεν...ἐκ τεκμηρίων εὕρισκόμενον πρᾶγμα. τεκμήριον δέ ἐστίν ὃ ἀποφθέγγονται τε καὶ πράττουσιν οἱ κάμνοντες, *Hipp. Epid. I*, III.1, 107,24–6 Wenkebach–Pfaff, XVIIA.213 Kühn).
- ²⁶ For further discussion and exemplification of this point, see Singer (2013) 211.

Music and the Soul in Stoicism

Paul Scade

1. Introduction

Discussions of Stoic thought on the psychological effects of music have tended to take their starting point from a passage of Galen in which the effects of music are presented as problematic for the Stoa's monistic psychology (*PHP* 5.6.17–22). Galen argues, against Chrysippus, that it is necessary to distinguish irrational parts of the soul from the rational part (5.6.17–20) and he then goes on to offer a direct challenge, framed in terms of music, to Chrysippus' view of the emotions as rational judgements:

Why was it, in heaven's name—I shall address this question also to Chrysippus' followers—that when Damon the musician came upon a flute-girl playing in the Phrygian mode to some young men who were overcome with wine and acting madly, he told her to play in the Dorian mode and the youths immediately dropped their wild behaviour? Obviously, they are not taught anything by the music of the flute that changes the opinions of their rational faculties; but since the affective part of the soul is irrational, they are aroused or calmed by means of irrational motions. For the irrational is helped and harmed by irrational things, the rational by knowledge and ignorance.

(*PHP* 5.6.21–2, trans. De Lacy)

The idea here is that music's ability to affect the emotions undermines both the early Stoic notion of a unified rational soul and the claim that all emotions involve rational judgements. Neither position is sustainable, the claim runs, because music *does* affect the emotions but

does not derive its effects from rational judgement.

This criticism has been taken seriously by scholars working on Stoic ethics and psychology and has also shaped the scholarly discussion of Stoic thought on music more broadly.¹ However, there are good reasons to reject the key claim that underlies Galen's criticism of Chrysippus. At the core of Galen's attack is the view that, '[people] are not taught anything by the music of the flute that changes the opinions of their rational faculties'. I will argue, by contrast, that Stoic theory treats music as a fundamentally rational phenomenon: musical composition involves the creation of an ordered structure of notes representing rational impressions in the soul of the composer; sound acts as a corporeal medium that is shaped to convey these rational musical structures; and, at the other end of the equation, the structures carried by the sounds are impressed on the souls of the listener and cognized in a rational manner. In short, music has its effect by communicating meaningful rational structures from one mind to another and, as such, the problem identified by Galen is a phantom that does not accurately reflect Stoic theory.²

2. The Background

Before examining how audible music can have a rational effect on the soul it will be worth briefly surveying some of our evidence for Stoic thought on music and identifying some broad trends therein. The first point to take into account is that, despite having driven much of the scholarly conversation on the topic, the Galen passage is unique in suggesting that Stoic theory is unable to accommodate a rational analysis of music. Indeed, there is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that not only is such an analysis possible in Stoic terms but that this approach was actively pursued by the Stoics.

Musical language is found at the heart of the Stoic philosophical system.³ The standard formulation of the end is 'a life in agreement (*homologia*) with nature'. Plato treats *harmonia* and *symphōnia* as types of *homologia* in his *Symposium* (187b)⁴ and the Stoics follow him in treating harmony and agreement as interchangeable notions. *Symphōnia* stands in for *homologia* in a number of alternative formulations of the Stoic end;⁵ in each case, a life in agreement or harmony with nature is one in which the human being comes to stand in the proper relationship with the cosmos, a relationship which is characterized by order, coherence, and unity. The reason that the

appropriate relationship to the cosmos is one of harmony and agreement is that the cosmos itself has a harmonious structure.⁶ The same notion of an orderly unified structure is also expressed in harmonic language in descriptions of virtue as involving ‘the mutual concordance of [the virtuous man’s] actions’ (*omnium inter se actionum concordia*)’ (Sen. *Ep.* 120.11) or the ‘regularity and, so to speak, the harmony of conduct’ (*rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam*) (Cic. *De Fin.* 3.21). Similarly, beauty in the soul consists in ‘a harmony of doctrines and concord of virtues’ (ἁρμονία δογμάτων καὶ ἀρετῶν συμφωνία) (Philo, *De Mos. Lib.* 2.140 = *SVF* 3.392).

This language of harmony forms part of a broader vocabulary used by the Stoics in describing value-bearing structures. Harmony is equivalent to beauty, health, proportion, and the rather enigmatic characteristic of ‘having all the numbers’, with all of these terms being used interchangeably to describe properly unified structures. In particular, harmony, proportion, and ‘having all the numbers’ are concerned with expressing order in terms of the structural inter-relationships between parts of a higher-level unit.⁷ Now, the bare minimum that we can say about this use of harmonic language is that the Stoics thought musical harmony provided an appropriate metaphor for the highest level of unity between the individual and the cosmos and also for the ways in which the soul and the cosmos are each properly ordered internally. I will argue below that the connection between musical harmony and psychic harmony runs rather deeper than mere metaphor but for the moment what is important is that the Stoics must have understood musical harmony as exhibiting some form of rational structure, given that this language is used to describe the ethically valuable states that are ultimately equated with rationality in its highest form. Musical language would simply not have been available as a metaphor for rational structure if music was conceived of as fundamentally irrational.

While this provides useful background material, the key issue for the present discussion is whether and how *audible* music can have a rational psychological effect. Galen, we have seen, implies that Chrysippus has no ready answer to the difficulty music raises but there are good grounds for thinking that the issue *was* addressed in the school and addressed in such a way as to render Galen’s criticism invalid. In addition to Galen’s evidence, we have just three further passages that associate views on audible music with the earliest heads of the Stoa—one each for Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Zeno. I will discuss the Cleanthean passage in some detail in Section 4 but will turn now to briefly survey the evidence for Zeno and Chrysippus.

The evidence for Chrysippus is the least promising. Quintilian reports that Chrysippus identified a particular tune for nurses to use in

calming babies (1.10.32–3). Since children are non-rational animals for the Stoics this does not, taken in isolation, help establish that Chrysippus treated music as rational but the context for this report is, nevertheless, suggestive. Quintilian is attempting to justify the inclusion of the study of music on the curriculum for his ideal orator. Music is a theoretical discipline here (1.10.31–2) and Chrysippus' view is one of three examples given to show music's ability to affect the emotions. Moreover, the general thrust of Quintilian's discussion of music is Platonic and a little earlier he locates the Stoics on a continuum with Plato and the Pythagoreans in treating music as a worthwhile pursuit for the philosopher (1.10.12–15; cf. Stob. 2.67.5–12 = LS 26H). Given this context it would be odd if the Chrysippean example he exploits should turn out to be grounded in an interpretation of music that was thoroughly at odds with that of the Platonic/Pythagorean tradition.

The evidence for Zeno is more illuminating. Plutarch records an anecdote according to which, when on his way to the theatre with his pupils to listen to some music, Zeno remarked, 'Come, let us observe what harmony and *phōnē*, gut and sinew, wood and bone, send forth when they partake of *logos*, proportion/rhythm and order (ἰωμεν', εἰπεῖν, 'ὅπως καταμάθωμεν οἶαν ἔντερα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὅστ' ἄ λόγου καὶ ῥυθμοῦ μετασχόντα καὶ τάξεως ἐμμέλειαν καὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησιν', *Mor. Virt.* 443A, trans. Helmbold, revised). The harmonious aspects of music are here presented in terms that are characteristic of the Stoic understanding of rationality. The context is also interesting, as the anecdote about Zeno forms part of a brief description of a view according to which instrumental music is able to reproduce judgements, emotions, and characters (τὰς κρίσεις ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἥθη). Plutarch refuses to provide any further details about this position or those who hold it but in the remainder of this paper I will provide a reconstruction of Stoic thought on music that matches the views of these thinkers very closely. It is, I suggest, no coincidence that Plutarch draws on a Zenonian anecdote here for the thinkers he has in mind are the Stoics.

3. Diogenes of Babylon on Audible Music

Our most important source for Stoic musical thought is the Epicurean Philodemus' work *On Music*.⁸ The bulk of the surviving portion of this text is concerned with reporting and criticizing the musical views of

Diogenes of Babylon, the fifth head of the Stoa and a pupil of Chrysippus. Through Philodemus' discussion it becomes clear that, as well as writing extensively on this topic, Diogenes assigned great philosophical importance to music.

Not only does Diogenes think that audible music can affect the emotions, intensifying them or pacifying them (e.g. Cols. 42, 47, 49), but he also claims that listening to music can produce harmony and proportion in the soul (e.g. Cols. 8 and 78) and that an education in music leads to a comprehension of harmony (e.g. Col. 32). Indeed, he goes so far as to say that, as a correct regimen of diet and exercise makes the body healthy and counters bodily illness, so music is an art that can bring health to the soul and treat psychic illness (e.g. Cols. 8, 77, 83), apparently claiming at one point that music is the *only* art of the soul ([τῆς ψυχῆς μόνον τέχνην] (Col. 77). This status is truly remarkable when considered in the context of the more common Stoic use of the medical analogy, according to which it is *philosophy* that produces health in the soul.⁹

A few points here are worth considering in more detail. First, Diogenes holds that music can affect the *ethical character* of its audience, both positively and negatively. On the one hand, music can be the source of emotions and the bad behaviour that follows from them; it can intensify emotions and it can calm them, leading to the modification of impulses and, ultimately, actions (see Cols. 13, 14, 43, and 89, for instance). And it is not just the *effects* of music that have this ethical dimension. Rather, music can, itself, bear (συνεπιφέρει) emotional dispositions and be characterized in terms of these (e.g. Cols. 20 and 98). Equally, music can help lead the soul towards, and help preserve, virtue, and just as music can bear emotions, so too can it be characterized as actually possessing virtues (Cols. 18, 20, 51, 98, 116) as well as being instrumental for virtue. We must suppose, then, that Diogenes at least did have some view about how music could affect the soul.

A second important point is that Diogenes' understanding of music has two aspects: he thinks both that the *study* of music is valuable for ethical development and also that *listening* to music can have an effect on the ethical state of the soul. This applies not just to adults but also to pre-rational children, and even to animals, who can benefit from exposure to good forms of music (for children, see Col. 25, cf. Cols. 18, 22, 92, 93, 112, 126; for animals, see Col. 49). Exactly what a musical education consists in for Diogenes is unclear. The surviving text tells us little about his interests in the area of theoretical harmonics¹⁰ but it seems as though becoming skilled in the musical art involves developing an understanding of notions such as harmony and rhythm. I will later return to the question of how a musical

education can be understood as affecting the way in which music is perceived.

The elevated role Diogenes gives to music, and the notion that the study of music is both ethically valuable and leads to an understanding of harmony, fits well with the Stoic use of harmonic language in describing ethical states and the end. Together these provide very good reasons to doubt whether Galen is right that the fact that music has an effect on the emotions is problematic for Stoic psychology. If Diogenes is representative of the Stoic orthodoxy concerning the unified soul, and I see little reason to doubt that he is,¹¹ then we must suppose that the Stoics did have some sort of answer to Galen's challenge. But the question remains as to *how* they accounted for the effects of music. What I want to suggest is that Galen is wrong to reject the possibility that music can teach the listener something in a way that changes the opinions of the rational faculty. On the contrary, I will claim that music is a type of 'language' that provides an alternative, non-verbal means through which rational structures can be articulated and comprehended and that, as such, music has the ability to be rationally persuasive in the same way as does verbalized language. Music is able to communicate the content of thoughts from the composer or the musician to the audience, and the listener is, likewise, able to comprehend the rational contents of the musical message, in principle at least. What underpins this possibility is that music has a structure that is able to encode and carry the qualities that make things what they are.

4. Music and Structure

An important reason for thinking that music is rationally communicative is that it is included as part of the study of *phōnē* (DL 7.44). It has sometimes been thought that *mousikē* here, and in the theory of Diogenes of Babylon, must always be taken as the study of text and music together, with the rational content being supplied by the text rather than the instrumental accompaniment.¹² However, the evidence does not, I think, support this kind of interpretation. It is true that many of Diogenes' examples do take instrumental music together with a sung text but this does not mean that *mousikē* excludes unaccompanied instrumental music. On the contrary, in a number of passages Diogenes does give purely instrumental examples of music, as when he cites the effect of the trumpet on soldiers arrayed for

battle, or the fact that the aulos and trumpet are used to accompany athletics in some cities, or that the pipe spurs on rowers to greater exertions (see Cols. 39–41 and Philodemus’ criticisms at Cols. 68–9, 119–22, and 134).

The fact that Diogenes associates specific musical structures with particular character states is another reason to reject the idea that music only acquires its rational content from an accompanying text. Enharmonic music, for example, is said to be dignified, noble, and pure while chromatic music is unmanly, vulgar, and slavish (Col. 116); different *harmoniai*, in the sense of scales or modes, are said to correspond with different character states (Cols. 9 and 77); songs, we are told, have a quite different effect if the music is removed from the text and in this context the music is said to move the listener *more* than the words (Col. 124). In none of these cases is music presented as depending entirely on an accompanying text for its power or character.

It is also worth considering Col. 51, in which Diogenes provides an extensive paraphrase of a passage from Plato’s *Laws*.¹³ Diogenes/Plato identifies here the possible moral dangers that can arise from misusing music. The wrong music can cause negative psychological effects and these negative effects can arise from the isolation of melody and rhythm from words. In such cases it is very difficult (παγχάλεπος) to understand what the wordless rhythm and harmony means or what it imitates. The point here is clearly that wordless music *does* have an effect; the danger, though, is that the effect may not be what the player or composer intends because it will be extremely difficult for the listener to see exactly what is encoded in the music unless there are words available to provide a guide. I will argue that it will only be people with adequate musical expertise who will be able to consistently identify complex structures in wordless music but this does not mean that wordless music fails to carry a rationally comprehensible message, only that not everyone has sufficient expertise to be able to understand it adequately at all times. A textual guide is useful because it can assist the non-expert in understanding a piece of music but it is not an essential requirement for all listeners.

An important fragment of Cleanthes (Col. 142) confirms both that musical structures are equal, or even superior, to words in their imitative power and that Diogenes was not the only Stoic to think so.

[Cleanthes says]: ‘The poetic and musical patterns¹⁴ are abiding¹⁵ (με{ί}νον[τά] τε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ μου{σ}ικὰ παραδείγματα)’ and ‘even though the discourse of philosophy has the ability to express divine and human matters adequately, it does not as prose have expressions appropriate to the grandeur of the divine, while meters, melodies and rhythms¹⁶ come closest to the truth of the contemplation of the divine (καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ

τῆς φιλοσοφίας ικανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ |
ἀνθ[ρ]ῶ[πι]ν[α], μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ | ψευλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν | λέξεις
οἰκείας, τὰ μέτρα καὶ | τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς | ὡς μάλιστα
προσικνεῖσθαι | πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν | θείων θεωρίας’.

Even though philosophical speech in prose is adequate for its task, metrical, melodic, and rhythmic structures are better able to represent the truth about the divine than are words.

So, music is able to represent the highest subject matter, can affect the souls of listeners and can, itself, be characterized in ethical terms. What underlies these claims is the view that music is imitative, or that it is able to bear likenesses of character states and, more broadly, qualities. This comes out particularly clearly at Col. 117, where we find that music carries likenesses of characters (ὁμοιότητας ἡθῶν) and, indeed, ‘completely displays *all* the qualities of character (πάντως δὲ πασα[ς] τὰς ἡ]θῶν ποιότητας ἐπιφ[α]ίνε[ι]).’¹⁷ The fact that music carries *qualitative* likenesses is particularly important because the role of qualities in Stoic metaphysics is to make things what they are: someone is courageous, for instance, because they have the quality of courage and this is a structural element within their corporeal *pneuma*.¹⁸ Qualities are physical things and common qualities, the type of qualities that are not particular to specific individuals, will exhibit the same characteristics wherever they are found.¹⁹

But an important question remains: how can music bear the likenesses of qualities? One possible answer is that music somehow *sounds like* the things it imitates,²⁰ but the fact that Diogenes associates the qualities found in music with musical structures—modes, rhythms, melodies—points in another direction. The prototype of Diogenes’ view, and I take it that the same position is evident in our fragment of Cleanthes, is found in Plato, in the central books of the *Republic* and, especially, in the *Timaeus*, a text that was very important to the development of Stoic thought.²¹ In discussing the mathematical education of the Guardians in the *Republic*, Socrates identifies harmonics as the final discipline to be studied before a synoptic view of mathematics is achieved and the student can then move on to his training in dialectic (530c–531c). Harmonics is said to be the sister-science of astronomy and is concerned with concordance among *numbers*, which is to say that its proper subject matter is numerical ratio rather than the audible sounds that happen to be structured in accordance with these ratios. The key point is that a study of harmonics leads to a deeper understanding of order and unity. Some ratios are concordant, in that their terms are brought together into a single coherent unit, while others are discordant, in that their terms are in conflict with each other. I follow Myles Burnyeat in

understanding that the point of this mathematical education is that mathematics, and mathematical harmonics in particular, is a science of value, insofar as it identifies unity and harmony with good structure and, thus, with ethical goodness.²²

The same understanding of harmony as bearing ethical value through exemplifying unity and order is exploited in the *Timaeus*, where the world derives its good structure from the system of harmonic ratios that organize the World Soul and determine the orderly motions of the heavenly bodies by dividing the circles of the Same and the Different (35b–36d). The human soul is structured in an analogous way but when the soul is embodied the traumatic experience shakes and twists the circuits of the soul, disrupting its ratios (43c–e). The senses of sight and hearing are given to humans so that they can repair the psychic damage caused by this trauma (47b–e). Our eyes allow us to study the structure of the World Soul by examining the orderly revolutions of the heavenly bodies and we can make our souls like that of the world by modelling the revolutions in our soul on those of the cosmos. Our ears are given for the same reason. In addition to allowing us to understand speech they also give access to audible music:

And all such composition as lends itself to making audible musical sound is given in order to express harmony, and so serves this purpose as well. And harmony, whose movements are akin to the orbits within our souls, is a gift of the Muses, if our dealings with them are guided by understanding,...to serve as an ally in the fight to bring order to any orbit in our souls that has become unharmonious, and make it concordant with itself. Rhythm, too, has likewise been given us by the Muses for the same purpose, to assist us. For with most of us our condition is such that we have lost all sense of measure, and are lacking in grace. (Trans. Zeyl)

So, states of the soul are here understood in terms of systems of ratios and the same sort of systems can be found in the structure of music, as well as in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Music that is properly harmonious and rhythmical exemplifies the same value-bearing structure as does the divine World Soul and provides the human soul with a structural representation of goodness on which it can model itself. The soul that has corrected its disorderly circuits is elsewhere said to turn out perfectly whole and healthy, having escaped the illness of its twisted circuits (44b–c).

I will return to the role of ratios in the Stoic theory in a moment but it will first be worth briefly considering Cleanthes' views on astronomy, as these help illuminate both his debt to Plato and his views on music. Cicero reports that, according to Cleanthes, the most important cause of humans forming conceptions of the divine is the observation of the movements and alterations of the heavenly bodies

(ND 2.13 and 15). Later on, in a passage that is clearly indebted to the *Timaeus*, we are told that the study of the heavenly bodies and their motions ‘allows the mind to attain knowledge of the gods, and thus gives rise to religious devotion, with which justice and the other virtues are closely linked’ (ND 2.153). These movements offer a spectacle (*spectaculum*) that is

more beautiful and reflects greater reason and intelligence than all others, for by measuring their courses we become aware of the due arrival of the seasons, and of variations and changes in them. Since only humans have this awareness, we must infer that this is a dispensation made for their sake.

(ND 2.155, trans. Walsh)

It is very tempting to connect this astronomical *spectaculum* (cf. 2.140) with the *theoria* of the divine (τῆς τῶν θεῶν θεωρίας) to which musical structures come closer than do words (Phil. *De Mus.* Col. 142), especially given the use of harmonic language to describe the movements of the heavens at ND 2.19 (cf. 2.119 and 3.27).²³ The idea that the heavenly motions and musical structures both share a ratio-based, mathematically analysable structure finds further support in a report that Cleanthes called the gods ‘mystical shapes’ (μυστικὰ σχήματα) and ‘holy calls’ (κλήσεις ἱεράς) in the context of understanding the cosmos as a ‘mysterion’ in which the sun is the ‘torch-bearer’ (Epiphanius, *adv. Haeres.* 3.2.9 = *SVF* 1.538). One meaning of this must surely be that the motions of the sun lead us to the ‘initiation’ of knowledge of the divine, with the description of gods in geometrical terms indicating the patterns of orderly motion in the heavens on which Cleanthes placed so much emphasis. Cleanthes also makes a direct link between the heavens and music when he likens the sun to a plectrum (πληκτρον) which strikes (πλήσσω) the cosmos with its rays and leads it on its harmonious course (τὴν ἐναρμόνιον πορείαν) (Clement, *Strom.* 5.8.48 = *SVF* 1.502). In addition, it may be that we should understand Cleanthes’ description of tension as a blow of fire (πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ) as providing a direct analogy between musical structure and tensional structure (Plut. *St. Rep.* 1034D).

5. Ratio and Tension

A key difference between the Stoic view and that of Plato is that, for Plato, the fundamental structure of the cosmos, the human soul, value,

and audible music is conceived in explicitly mathematical terms. The ratios that determine states are, first and foremost, numerical ratios, and mathematics provides access to the basic structure of reality. The Stoics, by contrast, do not give mathematics the same foundational role but they *do* follow Plato in conceiving of the structure of the world in terms of ratio. What causes a body to be a single unified thing, and what determines the qualities of that thing, is the tension between expansive and contractive forces, associated with the elements of fire and air respectively, in the *pneuma*. Different degrees of tension correspond with different qualities or dispositions and this enables us to say that states of the soul are determined by tensional ratios.

A.A. Long has pointed out that one way of understanding the Stoic notion of *orthos logos* is as the correct ratio between the expansive and contractive forces in one's *pneuma*, since to have the correct degree of tension in the soul is the same thing as to have right reason.²⁴ Equally, the *spermatikoi logoi*, the seed-principles from which things grow, can be understood as blueprints of the tensional ratios that will later determine the characteristics of the thing. According to Stoic etymology, seed is named σπέρμα after the spiralling (σπειράσις) of a large mass into a small one, while nature is named φύσις because it is the 'diffusion or expansion (ἐμφύσησις) of the ratios or numbers (λόγων ἢ ἀριθμῶν) which it opens up or resolves' (Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1077B, trans. Cherniss).²⁵

The Stoic understanding of the soul and its states in terms of tensional ratios between forces, with different qualities being associated with different ratios, places them in a position to take over Plato's views in the *Timaeus* about the way in which music can affect the soul. Like pneumatic tension, music is also structured by ratios. At a basic level, different notes can be extracted from a string pegged to a sounding board through tightening or loosening it and, thus, altering its tensional state. But at a higher level, complexes of notes can also be understood in terms of ratios. Assuming a uniform degree of tension across the strings, a string of length x will sound the same note as a string twice its length, only an octave higher, and the relationship between these two notes, which will come together to form a harmonious unit when sounded concurrently, can be understood as a ratio between lengths, as can any sequence of notes in between the two. Similarly, musical rhythm can be understood as a system of ratios between the lengths of notes and pauses: whole beats, half beats, quarter beats, and so on.

Given that both music and physical structure can be analysed in terms of ratios we have good grounds to suspect that music is able to bear character-states and qualities because it can be ordered such as to

carry a likeness of the ratio-based structures of corporeal tensional complexes. This would explain why the language of harmony provides an appropriate way of describing virtue and the relationship between humans and the cosmos. Cleanthes can thus be interpreted as claiming that musical patterns are superior to words in representing the truth about the contemplation of the divine because music can represent the structure of the divine in terms of its underlying ratios, rather than just *describing* that structure in words.

There is evidence that the Stoics did, indeed, conceive of musical likenesses in this way. In two related passages of Philodemus' work (Cols. 9 and 77; cf. Col. 60), each musical mode (*harmonia*) is said to have a *tonos* appropriate to an emotion. Delattre translates *tonos* as 'ton' or tone²⁶ but I think we must understand the word as having a double meaning here, for the character of a particular mode will be determined by the ratios between the notes that make up the scale and it will also be a particular *tonos*, a particular degree of tension in the soul, that determines the nature of a given emotion (or any other character state or quality) in the soul. That musical structures and their effect on the soul were understood in tensional terms is further supported by the description of some music as 'relaxed' (ἄνετος)²⁷ and by Diogenes' use of tactile language in describing the effects of music on the soul.²⁸ As David Sedley has pointed out, in a discussion of the use of similar language in non-musical contexts, such terms have their force in that they describe degrees of tension and, when they are applied to the soul, they emphasize the fundamental physicality of psychic tensional structures.²⁹

Two other pieces of evidence, which also have a broader relevance, are worth considering here. Cicero reports that the Stoics commonly explained how the tongue forms articulate speech, through impressing structure on the sound coming through the mouth, by analogy with the way in which the plectrum picks out sounds on a stringed instrument (*ND* 2.149), and this provides another reason for thinking that instrumental music is articulate in the same way as is speech. To this we can add a passage from Philo which tells us that the beat or stroke (πλήττουσι) of the tongue 'imparts articulation and speech to the tension of the voice (τῇ τῆς φωνῆς τάσει)' (*De Som.* 1.29). If music is analogous to speech in the way it is articulated then we can readily understand that musical structures are impressed on the tension of the air in just the same way as occurs when the tongue imparts articulation to the tension of the voice.

So, what I want to suggest is that a musician or composer starts with a conception or series of conceptions in his mind. The objects of these conceptions will be tensional structures, and the conceptions themselves will be corporeal impressions in the mind of the composer

and, thus, determined by the tension in the composer's soul. The composer encodes the structure of these conceptions into a piece of music by arranging its ratio-based structure so as to bear a likeness of the tensional make-up of the conceptions. When the piece of music is played by a musician, he articulates the musical likeness by imprinting its structure on the tension of the air. The audible representation of these conceptions is then conveyed to the listener in a sonic form. Up to this point there is no difficulty in understanding music as a rational phenomenon—musical sounds carry rational structures that start off as conceptions in the soul and are then encoded into an audible form, in a manner largely analogous to speech.

6. Three Problems

On this analysis, then, music is a type of language. However, such an interpretation is not without its difficulties. In the first place, music differs from verbal language in important respects. It bears *likenesses* of qualitative structures rather than *describing* these structures and, as such, it has the potential to provide the listener with a more direct representation of its subject, as Cleanthes' evidence attests. However, music also seems to be less accessible than speech, often requiring the assistance of an accompanying text to make its meaning clear to an audience.

We should not, though, understand this last point as subordinating music to speech since the apparent difficulties in musical communication simply derive from the lack of adequate expertise on the behalf of many listeners. It is not that music is inherently less able to communicate but, rather, that familiarity with the language of music is less common than familiarity with verbal language. The ability fully to understand a piece of music depends on possession of an adequate system of technical conceptions relevant to the subject. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics made a distinction between expert impressions and those of non-experts (7.51) and, in a passage of Cicero's *Academica* (2.20–1) that has typically been taken as reflecting Stoic theory, we find precisely this distinction being made with respect to music. Practice and skill in the arts are said to allow one to see and hear things that are not available to the untrained eye and ear and this ability depends on having a systematically ordered set of conceptions which interact with the raw data received by the

senses, classifying the sensory information and putting it into order. Music is not a purely sensory phenomenon but is, rather, subject to rational analysis by the mind. That impressions of music are rational impressions should not be surprising given Diogenes Laertius' report that, for the Stoics, *all* impressions in rational animals are rational (7.51 again).

Confirmation that the senses, in combination with the mind, are able to identify value-bearing structures in the products of the visual and auditory arts is found at *ND* 2.145–6. In an account of the providential origins of the senses, Cicero's Stoic spokesman says that human eyes are able to attain a refined judgement (*iudicium*) of objects in the fields of the visual arts and are able to judge 'the beauty and order and the propriety, so to say, of colours and shapes', in addition to being able to 'distinguish virtues from vices, the angry person from the well-disposed, the brave from the coward, the bold man from the craven' (trans. Walsh). Similarly, human ears have the capacity to make distinctions among different types of sound in both vocal and instrumental music. Cicero does not explicitly mention the ability of the ears to pass value-judgements on auditory impressions but this is implied both by the context, since the ears are presented in parallel with the eyes, and by the fact that Cicero, or his Stoic source, is drawing heavily on Plato's *Timaeus* for his account of the senses, a text in which this power of the ears is emphasized.³⁰ It is most likely that the description of the capabilities of the ears is simply compressed here to avoid repetition.

If the ears are able to assess the structural content of music and pass judgement on such value-bearing characteristics as order and beauty by analysing the music in terms of a system of rational conceptions, then there seems little scope for accepting Galen's claim that the effects of music are wholly irrational. On the contrary, musical structures affect the soul in the same way as do any other sensory phenomena, and ethical characteristics in music will be interpreted in the same way as will visual or oral representations of ethical states.³¹

We should understand, then, that someone with a fully developed musical expertise will be able to understand the 'argument' of a piece of music in much the same way that a verbally articulated argument is comprehended and that such a person can be motivated by the musical argument accordingly.³² But we might still wonder how music without an accompanying text can have a rational effect on the non-expert or, indeed, how music can have any effect at all on non-rational creatures if it is, as I have argued, a fundamentally rational phenomenon. Is there not still scope for Galen's criticism to hit home in a more limited manner if music can affect the emotions of the

untrained soul in a way that speech in a foreign language cannot affect those who do not understand the language?

The answer, I think, is no. As we have seen, all impressions in rational animals are rational, not just expert impressions. Full expertise in a discipline is not required in order to make sense of at least some of the impressions that fall under it, and limited comprehension does not imply an irrational effect. An expertise is a complete, or adequate, system of conceptions relating to an art, but someone who is not an expert may still have a partial grasp of the subject through having a more limited vocabulary of relevant conceptions. Just as one need not have real expertise in the German language to comprehend an emphatic 'Nein!', so one need not have a fully developed expertise in music to comprehend very simple musical messages. Indeed, at this basic level simple musical messages will be more universally comprehensible than verbal communications due to the fact that music communicates structural likenesses. Even if we assume that the youths in Galen's story have no formal musical training at all, being confronted with a simple musical representation of a state of calm could still induce them to calm down in the same way that they might be swayed by the visual example of someone acting calmly. In each case, what will be impressed on the souls of the youths will be a structural likeness of the quality of calmness that will be recognizable to anyone who has a conception of this quality. In the absence of a knowledge of the 'grammar' of music the youths may be like the people in the paraphrase of the *Laws* who cannot understand a complex musical argument or connected set of representations. However, isolated common qualities should be recognizable in whatever structural format they appear if one already has a conception of the quality in question. One needs no expertise in metallurgy, for instance, in order to identify the quality of hotness in a heated brand and we should similarly expect individuals to be able to identify uncomplicated musical representations of character states with which they are already familiar.

The analogy between music and astronomy is again instructive here. While it might take an expert astronomer to understand all the fine details of the movements of the heavenly bodies, it seems clear that cognition of the basic order and regularity of the seasonal changes and the movements of the sun and moon is available to everyone (as far as I can see, there is no hint in *De Natura Deorum* Book 2 that expert knowledge is required to benefit from the sight of the heavenly order). This is probably because all rational humans possess a store of innate preconceptions which allow for the identification of value-bearing structures. Epictetus tells us that, while humans have no innate conception of technical notions such as half-

tone intervals or right-angled triangles, and must acquire these through systematic learning, everyone has an innate conception of good and evil (*Diss.* 2.11.2–4). Presumably, everyone will, then, have the potential to identify the good structure in the orderly progressions of the heavenly bodies or in a harmonious piece of music.

Such an understanding also helps to explain how music can have an effect on non-rational creatures: animals and pre-rational human children. Rationality is a consequence of having an adequate set of conceptions, such that one has all the tools that are necessary for rational thought. But, even before this stage is reached, human children will have *some* conceptions and will, thus, be able to recognize and identify certain things in the world. The Stoics label all the impressions of children as irrational on the grounds that their conceptual vocabulary is inadequate for full rational thought but the mechanism by which their impressions are analysed in terms of their limited conceptual range will broadly be the same as in adults. That music can affect irrational creatures does not, then, imply that music itself has an irrational structure any more than the fact that speech can affect an 8-year-old implies that speech has an irrational structure.

The final problem is how to reconcile the account of music I have given with the evidence which makes propositions, and verbal language more broadly, fundamental to the Stoic conception of *logos*. Verbal language clearly plays a central role in Stoicism. One Stoic division of the logical part of philosophy was into dialectic and rhetoric, both of which are understood as types of speech (DL 7.41–4 = LS 31A), while ‘internal speech’ (τῷ ἐνδιαθετῷ λόγῳ as contrasted with τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ) is reported as the characteristic that distinguishes rational from irrational animals (Sext. *Emp. Adv. Math.* 8.275–6). What are true and false for the Stoics are propositions, which are types of *lekta* or ‘sayables’, and, unsurprisingly, propositions are discussed in terms of verbal language and the grammar according to which such language is ordered. A demonstrative proposition, for instance, is said to consist of a nominative demonstrative case and a predicate while an indefinite proposition consists of one or more indefinite particles and a predicate (DL 7.70).³³ Indeed, in discussing language, Diogenes of Babylon identified proper names, common nouns, verbs, conjunctions, and articles as the five parts of *logos* (DL 7.58).

Given this background it is tempting to suppose that musical meaning should always be subordinated to a propositional account of rationality, such that any communication of impressions in a musical form must ultimately be cashed out in terms of words by reducing it to a propositional form.³⁴ However, Cleanthes’ evidence speaks against such an interpretation since, according to him, music is better

able to communicate certain things than are words. Similarly, Diogenes of Babylon's view that music can both add to the power of words and have an independent effect suggests that he did not consider it to be always reducible to a verbal form.

My suggestion is that what is fundamental for the Stoic understanding of *logos* is the underlying orderly structure, conceived of in terms of unity, harmony, and proportion.³⁵ Words, and the propositions that are formed from them, provide the paradigmatic way of encoding this structure but there are other 'vocabularies' and other 'grammars' with which rational meaning can be expressed. We can start by noting that words are not, in fact, the most basic bearers of meaning for the Stoics. On the contrary, words themselves are composed from more fundamental sonic elements and these primary sounds (πρῶται φωναί) are already meaningful. Names are composed from primary sounds that are *imitative* of the things named (Origen, *Cels.* 1.24) and this imitation extends beyond simply mimicking the sounds made by things, with a second form of imitation deriving from the tactile similarity of the perception of sounds with the perception of the objects they imitate (Aug. *De Dial.* 6). It is worth noting the similarity between the language of 'harshness/roughness' and 'smoothness/softness' (*asperitas* and *lenitas*) here and the similarly tactile language that the Stoics use to describe degrees of tension.³⁶ I suspect that the primary sounds from which names are formed are imitative in that they carry some likeness of the tensional structure of the qualities of the thing named, just as is the case with musical representations. Whether or not this is accepted, the key point is that words are *not* the most fundamental bearers of meaning and we should not, thus, think that all rational content must be reducible to verbal forms.

If it is allowed that there can be non-verbal bearers of meaning then music is the most obvious candidate for an alternative way of ordering meaningful sounds, that is as a non-verbal language with its own grammar and syntax and its own 'propositional' forms. Indeed, it is tempting to suggest that the Stoics have no reasons to restrict themselves even to the sonic domain. We have seen that the eyes are able to judge beauty, order, and propriety, and more broadly virtues and vices, in works of visual art, and that the astronomical spectacle of the heavens is an expression of the rationality of the divine mind that can be 'read' by humans. If music is not fundamentally reducible to verbal forms then there seems to be little reason to suppose that visual 'languages' must be either, or to deny that a sculptor, for instance, can send forth articulate messages from his rational centre, encoding his conceptions in the ratios and proportions according to which he works his stone, conceptions that will be comprehensible to

at least some viewers but that will not always be perfectly expressible in words.³⁷

One reason that verbal language has a special status may be because it is always able to *adequately* convey structures in a manner that is accessible to all rational creatures, even if it cannot do so perfectly. Verbal language can be thought of as a derivative form of communication, one that *describes* structure at one remove without imitating the structure. Non-verbal languages that convey likenesses directly, on the other hand, provide a more immediate representation of structure but one that is only fully accessible to those with the necessary aptitude for acquiring expertise in those fields. The Stoic focus on verbal language, as opposed, say, to the Platonic preference for mathematics, may simply be a consequence of their anti-elitism and their claim that anyone can become a sage.

In summary, there are very good grounds for rejecting Galen's claim that the Stoics will not be able to maintain their monistic psychology while at the same time acknowledging the effects of music. Not only do we have evidence showing that the early Stoics did reflect on the psychological effects of music but Cleanthes and Diogenes, at least, appear to have given music a particularly prominent place in their thought. Music and its effects are fundamentally rational for the Stoics and musical structure is capable of communicating the highest subject matter just as well as, if not better than, words. It is for this reason that musical language is particularly suitable for describing both the human end and the orderly structure of the cosmos.

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¹ See e.g. Nussbaum (1993) 113–14 (cf. (2003) 255–6) and Sorabji (2002) 85–7 and 130–2. Graver does not offer a detailed discussion but cites the passage as an example in the context of a broader discussion of challenges to Chrysippus' theory: (2007) 76 with 235 n. 38.

² One reason for thinking that Galen accurately represents the Stoic position is that this passage is bracketed by discussions of Posidonius' views (including quotations from his works) and the manner in which his thought differs from that of the earlier Stoics (5.6.13–19 and 5.6.23 ff.). If we suppose that 5.6.21–2 is taken from Posidonius as well then we might be inclined to accept it as an accurate representation of earlier Stoic thought, since Posidonius can hardly be considered a hostile reporter. However, our passage is *not* attributed to Posidonius and, even if it were, this would not provide a guarantee of its accuracy since there are very good reasons to doubt the reliability of Galen's representation of Posidonius' views: see Cooper (1998) 72–3; Tieleman (2003) 192–287; Gill (2006) 210, 214–15, and 266–90, esp. 281–3 and 286–7). The surrounding Posidonian context should not, then, be treated as indicative of the accuracy of Galen's representation of Stoic thought here (*pace* Sorabji (2002, 130–1), who claims that, even if 5.6.21–2 is in Galen's own voice, it is said by Galen on behalf of Posidonius and that the connections with the previous discussion are sufficient to attribute the views to Posidonius; cf. Nussbaum (1993, 113) who treats the passage as Galen's summary of Posidonius' position but suggests that the example of wordless music must be Galen's own).

³ The only extensive study of this topic is found in Long (1996) 202–23. Long's discussion is extremely valuable, noting as it does the connections between the language of harmony and 'the numbers', connecting both to the Stoic notion of tension, and identifying ratio as the key structural feature in the Stoic cosmos and as an important meaning of *logos* for the Stoics. However, I find his connection of the language of numbers and harmony to the possession of all the virtues to be unnecessarily restrictive. 'The numbers' have a wider application and are used to indicate correct structural relationships between things more broadly. See e.g. Cic. *ND* 2.37, where the cosmos is said to be complete in all its numbers and parts, and Plut. *Comm. Not.* 1077B, where the seminal principles contain numbers and ratios.

⁴ Cf. *Rep.* 431e–432a, where *harmonia* is identified with *symphōnia* and *homonoia*.

⁵ e.g. the end as 'living in accordance with a single and concordant reason/ratio' (καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ συμφωνον ζῆν) (Stob. 2.75.114); the virtuous man does everything 'on the basis of the concordance (κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν) of [his] guardian spirit with the will of the administrator of the whole' (DL 7.88).

⁶ See the use of *conspirans* and *consentiens* at *ND* 2.19, along with the claim there that the orderly progressions of the cosmos 'could not take place through harmonious (*concinentibus*) activity in all parts of the universe, unless they were

each embraced by a single divine, all-pervading, spiritual force' (cf. 2.119 and 3.28).

⁷ For the equation of the good, the beautiful, the perfectly proportionate, and that which has 'all the numbers', see DL 7.100. Proportion stands in for *harmonia* at Stob. 2.62.15, where 'the beauty of the soul is a proportion of reason and its parts with respect to the whole and each other'; cf. Galen, *PHP* 5.3.13–15 for health and beauty as proportions between parts. To have '(all) the numbers' is the same thing as to have proportion and/or harmony (see, e.g. Stob. 2.93.14–18 = LS 59K; Cic. *De Fin.* 3.24; *De Off.* 3.14; *ND* 2.37; DL 7.100; Sen. *Ep.* 71.16; Marcus Aurelius 3.1 and 6.26). For the relational nature of harmony, see Cic. *ND* 3.28. Brunschwig (1994) 72–91, esp. 80–1, identifies the notion of 'having all the numbers' as an example of what he calls 'the conjunctive model' that is prevalent throughout Stoic thought. What is essential to the conjunctive model is that a structure be so dependent on the proper disposition of its parts that it would fall apart should any single piece be out of place, just as a conjunctive proposition is false if any single component is false. The Stoic approach to musical structure that I develop in this chapter provides an example of the importance of the conjunctive model in Stoicism.

⁸ Daniel Delattre's recent (2007) edition has put discussions of this text on far firmer ground than in the past, in large part due to his laborious reconstruction of the correct order of the columns. All references to Philodemus will be to the column numbers in Delattre's edition.

⁹ For discussion of Stoic thought on psychic health and the use of medical analogies, see e.g. Nussbaum (1994) 316–401; Tieleman (2003), esp. 143–57; Gill (2006) 154, 201, 247, 264–6.

¹⁰ See Barker (2001) for a discussion of the limited evidence on this issue.

¹¹ For the claim that Diogenes' psychology is unorthodox, see Obbink and Vander Waerdt (1991) 355 n. 2; Nussbaum (1993) 115–16. For compelling responses to this view, see Tieleman (2003) 243–4, n. 118, and Blank (2011) 246.

¹² See Nussbaum (1993) 103–4; cf. Janko (2000) 180.

¹³ On this passage, see Delattre (1991) and Woodward (2010).

¹⁴ I take *παρδείγματα* as referring to the patterns found in the structural elements of music listed in the subsequent lines: the metres, melodies, and rhythms, all of which are determined by ratios. For Delattre's understanding in terms of artistic representation see Delattre (2007) 443 for his n. 6 to p. 292.

¹⁵ Or possibly are 'better' ([ἀ]μείνο[να]), following the text offered by both Kemke (1884) and Neubecker (1986). Delattre's suggestion appears to be preferable on the grounds that it looks as if a scribal error is responsible for the *iota*, which could have slipped in through an erroneous anticipation of εἶναι (2007, 292 n. 5). This claim draws considerable strength from the fact that the *mu* is added in the margin of the papyrus, leaving no room for a preceding letter.

¹⁶ The text gives 'τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς' but Delattre translates 'τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη' as 'les vers épiques et lyriques' on the grounds that he has already taken an earlier reference to 'τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς τῶν μέτρων καὶ μελῶν' (Col. 131) as indicating epic and lyric poets (see 2007: 428 for his n. 5 to p. 251). However, this strategy seems to me to be misguided for a number of reasons. Primarily, there are no grounds to think that Col. 131 derives from Cleanthes and, thus, no reason to connect it to the quotation of Cleanthes at Col. 142. In addition, while Col. 131 directly connects the two terms with poets, Col. 142, by contrast, not only does not do so but, rather, provides metre and melody as two terms in a list of three. All three are most obviously understood simply as structural elements, types of patterns, within poetry and music and turning the first two into types of poetry leaves rhythm isolated. What the three members of the list have in common is a ratio-based structure that will, in each case, be able to represent the truth about the divine better than will words because they will be able

to bear the ratios that determine and describe the qualities of the divine *as* ratios in their own structural formats.

¹⁷ Music is often said to be mimetic in Philodemus' reports of Diogenes' views (e.g. Cols. 36, 91, 94) but here in Col. 117 we find a distinction between the view that music is mimetic and Diogenes' view that it bears likenesses. Barker (2001) 361–2 suggests that the preference for the language of likeness over imitation derives from Diogenes' rejection of Plato's view (*Rep.* 399a–c) that music somehow *sounds like* the character it imitates. While I agree that Diogenes is not interested in the sounds made by characters, I doubt that the Stoics would have taken Plato's description of this aspect of imitation too literally, given their familiarity with the *Timaeus* and their almost certain understanding that Plato's point about the power of music is really grounded in its ratio-based structure (emphasized in the discussion of harmonics in the *Republic*, as well as in the relationship between cosmic and human soul in the *Timaeus* and the role given there to audible sounds in harmonizing the soul). They were, on the other hand, intensely concerned with responding to, and differentiating their own views from, Plato's Theory of Forms (see e.g. Sedley (1985); Long and Sedley, 1.181–3; Caston (1999)), with which the language of *mimēsis* is closely associated. I suspect that Diogenes was willing to take over the language of imitation in describing musical likenesses while stripping it of any reference to the Forms in the same way that the Stoics appropriate and recast Plato's language of 'participation' to describe the relationship that they think holds between universals and particulars (see Stob. 1.137, 5–6 = LS 30A3). Another Stoic use of mimetic language in relation to meaningful non-verbal sounds can be found at Origen, *Cels.* 1.24. See Barker 2001: 363–4 for the claim that Diogenes' sense of likeness may be related to that found at ps.-Aristotle, *Problemata* 19.27.

¹⁸ On common and particular qualities in Stoicism, see the texts collected at LS 28 with the commentary at pp. 172–6, esp. 173–4. It is possible that common qualities are mentioned at the beginning of Col. 117 although the text is not certain.

¹⁹ Instances of common qualities need not all be exactly the same but variations will be within fixed boundaries, such that they will all fall under 'the mark of the genus' (ὁ γενικὸς χαρακτήρ) (Simp. *in Cat.* 238.12–20 = LS 47S(5)). Variations within these boundaries are associated with differing degrees of tension, allowing us to see that to have a common quality is to have a certain tensional structure falling within a narrow range of possible degrees of tension.

²⁰ See n. 17.

²¹ On the influence of the *Timaeus*, see e.g. Reydam-Schils (1999) and (2013); Gill (1997); Betegh (2003); Bryan (2013). This is only a small selection of the growing literature on this topic.

²² Burnyeat (2000); cf. Burnyeat (1987). For discussion of Burnyeat's views in the context of Stoicism, see Gill (2004a), (2004b), and (2007). See also Schofield (2010) for a discussion of audible music in Plato that provides a valuable companion to Burnyeat's treatment of mathematical harmonics.

²³ On the heavenly bodies as objects of *theōria*, see Bénatouil (2013) 156–60.

²⁴ Long (1996) 204–9.

²⁵ It will not be possible to deal in any detail with the role of numbers in Stoic thought in this chapter but it is worth noting that this passage, and others which equate 'having all the numbers (of virtue)' with harmony and proportion (see n. 7), suggest that the Stoic conception of orderly structure may well be more mathematical, and thus closer to Plato, than is usually thought, even if mathematics is just one way of expressing this structure rather than the only, or the most fundamental, way.

²⁶ Delattre (2007) 25 n. 3.

²⁷ This is equated with a lack of harmony at Col. 60; see also e.g. Cols. 13, 47,

82, and 92. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 411e–412a, where the cognate ἀνιεμένῳ appears in a tensional context contrasted with ἐπιτεινομένῳ. The same language is used to describe variations in degrees of tension that fall under single common qualities at *Simp. in Cat.* 238.12–20 = LS 47S(5).

²⁸ See Cols. 36, 76–7, 85, 96, 117, and 137, and Philodemus’ criticism of the use of such language at Cols. 60–1. Another critic of the Stoic use of such language is Galen (e.g. *PHP* 5.2.26 ff.).

²⁹ Sedley (1993) 328–9.

³⁰ Compare e.g. *Tim.* 44d–45a and 46e–47c with *ND* 2.140–1, 145, 153, and 155.

³¹ Diogenes of Babylon holds that the qualities in music are perceived through a combination of ‘natural perception’ and ‘cognitive perception’ (Cols. 34 and 115). The fact that natural perception is said to be *alogos* (Col. 115) might be thought to provide some support for Galen’s claim that music is irrational but I take it that we should rather associate the two types of perception with the two elements in expert impressions. On the one hand, we have raw sensory data and on the other hand we have the analysis of the data according to our system of mental conceptions. Natural perception is *alogos* only in the sense that the mind has not yet interpreted it and not because it is a type of irrational perception (*pace* Sorabji (2002) 90). As we have seen, all impressions in rational animals are rational impressions for the Stoics (DL 7.51). For attempts to link these two types of perception to a doctrine of Speusippus, see Sorabji (2002) 90 and Delattre (2007) 210 n. 1.

³² This interpretation is supported by Plutarch’s connection of Zeno to the view that music is able to communicate not just characters and emotions but also judgements (*Mor. Virt.* 443A).

³³ The position of the ‘sayables’ in Stoic philosophy is so elevated that they are not only of epistemological significance but also play a vital metaphysical role. The Stoics famously hold that ‘every cause is a body which becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal’ (Sext. *Emp. Adv. Math.* 9.211 = LS 55B) and this incorporeal is a predicate, which is a type of sayable: ‘For instance the scalpel, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate “being cut”.’

³⁴ In the initial version of this chapter I wavered over whether such an interpretation should be pursued and would like to thank Gretchen Reydam-Schils, Malcom Schofield, and David Sedley for their comments encouraging me to take a firmer line on the issue.

³⁵ Cf. Brunschwig’s ‘conjunctive model’ (1994, 72–91).

³⁶ The correspondence between names and primary sounds is not always direct. Some names are formed from sounds that convey the opposing qualities, for instance. For recent discussions of Stoic views on etymology see Allen (2005) 14–35 and Long (2005) 36–55.

³⁷ It is important to emphasize that the physical structure of music, that is the degrees of tension given to the air by musical instruments and voices, should be compared to spoken words, which are also physical, rather than to the incorporeal *lekta* which the words signify. I suspect that the notion of the *lekta* encompasses the meanings of non-verbal forms of articulation for the Stoics since it seems that they held that a verbal representation was always possible. Cleanthes tells us, after all, that words are adequate to the task of describing the divine despite the fact that music captures the divine structure more precisely. The music and the words will, then, mean the same thing but the former will articulate this meaning more elegantly and completely.

A Lover's Discourse

Erōs in Greek Tragedy

Matthew Wright

Among the forces which can assail the human psyche, erotic love has a strong claim to be considered the most powerful as well as the most universal in its effects. But among the emotions associated with Greek tragedy it might be thought that *erōs* was of comparatively minor importance. Certainly tragic love has received much less scholarly attention than tragic pity, fear, shame, anger, or grief: painful feelings such as these feature more prominently, and no doubt they are to be seen as characteristic of the genre on the whole.¹ Nevertheless, *erōs* does have an important place within the emotional texture of tragedy: it contributes in significant ways not just to the characters' experience within the plays but also, more broadly, to the plays' view of human nature and relationships.

Love is a phenomenon that can be experienced, or talked about, in many different ways, and it would be possible to approach the topic from a number of perspectives (philosophical, ethical, psychological, cognitive, behavioural, sociological, etc.).² This chapter takes an unashamedly literary approach, concentrating primarily on the language of love. I believe that detailed study of the tragedians' use of language can reveal something of their outlook and that of their audience, and also that the vocabulary of love, considered in terms of a semiotic system of discourse, is intrinsically interesting in its own right. A focus on language seems justifiable, given the difficulties inherent in constructing a complete picture of Greek love—including the cultural specificity of emotion as well as the lack of good evidence for what ancient Greeks actually felt (as opposed to what they wrote

about emotions in a variety of literary texts).

After all, as Roland Barthes demonstrated, love is not simply experienced by the subject but rather constructed through language, much of which is figurative or metaphorical in nature.³ In his brilliant and playful work *Fragments d'un discours amoureux* (to which this essay pays heavy-handed *hommage*) Barthes subjects the discourse of love to detailed analysis, not offering definitions of terms but rather illustrating the dynamic function of language at work in a variety of contexts, and looking not at what lovers are but at what they say. For Barthes the dividing line between literature and real life is not easy to mark out, since our real-life feelings are seen as essentially fictional or intertextual constructs, shaped and determined to a large degree by social and literary conventions.⁴

The importance of literary genre needs to be emphasized, since generic conventions play a significant part in determining the precise nature of the language in which emotions are articulated.⁵ One of the big questions to be asked is whether *tragic* love (in particular) is unusual or distinctive in its nature, in comparison with the discourse of ancient Greek love in general, or in comparison with the stylized depictions of love encountered in lyric poetry or other literary genres. Recent scholarship has suggested a definite answer to this question.⁶ Several critics have argued that tragic love is characteristically harmful, destructive, morbidly pathologized, excessive, unfulfilled, or negative in some other sense—essentially it is seen as being, one might say, a sort of *anti*-love (ἄπερωτος ἔρως).⁷ Most recently Chiara Thumiger, in a suggestive study of eroticized madness in tragedy, has argued that tragic love is invariably and exclusively negative in its associations. ‘The erotic emotion,’ she claims, ‘is one of the most codified in tragedy. While others are granted a variety of nuances and outcomes, sexual passion is remarkable for being univocally associated with instances of loss of self, destruction and disorder, and systematically associated with madness’.⁸

Of course love is often the cause of suffering or disaster in tragedy—one immediately calls to mind the experiences of Phaedra, Medea, Helen, Deianeira, Heracles, and other obvious examples—but I believe that Thumiger and others have overstated the case for a straightforwardly negative interpretation. More nuance is possible, and in fact tragic love is a more interestingly varied, multi faceted phenomenon than has been suggested. Love in tragedy does not always lead to madness or ruin: it is often depicted as having beneficial effects.⁹ Even if it often does, undeniably, cause harm,¹⁰ it is also seen to do so in other non-tragic contexts, in literature and real life. From the earliest times love was always regarded as an inherently ambivalent emotion with the capacity to bring both pleasure and pain.

It is striking that in archaic lyric poetry the painful or disruptive effects of love are emphasized at least as often as its beneficial aspects; and yet no one tends to read the *erōs* of Sappho, Anacreon, et al. as a predominantly morbid or sinister emotion.

It is hardly surprising that tragedy, a genre preoccupied with human suffering, should explore the painful effects of love. It is also clear that dramatic poetry has the scope to develop the portrayal of emotion (and its consequences) at greater length, and in a more sustained or intense manner, than other types of poetry such as choral lyric. Nevertheless, the Greek tragedians are more accurately seen as inheriting and employing a wide range of ways of talking about love that already existed. They have taken a vocabulary and a way of thinking about love directly from the Greek lyric poets, just as tragedy more generally absorbed and adapted much of its material from earlier poetic genres. Tragedy emerged comparatively late in a long poetic tradition, and it can be seen as, essentially, an amalgam of diverse generic elements from within that tradition, including its subject matter, its formal and musical characteristics, its language, and its general outlook.¹¹ The extent to which tragedy differs in its essence from these other genres has been enormously exaggerated, mostly by scholars who like to treat Greek *tragoidia* as being coterminous with other types of ‘tragedy’ or the concept of ‘the Tragic’ in the later European tradition. But the world of Greek tragedy, in most respects, is no different from the world of Greek lyric poetry or Greek myth generally. Or, at any rate (since further discussion of genre is beyond the scope of this chapter), the Greek tragedians’ conception of love seems to be largely the same as that of earlier Greek poets. ‘Tragic love’ is apparently *not* a unique or special category of love.

A primarily linguistic approach can help us to see that this is so, because by concentrating on the specific details (or figures) of the tragic *discours amoureux* it is possible to demonstrate the full variety of tragic love as well as its broadly conventional nature. The significant point to be made emphatically here is that the tragedians reflect *the entire range* of the discourse of love shared by other poets; they do not have an exclusive focus on just one (negative) aspect. The tragic poets show an interest in the whole phenomenon of *erōs*: they are interested in its mental and physical effects; they speak of it as affecting different parts of the mind, body, or soul; they use a range of metaphors and images to describe its nature and workings; they generalize about it in the form of moralizing maxims; they mention its benefits as well as its problems; they attempt to define it; they apply a large number of varied epithets to it; they talk about love not just as an emotion but as an autonomous supernatural force or god; they talk about its cosmic

or cosmogonic significance; and from time to time they attempt to provide a 'taxonomy' of love, dividing the phenomenon up into two or more different sub-categories.

Even though Greek tragedy in general did not have a special view of love, it may well be that some tragedians were more interested in love than others. Euripides in particular was credited, within antiquity, with a penchant for erotic themes, or even with a fascinatingly fraught or *outré* love-life (this biographical 'fact' being almost certainly an invention based on the content of his plays).¹² This strand in the ancient critical tradition can be traced back as far as Aristophanes, who poked fun at Euripides for filling his plays with 'harlots' such as Stheneboea and Phaedra, in contrast to Aeschylus, whose plays (allegedly) do not furnish a single example of a woman in love.¹³ This could all be comic exaggeration, of course; but other writers both serious and frivolous reflect the same sort of idea. According to Longinus, for instance, Euripides was notable for having put an unusual amount of effort into the depiction of two emotions, madness and love.¹⁴ Plutarch's treatise on erotic love, the *Erōtikos*,¹⁵ is notable for selecting significantly more examples and quotations from Euripides than from any other poet, and the precise use which he makes of these quotations shows that Euripides is being treated as an especially authoritative source to illustrate love's complex nature and miscellaneous effects.¹⁶ The popular reception of Euripides tells a similar story. The existence of two fourth-century comedies, by Philippides and Axionicus, entitled *Phileuripides* ('The Lover of Euripides') suggests that Euripides' perceived eroticism may have struck a particular chord with theatre audiences in the decades immediately following the poet's death, and the fragments of these and other plays indicate that the poet himself could inspire something akin to passionate devotion among his fans.¹⁷ Several decades later, the influence of Euripides is seen in the comedy of Menander. One ancient biographer claims that most of the romantic or erotic elements in Menander's plots are taken from Euripidean tragedy—a claim that led Bernard Knox, in an influential and much-discussed article, to suggest that Euripides was deliberately setting out to write a sort of generic hybrid or proto-comedy.¹⁸ But actually Menander's appropriation of Euripidean themes can tell us nothing about Euripides' own aims, and the fact that Euripides was famous for putting love-stories on stage does not imply that he is to be seen as transforming tragedy into comedy. What it means is that he is reworking themes from earlier poetry, and (as I have already suggested) lyric poetry provides a much more obvious generic frame than comedy for understanding tragedy.

However that might be, it is certainly not the case that Euripides

was the only tragedian to explore the effects of love. There are signs, for instance, that Gnesippus' tragedies were also thought to have a particular association with erotic themes,¹⁹ while the remains of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and others contain many references to love, including a number of striking images and descriptive passages. There are indeed more surviving Euripidean references to love than are found in other playwrights' work, but this may be an accident of survival, at least in part, and it is impossible to be confident about such generalizations when so many of the plays are lost. In this respect, it is also worth pointing out that there seems to have been rather more focus on love in the lost plays than in the plays which are extant: the evidence of titles and fragments strongly suggests that love was a prominent or central element in the plot of numerous lost tragedies.²⁰ Is this another accident of survival, or might it be that the more 'erotic' tragedies were deliberately excluded from the canon by those who were concerned to create, by means of careful selection, a more narrowly defined, edited-down (or 'censored?') version of the tragic genre?²¹ I suspect that this is exactly what happened, but unless some more lost plays should miraculously come to light it remains impossible to prove. In the meantime, what one can prove is that tragic love is full of interest and variety.

*

What follows, then, is a sort of tragic 'Lover's Dictionary', arranged alphabetically by keywords after the manner of Barthes.²² It includes all of the extant references to *erōs*/*Erōs* in tragedy, with parallels from earlier Greek poetry (and other texts) where relevant or illuminating. Of course, a truly complete or comprehensive list would be impossible, given the nature of the subject and the state of the evidence. As Barthes put it, the discourse of love is fundamentally 'fragmentary' in nature.²³ What he meant was that *le discours amoureux* does not amount to a comprehensively worked-out, hierarchical, or fully coherent system; but his description may well seem ironically apt when applied to Greek tragedy, a genre of literature for which the surviving evidence is itself highly fragmentary and incomplete.

Agency: Love, whether or not it is explicitly presented as a personified being, is normally portrayed as an active force at work in the world.²⁴ It appears in tragedy as the subject of numerous (transitive and intransitive) verbs, acting variously for good or ill. Love comes and goes; it seizes or holds those who encounter it; it charms or bewitches; it shoots or wounds its victims; it conquers; it rules; it oppresses; it kills; it drips; it breathes; it confuses the psyche;

it sets one aflutter; it stays up all night; it falls upon people; it exercises compulsion; it builds walls; it grants favours; it trains or educates lovers; it makes the weak strong and shows the way to those who are lost.²⁵

Aphrodite: The goddess Aphrodite (Cypris) is specifically associated with *erōs/Erōs* at numerous points in tragedy,²⁶ as in many other contexts;²⁷ but the relationship between these two forces is not always clear. Sometimes we are to imagine Eros as a god in the entourage of Aphrodite; sometimes the two are conceived of as being practically synonymous or interchangeable; but at other times the association is more vague. In several places Aphrodite is seen as acting autonomously (as, most notably, in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, where from the prologue onwards the goddess is seen as being personally responsible for Phaedra's emotional state), and several hymns or appeals are addressed to her alone. Aphrodite is not consistently characterized, and (despite her extreme portrayal in *Hippolytus*) she is not invariably harmful or malignantly disposed towards the human characters; often it is her power to bring about beauty and happiness that is emphasized.

Arrows: The picture of winged Cupid with his little bow and arrows, familiar from a million Valentine's Day cards, derives from the traditional Greek portrayal of Eros as an archer, firing arrows of love which might fix in the breast (or some other part) of the victim and fill them with erotic desire.²⁸ But is this just a charmingly picturesque image, or does it suggest something more frightening or hostile, some sort of combative or competitive context with a clear winner and loser? Who wounds whom, and in what part? Is the wound painful, or even fatal? The image is not usually developed at length, and its force tends to be suggestive rather than explicit, which means that different types of interpretation are possible. But it is not always Eros himself who shoots the arrows. Sometimes the image is developed in a more complex way, as in Danaus' description of men overcome by desire for beautiful women (Aesch. *Suppl.* 1003–5):

καὶ παρθένων χλιδαῖσιν εὐμόροισι ἐπὶ
πᾶς τις παρελθὼν ὄμματος θελκτῆριον
τόξευμ' ἔπεμψεν, ἡμέρου νικῶμενος.

...and in the case of young girls, delicate and shapely, every man, overcome by desire as he passes by, shoots a bewitching glance in their direction.

The Greek is slightly ambiguous, not only because of the mixture of metaphors (as archery mingles with magic charms) but because of the unusual phrase ὄμματος...τόξευμα, 'the archery of the eyes'. It seems

that the men are the ones firing the arrows, but are the arrows being fired *from* their eyes, or are they firing their arrows as a response to the beauty that they have seen *with* their eyes? And, if eye contact is what is being described here, are we to imagine these girls as shooting more arrows back at the men? Aeschylus leaves it up to us to decide (but see under *eyes* for further examples of ophthalmic imagery).

Bite (or sting): The force of the metaphor of love's bite (e.g. Sophocles fr. 841, ἔρωτος δῆγμα) is not quite clear. It is to be seen as something like a bee-sting, or as the bite of some other, more dangerous animal? Does it just nip, in a pleasantly piquant fashion, or might it gnaw or eat one away? The latter, more troubling interpretation seems unavoidable at Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 744 (δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος), but this is a unique formulation of special grotesquerie (and a mixed metaphor to boot, since it is combined with the language of flowers). Elsewhere the image is more ambivalent, as at Euripides, *Hippolytus* 564–5, where the comparison of Cypris to a bee may suggest the honey as well as the sting.²⁹

Cosmology: Several early Greek writers, including philosophers as well as poets, elevated *erōs/Erōs* to the status of a vital cosmological or cosmogonic force. Hesiod, Parmenides, Empedocles, and others treated love not just as one of the earliest gods but also as a power involved in the creation of the universe and the generation and sustenance of life on earth.³⁰ The same idea is found in a couple of tragic fragments, both of which seem to celebrate love as a wholly positive, life-giving force. Aeschylus, in *Danaids* fr. 44, depicts heaven and earth as yearning for one another, an impulse which results in mutual fulfilment through 'marriage', as well as benefit for mortals:³¹

ἐρᾷ μὲν ἀγνὸς οὐρανὸς τρῶσαι χθόνα
ἔρωσ δὲ γαῖαν λαμβάνει γάμου τυχεῖν·
ὄμβρος δ' ἅπ' εὐνάνεντος οὐρανοῦ πεσὼν
ἔκυσε γαῖαν, ἥ δὲ τίκτεται βροτοῖς
μήλων τε βοσκὰς καὶ βίον Δημήτριον
δένδρων τ' ὀπώραν· ἐκ νοτίζοντος γάμου
τέλειός ἐστι· τῶν δ' ἐγὼ παραίτιος.

The holy heaven desires to penetrate the earth, and earth is seized by a desire to get married to heaven: the rain, as it falls from heaven with its lovely springs of water, makes the earth conceive, and she brings forth grazing for flocks, and grain, the stuff of life, and the fruit of trees, for the benefit of mortal men; and from the wedlock of the rain she finds perfect fulfilment. And I am partly responsible for this...

Much is unclear about this fragment, including its context within

the plot (which revolved around marriage) and the ways in which cosmic love may have compared or contrasted with human love. But it seems likely that the process being described here is seen as transforming or setting right the more brutal or problematic *erōs* exhibited elsewhere in the same trilogy, providing a (typically Aeschylean) form of resolution to the action.³² The relationship between the speaker (Aphrodite) and the other cosmic forces at work here is ambiguous as the fragment stands; but elsewhere Euripides, in fr. 898 (from an unknown play), describes the same relationship more explicitly, describing Aphrodite as the driving force or guiding influence behind everything. In this fragment, which describes the cosmic-erotic union of heaven and earth in very similar terms to Aeschylus, the goddess's actions are seen as wholly positive: she nurtures (τρέφει) us all, and through her activities the entire human race thrives (θάλλει). It is hard not to read these fragments as providing a straightforwardly positive account of *erōs*, implying that love-affairs among humans, far from being morbid or disastrous, can be natural, healthy, life-affirming, and in balance with the principles underlying the cosmos.³³

Craftsman: Euripides describes love as a craftsman (δημιουργός) at *Andromeda* fr. 136. This may be a one-off decorative image, or it may have a deeper significance, linked, perhaps, to the concept of the cosmogonic power of love (as above): in a suggestive cosmological fragment of Pherecydes, it is said that Zeus 'becomes' Eros when he intends to undertake an act of creation (δημιουργεῖν).³⁴ Even if it is impossible to prove any special significance to the metaphor in Euripides' hands, it is clear at any rate that love is being presented in a positive light, possessing creative (not destructive) power.³⁵

Deceptive: A link (of some sort) between *erōs* and deception is implicitly made by Sophocles in a couple of suggestive passages.³⁶ *Antigone* 617 refers to the false hope of lovers, using a nebulous periphrastic expression (ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων)³⁷ in which love may or may not be conceived of as an actively deceptive force in itself. (Does the deception consist in love? Or are lovers more prone than others to experiencing or causing deception?) At *Electra* 197 δόλος and ἔρος are neatly paired together, as (apparently) jointly responsible for the murder of Agamemnon: here the grammar is unambiguous, but the question of human versus inhuman agency remains unclear. Perhaps one might also perceive a connection between this theme and the motif of erotic *persuasion* (q.v.).

Differentiation: Some of the tragedians, most notably Euripides, explore the possibility that love is not a single entity but may have

several different forms. This feature of the discourse of love is remarkable for three reasons: it does not seem to appear in earlier Greek poetry (thus suggesting that tragic love is not wholly unoriginal or derivative),³⁸ it gives the lie to the idea that tragic love is univocal or homogeneous, and (most importantly) it seems to anticipate, albeit in a simple and embryonic form, later philosophical discussions of different categories of *erōs*.³⁹ It seems that either the tragedians are making an original contribution to the discourse of love, or that they are reflecting contemporary intellectual debates.

Euripides' *Theseus* (fr. 388) is particularly interesting, with its distinction between sexual and non-sexual *erōs*:

ἀλλ' ἔστι δὴ τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως
 ψυχῆς δικαίας σώφρονός τε κάγαθῆς.
 καὶ χρῆν δὲ τοῖς βροτοῖσι τόνδ' εἶναι νόμον,
 τῶν εὖσεβούντων οἵτινες τε σώφρονες
 ἔρᾱν, Κύπριν δὲ τὴν Διὸς χαίρειν ἔᾶν.

But there is another kind of love among mortals, belonging to a soul that is just and temperate and good. Indeed, this ought to be the custom in human life: to love those who are pious and temperate, and say goodbye to Zeus' daughter Aphrodite.

This distinction almost certainly anticipates the 'Platonic' conception of love.⁴⁰ But it is not the only type of distinction that is made. Elsewhere the emotion is divided into moderate versus excessive love;⁴¹ or daytime versus night-time love;⁴² or good versus bad love;⁴³ or moderate love is contrasted both with excessive love *and* with total abstinence;⁴⁴ or love is said to breathe two types of breath.⁴⁵ A character in Critias' *Rhadamanthys* declares that there are many assorted types of *erōs* (ἔρωτες ἡμῖν εἰσὶ παντοῖοι βίου, fr. 17.1), though he seems to be talking only about different varieties of non-erotic passion (such as the love of money or reputation).

Epithets: A rich and colourful range of epithets is used to describe love in tragedy and elsewhere. The words speak for themselves; I simply list them: ἀβρός (Anacreon fr. 505d); αἵματολοιχός (Aesch. Ag. 1478); ἀλγεσίδωρος (Sappho fr. 172); ἀμφιθαλής (Ar. *Birds* 1738); ἀνικάτος μάχαν (Soph. *Ant.* 781)–2); ἄπιστον (Eur. *Andromeda* fr. 138a); ἀργός (Eur. *Auge* fr. 322); γλυκύθυμος (Ar. *Lys.* 551); γλυκύπικρον (Sappho fr. 130); γλυκύς (Alcman fr. 59); δαμάλης (Anacreon fr. 357); δεινός (Aesch. *Eum.* 865, Eur. *IA* 808–9, *Andromeda* fr. 138a, incert. fab. fr. 850 *TrGF*); δεινότατος θεῶν (Alcaeus fr. 327); δυσμαχώτατος (Eur. *Hippolytus Veiled* fr. 430); θηλυκρατής (Aesch. *Cho.* 600); κάλλιστος (Hes. *Theog.* 120); λυσιμελής (Hes. *Theog.* 121, Sappho fr. 130, Alcman fr. 3); μάργος

(Alcman fr. 58); μυθοπλόκος (Sappho fr. 188); πάντολμος (Aesch. *Cho.* 597); πικρός (Eur. *Hipp.* 727); σχέτλιος (Simonides fr. 575); τακερός (Anacreon fr. 459); χρυσοκόμος (Eur. *IA* 548, Anacreon fr. 358); χρυσόπτερος (Ar. *Birds* 1739). Of course, there will have been many other epithets in the lost poems and plays.

External: Love is repeatedly presented by the tragedians as an external force which enters the lover or the beloved from outside, overriding the will of the individual.⁴⁶ This mode of presentation reflects primitive Greek concepts of psychology in which emotions are seen as being imposed on the mind (typically by some god or *daimōn*) rather than arising directly from inner mental processes. (Such concepts have been discussed in depth by Ruth Padel, who demonstrates that the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ was crucial for Greeks of the fifth century and earlier when articulating emotional states of various different types.⁴⁷)

Eyes: If love is seen as entering the body from outside, how does it gain entrance? The eyes, already mentioned above, seem to provide an important way in. Most obviously, the eyes are the organs which we use to gaze at the beloved one, but they may also be thought to act as a conduit for love (as in the traditional imagery of the lyric poets).⁴⁸ Aeschylus (Ag. 742–3) indirectly describes Helen’s beautiful appearance and its effect on Paris by referring to a ‘soft weapon of the eyes’ (μαλθακὸν ὀμμάτων βέλος). It is not clear whose eyes are meant: perhaps we are to think both of Paris’ eyes alighting on Helen and marvelling at her beauty, and of Helen’s making eye contact with Paris, causing love in that moment to travel, as it were, between the two pairs of eyes. Another Aeschylean description of a similar moment is also vague: this is the ‘bewitching archery of the eyes’ that we have already discussed (*Suppl.* 1003–5; see under *arrows*).

In Sophocles’ hands the image is more concrete, as when, for instance, a lover is explicitly said to be darting spears from his eyes at another (*Lovers of Achilles* fr. 149). The same image is developed further in a striking passage from *Oenomaus* (fr. 474), a tragedy which had a markedly erotic central theme and plotline (centring on Hippodameia and her suitors, including Pelops, the lover of Poseidon). Here Hippodameia is describing the love that has sprung up between herself and Pelops as a mutual emotion, experienced suddenly and simultaneously; this love is said to be travelling between the two lovers in both directions, via the eyes as conduit:

τοίαν Πέλοψ ἴσσυγα θηρατηρίαν
ἔρωτος, ἄστραπὴν τιν’ ὀμμάτων ἔχει·

ἥι θάλπεται μὲν αὐτός, ἐξοπτᾷ δ' ἐμέ,
ἶσον μετρῶν ὀφθαλμόν, ὥστε τέκτονος
παρὰ στάθμην ἴοντος ὀρθοῦται κανών.

It is a magic charm of this sort that Pelops possesses—a love-charm, such as a huntsman might use, as it were a kind of lightning of the eyes. By this he himself is warmed up, and I am burned, as he surveys me with responsive eye just as closely as the carpenter's straight-driven plumb-line clings to its level.

Love is seen as flashing, with the speed and energy of lightning, from one pair of eyes to the others, as if an electrical current is being conducted between the two—an extraordinarily exciting image. In fact Hippodameia's words contain an exuberant mixture of metaphors: not only eyes but also weather, temperature, magic, hunting, and craft images combine in the space of a few lines. A principle of balance and contrast underlies the use of language: the violent intensity and huge scale implied by the lightning image is unexpectedly offset by the scrupulous, small-scale precision of the carpenter's activity; love emerges as an uncontrollable force of nature, but also measurable and subject to careful calibration; the eyes are a conduit for love, but they are also the instrument of detailed observation. Even in this small fragment Hippodameia is vividly characterized by her use of language: this is a woman passionately in love, who uses a beautifully controlled cluster of figurative expressions to articulate her emotions.

The idea of 'love at first sight' is seen also in the tragedy of Agathon,⁴⁹ but it was developed more explicitly by Euripides, and indeed seems to have become something of a characteristic motif in his work. At *Hippolytus* 27–8 Aphrodite says that it was upon *seeing* Hippolytus (ἰδοῦσα) that Phaedra's heart was seized by love. Now of course Phaedra has seen Hippolytus before, but here she is made to see him, all of a sudden, in a new light, as if for the first time: the instantaneous nature of this experience is given particular emphasis, though (unlike elsewhere) the directional movement of love is exclusively one-way, since Hippolytus most certainly does not return Phaedra's feelings. Considerably more is made of the instantaneous erotic power of appearances in a later tragedy, *Andromeda*, in which Perseus is made to fall in love with Andromeda at the moment of his first entrance onto the stage (fr. 125): the hero's first glimpse of the beautiful girl causes him to suffer a *coup de foudre*, even though he initially mistakes her for a statue. This scene clearly made a big impact on theatre audiences (as Aristophanes' parody in *Thesmophoriazusae* confirms), and the motif of love at first sight later became a *topos* of fourth-century Greek comedy and the Greek novel, no doubt in part because of the influence of Euripides.⁵⁰

Falling: *Andromeda* also contained one of the first recorded usages of

the phrase ‘falling in love’ (εἰς ἔρωτα πίπτειν)—an expression which is now commonplace but which no doubt seemed much more striking to the spectators in 412 BCE. (The only other attested fifth-century uses of the phrase are also from Euripidean plays.⁵¹)

ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς ἔρωτα πίπτουσιν βροτῶν,
ἐσθλῶν ὅταν τύχῳσι τῶν ἐρωμένων,
οὐκ ἔσθ' ὁποίας λείπεται τόδ' ἡδονῆς.

Whenever mortals fall in love, if they should happen to meet with fine lovers,
there is no greater joy than this.

These lines (fr. 138) seem to constitute blandly gnomic maxims of general applicability to everyday life (they were read as such by John of Stobi, who preserved them among a collection of other maxims relating to love and marriage);⁵² and they might almost seem completely unremarkable, except that they illustrate that tragic love can have a positive outcome. Indeed, *Andromeda* does appear to have been a notable example (surely not the only one) of a tragic love story with a happy ending.⁵³ Furthermore, these lines hint that fortune (*tuchē*) may play a part in love-affairs, alongside other supernatural powers—a possibility that is not explicitly attested elsewhere in tragedy, but may constitute another strand of Euripides’ influence on the world of fourth-century comedy and the novels.⁵⁴

Flight: Eros (as god) is normally described as winged: Plato was joking about this when he made Socrates say that the god’s name should really be Pteros, not Eros.⁵⁵ The tragedians inherit this iconographic detail directly from the lyric poets,⁵⁶ though they extend the image interestingly in a number of passages, as when Euripides says that love can, as it were, *give you wings* (δαινὸς ἐπτέρωκ' ἔρως, *IA* 808);⁵⁷ or when Euripides and Sophocles both describe Eros as able to achieve swift, free-ranging movement over a vast geographical area, thus spreading his effects far and wide.⁵⁸

Frisson: Both Aeschylus and Sophocles use the memorable phrase φρίσσειν ἔρωτι (Aesch. fr. 387; Soph. *Aj.* 387), though in each case (disappointingly) it seems to denote non-erotic passion.

Hunting: The erotic metaphor of hunting and hunting-nets, familiar from lyric poetry, is not well attested in tragedy, though it is seen in a lost play by Dicaeogenes, as well as a fragment of Euripides’ lost *Hippolytus Veiled* (fr. 428), in which Aphrodite is the ‘prey’ and a warning is issued to those who are inclined to hunt her excessively (τοῖς ἄγαν θηρωμένοις).⁵⁹

Ice: The idea that love may somehow be comparable to ice is a strikingly original or even unique image, seen only in Sophocles' play *Lovers of Achilles* (fr. 149). This may or may not have been a tragedy, but it was obviously a play with a strongly erotic or pederastic theme, as its title and fragments indicate.⁶⁰

τὸ γὰρ νόσημα τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν·
ἔχοιμι' ἂν αὐτὸ μὴ κακῶς ἀπεικάσαι.
ὅταν πάγου φανέντος αἰθρίου χεροῖν
κρύσταλλον ἀρπάσωσι παῖδες εὐπαγῆ,
τὰ πρῶτ' ἔχουσιν ἡδονὰς ποταίνιους.
τέλος δ' ὁ θυμὸς οὐθ' ὅπως ἀφῆι θέλει,
οὔτ' ἐν χεροῖν τὸ κτῆμα σύμφορον μένειν.
οὔτω δὲ τοὺς ἐρῶντας αὐτὸς ἵμερος
δρᾷν καὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾷν πολλακίς προσιέται.

This sickness is a desirable evil: I could suggest quite a good analogy. Whenever ice appears out of doors, and boys pick it up while it is solid, at first they experience new joys. Finally, however, their spirit is unwilling to let it go, and yet this possession is not good for them so long as it stays in their hands. Just so the same desire impels lovers to act and yet not to act...

This metaphor is without parallel, though it may be obliquely related to the language of 'burning' or 'melting' with love (both of which motifs are attested in lyric poetry).⁶¹ These lines also contain a cluster of other images, leading one to reflect (as elsewhere) that the most fully developed evocations of love in tragedy almost always involved mixed metaphors. As well as the image of ice—with its connotations of slipperiness, ungraspability, ephemerality, and evanescence—there is a strong sense here of the inherently paradoxical, internally inconsistent nature of love:⁶² it is a desirable evil, both pleasant and unpleasant; it is a 'sickness'; it both impels one to act and restrains one from acting. The train of thought is unpredictable and somewhat odd, but this description is uniquely memorable.

Irresistibility: Love in tragedy—like everywhere else—is uncontrollable and impossible to resist. This fact is implied by love's very nature as a divine or superhuman power, but it is also stated explicitly from time to time for extra emphasis.⁶³

Light: A fragment of an early tragedy by Phrynichus, apparently uniquely, contains the image of the light of love, which here is seen as illuminating the face so as to make one's cheeks glow (λάμπει δ' ἐπὶ πορφυρέαις παρῆισι φῶς ἔρωτος).⁶⁴ This may refer either to the visual appeal exerted by the beloved one, or to the effects of love upon the face (and constitution) of a person in love, inflamed and

excited by passion.

Liquid: The chorus in *Hippolytus* (525–6) describe love as ‘dripping desire upon the eyes’ (κατ’ ὀμμάτων | στάζων πόθον), an unusual image with many possible associations, both positive and negative. Perhaps it is meant to evoke thoughts of water, tears, rain, honey, blood or similar; one notes that liquid imagery is also used in connection with love in a couple of passages from Alcman (fr. 59, where love ‘pours down’) and Sappho (fr. 112, where love itself is ‘poured out’ upon a lover’s face).

Madness: The notion that love is a sort of mental illness gives rise to a number of notable tragic scenarios,⁶⁵ which have been so widely discussed elsewhere that there is no need to describe them here. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing, once again, that erotic madness is only one among many aspects of tragic love, and that it is yet another motif taken directly from the archaic lyric poets.⁶⁶

Magic or charms: Love’s power over the mind or body may be likened metaphorically to that of a magical charm; but actual love-philtres (φίλτρα) are also mentioned in a number of plays, while elsewhere we read of Love-gods in the plural (surrounded by other personified abstractions including the Muses and Graces) described as θελξίφρονες (*Bacch.* 404–5).⁶⁷ The most fully developed (but fatally unsuccessful) use of love-magic in a surviving tragedy is seen in *Women of Trachis* (555–619), where Deianeira smears Heracles’ tunic with a magic potion (variously described as a dye, a philtre, a charm, and a poison) in the hope of regaining his love.⁶⁸

Maxims: Love is the subject of a number of tragic maxims (*gnōmai*).⁶⁹ I quote three selected examples, all excerpted by John of Stobi from lost Euripidean plays:

Ἔρωτα δ' ὅστις μὴ θεὸν κρίνει μέγαν
καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων δαιμόνων ὑπέρτατον
ἦ σκαιὸς ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶν ἄπειρον ὦν
οὐκ οἶδε τὸν μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις θεόν.

Whoever does not judge Love to be a great god, and highest of all the divine powers, is either a fool or, lacking experience of his good things, is not acquainted with mankind’s greatest god. (Eur. *Auge* fr. 269)

ἀνδρὸς δ' ὁρῶντος εἰς Κύπριν νεανίου
ἀφύλακτος ἢ τήρησις, ὡς κἂν φαῦλος ᾗ
τᾷλλ', εἰς ἔρωτα πᾶς ἀνὴρ σοφώτατος.
†ἦν δ' ἂν προσῆται Κύπρις, ἥδιστον λαβεῖν†

When a young man looks toward Aphrodite, no one can keep an eye on him, because every man is cleverest in the pursuit of love, even if he is no good in other respects. If Aphrodite allows love to come, it is very sweet to seize it. (Eur. *Antigone* fr. 162)

πατέρα τε παισὶν ἡδέως συνεκφέρειν
φίλους ἔρωτας ἐκβαλόντ' αὐθαδῖαν,
παῖδάς τε πατρί· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ αὐθαίρετοι
βροτοῖς ἔρωτες οὐδ' ἐκουσία νόσος.
σκαῖόν τι δὴ τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ,
θεῶν ἀνάγκας ὅστις ἰᾶσθαι θέλει.

A father ought to be glad to lay aside stubborn objections and help his children achieve their fond desires, as should children help their father; for people's erotic desires are not voluntary, nor are they a willing affliction. A certain amount of folly tends to result when anyone ventures to cure what the gods impose by necessity. (*Dictys* fr. 339)

These maxims are interesting not because of any astounding originality—indeed their content and expression can strike us as commonplace or even clichéd—but precisely because (like many other tragic maxims) they seem to be based on a traditional, uncontroversial formulation of Greek ethical norms, rather than an unusual or especially ‘tragic’ view of life.⁷⁰ Of course, these maxims cannot be read as literally embodying the moral message or meaning of the works in which they appear, and the sentiments which they express may have been undercut or questioned in various ways by their dramatic context; but all the same it is striking that none of these maxims suggests that tragic love should be conceived of as a distinct (or distinctly troubling) entity in comparison with Greek views of love more generally.

Metaphor/metonym: As we have seen, many metaphors are used to evoke the nature of love; but love itself is used as a metaphor for other things. In tragedy (as elsewhere in normal usage) the word ἔρωξ can denote any strong wish, passion, or desire.⁷¹ Occasionally the same word is also used metonymically to stand for a love-affair or a person who is loved.⁷²

Organs of the body or parts of the self: It is the soul (ψυχή) that is most commonly said to be affected by love, in tragedy as in Greek literature and philosophy more generally;⁷³ but certain other bodily organs or parts of the self are also mentioned, namely the θυμός,⁷⁴ the καρδία,⁷⁵ the κέαρ,⁷⁶ the νοῦς,⁷⁷ and the φρένες⁷⁸—a range of vocabulary demonstrating that the Greeks conceived of *erōs* as being somewhere in-between a physical, mental, and spiritual condition.

Parentage: Greek writers argued over the exact identity of the parents of Eros: Ouranos, Gē, Aphrodite, Zeus, Iris, and Zephyrus were among those named as possible candidates, although Hesiod had earlier stated that Eros had no parents at all.⁷⁹ The only known tragic contributor to this genealogical debate is Euripides, who makes a chorus addresses the god as Ἔρως ὁ Διὸς παῖς (*Hipp.* 532).

Personification: It is not always possible to say for certain whether any given passage from tragedy is describing *erōs* as an abstract entity or *Erōs* as a personified deity. In certain contexts it is made explicit that we are dealing with the Love-god (or even plural Love-gods),⁸⁰ but in general Greek usage seems to have been fairly unsystematic, and in many places it does not seem to make very much difference whether one reads an upper- or lower-case epsilon.

Persuasion: Persuasive or seductive language is associated with *erōs* in a number of literary contexts, including the lyric poetry of Sappho and Alcaeus.⁸¹ The motif of erotic persuasion is not much seen in surviving tragedy, though a fragment of Aristarchus (fr. 2 *TrGF*) describes the persuasive power of love in the context of its wider benefits, and one Aeschylean ode (*Suppl.* 1034-42) portrays Aphrodite as associating with various personified abstractions including Peitho.

Poetry: One of the beneficial effects that love may have, according to Euripides, is that it can lead to the creation of art. This view is explicitly stated in fr. 663 of *Stheneboea*: ποιητὴν ἄρα | Ἔρως διδάσκει, κἄν ἄμουσος ᾗ τὸ πρὶν ('Love teaches a poet, then, even if he be a stranger to the Muse beforehand'). These lines are remarkable for several reasons: they became one of the most frequently quoted Euripidean passages within antiquity; they use the metaphor of love as *teacher* (q.v.); they constitute one of the few instances from tragedy of self-conscious commentary on the nature and function of poetry; and they also provide one of the first attested uses of the noun ποιητής in Greek.⁸² The fragment is too small to allow us to say much more about its meaning or function within the play, but it seems obvious that love's 'educational' role is seen as that of inspiring poets to write or providing them with subject matter.

Sickness: Love is sometimes portrayed as a sickness, with morbid or overpowering physical effects:⁸³ this aspect of tragic *erōs*, along with madness, has been explored at length by other scholars. Nevertheless (despite what is sometimes claimed), this is not the most prominent aspect of love's portrayal in tragedy; it is one among many metaphors. Nor is it characteristically tragic, for the metaphor has a long history in Greek lyric, especially in the poetry of Sappho, whose

extraordinarily vivid accounts of the ‘symptoms’ of love are well known.⁸⁴

Sport: From time to time the lyric poets sung about love in terms of sport and play: Alcman depicted Eros as playing like a boy, while Anacreon (who was particularly fond of sporting metaphors) described love-affairs using the language of boxing-matches, ball-games, chariot-races, and dice-games, and depicted Eros, Aphrodite, and the Nymphs as playing happily together.⁸⁵ This metaphor, like many others, is inherited by the tragedians: Sophocles’ Deianeira describes Eros as a skilled boxer (*Trach.* 441-4), and the chorus in *Antigone* see Cypris as playing games with humans (ἐμπαίζει, 799).

Teacher: We have already seen love described as a teacher in the famous fragment of *Stheneboea* (fr. 663, quoted under *poetry*). The same motif recurs in several other Euripidean fragments, suggesting, perhaps, that it was a favourite image of the poet;⁸⁶ it is also one of the few erotic metaphors from tragedy that is not paralleled in earlier lyric. The most extended use of the metaphor occurs in fr. 897 (from an unknown play):

παίδευμα δ' Ἔρως σοφίας ἐρατῆς
πλεῖστον ὑπάρχει,
καὶ προσομιλεῖν οὗτος ὁ δαίμων
θνητοῖς πάντων ἡδιστος ἔφυ·
καὶ γὰρ ἄλυπον τέρψιν τιν' ἔχων
εἰς ἐλπίδ' ἄγει. τοῖς δ' ἀτελέστοις
τῶν τοῦδε πόνων μήτε συνείην
χωρίς τ' ἀγρίων ναίοιμι τρόπων.
τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν προλέγω τοῖσι νέοισιν
μήποτε φεύγειν,
χρῆσθαι δ' ὀρθῶς, ὅταν ἔλθῃ.

Love is the fullest education in lovely wisdom, and he is the sweetest of all gods for mortals to associate with—yes indeed, for the joy that he possesses comes without pain and encourages one to hope. May I not be among those who are uninitiated in his labours, and may I avoid his savage ways! To young people I say this: never run away from love, but make proper use of it whenever it comes.

Despite their acknowledgement that love can be savage as well as sweet, and the implication that it can be used improperly, these verses seem to be another instance of a celebratory, positive attitude to love in tragedy. This sort of love leads not to ruin but to joy; it gives one hope; it seems to constitute not just an education but a rite of passage, bestowing wisdom and maturity on lovers. Note too the additional

metaphor of love as initiation into mystery-cult, a highly suggestive image which is not seen elsewhere. One would not wish to claim that these lines have any special interpretative status, or that they represent the poet's real views on the subject, but it is important to note the presence in tragedy of a view of love which runs counter to the strain of morbid dysfunctionality emphasized by so many scholars.⁸⁷

Tyranny: Love may be depicted as a tyrant or ruler, as in Euripides' *Andromeda* (fr. 136), where one of the characters makes a prayer or entreaty beginning ὦ θεῶν τύραννε κἀνθρώπων Ἔρωσ.⁸⁸ The image primarily denotes power, but there may also be a hint of capriciousness or cruelty (though of course the word *turannos* in Greek does not necessarily bear the same negative connotations as the English 'tyrant').

Universal: The phrase quoted under *tyranny* (ὦ θεῶν τύραννε κἀνθρώπων Ἔρωσ) also contains another recurrent motif: the idea that love's effects are universal. This idea is expressed in a number of slightly different ways: most frequently we read that love affects humans and gods alike,⁸⁹ though Sophocles goes into more detail, emphasizing that love affects both men and women, humans and gods (*Phaedra* fr. 684), and Aeschylus stresses the fact that love is experienced not just by humans but also by animals (*Cho.* 600–1).

Wine: In archaic lyric, particularly the poetry of Anacreon, wine is either associated with love or even treated as equivalent to love.⁹⁰ The same connection is also implied by Euripides in a fragment of *Pleisthenes* (fr. 631) in which the three elements of wine, love, and poetry are suggestively juxtaposed:

πολὺς δὲ κοσσάβων ἀραγ-
μὸς Κύπριδος προσωιδὸν ἄ-
χεϊ μέλος ἐν δόμοισιν.

The house echoes with the sound of a song to Aphrodite accompanied by much ringing of wine-drops.

All of these elements, together with the reference to the game of *kottabos*, unmistakably evoke the world of the symposium within the world of tragedy.

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¹ On tragic emotions generally, see Konstan (1999), LaCourse Munteanu (2011) and (2012), Stanford (1983): these studies tend to concentrate largely or exclusively on pity, fear, and painful emotions. Cf. Wright (2005) on tragedy's tendency to distort or pervert even apparently beneficial emotions.

² Cf. Konstan (2006), esp. ix–xiii, 1–40, on different approaches to the study of ancient emotions (and their concomitant problems).

³ Barthes (1977), esp. 7–12; cf. Barthes (1985) on semiotic analysis more generally.

⁴ Barthes (1977) 8–10: 'La figure, c'est l'amoureux au travail...A chacun de ces incidents (ce qui lui "tombe" dessus), l'amoureux puise dans la réserve (le trésor?) des figures, selon les besoins, les injonctions ou les plaisirs de son imaginaire'. Cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) for a classic discussion of the 'constructivist' view of metaphor (by which figurative language is seen as shaping the way we perceive reality and express ourselves).

⁵ A point well made by LaCourse Munteanu (2011) 5–6; cf. Nussbaum and Sihvola (2002) 14–15. The idea of a distinctive 'language of love' specific to individual literary works is suggested by Robson (2013).

⁶ Calame (1999) 141–50 discusses tragedy's focus on failed or disastrous marriages, suggesting that otherwise 'the tragic texts have nothing particularly new

to offer' (141) on the subject of love; cf. Seaford (1987). Kaimio (2002) sees tragic love as uncontrollable, violent, or destructive. Stanford (1983) 36–7 discusses only the painful or morbid aspects of tragic love, as does Padel (1992), esp. 115–27, 158–61.

⁷ Aesch. *Cho.* 600–1: 'a characteristic tragic oxymoron' with pejorative sense (so Garvie (1986) *ad loc.*).

⁸ Thumiger (2013) 28.

⁹ e.g. Aristarchus fr. 2 *TrGF* (makes the weak strong and helps those who are lost to find their way); Aesch. *Suppl.* 1034–42, *PV* 590–1 (warms one's heart), *Danaids* fr. 44 (life force); Eur. *Hipp.* 447–58, *Med.* 630–2, 840–5, *Andromeda* frs 136, 138, *Antigone* fr. 162, *Antiope* fr. 192, *Auge* fr. 269 (source of καλὰ), *Danae* fr. 323, *Erechtheus* fr. 358 (mother-love), *Stheneboea* fr. 661 (potential for good; leads to ἀρετή), *Phaethon* 781 (love within marriage approved), fr. 897 (love and σοφία connected); cf. other passages discussed below.

¹⁰ e.g. Aeschylus *Ag.* 540 (pain/nostalgia), 1478 (sinister/bloody), *Cho.* 600–1 (ἀπέρωτος ἔρωτος), *Seven against Thebes* 688–9 (evil desire for conquest); Sophocles *Ant.* 617 (false hope/deceit), 781–805 (cause of strife), *Trach.* 431–2, 441–4, 488–9 (cause of ruin), *El.* 197 (love kills), *Lovers of Achilles* fr. 149 (disease), fr. 770 (unyielding/evil), fr. 855 (Cypris synonymous with Hades and madness); Agathon fr. 31 (Κύπρις/ῥβρις); fr. adesp. 306 *TrGF* (bad for old men); Euripides *Hipp.* 358–61, 439–43, 476, 535–42 (destroys cities), 545–65 (causes death), 727 (bitter), 764–6, *Hel.* 666–8 (illicit), 1098 (cause of suffering), 1102 (one of a catalogue of κακά), *Phoen.* 622 (bad/excessive), *Alc.* 1080 (makes one groan), *HF* 1308–10 (destructive), *Bacch.* 813 (leads to ruin), *Med.* 8, 330, 628–35, 697–8 (various bad effects), *Tro.* 255–9 (causes slavery), 840 (leads to abductions), 989–90 (cause of folly), *Rhesus* 184, 859–60 (leads to destructive rivalry and murder of one's friends), *IA* 74–8, 508–9, 584–9, 808–9 (cause of destruction and war), *Antigone* fr. 161 (causes suicide/madness), *Dictys* fr. 340 (causes conflict), *Stheneboea* fr. 665 (oppressive).

¹¹ See Herington (1985), Kranz (1933), and, most recently, Swift (2010).

¹² Longinus *De Subl.* 15.3; cf. Dion. Hal. *De Imitatione* fr. 6 (2.206 U-R), on Euripides' depiction of 'unmanly' emotions, and Quintilian 10.1.68–9 (who does not mention love in particular but says that Euripides is especially remarkable at depicting the sort of emotions that arouse pity; he also mentions Euripides' influence on Menander in this respect). Several passages in Aristophanic comedy depict Euripides as interested in women or erotic subject-matter: e.g. *Thesm.* 85, 383 (and *passim*, on plotlines involving erotic intrigue); *Clouds* 1371–2 (incestuous love in *Aeolus*); *Frogs* 52–5 (Dionysus is roused to *pothos* by reading the *Andromeda*), 1042–55 (see below). For Euripides as a lover in private life, cf. Plut. *Mor.* 177a; Aelian *VH* 2.21, Athen. 13.57e, 603c; see also *TrGF* V.1 (Kannicht), Test. 106–7 (pp. 97–9). On ancient 'biographical' inventions see Lefkowitz (1981).

¹³ *Frogs* 1042–55. Aeschylus' tragedies do, however, furnish a notable example of homosexual love, between Achilles and Patroclus (*Myrmidons*, esp. frs 135–6).

¹⁴ Note that Longinus does not (*pace* Thumiger) imply that these two emotions are similar or connected.

¹⁵ *Mor.* 748–71.

¹⁶ Plutarch also implies that Aeschylus and Solon are *not* the sort of poets whom one would quote for their erotic content (*Erot.* 5, *Mor.* 751a–b). Compare the disproportionately large number of Euripidean quotations (fifteen) in the section of Stobaeus' anthology relating to Aphrodite and Eros (Περὶ Ἀφροδίτης πανδήμου καὶ περὶ ἔρωτος τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν, Stobaeus 4.20): see Hense (1909) 434–80.

¹⁷ Nicostratus fr. 28 K–A; Philemon fr. 118 K–A; Diphilus fr. 74 K–A (cf. Lucian, *De Conscrib. Hist.* 59.1 and *Vit. Eur.* 31). See Nesselrath (1990) 245–8; Wright (2013) 603–9.

¹⁸ Satyrus, *Life of Eur.* fr. 39 Col. VII (cf. Quintilian 10.1.68–9); see Knox (1979); cf. Seidensticker (1982) 15–19.

¹⁹ This is suggested by Gnesippus' reception in comedy, e.g. Eupolis, *Helots* fr. 148 K-A (which says that his tragedies featured lovers' serenades to women and adulterous affairs); cf. Cratinus, *Malthakoi* fr. 104 K-A. It was even said by Teleclides (*Sterroi* fr. 36 K-A) that Gnesippus in real life spent his time seducing women—no doubt an invention based on the content of his work.

²⁰ e.g. Aesch. *Danaids* and *Myrmidons*; Soph. *Andromeda*, *Daedalus*, *Danae*, *The Rape of Helen*, *Phaedra*, and *The Lovers of Achilles* (this last title may or may not have been satyric); Eur. *Aeolus*, *Alcmene*, *Andromeda*, *Antigone*, *Danae*, *Dictys*, *Melanippe*, *Oenomaus*, *Stheneboea*, etc.

²¹ The tragedies which survive in full (apart from those Euripidean plays preserved in the *codex Laurentianus*) represent the remains of a 'selected edition' made in the third century CE. This selection may have been made on the basis of perceived educational or moral value, but much is uncertain: see Zuntz (1965).

²² A similar exercise is attempted by Carson (1986), which is probably influenced by Barthes (though Carson does not explicitly say so). Nevertheless, Carson is selective in her coverage of Greek erotic discourse, and she has comparatively little to say about tragedy. Cf. Barthes (1975) for another (provocative) example of Barthes' use of the alphabetic catalogue as a form of organizing knowledge.

²³ Barthes (1977), esp. 10–12 ('Les figures surgissent dans la tête du sujet amoureux sans aucun ordre...En termes linguistiques, on dirait que les figures sont distributionnelles, mais qu'elles ne sont pas intégratives').

²⁴ Cf. Stehle (2009) 57–8: 'Love makes one subject.'

²⁵ ἔρχεσθαι Eur. *Tro.* 840; αἰρεῖν Eur. *Rhes.* 859, *Dictys* fr. 331; ἔχειν Soph. fr. 953, Eur. *Suppl.* 521, *Phoen.* 622; cf. Ar. *Birds* 1316, *Thesm.* 1117–18 (λαμβάνειν); θέλγειν Eur. *Hipp.* 1274, Soph. *Trach.* 324–5; τοξεύειν Eur. *Tro.* 255; τιτρώσκειν Eur. *Hipp.* 392; παρανικᾶν Aesch. *Cho.* 600; ἄρχειν Soph. *Trach.* 443; πιέζειν Eur. *Stheneboea* fr. 665 (cf. δαμάζειν Anacreon fr. 505d); κτείνειν Soph. *El.* 197; στάζειν Eur. *Hipp.* 525; πνεῖν Eur. *Hipp.* 563, fr. 929a, *TrGF* incert. fab. fr. 187 (cf. Ar. *Lys.* 551); ταράσσειν Soph. *Phaedra* fr. 684 (cf. δονεῖ Ar. *Eccl.* 954); πετροῦν Eur. *IA* 808; ἐννυχεύειν Soph. *Ant.* 782; (ἐμ)πίπτειν Aesch. *Ag.* 341–2, Soph. *Ant.* 781, Eur. *Hipp.* 37–41; ἀναγκάζειν Eur. *Med.* 530–1 (cf. ἐξάγειν Eur. *Alc.* 1080); πυργοῦν Eur. *Tro.* 844; παραδιδόναι Eur. *Med.* 628–30; διδάσκειν Eur. *Andromeda* fr. 136; γυμνάζειν Aesch. *Ag.* 540; τὸν ἀσθενῆ σθένειν τίθησι καὶ τὸν ἄπορον εὐρίσκειν πόρον Aristarchus fr. 2 *TrGF*. Cf. also βάλλειν Ibycus fr. 287, Anacreon fr. 358; κόπτειν Anacreon fr. 413; λούειν Anacreon fr. 413; ἡνιοχεύειν Anacreon fr. 360.

²⁶ Aesch. *Suppl.* 1001–5, 1034–42; Soph. *Ant.* 781–805; Eur. *Hipp.* 447–58, 525–65 (also Zeus), *Hel.* 1098–104, *Bacch.* 404–6, *Med.* 840–5, *IA* 543–7, *Danae* fr. 324, *Meleager* fr. 524, *Phaethon* fr. 781; cf. Hes. *Theog.* 120–2, 200–2; Sappho fr. 159; Alcman fr. 59; Alcaeus fr. 296; Ar. *Ach.* 991–2, *Lys.* 551.

²⁷ Including cult, where Aphrodite and Eros were often worshipped together (though there is some doubt about the extent of the cult in the fifth century): see (e.g.) *IG* I³.1382a–b, Paus. 9.271; cf. Parker (2005) 470; Breitenberger (2007), esp. 139–69. Note also the existence of many theatrically inspired vase paintings featuring the figures of Aphrodite and Eros together: see Taplin (2007) 117–21, 133–4, 146–8, 172–4, 192–7, etc.

²⁸ Eur. *Hipp.* 392, *Tro.* 255, *Med.* 530–1, 633–5, *IA* 543–7, fr. 850.

²⁹ Pointed out by EBV *ad loc.*

³⁰ Hes. *Theog.* 120–5, 171–5, 200–2; Ar. *Birds* 696–706; Parmenides DK28 B13; Empedocles DK31 A30, B27. Cf. (in tragedy) Eur. *Hipp.* 447–58, 1268–81. Cf. Rudhardt (1986).

³¹ The same idea of a 'marriage' between heaven and earth is also seen in

another cosmological fragment (Eur. *Chrysippus* fr. 839), though without reference to *erōs*.

³² See Seaford (2012) 304–6 for an interpretation of the fragment along these lines.

³³ Cf. Shelley's poem 'Love's Philosophy' for an alternative version of the same idea, seen through the lens of English Romanticism ('The fountains mingle with the river / And the rivers with the ocean; / The winds of heaven mix forever / With a sweet emotion...' etc.).

³⁴ Pherecydes fr. 3d (Proclus in *Tim.* 2, p. 54 Diehl): see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 62–3.

³⁵ Cf. also Soph. *Oenomaus* fr. 474 (quoted under *eyes*), where the gaze of the lover is likened to that of a carpenter.

³⁶ Cf. also fr. adesp. 919 PMG (δολοπ[λ]όκω Κύ[π]ριδος) and Sappho fr. 188 (love as μυθοπλόκος).

³⁷ 'A false lure of giddy desire' (Jebb).

³⁸ A possible precedent is provided by Sappho fr. 213c (δὺ ἔρωτές με...), but the fragment is too lacunose to interpret properly.

³⁹ e.g. Plato, *Symp.* 205–6, Plut. *Erot.* 1–6, 14, 19 (*Mor.* 750–3, 756, 764).

⁴⁰ Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 11e (though Plutarch perceives the distinction as between heterosexual and homosexual love). Elsewhere (*Amatorius* 4, *Mor.* 751, quoting Anacreon fr. 444) Plutarch contrasts true love (of παιδικά) with other types of love.

⁴¹ Eur. *Hel.* 1098–104, *Hipp.* 439–43, *IA* 543–7, *Dictys* fr. 331.

⁴² Eur. *Meleager* fr. 524.

⁴³ Eur. *Stheneboea* fr. 661; cf. Soph. *Phaedra* fr. 677 (two types of pleasure, right and wrong).

⁴⁴ Eur. *Hipp.* *Veiled* fr. 428.

⁴⁵ Eur. incert. fab. fr. 929a.

⁴⁶ Aesch. *Cho.* 600; Soph. *Ant.* 781–9, 790–805, *Trach.* 488–9, *Phaedra* fr. 680; Eur. *Hipp.* 358–61, 392, 476, 1268–71, *Bacch.* 404–5, *Phoen.* 622, *Dictys* fr. 339; cf. fr. 929a.

⁴⁷ 'What came in from outside? What came out from within? What is inside and outside is seen in terms both biological and daemonological': Padel (1992) 3.

⁴⁸ Alcman fr. 3, Ibycus fr. 287, Licymnius fr. 771, Pindar fr. 123.3–4 M, Sappho frs 22, 23, 31, 112. Cf. also Pl. *Phaedr.* 251b for the idea that desire is infused into the soul through the eyes by the emanation of beauty. Other tragic references include Aesch. *PV* 901–2; Soph. *Ant.* 795–6; Eur. *Hipp.* 525–65, *Med.* 584–6, *Danae* fr. 324.

⁴⁹ Agathon fr. 29 *TrGF* (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἑσορᾶν γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις ἐρᾶν), wittily punning on the similarity of sound between the words for seeing and loving (and perhaps thereby hinting at an intrinsic connection between the two).

⁵⁰ See Gibert (1999–2000), who views the *suddenness* of Perseus' love as the particular attraction of this play in antiquity; cf. Konstan (1994), esp. 139–86, for aspects of the motif in later literature.

⁵¹ Eur. *Bacch.* 813, *IT* 1172; cf. fr. 1007e (εἰς ἔρωτ' ἀφιγμένοι). Cf. Gibert (1999–2000) 164, who notes that 'the expression is almost unique in classical Greek' (citing only Antiphanes fr. 234 PCG and Hypoth. Men. *Her.* 4–5 as parallels).

⁵² Stobaeus 4.20.22.

⁵³ On the plot of *Andromeda* see Bubel (1991); cf. Collard, Cropp, and Gibert (2004) 133–43.

⁵⁴ Cf. Vogt-Spira (1992), esp. 1–10.

⁵⁵ Pl. *Phaedr.* 252c; cf. Carson (1986) 160. See also Aristophanic jokes at *Birds* 576, 1738–9.

⁵⁶ e.g. Sappho frs 22, 194; Anacreon fr. 379.

⁵⁷ It is not clear whether this refers to erotic love (of Helen) or to lust for war. For a similar usage cf. *IA* 585–6 (ἔρωτι...ἐπτορήθης).

⁵⁸ *Soph. Ant.* 781–805, *Phaedra* fr. 684; *Eur. Hipp.* 564–5, 1269–71.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Dicaeogenes* fr. 1b (ἔρωτος...ἄρκυσιν); *Ariphron* fr. 831; *Ibycus* fr. 287.

⁶⁰ Fragments include mention of παιδικά (153), a ‘honeyed tongue’ (155), and spears darting from the lover’s eyes (157); the *erastai* may have included Heracles and Patroclus. Was the play tragic or satyric? See *TrGF* IV (Radt) *ad loc.*; cf. Lloyd-Jones (1996) 58–9. (Significantly, there is nothing about the presentation of love that would mark out the fragments as either tragic or non-tragic.)

⁶¹ Burning: *Ibycus* test. 12 (*Cic. Tusc.* 4.71), *Sappho* frs 31, 38, 48. Melting: *Alcman* fr. 3, *Anacreon* fr. 459, *Sappho* fr. 30.

⁶² As in *Sappho*’s famous oxymoronic formulation γλυκύπικρον (fr. 130); cf. *Euripides* fr. 875 (*Cypris* both sweet and grievous); *Anacreon* fr. 428. Carson (1986) sees paradox and internal division as fundamental to Greek views of *erōs* more generally.

⁶³ *Aesch. Suppl.* 1034–42; *Soph. Ant.* 781–9, *Trach.* 441–4, cf. fr. 770 (love itself cannot yield); *Eur. Med.* 530–1, *Dictys* frs 330–40, *Hippolytus Veiled* fr. 430, *Stheneboea* fr. 665; cf. *Sappho* fr. 130.

⁶⁴ *Phrynichus* fr. 13 *TrGF*.

⁶⁵ Love explicitly compared to madness: *Soph. Ant.* 790, fr. 855; *Eur. Bacch.* 813, *Hipp.* 1274, *Tro.* 989–90, *IA* 74–8, *Antigone* fr. 161, *Stheneboea* fr. 665 (cf. *Dictys* 331, where love is τὸ μῶρον).

⁶⁶ Cf. *Ibycus* fr. 286; *Alcaeus* fr. 283; *Alcman* fr. 58; *Anacreon* 428.

⁶⁷ *Aesch. Suppl.* 1003–5; *Soph. Oenomaus* fr. 474; *Eur. Hipp.* 509–10, 1274; *Hel.* 1103; *Tro.* 859; cf. *Hom. Od.* 18.212; *Sappho* fr. 57.

⁶⁸ See Faraone (1999) for further discussion of love-magic in its historical and religious context.

⁶⁹ *Aesch. Suppl.* 1034–42; *Soph. Trach.* 441–4; *Eur. Hipp.* 439–43, 447–58, *Med.* 330, *Andromeda* frs 138, 138a, *Dictys* fr. 340, *Theseus* fr. 388, incert. fab. fr. 895.

⁷⁰ On the function and interpretation of tragic *gnōmai* generally see (most recently) Lardinois (2006); Most (2003).

⁷¹ *Aesch. Ag.* 341–2 (conquest/city-sacking), 540 (patriotism), *Eum.* 865 (glory in war), *Seven against Thebes* 392 (battle), 688–9 (conquest), *Suppl.* 880 (conquest), fr. 387 (of mystic ritual; possibly with erotic overtones?); *Soph. Aj.* 1205 (the will to live), *Phil.* 660 (desire to talk), *OC* 436, *Laocoon* fr. 373 (desire to act); *Eur. Ion* 67 (children), *HF* 65–6 (political domination), 318 (in love with the impossible), *Alc.* 715 (life), *Suppl.* 178, 238–9 (money), 1440 (death), *IT* 1172 (desire to learn), *El.* 297 (knowledge), *Med.* 714 (children), *Antiope* fr. 192 (music), *Temenidae* fr. 729 (patriotism), *Phoenix* fr. 816 (life), fr. 1007e (rivalry/ambition), fr. 1077 (any strong desire), fr. 1076 (love of the impossible); *Agathon* fr. 7 (death-wish); fr. adesp. 129 *TrGF* (gold), fr. adesp. 567 (strong wish/oath); *Ar. Plut.* 1009 (knowledge), *Ach.* 32 (yearning for spring), *Cocalus* fr. 364 (wine).

⁷² *Eur. Rhesus* 362, *Dictys* fr. 339.

⁷³ *Soph. Phaedra* fr. 684; *Eur. El.* 297, *Hipp.* 439–43, *Danae* fr. 323, *Theseus* fr. 388; cf. *Anacreon* fr. 360.

⁷⁴ *Eur. Med.* 8; cf. *Alcaeus* fr. 283, *Sappho* fr. 1.

⁷⁵ *Eur. Hipp.* 1274; cf. *Alcman* fr. 59.

⁷⁶ *Aesch. PV* 590–1.

⁷⁷ *Soph. Ant.* 617 (implied by κουφονόων ἐρώτων); cf. *Hes. Theog.* 122.

⁷⁸ *Aesch. Cho.* 696–7; *Eur. Hipp.* 765, 969, 1268, *Bacch.* 404 (θελξιφρων); *Critias Rhadamanthys* fr. 17.5; cf. *Ibycus* fr. 286, *Sappho* fr. 47.

⁷⁹ *Ibycus* fr. 324; *Simonides* fr. 575; *Alcaeus* fr. 327; *Sappho* fr. 197 (cf. *Pausanias* 9.27.3); *Hes. Theog.* 120–5.

⁸⁰ Soph. *Ant.* 781–805 (ode to Eros), *Trach.* 354–5, *Phaedra* fr. 684; Eur. *Andromeda* fr. 136, *Auge* fr. 269, *Hippolytus Veiled* fr. 430, *Tro.* 840. Plural *Erōtes*: Eur. *Bacch.* 404–6, *Med.* 330, 628–30, 840–5, *Hel.* 1103, ?Aesch. *Suppl.* 880 (corrupt); Soph. *Ant.* 617; cf. Sappho fr. 194; Anacreon frs 490, 494; Ar. *Birds* 1316. See Stafford (2001) for more discussion of the issues involved.

⁸¹ e.g. Alcaeus fr. 283; Sappho fr. 188 (love as μυθοπλόκος); Sappho fr. 200 (Πειθώ daughter of Aphrodite); cf. Max. Tyr. 18.9 (Socrates calls love σοφιστής), Gorgias *Encomium of Helen* (B11 DK).

⁸² On these matters see *TrGF* V (Kannicht) *ad loc.*; cf. Wright (2010).

⁸³ Aesch. *Suppl.* 1001–5; Soph. *Trach.* 435, 445, 488–9, *Lovers of Achilles* fr. 149, *Phaedra* fr. 680; Eur. *Hipp.* 37–41, 509–10, 727, 764–6, *IA* 585–7, *Med.* 8, *Dictys* fr. 339.

⁸⁴ Sappho frs 1, 4, 22, 31, 37, 47, 102, 130; cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 120–2; Alcaeus frs 283, 380; Alcman frs 3, 357; Anacreon frs 368, 376, 505d; Ar. *Eccl.* 954.

⁸⁵ Alcman fr. 58; Anacreon frs 346, 357, 358, 360, 396, 398.

⁸⁶ Cf. *Andromeda* fr. 136 (Love is implored not to teach misleading lessons), *Hippolytus Veiled* fr. 430 (Phaedra says that love has taught her boldness, daring, and resourcefulness).

⁸⁷ Note also that the motif of erotic pedagogy/*sophia* would be developed in a different (and idiosyncratic) way by Socrates: see e.g. Pl. *Alc.*, *Symp.*; Xen. *Symp.* (*passim*). Cf. Tarrant and Johnson (2012).

⁸⁸ Cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 535 (Ἐρωτα δέ, τὸν τύραννον ἀνδρῶν); cf. fr. 850 (love mentioned in conjunction with τυραννίς, though the connection is obscure); Anacreon fr. 505d (δυναστίης).

⁸⁹ Soph. *Ant.* 781–9, *Trach.* 443–4, Eur. *Hipp.* 447–58, *Andromeda* fr. 136; cf. Hes. *Theog.* 121–2; Anacreon fr. 505d; Ar. *Clouds* 1081.

⁹⁰ Anacreon fr. 376 (μεθύων ἔρωτι), 396, 450 (love = wine). See Campbell (1983).

The Self and the Underworld

Emma Gee

...he went his way
down among the lost people like Dante...

(W.H. Auden, *In Memory of Sigmund Freud*)

1. Introduction

In Auden's 'In Memory of Sigmund Freud', Freud's explorations of the unconscious are represented by the journey to the underworld.¹ Auden has Freud descending like an epic hero, in search of lost souls.² The underworld represents the unconscious, expressed in spatial terms. This was apparently the case as much for Freud himself as for Auden. The epigraph to *The Interpretation of Dreams* is a line from the *Aeneid* (7.312) where Juno threatens, in the absence of divine sanction, to 'activate Acheron', bring the underworld powers to the surface:³

flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo
'If I can't bend the powers above, I'll move Acheron' (my translation).

Freud himself glosses his interpretation of the line when he reuses it towards the close of *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

The suppressed psychic material, which in the waking state has been

prevented from expression and cut off from internal perception by the antagonistic adjustment of the contradictions, finds ways and means of obtruding itself on consciousness during the night under the domination of the compromise formations.

flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.

At any rate the interpretation of dreams is the *via regia* to a knowledge of the unconscious in psychic life.⁴

Freud describes *The Interpretation of Dreams* using the image of a journey:

The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. First comes the dark wood of the authorities (who cannot see the trees), where there is no clear view and it is easy to go astray. Then there is a cavernous defile through which I lead my readers—my specimen dream with its peculiarities, its details, its indiscretions and its bad jokes—and then, all at once, the high ground and the open prospect and the question: ‘which way do you want to go’.⁵

It has not been noted (apart from by Auden, allusively, in the epigraph to this chapter) how Freud draws on Dante in particular here. His ‘walk’ is Dante’s ‘*cammin*’ (*Inferno* 1.1); his ‘dark wood’ Dante’s ‘*selva oscura*’ (*Inf.* 1.2); his defile Dante’s ‘*passo*’ (*Inf.* 1.26): points of contact could be multiplied. The overall progression Freud envisages for himself mirrors the progression of the *Commedia* from low to high (*Inferno*—*Purgatorio*—*Paradiso*), which itself mirrors Aeneas’ progress through and out of the underworld in *Aeneid* 6. Freud invokes space in the traditions of underworld literature, as an analogy for repressed instincts, which must be brought to light.

It is the metaphor of space I am interested in here. The underworld landscape which Freud deploys has a long history. How are we to envisage the landscape of the underworld in which Freud finds himself? We tend to think, if we think of the afterlife at all, of its being some-place, or some-time. That location is usually defined in spatial or temporal relation to somewhere else (for instance the world we live in, the here-and-now), and its definition characteristically involves a system of dichotomies, which includes such pairings as up–down; inside–outside; real–not real; present as opposed to past or future.⁶

The afterlife both invites, and resists, topographical representation. It is spatially slippery. When we look more closely into the Classical tradition of afterlife representations, whether in epic or philosophy, we see the dichotomies on which we’ve come to rely (up–down, heaven–hell) begin to collapse. Down can encapsulate up, we can be both inside and outside; the world we’re in is imaginary but real.

What do we do about representing space, in the face of the collapse of the dichotomies it rests on? The afterlife is an imaginary world constructed on the analogy of the ‘real’ world, and each afterlife representation takes a snapshot of its creator’s current state of knowledge. So we would expect it to be easily related to the ‘sciences’, such as cosmology and geography, whose job it is to define the parameters of knowledge about the world. But because it is an imaginary landscape, it need not conform to the rules: it may take its shape from the world but not become a map of it. This is more so because, of course, the afterlife is not ‘just’ a landscape. It is the abode of souls, and therefore as much an ethical as a physical environment, an externalization of systems of ethics, philosophy, and (dare I say) religion: in fact, the externalization of the soul (in Freudian terms the ‘unconscious’) itself. The afterlife landscape is built on the plan of the soul as well as of the world. It is an extrusion of the soul’s configuration onto the idea of landscape.⁷

Given that the afterlife pushes the limits of mapping, is there a useful way of theorizing how we think about afterlife space? This chapter suggests various approaches to the visualization of the afterlife. It is a theoretical exploration of various parallels through which afterlife space might begin to be represented, and I do not provide either a straightforward map, or a single answer. I begin with Sigmund Freud’s ‘archaeology of the psyche’, the metaphor of the unconscious as a city whose archaeological strata defy a proper conception of space by being simultaneously visible. This problematizes the ‘space of the soul’ in advance of my exploration of Classical materials. Once I have introduced the Freudian metaphor for psychic space, I leave it aside for later, and move to *Aeneid* 6. I take this text as an exemplum primarily because of its wide interest to readers who are Classically trained and those with interests in later periods (for instance, in Dante). In the sense of its familiarity, that text might be taken as some kind of archetype of afterlife representation in the Western tradition. Of course it is not the first afterlife text, nor is it the first text to both define and disrupt afterlife topography: we think most of all of Homer’s *Odyssey*, Book 11, about which I write elsewhere.⁸ But Virgil is also unique in the sense that the Augustan age from which he comes may present, among historical eras, a uniquely focused interlacing of geography and politics.⁹ In this sense too he is a paradigm.

A natural way for a Classicist to try to come up with parallels for Virgil’s afterlife is, perhaps, to look at contemporary mapping of the ‘actual’ world. To this end I draw on several instances of mapping roughly contemporary with Virgil. The conclusion is that, not only are the ancient representations themselves so problematic as to be useful

only in limited degree, but also that no single representation of topography will do the job as an explanation for the different types of space we find to coexist in Virgil. We realize that we have run up against the same problem as does Freud in his psyche-as-city metaphor: that many spatial layers, or spatial paradoxes, cannot easily be represented.

There are, however, ways in which this can be done, and it may be that these provide better means of envisaging afterlife space than traditional topographical representation. These spatial paradigms are offered by the more recent science of metageography, the reflective study of geography and cartography by geographers and cartographers themselves. Both of these sciences work with new ways of modelling space. We'll see that, while the afterlife resists containment by means of topographical space, its geography is better represented by topological space, a free and fluid system of spatial relation in which oppositions such as up–down, outside–inside, and real–unreal collapse into one another, and fixed spatial hierarchies cease to obtain. It is my conclusion that modern paradigms of representing space ought to be given serious consideration as useful theoretical tools in the envisaging and characterization of afterlife space in ancient texts.

2. The Problem of Space in Freudian Psychoanalysis

In *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud makes an analogy between human memory, and the past of a city, Rome:¹⁰

Since we overcame the error of supposing that the forgetting we are familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace—that is, its annihilation—we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that everything is somehow preserved, and that in suitable circumstances...it can once more be brought to light. Let us try to grasp what this assumption involves by taking an analogy from another field. We will choose as an example the history of the Eternal City. Historians tell us that the oldest Rome was the Roma Quadrata, a fenced settlement on the Palatine. Then followed the phase of the Septimontium, a federation of the settlements on the different hills; after that came the city bounded by the Servian wall; and later still, after all the transformations during the periods of the republic and the early Caesars, the city which the Emperor Aurelian surrounded with his walls. We will not follow the changes which the city went through any further, but we will ask ourselves how much a visitor, whom we will suppose to be equipped with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge, may still find left of these early stages in the Rome of today. Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of

Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If he knows enough—more than present-day archaeology does—he may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall and the outline of the Roma Quadrata. Of the buildings which once occupied this ancient area he will find nothing, or only scanty remains, for they exist no longer. The best information about Rome in the republican era would only enable him at most to point out the sites where the temples and public buildings of that period stood. Their place is now taken by ruins, but not by ruins of themselves but of later restorations made after fires or destruction. It is hardly necessary to remark that all these remains of ancient Rome are found dovetailed into the jumble of a great metropolis which has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance. There is certainly not a little that is ancient still buried in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings. This is the manner in which the past is preserved in historical sites like Rome.

Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one. This would mean that in Rome the palaces of the Caesars and the Septizonium of Septimius Severus would still be rising to their old height on the Palatine and that the Castle of S. Angelo would still be carrying on its battlements the beautiful statues which graced it until the siege by the Goths, and so on. But more than this. In the place occupied by the Palazzo Caffarelli would once more stand—without the Palazzo having to be removed—the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this not only in its latest shape, as the Romans of the Empire saw it, but also in its earliest one, when it still showed Etruscan forms and was ornamented with terracotta antefixes. Where the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero's vanished Golden House. On the Piazza of the Pantheon we should find only the Pantheon of today, as it was bequeathed to us by Hadrian, but, on the same site, the original edifice erected by Agrippa; indeed, the same piece of ground would be supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it was built. And the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up one view or the other.

There is clearly no point in spinning our phantasy any further, for it leads to things that are unimaginable or even absurd. If we want to represent historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space cannot have two different contents. Our attempt seems to be an idle game. It has only one justification. It shows us how far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms.¹¹

Freud envisages the human psyche in topographical terms. Its map works along two axes, horizontal (motion from place to place) and vertical (stratigraphy, the archaeology of the psyche). Freud's psyche is built from a layering of materials: the strata of a city. As with a work of art, the layers, though the result of temporal process, are simultaneously present to the viewer. The fact that the city is Rome brings home to Freud's audience the great depth and variety of stratigraphical layers, to which we must apply forensic techniques; in

this case, those forensic techniques required to bring the psyche to light. At the same time, in order for this topographical comparison to work, we have to change the way we see Rome, and instead of seeing its cultural layers as stratified and largely hidden, we must see them as simultaneously present, buildings of the past ghosted onto buildings in their present form, an anarchic jumble of memory-traces.

Freud is ambivalent about the value of his own topographical metaphor. By the end of this passage he eschews the elaborate comparison of psyche and city.¹² It's the need for topographical simultaneity which Freud claimed to be unhappy with, because he couldn't square that with 'realistic' representations of space. He was bound by concept of space in which, as he says, 'If we want to represent historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space cannot have two different contents.'

Despite his disquiet, Freud was never entirely prepared to relinquish his city of the psyche. The topographical metaphor recurs throughout his work in one form or another as part of a wider ambivalence towards topography in Freud's work which it was left to subsequent generations of psychoanalysts to try to resolve. But before we proceed with the resolution, let's take a foray into the ancient material, to see how far Freud's topographical model as we've seen it so far can help us envisage the literary underworld of the *Aeneid*.

3. Space in *Aeneid* 6

In *Aeneid* 6, Aeneas descends to an underworld in which he hopes to find revelation, in the way in which the Homeric Odysseus did in *Odyssey* 11. Most obviously, this is a journey: *Aeneid* 6 charts Aeneas' movement across the horizontal space of the underworld. What is less remarked is that *Aeneid* 6 contains not just one type of space but many: a superimposition of topographies.

First is imaginative space. In Aeneas' journey, the mental map comes first: *omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi*, 'I have grasped it all, and in my mind, with myself as guide, I have already passed through the whole journey' (Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.105).¹³ Aeneas has 'performed' his journey before he makes it. Any subsequent journey will be replay of this imagined topography, and measured against it. Aeneas' first, mental *periēgēsis* of the underworld becomes his ethnographic report to himself—his own road-map. This pre-

imagining is consistent with ancient geography, which ‘relied on words and discourses, on human memory’.¹⁴ Moreover, it is a signal to us, the reader, reading within the epic tradition, that we are working along a pre-traversed route: that of the *katabasis*-narrative, which begins, again, with Homer’s *Odyssey* Book 11.

Once the journey gets underway, simple verbs such as *ibant* (*Aeneid* 6.268) describe motion across horizontal space. At the same time, this space is envisaged in architectural or political terms, still quite general at this stage (*domos, regna, Aeneid* 6.269). The associations of underworld space, as it becomes more articulated, are at this stage primarily domestic:

uestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci
Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae...

(*Aeneid* 6.273–4)

At the lip of the entrance hall and at the first ingress of Orcus, Grief and vengeful Cares make their beds...

In the house of Hades, the *fauces*, ‘jaws’, are the narrow entrance-passage into the house.¹⁵ Here Virgil’s allegorical figures, *Luctus* and *Curae*, lay down their sleeping-pallets like door-slaves.¹⁶ The term *fauces* can also carry a geographical sense. Lucretius used it of the opening of the crater of Mt Etna, at *DRN* 6.639–40: ...*per fauces montis ut Aetnae / expirent ignes* (‘...how through the jaws of Mt Etna fires breathe forth’; cf. *DRN* 6.697). Although the domestic sense is primary in Virgil—it chimes with terms of domestic architecture like *vestibulum* and *cubilia*—the geographical one gives perhaps a secondary association in the reader’s mind.

As well, Virgil’s underworld has city-like features, a branching road-system, high walls:

hic locus est, partis ubi se uia findit in ambas:
dextera quae Ditis magni sub moenia tendit,
hac iter Elysium nobis; at laeua malorum
exercet poenas et ad impia Tartara mittit.

(*Aeneid* 6.540–3)

This place is where the road divides into two parts: this way is our journey to Elysium, but the left fork exacts punishments from bad people and sends them to profane Tartarus.

Dis’ walled complex (*Ditis magni sub moenia*, 541) can’t but remind us, I think, of the *altae moenia Romae* in *Aeneid* 1.7, the walls Aeneas is setting out to establish. In *Aeneid* 6, the underworld cityscape is a kind

of mirror image of Rome. The walls of Tartarus itself may be even more like a negative analogy for the eternal city:

Respicit Aeneas subito et sub rupe sinistra
moenia lata uidet triplici circumdata muro,
quae rapidus flammis ambit torrentibus amnis,
Tartareus Phlegethon, torquetque sonantia saxa.
porta aduersa ingens solidoque adamante columnae...

(*Aeneid* 6.548–52)

All at once Aeneas looks back and sees at the foot of a cliff on the left massive walls with a threefold retaining buttress thrown around. A river slick with floes of flame winds around them—Phlegethon, the River of Tartarus—and rolls its echoing rocks. Opposite there's a huge door and columns of reinforced steel...

Here Virgil uses both *moenia* and *murus*. Tartarus is in constant siege-readiness—not to stop invaders, but a secure facility preventing the egress of inmates. Its architecture is more civic and imposing than the House of Dis (*porta ingens, columnae*). The architect of Tartarus also exploited the features of topography, natural landforms. Not unlike the Hills of Rome and its Tiber, the site of Tartarus is naturally protected by a cliff (*sub rupe sinistra*), the line of the walls echoing the circumambient river, labelled Phthegethon on the map.

We move seamlessly between urban geography and chorography (the study of local topography¹⁷). In traversing the horizontal lines on Virgil's map, we experience close at hand the country Aeneas' father is tucked away in: a green valley (*convalle virenti*, *Aen.* 6.679). The chorographic features of the spot are listed a little later:

Interea uidet Aeneas in ualle reducta
seclusum nemus et uirgulta sonantia siluae,
Lethaeumque domos placidas qui praeonat amnem.
hunc circum innumerae gentes populiue uolabant...

(*Aeneid* 6.703–6)

Meanwhile, Aeneas spots a secluded grove and rustling woody thickets in a deep-cut valley, and the River Lethe which flows by the houses of rest. Around this fluttered countless tribes and peoples...

These sorts of landforms or chorographic features—in *valle*, *neumus*, *virgulta*, *amnem*—as well as the ethnography of the place—*gentes populiue*—correspond with some of those described by Virgil's Augustan contemporary, Strabo, at *Geography* 2.5.17:

Πλεῖστον δ' ἡ θάλαττα γεωγραφεῖ καὶ σχηματίζει τὴν γῆν, κόλπους

ἀπεργαζομένη καὶ πελάγη καὶ πορθμούς, ὁμοίως δὲ ἰσθμούς καὶ χερρονήσους καὶ ἄκρας προσλαμβάνουσι δὲ ταύτη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ τὰ ὄρη. διὰ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ἡπειροὶ τε καὶ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεων θέσεις εὐφρεῖς ἐνενοήθησαν καὶ τᾶλλα ποικίλματα, ὅσων μεστός ἐστιν ὁ χωρογραφικὸς πίναξ.

It is the sea more than anything else that defines the contours of the land and gives it its shape, by forming gulfs, deep seas, straits, and likewise isthmuses, peninsulas, and promontories; both rivers and mountains assist the sea in this. It is through such natural features that we gain a clear conception of continents, nations, favourable positions of cities, and all the other details with which our geographical map is filled.¹⁸

Strabo seems to speak in terms of a painted representational map: note his apparent use of the vocabulary of the visual arts in ποικίλματα ('details') and πίναξ (lit. 'painting'). In fact, some think a specific visual representation is meant here, namely the Map of Agrippa.¹⁹ This brings us to an immediate visual parallel for Virgil's underworld description.

We do not have the Map of Agrippa, described by Pliny (*Naturalis Historia* 3.17).²⁰ But we do have what some have taken to be a medieval recension of it. This is the Peutinger Table (see [Figure 12.1](#)). This map in the form we have it dates from the thirteenth century.²¹ Because it differs in form from medieval *mappaemundi* of the same period, such as the Hereford Mappamundi, it is generally taken as a medieval representation of a Roman road-map.²² The fact that it may have been elongated along the East–West axis led scholars to hypothesize that it may have been a wall-map. Its ultimate source seems to date to before the first century CE because it shows Pompeii, which was not rebuilt after it was destroyed by the Vesuvius in 79. The present version must have been drawn after 328, because the map names Constantinople, which was founded in that year. What we have in the Peutinger Table, apparently, is a medieval copy of a late antique map which was itself working from an earlier source.²³




Figure 12.1 The Peutinger Table, Codex Vindobonensis 324, by permission of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna.

If this source was the Map of Agrippa, which was set up in the Porticus Vipsania, the portico setting might account for the lateral elongation of the map in the Peutinger Table.²⁴ If the Peutinger Table does indeed transmit the Map of Agrippa, then that map included coastlines, rivers, islands, mountains, peoples, and regions:²⁵ the same features as in the passage quoted from Strabo 2.5.17, and in Virgil's account of underworld topography.

If the Map of Agrippa was finally executed after Agrippa's death in 12 BCE, as Pliny records, it is too late for Virgil to have seen it (although not, of course, his near-contemporary audience). However, there may be a further recension of the tradition: the Map of Agrippa was a completion of a world map commissioned by Julius Caesar, perhaps in 51 BCE, for which the surveyors' findings might have been available for consultation by c.44 BCE.²⁶ If this is so, it is not inconceivable that Virgil as well as his audience might have seen something very like it and could (in theory) have applied this kind of spatial model to the imaginative visualization of the underworld.

Is this helpful though? The itinerary model of the Peutinger Table is not, perhaps, a particularly good analogy for the way space functions in *Aeneid* 6. It works in very general terms, for the passage across horizontal space (the type of space represented by *ibant* in 6.268, and other such verbs of motion); less well in detail.

In terms of the mechanics of how Virgil's underworld space might be envisaged by an ancient audience, we might best think of Pausanias' description of the Classical painter Polygnotus'

representation of the underworld, *Description of Greece* 10.28–31, in which we see not only detail, but the interplay of literary and physical visualization. The first landform in the painting to be described by Pausanias is the River Acheron (ὕδωρ εἶναι ποταμὸς ἔοικε, δῆλα ὡς ὁ Ἀχέρων, ‘There is water there like a river, clearly, as it were, Acheron’, 10.28.1). It is the representational quality of the image which is in the forefront of Pausanias’ description: the river is not a ‘real’ river; it is ‘like’ a river, ‘as it were’, the river Acheron.²⁷ This painting is doubly a representation: a representation of a landscape, but of an imaginary landscape, the features of which might have verisimilitude but never veracity.

The river itself is only the backdrop for the scene which takes place in and around it. The character of Charon is meticulously painted in 10.28. In this, Polygnotus is said to be following a literary source: ἐπηκολούθησε δὲ ὁ Πολύγνωτος ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ποιήσει Μινυάδι, ‘Polygnotus, it seems to me, followed the poem, the *Minyad*’ [a poem from the epic cycle], 10.28.2. Words and pictures come full circle, or rather, are not defined in opposition to one another. There is an interchangeability between them: you can describe the underworld landscape, paint it, describe what is represented, without privileging the authenticity of verbal or visual representation.

Polygnotus’ is an ethnography or a prosopography of the underworld: it isn’t comprehensive, and doesn’t aim primarily to give a sense of extension in space, but rather privileges groups of characters arranged around topographical elements, placed in relation to one another on the horizontal axis. So, for instance, there’s a group of souls ‘on the bank of the Acheron’, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀχέρωντος τῇ ὄχθῃ, 10.28.4. The characters are defined in spatial relation to one another²⁸ and interspersed by Pausanias (our tour guide) with their mythological *aitia*. This is a guided tour of the underworld, in which each group is the site (implied, as in the picture described, or explicit, as in Pausanias’ description) of its own mythology, complete with reference to literary sources. We pause before each scene to listen to the headphone exegesis of its mini-drama. Pausanias takes on the role of a cultural Sibyl or Hermes, guide to the underworld.

Pausanias’ passage gives us a better sense, perhaps, of the cognitive process we have to exercise to imagine what a graphic representation of Virgil’s underworld map would be like. A picture like this is not an abstract map but a narrative. If we’re looking for a physical parallel from the visual arts, Polygnotus’, and Virgil’s, representations probably have more in common with the Nile Mosaic from Praeneste (Figure 12.2) than with the Peutinger Table, or with a ‘map’ as we understand it. As in Pausanias’ description of Polygnotus’ picture, in the Nile Mosaic we have a ‘map’ based on groupings of figures which

carry particular symbolic value. There is no attempt at what we'd consider 'scientific' accuracy, or artist's perspective. The 'lack' of these values is most likely a matter of choice for the artist: the materials were available, but the artist chose a narrative style of representation over other options.²⁹




Figure 12.2 The Nile Mosaic (Mosaico del Nilo) from Palestrina, by permission of the Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Palestrina and the Ministry of Culture, Heritage, and Tourism (Su concessione del MiBACT, Soprintendenza per i Beni Archeologici del Lazio, Roma).

It isn't important that what the Nile Mosaic represents purports to be 'real', while Polygnotus' is an underworld representation. Both are essentially stylized landscapes, both can be 'read' using the same interpretative tools. These give a way of representing space which straddles landscape and map, literature and the visual arts. The map is laid out as a narrative, with points of reference provided by little pictorial representations of scenes and buildings. We can plausibly say that this type of representation, which we could call 'narrative space', might stand with some justification as an analogy for the type of space we are dealing with the *Aeneid* 6.³⁰ The Nile Mosaic stands up chronologically as well, as a visual parallel for how Virgil and his audience might expect the underworld landscape to be laid out.³¹

The modern designation for the kind of map which is a narrative, and which is presented, visually or imaginatively, as groupings of 'events' without conventional scale or perspective, is a psychogeographic map (Figure 12.3). This type of map is more about the experience of space and the ways in which objects can be related in space by the traveller, than it is about an 'authoritative' abstract mapping. The motion of the traveller through space is characterized as 'drift' (*dérive*). This is not to say it is purposeless, just that it claims space in a different way from, say, a linear journey along a road-map. Although the psychogeographic map is a modern concept, with its origin in mid-twentieth century Paris, this is a good analogy for how space works in the types of maps we've just seen: as a flexible, experiential, subjective medium in which elements are related to one another through the consciousness of the individual. This description of space could also apply to Virgil's verbal representation of underworld space.




Figure 12.3 Guy Debord, Psychogeographic Map, from *Guide Psychogéographique de Paris: Discours sur les passions de l'amour*, Copenhagen 1957, by permission of the Rijksbureau voor Kunsthistorische Documentatie, La Haye.

I emphasize that I am not trying to argue that there is firm ground for straightforward ‘mapping,’ as it were, of the visual onto the textual, at least in Virgil’s case. The ancient reader would not expect to—would probably not be able to conceptualize how to—draw a map from Virgil’s description of the underworld. Ancient geography had ‘no uniform way of perceiving movement or space’.³² Nor can we state that a modern concept such as ‘drift’ gives any sort of key to the interpretation of Virgil’s space. We are merely working with a number of alternative ways of modelling afterlife space. No one of our representations so far is an infallible match; nor does any map have the capacity to represent (as Freud noted in the case of his psychic model) the complex layering of space involved in an intellectual representation of it.

In fact, Virgil’s underworld topography implies the simultaneous mapping of different kinds of space, which don’t all fall into the same topographical class. I’ve mentioned domestic space, cityscape, road-map or itinerary, philosophical space, chorographic space, and psychogeographic space. These different types of space do not exclude one another: we do not have to come up with a definitive model. In Roman thought, it appears, a kind of layering is possible, and maybe even normal: one type of space can imply or evoke another.

One of the keys to this mode of thinking about space seems to me to lie in Roman domestic architecture. The Roman elite house represented different types of space within itself: domestic architecture played with geographical tropes, and even reproduced different parts of the world, so that to walk around the house was also to traverse a world-geography.³³ On this model, two types of space we’ve seen in Virgil are really one: domestic architecture and geography imply each other.

Likewise, it seems that there was little clear distinction between literary and ‘real’ geography in Roman thought. O’Sullivan comments, apropos of Cicero’s *De finibus* (a text from a generation before Virgil), ‘Cicero’s literary representation of Plato’s Academy in the *De finibus* and his architectural representation in his Tusculan villa work in very much the same way, transporting the visitor or reader to distant lands, in order to stimulate conversation or reflection.’³⁴ In addition, as well as encapsulating a geography, the villa could involve its inhabitants in *time-travel*, by evoking the Roman (and Greek) past through its ancestral masks (*imagines*), painted decorative scheme, and monuments.³⁵

A Roman house was perceived as an extension of the Roman ‘self’.³⁶ The house-as-self provided memory triggers—like taking a walk through your own brain. But the analogy between memory and house is not a one-way street. The house itself came to be constructed

as a physical expression of the psychic journey. It is remarkable that, rather than the house being used as a model for a mental journey, in fact, it seems the mental journey was such a dominant paradigm that it was being used as a model for domestic architecture.³⁷ It is natural, in the underworld ‘chronotope’, which is a location for cultural and individual memory, that domestic architecture should be present as a way of envisaging space.

This is where the Roman house intersects with a system of *thought*: the Roman system of ‘architectural memory’, a widespread cultural mode of thinking with its origin in the technique whereby an orator, in memorizing a long speech, would use the layout of a house, with its different rooms, to represent ‘headings’ or topics, and features within those rooms, such as statues, to represent ‘subheadings’, or individual events.³⁸ Quintilian, who provides us with the fullest source of information for the Roman ‘architectural memory system’, has no problem with using *either* real *or* imaginary space as locations in which to place one’s memory-topics (*Institutio oratoria* 11.2.21):

opus est ergo locis quae vel finguntur vel sumuntur, et imaginibus vel simulacris, quae utique fingenda sunt.

So one needs (1) Sites, which may be invented or taken from reality, (2) Images or Symbols, which we must of course invent (tr. Russell).

Topics for memory could be placed in a totally imaginary landscape. It is a short step from here to the imaginary landscape of Virgil’s underworld, a chronotope containing its own memories, in the form of *imagines agentes* (‘active images’), the characters from myth and history (and from his own future) encountered by Aeneas.³⁹

Aeneid 6 is not unique, but fits into this peculiarly Roman way of conceiving of space.⁴⁰ It begins with space akin to a linear geography, but then kicks off into a schematic view of the universe-as-a-whole. For most of *Aeneid* 6, there is a linear progression through the underworld, its regions and features marked topographically, becoming more and more extensive and comprehensive of different kinds of space. The upper world is *implied* in the underworld. Once we get to Virgil’s Elysium, a different kind of space enters the underworld picture:

his demum exactis, perfecto munere diuae,
deuenero locos laetos et amoena uirecta
fortunatorum nemorum sedesque beatas.
largior hic campos aether et lumine uestit
purpureo, solemque suum, sua sidera norunt.

(*Aeneid* 6.637–41)

When they'd done these things, and the goddess's duty was done, they came to the places of happiness, the beautiful glades of the groves of the fortunate, the home of the blessed. Here a more open atmosphere clothes the plains with deep-coloured light, and they know their own familiar sun, their own stars.

Vertical space is included in the afterlife, albeit we have to survey it from a vantage point below. But *because* our vantage point in *Aeneid* 6 is that of the underworld, the resulting view is a sort of Russian doll cosmos, in which the heaven contains the world, which contains the underworld, which contains *its own* heaven. This implies not just an imaginary *periēgēsis*, but a readjustment of how you visualize space: 'inside' and 'outside', 'up' and 'down' become relative to your vantage point, rather than absolute. The 'heaven' relative to the economy of the underworld narrative is not 'our' heaven but another one, under the ground: to the inhabitants of Elysium, that is 'heaven'.

It is most radically in lines 724–51 that our gaze is thrust upward from the horizontal to the vertical axis. Aeneas' father Anchises begins his philosophical exposition of the nature of the soul with an abrupt upward shift via the surface of the earth, to the heavenly bodies (*Aen.* 6.724–6):

‘Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis
lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra
spiritus intus alit...’

‘First of all, Breath nourishes, from within, the sky, earth and sea, the shining orb of the moon and the Titan star [the sun]...’

When Anchises expounds the fate of souls in philosophical terms, he chooses to weight his imagery towards the celestial from the outset, even though both the speaker and the setting are in the underworld. Although the three traditional world-divisions—sky, earth, and sea—are enumerated, the emphasis falls on the last, with the focus on the heavenly bodies. This is appropriate, because in what follows the fundamental particles of soul ‘take their strength from fire, their origin from the heaven’ (*igneus est ollis uigor et caelestis origo | seminibus*, 730–1); what's left after the attrition of the body is ‘pure sentience akin to ether and the fire of unmixed air’ (*purumque relinquit | aetherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem*, 746–7).

Concern about the sudden upward shift of focus at the beginning of this passage, in contrast to the underworld landscape which went before, taxed ancient commentators as well as modern readers. The late antique scholar Macrobius feels he has to apologize for Virgil's *gemina doctrina*—his literary split personality (*Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* 1.9.8–10):

licit argumento suo serviens heroas in inferos relegaverit, non tamen eos abducit a caelo, sed aethera his deputat largiorem, et nosse eos solem suum ac sua sidera profitetur, ut geminae doctrinae observatione praestiterit et poeticae figmentum et philosophiae veritatem....hae autem animae in ultimam sphaeram recipi creduntur quae ἀπλανής vocatur, nec frustra hoc usurpatum est, si quidem inde profectae sunt. animis enim necdum desiderio corporis inretitis siderea pars mundi praestat habitaculum, et inde labuntur in corpora: ideo his illo est reditio, qui merentur.

Although [Virgil] relegates his heroes to the underworld in accordance with his plot, he does not divorce them from the heaven, but assigns them ‘ampler ether’ and proclaims that ‘they know their own sun and stars’, thus offering both poetic fiction and philosophical truth by virtue of his twofold erudition (*gemina doctrina*)....These souls are believed to be received into the outermost sphere of the universe, which is called ‘fixed’, and this supposition is appropriate if indeed they set out from there. The starry part of the sky provides a habitat for those souls not yet ensnared by desire for the body: and likewise the return by this route is open to those who deserve it (my trans.).

Macrobius resolves the apparent problem of the sudden intrusion of vertical space into the underworld by arguing that the underworld belongs to the sphere of ‘poetic fiction’, while the celestial afterlife belongs to that of ‘philosophical truth’. In other words, he gets around the problem by refracting his reading Virgil’s afterlife through two different interpretative frames.⁴¹ The ‘poetic fiction’ gives us the linear journey, the ‘philosophical truth’ the upward thrust.

For us, the focal point of the upward thrust in Anchises’ account of souls—its swing from horizontal to vertical or ‘philosophical’ space—is *caelestis origo* in 730. The fact that (in this part of the text only) the souls are said to be originally seeded from the sky, sits uneasily with the ensuing account of psychic recycling in the underworld. At the very least, we have to gloss the text with the idea of different stages in the life of souls—*first* they are made in the stars, *then* they enter into the process of reincarnation—and thus to spell out something left largely unsaid by Virgil. One reason for the inconcinnity in this case is that Anchises, explaining the life cycle of souls with reference to philosophical cosmology, calques a Platonic text in which reincarnation is underplayed relative to Plato’s other dialogues such as the *Republic*. This is the *Timaeus*, in which souls are said to originate from the stars and return to them (*Tim.* 41d8–42b5):⁴²

συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις, ἔνειμέν θ’ ἐκάστην πρὸς ἑκάστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, ὅτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μή τις ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, δεῖο δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάσταις ἑκαστα ὄργανα χρόνων φῦναι ζῶων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον...ὁπότε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεῖεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσίοι, τὸ δ’ ἀπίοι τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν αἰσθησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶη μίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ βιαίων παθημάτων σύμφυτον γίγνεσθαι, δεῦτερον δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμειγμένον ἔρωτα, πρὸς δὲ

τούτοις φόβον καὶ θυμὸν ὅσα τε ἐπόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁπόσα ἐναντίως πέφυκε διεστηκότα· ὧν εἰ μὲν κρατήσουσιν, δίκη βιώσονται, κρατηθέντες δὲ ἀδικία. καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη ἔξει.

And when he had compounded it all, he divided the mixture into a number of souls equal to the number of the stars and assigned each soul to a star. He mounted each soul in a carriage, as it were, and showed it the nature of the universe. He described to them the laws that had been foreordained: They would all be assigned one and the same initial birth, so that none would be less well treated by him than any other. Then he would sow each of the souls into that instrument of time suitable to it, where they were to acquire the nature of being the most god-fearing of living things...So, once the souls were of necessity implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and leaving them, the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances. This they would all have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain. And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as well as their natural opposites. And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust. And if a person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end return to his dwelling-place in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character (trans. Zeyl (2000)).

The progression of Anchises' speech, from the soul's cosmic origins through the genesis of emotions by incarnation, mirrors Plato's progression in the *Timaeus*. But unlike in the *Aeneid*, it's specified in Plato that souls do not just originate from stars, but *also* return to them (πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, *Tim.* 42b3–4). There was no such specific statement in *Aen.* 6.724–51; you have to imply it at best. Macrobius, with his Neoplatonist leanings, reunites this passage of the *Aeneid* with its Platonic context when he states (above, p. 261), 'The starry part of the sky provides a habitat for those souls not yet ensnared by desire for the body: and likewise the return by this route is open to those who deserve it.' Macrobius' reading of Virgil's text involves an almost verbatim insertion of the Platonic passage, 'And if a person lived a good life...he would at the end return to this dwelling-place in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character, In Macrobius' reading, the passage of the *Aeneid* looks a lot more like Plato than it does in its original setting, which begs more questions as to the consistency of the ideas it presents, vis-à-vis their underworld setting, than it provides answers. In Virgil, the contradictions between the underworld and the sky in which Plato's stars are situated, between celestial origin and return for souls, and their reincarnation, and between Anchises' speech and its setting, are left hanging.

This shows that any impression of consistency in Virgil's text that we might have, comes more from our often unconscious knowledge of

later readings of the text, than from the text itself. We do not get a consistent picture of the structure of the world or of the destiny of souls from Virgil himself. If you look for ways to find spatial consistency in the text on the analogy of contemporary ‘maps’, you will find that they are all, in one way or another, only partially satisfactory. If, however, we look for Virgil’s techniques in Roman *thought*, including the ‘architectural memory system’, we are much closer to home.

The progression in space we see in *Aeneid* 6—from domestic, to geographical, to universal space—is found in other Roman writings both before and after Virgil. For instance, Seneca *Dialogues* 12.20 (*Ad Helviam*) exemplifies the Roman ability to use a localized topographical *periēgēsis* (in this case Seneca’s pacing up and down while in exile) as a way of representing the simultaneous traversing of many types of space, along a spectrum ranging from the physical to the metaphysical:⁴³

animus omnis occupationis expers operibus suis vacat et modo se levioribus studiis oblectat, modo ad considerandam suam universique naturam veri avidus insurgit. terras primum situmque earum quaerit, deinde condicionem circumfusi maris cursusque eius alternos et recursus; tunc quidquid inter caelum terrasque plenum formidinis interiacet perspicit et hoc tonitribus fulminibus ventorum flatibus ac nimborum nivisque et grandinis iactu tumultuosum spatium; tum peragratis humilioribus ad summa perrumpit et pulcherrimo divinorum spectaculo fruitur, aeternitatis suae memor in omne quod fuit futurumque est vadit omnibus saeculis.

The mind, free of all preoccupation, is at liberty to do its own work, and at one time takes pleasure in more lightweight concerns, at another greedily thrusts forward to contemplate its own nature, and that of the universe. First it enquires how the continents are situated, then the character of the sea which surrounds them, its tidal ebb and flow. Then it perceives the region, full of threat, which lies between earth and heaven—that tempestuous space full of thunder and lightning and blasts of wind, rain and snow, and the battering of hail. Then when it has traversed these lower regions it bursts through to the top and enjoys the most beautiful spectacle of things divine. It recalls its own immortality and traverses all the ages, what was and will be (my trans.).

You can be a Roman aristocrat walking in your villa, while simultaneously being translated to ‘other places and times’.⁴⁴ This is because the bodily act of walking is at once an actual stroll, and a *mental* itinerary or *periēgēsis*. The mind wanders in its metaphorical journey further and further afield in a series of ever-widening concentric circles like ripples on a pond, first along the horizontal axis, from its immediate environs to the geography of the earth, then along the vertical axis, upwards to meteorological phenomena, before passing through the glass ceiling of the universe.⁴⁵ Topography yields contemplation. Real and imaginative space do not exclude each other. The Roman conception of space involves the construction of an

individual's mental map. This is as true for 'real' space as it is for 'imaginary' space. Thus the 'self' (or the 'soul') is always implied in the articulation of space.

4. Space and the Soul

No one paradigm of space is wholly successful as a means of visualizing the afterlife. In Freud, perhaps, there's a stratigraphic hierarchy implied, based on his enduring need to spatialize the different facets of the psychic apparatus, to straighten out and hierarchize the jumble during the process of analysis. But in Virgil, there is a *layering* of different types of space—domestic, topographic, cosmographic, philosophical—which culminates in a final spatial anomaly—the penetration of the upper world into the underworld. In eschatological space, up and down, inner and outer, real and metaphorical, are tangled up with one another.

But perhaps we, not Virgil, are in the wrong. Perhaps our spatial problem arises because we are looking in the wrong place for parallels. The afterlife is never going to be a 'map'. Afterlife geography is *au fond* a projection of psychic space: a world shaped according to ideas of the nature and fate of the soul.⁴⁶ What we need is an interpretative model which is going to accommodate *both* space *and* psyche. So let's turn again to Freud.

When we left our passage from Freud in Section 1, we noted Freud's dissatisfaction with his use of spatial metaphor for the psyche; as Blum and Secor put it, 'Freud is both compelled by the idea of mapping the psyche and frustrated by the geometric, material limitations that such a model imposes.'⁴⁷ This dissatisfaction goes beyond the work quoted above, *Civilization and its Discontents*. Freud was, and remained, ambivalent to his own model of the psychic apparatus. In his earlier work Freud had supposed the conscious and unconscious to correspond in some way to the physical structure—the spatial layout—of the brain. Later, in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) Freud revised his 'first topography', and attempted to exchange his spatial model for a structural or metaphorical one. His 'second topography'—the ego, the id, and the superego—was a compromise—it allowed him to continue thinking spatially without embedding his theory anatomically.

Nevertheless, spatial terminology persists in Freud's writings, even after *The Ego and the Id*. Take as an example the following passage

from *The Question of Lay Analysis* (1926): ‘I must ask you to picture the ego as a kind of façade of the id, as a frontage, like an external, cortical layer of it....For is the ego is really something superficial and the id something deeper—looked at from outside, of course. The ego lies between reality and the id’.⁴⁸ Freud felt the need to apologize in advance for the spatial terminology he uses here: ‘We shall leave entirely on one side the *material* line of approach, but not so the *spatial* one. For we picture the unknown apparatus which serves the activities of the mind as being really like an instrument constructed of several parts...each of which performs a particular function and which have a fixed spatial relation to one another; it being understood that by spatial relation—“in front of” and “behind”, “superficial” and “deep”—we merely mean in the first instance a representation of the regular succession of the functions.’⁴⁹

In *New Introductory Lectures in Psychology* he blurred the boundaries further: ‘In thinking of this division of the personality into an ego, a superego and an id, you will not, of course, have pictured sharp frontiers like the artificial ones drawn in political geography. We cannot do justice to the characteristics of the mind by linear outlines like those in a drawing or in a primitive painting, but rather by areas of colour melting into one another as they are presented by modern artists. After making the separation we must allow what we have separated to merge together once more.’⁵⁰ In other words, any psychic topography is for didactic purposes: what we are dealing with is in reality an amorphous terrain composed of shades of grey.

So—our partial lack of success in conferring spatial closure on the afterlife is perhaps because we are wrestling with the same problem as Freud: that psychic space, or in our terms afterlife space, isn’t ‘mappable’ in the sense of what we commonly understand as a map. But an answer may be forthcoming from post-Freudian psychoanalysis, where Freud’s spatial model is modified and made less absolute.

Instead of using Freud’s topographical approach, Jacques Lacan redefined the psychic model not as a bounded field like a city, but as a torus or doughnut-shape (Figure 12.4): ‘This structure differs from the spatialization of the circumference or sphere with which some people like to schematize the limits of the living being and its environment: it corresponds rather to the relational group that symbolic logic designates topologically as a ring. If I wanted to give an intuitive representation of it, it seems that I would have to resort not to the two-dimensionality of a zone, but rather to the three-dimensional form of a torus, insofar as a torus’ peripheral exteriority and central exteriority constitute but one single region’.⁵¹ A ring is different from a sphere because the inside is at the same time the outside and vice

versa. In Lacan's psychic model, subjective and objective, the self and the other, are not discrete, mutually exclusive entities, but are spatially continuous with one another just as inside and outside are spatially continuous in a torus. Lacan's 'doughnut of the self' is a much less bounded model than Freud's 'psychic apparatus'.




Figure 12.4 Diagram of Lacan's torus, from Blum-Secor (2011): 1036, reproduced by kind permission of the authors.

Lacan argued that Freud's topographical impasse was due to the shortcomings of the Euclidean model of space he was working with. Broadly speaking, Euclidean space is an absolute concept which can be defined by the distance between points. You can only look at it one way. Lacan translated Freud's *topographical* or Euclidean space into *topological* space, which deals with the qualitative as opposed to the geometric properties of space. Topological figures don't have a proper 'inside' and 'outside': in topological figures such as the torus, Möbius strip, or Klein bottle, interior and exterior are in a relationship of continuity.

This reconceptualization of psychic space may not give a definitive answer to the problems of afterlife space. But it provides a prompt in our attempt to find a new kind of space for the afterlife. To model the afterlife on the analogy of a topological rather than topographical model of the psyche takes care of the problem of the collapse of dichotomies we've been dealing with—between outside and inside,

between psyche and world, even between underworld and cosmos. Using Lacan's model of the psyche, we can see that all of these dichotomies are in fact spatially continuous. So, for instance, the supposed 'intrusion' of the upper world into Virgil's underworld which has worried commentators is not in these terms anomalous at all: the two types of space are simply continuous and interpenetrative. Lacan's torus is a particularly good model for interpretation of what I referred to above as Virgil's 'Russian doll' approach to the cosmos: in Virgil's Elysium 'outside' and 'inside' are part of the same configuration, only their spatial relations change according to our momentary vantage point. Thus, 'sky' in the context of Elysium has a simultaneous identity as both sky and underworld.⁵²

In applying the Lacanian topology to the underworld map, we are also helped by recent developments in mapping itself, many of which utilize topological rather than topographic concepts of space. Topological space is defined not by the distance between points which characterizes space in its fixed state, but rather by the characteristics it retains in the process of distortion: the relationship between 'nodes'. A simple example of topological mapping is the London Underground map. This is a topological rather than topographic representation because the *relations* between nodes (stations) would remain constant if the map were to be stretched, squeezed, deformed, or rotated.

Many forms of alternative mapping are based on spatial relationships, potential or actual. Corner (1999) discusses four of these—drift, layering, game-board, and rhizome. All of these concern different ways of representing spatial relationships. Of these, layering is perhaps closest to doing the job required for our afterlife topography.⁵³ As Corner describes the technique, 'The layers are not mappings of an existing site or context, but the complexity of the intended programme for the site. In both analysing and synthesizing the enormously complex array of data and technical requirements surrounding the programme for the new park, these mappings also array an enabling geometry. When these separate layers are overlaid together, a stratified amalgam of relationships amongst parts appears.'⁵⁴ No one 'layer' takes priority over any other; they are simultaneously present as a system of projected or potential spatial relations. Further, layers are not just neutral mappings of space but expressions of facets of the culture which provides the context for the map, as well as containing both the past and present of an area, with all its possible future configurations laid out on top. Layered maps evoke archaeological excavations 'as well as the *strata of historical and projective time*'.⁵⁵

This, in fact, is the solution to the problem of Freud's Rome: precisely a way of representing all the strata of space and time

simultaneously present. Just as this model can make sense of psychic topography, so too, for our purposes, it can make sense of afterlife topography. This sort of map enables us to envisage Virgil's underworld as a layered entity consisting simultaneously of *all* the various types of space discussed above. It can also help us to integrate the underworld as a vision of the past, with its function as a projection of the future through prophecy and reincarnation. I suggest that modern paradigms of topological space are worth serious consideration, as giving a good representation of afterlife space. Such space is a geographical paradox: not real, yet containing chorographic features pertaining to the real; internal and external; subjective and objective; up or down depending on one's vantage point; simultaneously past and future.

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anonymous readers of this volume, whose suggestions pushed me towards some more interesting connections. Most of all I would like to thank Chris himself. This paper is a poor attempt to try to present some material in line with his interests.

² Compare the formulation of Oliensis (2009) 129: ‘The psychoanalyst descends into the underworld not just to find but to produce the truth; reaching down from above, as it were, he gives a hand to the repressed thoughts and desires struggling up from below.’ Despite this acute observation, Oliensis’ book is of limited usefulness for the present purpose because it does not explore the underworld as a trope for the unconscious, or (to use a term more consonant with ancient thought) the ‘soul’. Oliensis is more often than not tantalizingly vague. Although she attempts on p. 13 to make a virtue of such vagueness (‘Sometimes fuzziness is more accurate—captures more of reality—than precision’) I think the relative absence of sustained engagement with the psychoanalytic sources themselves, at least until her remarks about Freud’s *Civilization and its Discontents* in the ‘Afterword’, is a flaw.

³ On this Virgilian line and its function in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, see Oliensis (2009) 127; Starobinski (1987).

⁴ Freud (1900) 482–3. The sentence which follows Freud’s quotation of Virgil was apparently added in 1909 (as a kind of gloss to the quotation?): see Starobinski (1987) 275.

⁵ Letter of Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 6 Aug 1899, in J. Strachey, trans. (1954) 290. On this letter see Starobinski (1987) 273. Starobinski does not note the explicit references to katabatic literature in Freud’s description, although he does briefly comment, in relation to the passage from *Civilization and its Discontents* discussed below, ‘The work of analysis is anamnestic and may have been sustained by the model of Virgilian katabasis.’

⁶ On afterlife landscapes as a spatio-temporal construct, a ‘chronotope’, to use the term coined by Bakhtin (1981), see Nightingale (2002). Nightingale applies Bakhtin’s model to Plato’s *Phaedo* only. Gee (forthcoming) intimates how the model might be actuated in a wide range of afterlife texts. For our purpose, the presence of the past (history) crystallized in the underworld or afterlife vision of Virgil’s *Aeneid* might be seen to parallel the role of the past in constructing geographies. Strabo 6.1.2 says, ὁμῶς δὲ τῷ πραγματευομένῳ τὴν τῆς γῆς περίοδον καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα λέγειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν ὑπαρξάντων ἔνια, ‘the man who busies himself with the description (*periodos*) of the earth must needs speak, not only of the facts of the present, but sometimes also of the facts of the past’ (trans. Jones 1917). On this passage, see Dueck (2012) 43.

⁷ Similarly Cosgrove (2001) 6: ‘Images of nature and society are always folded into each other and reach also into individual self-reflection, so that histories of global representation touch the depths of individual unconsciousness.’ Cosgrove’s works are the single most important theoretical influence on my approach to afterlife space.

⁸ Gee (forthcoming).

⁹ Dueck (2012) 33–4 refers to the ‘Augustan atmosphere of unprecedented political and geographical achievement’. On the unique mingling of geography, politics, and literature in the Augustan age, see also the comments of Dueck (2012) 13–15; 116 (on the ‘general geographical awareness of the [Augustan] age’). Note also that Strabo, whose extensive work is unique among geographers, was active under Augustus. It is possible to argue that Virgil’s readers were uniquely sensitized to geographical content.

¹⁰ Briefly on this passage, see Oliensis (2009) 132–6. Oliensis is not interested in the underworld as a location of memory, rather the ‘shared preoccupation’ of the *Aeneid* and *Civilization and its Discontents* with the ‘costs of civilization’ (132). Cf. Gowing (2005) 155–8. Again, Gowing’s concerns are different from mine: he uses

the Freudian passage as an analogy (only) for the way the Republic underlies imperial Latin literature: 'As with Freud's Rome, lurking just below the surface of these texts one glimpses the memory of the Republic at work' (157).

¹¹ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), trans. Strachey (1982) 6–7.

¹² As Oliensis (2009) 134 observes, 'One has to wonder in that case why he included it'. I think Freud was being disingenuous or self-effacing in undermining his own comparison. Disanalogy, as well as analogy, with archaeological strata is key to his image: the point is that in memory (or, we might add, *textual* representation), space is characterized by the simultaneous visibility of more than one stratum.

¹³ All translations of the *Aeneid* are mine.

¹⁴ Jacob (1999) 26.

¹⁵ Lewis and Short, *fauces* II.A.

¹⁶ Virgil's personifications behave like personified *Avaritia* in Cicero, *In Verr.* 2.2.190: *procedite in medium atque explicite descriptionem imaginemque tabularum, ut omnes mortales istius avaritiae non iam vestigia sed ipsa cubilia videre possint*, 'Come into the middle and open up the good copy of the records, so that everyone might see, not just the footprints of his concupiscence (*avaritia*), but even its bed.' In Cicero, the 'records' present a written topography (*descriptio*, a word also used of spatial representation, for instance, of the representation of the universe at *DND* 2.115) in which the imagery (*vestigia, cubilia*) sits.

¹⁷ See Dueck (2012) 7, and cf. 40, for the definition.

¹⁸ Trans. Jones (1917). See Dueck (2012) 75 on this passage in the light of the perceived 'mix of fact and imagination' involved in conceiving of the *oikoumenē*.

¹⁹ Bowersock (1983) 164–7, with the references there cited.

²⁰ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 3.17: *Agrippam quidem in tanta viri diligentia praeterque in hoc opere cura, cum orbem terrarum urbi spectandum propositurus esset, errasse quis credat et cum eo Divum Augustum? is namque complexam eum porticum ex destinatione et commentariis M. Agrippae a sorore eius inchoatam peregit*, 'Who indeed could believe that Agrippa, a man whose great meticulousness was particularly in evidence in the execution of this project, when about to set up the whole earth (*orbis terrarum*) for the perusal of the city (*urbi*), got it wrong, and the Divine Augustus along with him? For it was Augustus who brought to completion in accordance with the proposal and notes of Marcus Agrippa, the Portico that contained it, begun by his sister' (my translation). A good account of the problems involved in defining what the Map of Agrippa actually was is Brodersen in Dueck (2012) 108–9. Some have postulated that it was not a cartography at all, but text (p. 109).

²¹ On the Peutinger Table see Dilke (1985) 112–20, and 210 (with references); Bowersock (1983) 164–86; Albu (2005); Talbert (2010); Brodersen (2012) 104–5. For editions of the Peutinger Table see *Tabula Peutingeriana, Codex Vindobonensis 324, Vollständige Faksimile-Ausgabe im Originalformat* (Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz 1976); Levi and Levi (1967); Bosio (1983).

²² On medieval maps, the Hereford map in particular, see Wiseman (1987); Westrem (2001); Harvey (2006).

²³ Caveat about the *Tabula Peutingeriana* from Brodersen in Dueck (2012) 105, '...as we lack Classical parallels, we cannot draw conclusions about the appearance of the possible ancient exemplar, although it has been plausibly argued that the *Tabula* is a copy of a late Roman map of a similar appearance.' Albu (2005) argues strongly that the Peutinger Table did not have direct Classical models at all, but was rather a creation of the Carolingian period.

²⁴ 'If one grants that the Peutinger Table does not have to follow the work of Ptolemy (and close inspection of the Ptolemaic cartographic tradition makes this

imperative), then there is no alternative to connecting the origin of the Peutinger Table with the maps that were available to Pliny as copies of the Great Map of Agrippa displayed in the Porticus Vipsania', Bowersock (1983) 170. Talbert (2010) 136 is sceptical of this theory ('wishful thinking'); Nicolet (1991) 103 cautious; Dilke (1985) 112 agnostic. Harvey (2006) xvii–xviii on the other hand speaks of 'a fairly accurate Roman map' of the world as surveyed by an imperial authority of the first century BCE. Brodersen in Dueck (2012) 108–9 is cautious; surveying the scholarship, he concludes that 'such wildly incompatible opinions demonstrate the difficulty of imagining a map of the world on display in Augustan Rome. We might even wonder whether there was a map at all, since all ancient references to the display are compatible with the assumption that what Agrippa presented was merely an inscription offering some geographical detail.'

²⁵ Talbert (2010) 102–8.

²⁶ Wiseman (1987).

²⁷ For other expressions of 'likeness' see for instance 30.6, οἷα ἐπὶ λόφου τινός, 'on something like a hill', and τὸ δὲ ἄλσος εἴκειν εἶναι τῆς Περσεφόνης, ἔνθα αἰγέροι καὶ ἰτέαι δόξη τῇ Ὀμήρου πεφύκασιν, 'the grove appears to be that of Persephone, where there grew, in Homer's opinion, poplars and willows'; 30.9, σχῆμα ἔχων, 'having the form of'.

²⁸ So for instance πλησίον, 10.28.5; ἀνωτέρω, 28.7, cf. 29.1 and 31.10; μετὰ δὲ αὐτοῦς, 29.1, and cf. 29.8; ἐπιόντι δὲ ἐφεξῆς τὰ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, 'progressing through the elements of the picture', 29.3, and cf. 30.1 and 30.5; παρ' αὐτὴν, 29.7, ὑπὲρ τούτους, 30.5; ἀποβλέψαντι δὲ αὐθις ἐς τὰ κάτω τῆς γραφῆς, 'looking again to the lower field of the picture', 30.6; εἰ δὲ ἀπίδοις πάλιν ἐς τὸ ἄνω τῆς γραφῆς, 'If you look again to the upper field of the image', 31.1, and so on.

²⁹ Vitruvius 6.2.2 shows that a sophisticated understanding of perspective, even down to the distortion of objects due to the refractive index of water, was available in the first century BCE, if the artist had chosen to use it. That they did not, is a function of the *narrative* purpose of the scene. In support of the first century availability of perspective, a suggestive parallel might be drawn with Cicero's apparent reference to *verbal* perspective in his passage on architectural memory at *Orat.* 2.87.358. Cicero there says that one word may convey the sense of a whole sentence (*unius verbi imagine totius sententiae informatio*), just as a skilled painter can distinguish the position of things in space by modifying their shapes (*pictoris cuiusdam summi ratione et modo formarum varietate locos distinguentis*).

³⁰ On the Nile Mosaic and ancient cartography see Ferrari (1999), Moffitt (1997); on the Nile Mosaic and the intersection between literary and cartographic landscapes (specifically the landscape representation in Varro, *DRR* 1.2.2), see O'Sullivan (2006) 139 and n. 24.

³¹ The present consensus on the date of the Nile Mosaic is that it is earlier rather than later. Older scholarship, such as Dilke (1985) 149, tended to assign a later date, such as the second century CE. Meyboom (1995) 8–19, esp. 19, argues convincingly for the last quarter of the second century BCE (cf. Whitehouse (1976) 4–5 and 79 n. 11 for a similarly early date). For a synopsis of all prior dating proposals, see Meyboom (1995) 217–18 n. 58.

³² Dueck (2012) 66. Dueck continues (66–7), 'In general, in travel descriptions... the linear physical progress of the traveller determined the order of description. Beyond this, the choice of method of survey and the emphases within it were derived from the experience of the author, his literary tendencies and his scholarly background', i.e. a geography of the individual. Cf. Brodersen (2012) 109: 'The pre-modern Greco-Roman world generally managed without maps.'

³³ O'Sullivan (2006) 146 (on Hadrian's villa; but the point applies to earlier houses such as Cicero's Tusculan villa).

³⁴ O'Sullivan (2006) 146.

³⁵ O'Sullivan (2006) 146.

³⁶ Bergmann (1994) 225.

³⁷ Bergmann (1994) is a remarkable exposition of this idea, using the House of the Tragic Poet in Pompeii as an example of how house-design was informed by the memory paradigm.

³⁸ For the designation 'architectural memory system', see Bergmann (1994) 225. The sources are the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (an anonymous work of the 80s BCE) 3.16–24; Cicero *De oratore* 2.86.351–4; Quintilian *Inst.* 11.2.17–22. On these see Yates (1966) 1–5, and Bergmann (1994) 225.

³⁹ On *imagines agentes* as mnemonic devices specified by the ancient sources on memory, see Bergmann (1994) 249; Yates (1966) 10, 18, 23, 25. A more detailed study of *Aeneid* 6 as 'memory-house', an expression of the dominant cultural paradigm of the architectural memory system, could and should be undertaken. I have resisted that temptation here—it is for the future—but I thank the anonymous readers of this volume for comments suggesting this analogy to me.

⁴⁰ The individual exercise of seeing space is, of course, culturally informed; as Dueck (2012) 83 points out, 'the assumption is that certain cultural paradigms create spatial concepts which in turn determine the way a person observes, grasps and describes his environment.' Thus, Roman perceptions of space are articulated predominantly in the form of the *itinerarium*, the linear journey, a uniquely Roman form: see Dueck (2012) 60.

⁴¹ Williams (1964) refers to 'Virgil's two pictures of the underworld' (50), characterizing them, in a way reminiscent of Macrobius, as a katabasis and a 'theology' (51). Other modern accounts of the problem, too numerous to list here, can be exemplified by Austin (1977) in his introductory note ad *Aen.* 6.724–51: 'In the vision that [this passage] presents there is not only no consistency with the underworld of myth, but even Elysium is transformed from the ultimate paradise into a resting-stage on the soul's journeying far beyond it'; and again: 'the Elysium of the underworld has become fused in impalpable atmosphere.'

⁴² For a more detailed account of the significance of this Platonic idea in *Aeneid* 6, see Gee (forthcoming).

⁴³ On this passage see also O'Sullivan (2006) 143. O'Sullivan comments on the intersection of the physical landscape with the landscape of the mind; he does not, however, emphasize, as I do, the outward-rippling spatial expansion of the passage.

⁴⁴ O'Sullivan (2006) 135.

⁴⁵ As in the case of Virgil's allusion to Plato's *Republic* (p. 00 above), the model here is also a Platonic one: for breaking the glass ceiling of the universe, the archetype is Plato, *Phaedrus* 247b6–c2 and 248a1–6 (revelation of the things outside the universe).

⁴⁶ We might think of Aristotle's formulation for the soul as a τόπος εἰδῶν, a 'location for images' (*De anima* 429a27–8): the soul itself is a place where memories and thoughts can be inscribed, like locations on a map. Jacques Lacan (1979) showed, in his study of one of Freud's case-records, that the projection of psychological space can be actual as well as metaphorical: that psychic space can in fact *translate* into topographic space. In the particular instance studied, the individual tried to perform episodes of his *psychic* history in the form of a *physical* journey through space ('fictional' imposed on real space?).

⁴⁷ Blum and Secor (2011) 1032.

⁴⁸ Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis*, quoted here from Freud and Strachey (1986) 17.

⁴⁹ Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis*, 16.

⁵⁰ Freud (1933) 112.

⁵¹ Lacan (1966) 263–4.

⁵² The same could be applied to later maps of ‘Paradise’, which was, as Cosgrove (1999) 20 puts it, ‘a place which was on earth but not of earth, an unseen space for whose existence textual evidence alone was available and whose terrestrial location—which the mapping exercise was designed to determine—was a geographical paradox: simultaneously boundary and centre’. Cosgrove does not himself use the Lacanian paradigm.

⁵³ A good example of layering is the plan of an area of Yokohama by the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas. See Corner (1999) 237 for this image.

⁵⁴ Corner (1999) 225.

⁵⁵ Corner (1999) 237.

Philosophy, Physicians, and Persianic Satire

Shadi Bartsch

1. Satire's Decoction

When Socrates famously declares in *Gorgias* 465c that ‘rhetoric is to justice what cookery is to medicine,’ his purpose is to critique the deceptive counterparts of the arts that truly aim at the good.¹ Cookery (*opsopoiikē*) and rhetoric (*rhētorikē*) are dismissed not only because they are ‘knacks’ rather than true arts, but more significantly because they are forms of flattery (*kolakeia*) and as such partake in falsehood and deception. They pander to people by pleasing their tastes, and fool them into thinking that what they are partaking of is good for them. Despite the pleasure they provide, both these pseudo-arts ultimately corrupt their recipients by catering to their lower senses rather than their higher senses, to appearances rather than truths; although in each case the consumer *thinks* he is making a good choice, in fact he believes so wrongly, and for the constitution of both body and soul this incorrect decision will have damaging consequences. When faced with a chef brandishing a roast leg of pork or a doctor offering a regime of careful abstinence, the unenlightened individual is likely to go for the former, especially if the cook claims to know that pork is good for what ails you. As Socrates sums it up in *Gorgias* 463b, 464d–e:

[Flattery] as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery; which

appears indeed to be an art but, by my account of it, is not an art but a habitude or knack....[Through flattery] cookery assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body; so that if a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, as to which of the two, the doctor or the cook, understands the question of sound and noxious foods, the doctor would starve to death. (trans. W.R.M. Lamb)

Socrates thus offers a direct rebuttal to the real Gorgias' claim, in his *Defence of Helen*, that rhetoric's relationship to the soul was in fact that of medicine to the body (*Helen* 14).²

Plato's philosophical use of the contrast between the pleasure-giving and the healthful components of what the body takes in was a component of Stoic thought as well, unsurprisingly so in a philosophy in which the state of the body is so often a metaphor for the state of the mind.³ Contrasting what pleasures the body to what heals it, Persius' contemporary Seneca often invokes the potentially deadly effects of rich food over against the salutary outcome of simple foods. The illusory lure of a delicious meal can lead to 'indigestion and drunkenness and the other things which kill via pleasure' (*De prov.* 3.2); it may even result in a need for forms of medical intervention that were unnecessary in the good old days (*Ep.* 95.15):

Nec est mirum tunc illam minus negotii habuisse firmis adhuc solidisque corporibus et facili cibo nec per artem voluptatemque corrupto: qui postquam coepit non ad tollendam sed ad inritandam famem quaeri et inventae sunt mille conditurae quibus aviditas excitaretur, quae desiderantibus alimenta erant onera sunt plenius.

It's not surprising that medicine had less to do in the past, when our bodies were still firm and strong, and food was simple and not corrupted by art and pleasure. But when food began to be sought not for the sake of removing, but of stimulating, hunger, and a thousand sauces were invented to excite gluttony, what was nourishment to those who wanted it became a burden to men who were full.

As Christine Richardson-Hay (2009, 84) illustrates, Seneca accordingly condemns cooks such as Apicius for being practitioners of a dangerous 'scientia' of the snack bar and caterers to the tastes of men already corrupted by the desire for what is the rarest and most extravagant of foodstuffs.⁴ On this view, poverty can be a hidden blessing to a man, 'for he is made healthy against his will, and, if he won't take his medicine even when forced, in the meantime at least, while he cannot get what he wants, he is like a man who does not want them' (*Ad Helv.* 10.3).⁵ Seneca's view extends to the common trope that what humans eat can either degrade them to the level of an animal or render them second only to the gods (*Ep.* 60.4). Man's noblest part, he tells us, 'is virtue itself; there is joined to this, useless and perishable

flesh, fit only for the reception of food, as Posidonius says. This divine virtue ends in what is transient, and an inert and drooping animal is fastened onto those parts that are heavenly and worthy of respect' (*Ep.* 92.10).⁶ Food, in short, comes with medical *and* ethical baggage.

The extension of the Platonic analogy to include justice (more generally figured as philosophy) and rhetoric as parallels to medicine and cookery is likewise reproduced in Seneca's writing. Like Plato before him, Seneca declares that the true healer does not need fancy rhetoric, and while an eloquent doctor called in to help does not hurt, his skill in speaking is fundamentally irrelevant to the business at hand (*EM* 75.6–7):

Non quaerit aeger medicum eloquentem, sed si ita competit ut idem ille qui sanare potest compte de iis quae facienda sunt disserat, boni consulat...Quid aures meas scabis? quid oblectas? aliud agitur: urendus, secandus, abstinendus sum. Ad haec adhibitus es; curare debes morbum veterem, gravem, publicum; tantum negotii habes quantum in pestilentia medicus.

A sick man does not look for an eloquent doctor; but if it turns out that the same man who is able to cure him expounds elegantly about what has to be done, the patient will consider it a plus...Why do you give my ears a scratch?⁷ Why do you delight me? Our task is otherwise: I must be cauterized, cut into, or put on a diet. You were summoned for this; you must cure a disease that is chronic, serious, of public import. You have as much work at hand as a doctor has in a plague.

Rhetoric and cookery here reproduce their roles in the *Gorgias*, the former providing false comfort to the man who needs a more serious intervention and offering the *ears* a pleasant scratch when what needs to be cured has nothing to do with the aural. Philosophy, in contrast—here merged with the figure of the stern and cauterizing doctor—is not about pleasure from language; it calls for an intervention in a disease that is even more chronic than indigestion, the disease of human folly.⁸

The Platonic analogy between cookery and medicine that lies at the basis of these comparisons between the welfare of the soul and the body itself calls for a degree of explanation. As Plastira-Valkanou (1998) has noted, the *Gorgias*' treatment of fine cuisine and medical intervention as deceptively similar approaches to the health of the body is not (to us) a self-evident analogy. Unlike the comparison of true and false arts, or the notion that we might not fully know what is best for us, the worry that the cook could put the doctor out of business has little resonance in the modern period, and the apparent interchangeability of these two fields seems odd in our day of antibiotics and injections. And yet it made sense to Plato and Seneca, because in antiquity, generally speaking, most of what was used as medicine *was* food. Indeed, if we want to properly understand the role

that foodstuffs play in Persius' *Satires*, we must understand that ancient food and medicine were located on a spectrum in which they constituted opposite extremes along a single parameter—that of the comestible. From the earliest days of classical medical advice, dietetics was the major approach to healing sickness; accordingly, what was edible—especially cures made from plants and small animals—was the material from which medical treatments were constituted. As Owen Powell has explained (2003, 2–3):

As the ancients saw it, foodstuffs (or many of them) had a dual role—on the one hand as nutriment necessary for life and to provide the wherewithal for growth and reproduction; on the other as a drug (*pharmakon*), or better, pharmacological agent, with an effect, good or bad, upon the physiological processes of the body.

Regular comestibles consumed for the purpose of nourishment simply took up a place in the ancient kitchen that was intermediate between foodstuffs with curative properties and rich and exotic meals that threatened the indulgent with a stewpot of maladies.

There were high stakes attached to understanding these distinctions between the curative, the nourishing, and the dangerous, both in the maintenance and in the restoration of health. Not only the foodstuff but even the amount consumed could make all the difference in whether a given substance was medicine, nutrition, or poison. Democritus is known to have written a treatise on diet, the Pythagoreans were particularly concerned with it, and Hippocrates' treatment and advice was inherited and debated by the Greek and Roman physicians and polymaths of Persius' time as well, especially Pliny the Elder, Celsus, and (slightly later) Galen. Medically speaking, what had to be figured out by the doctor each time he was presented with a sickness and once the diagnosis had been made, was: what sort of curative foodstuff should be prescribed? What quantity should be given to the patient (different people having different reactions and different tolerances)? And, very importantly, how was it to be prepared so that it was in fact no longer food but medicine?⁹ For these physicians, so close were the contents and methodologies of cooking to those of medicine that Galen would call the former 'the physician's assistant' (Galen *De sanitate tuenda* 2.11 = 6.155–6K). In short, Plato's use of the medicine-cookery analogy was a distinction between two forms of consumption (one curative, one damaging) that were similar enough that the physician *could* be said to risk losing his position to the cook.

Two caveats need to be added to this general picture of the ancient overlap between food and medicine. First, what is defined as edible in Pliny, Celsus, and Galen covers a wider variety of materials than what

we would strictly call food. Galen's definition covers marijuana and poppy seeds, and many of the healing draughts in Pliny's recipes are outright repellent.¹⁰ Second, ancient doctors did have an awareness of the distinction between food-as-medicine and the inedible-as-medicine (the latter usually known as *medicamentum*).¹¹ Celsus addresses this distinction in the proem to Book 5 of *De medicina*, pointing out that some doctors refuse to use *medicamenta* because they are believed to damage the stomach—though he himself finds them useful. The medicines Celsus then goes on to discuss include not only ores, metals, minerals, and resins, but are also combined with some of the edible foodstuffs he lists elsewhere: we find, mixed or alone, such items as leeks and honey, wine and lentils, suggesting that even these distinctions are somewhat malleable. Unlike the dietetic cures, however, most *medicamenta* were toxic and had to be handled with care; indeed, the online editor of the *De medicina* finds Celsus' prescriptions alarming enough that he has put a medical disclaimer on his website.¹²

Ores and metals aside, most often an ancient Roman who had fallen prey to some disease—including the ones Persius displays for us in the pages of the *Satires*—would turn to remedies based on the special preparation of materials familiar in ordinary culinary practice. The extravagant cooked meals of these satires carry an ethically negative charge; used metaphorically to signify the flattering language of both poets and listeners, they inevitably recall Plato's critique of pandering language as 'cookery.' Accordingly, when Persius blasts the host of a rich meal who hopes for praise for his poetry, he links such cookery to the false praise it generates (*Sat.* 1.53–5):

Callidum scis ponere sumen,
scis comitem horridulum trita donare lacerna,
et 'verum' inquis 'amo: verum mihi dicite de me.'

You know how to serve a hot sow's paunch,
you know how to present a shivering retainer with a worn-out cloak,
and then you say 'I love the truth; tell me the truth about myself.'

Yet to counter such cookery, Persius does not urge us to seek the cure of 'medicine' from afar in some pharmacologist's stash, nor does he even set up a contrast between bad poetry as food and good poetry as *not* food. Instead he impresses upon us the need for the right *kind* of poetic food, the kind opposed to all that reeks of piggy meat. If over-rich dishes serve as satiric metaphors for a certain kind of literature, Persius imports another kind of culinary metapoetics to come to the rescue, for in exporting the cook, he does not need to exile all foodstuff altogether. Moreover, he links this *curative* culinary

metapoetics to the style and content of his own *Satires*. Perhaps surprisingly, given the history of *satura* as a sausage-laden smorgasbord, it turns out that the poetry with the right characteristics to cure what ails us lies in our hands as we read his non-fleshy corpus.

What then are the traits of this Persianic regime of poetry as Persius himself describes it?¹³ We will not be surprised, perhaps, to find that it is characterized as simple, vegetarian, and indifferent to gustatory pleasure. To be sure, not all of its characteristics have to do with the culinary; for example, his work attracts no favourable audience (*Sat.* 1.1–11), avoids grace and smoothness (*‘decor et iunctura’*, *Sat.* 1.92), and is not afraid to state the biting truth (*Sat.* 1.107). It makes assaults on men’s ears, steaming them clean with its penetrative content (*Sat.* 1.126). And it is didactic, offering instruction in self-knowledge rather than providing a frisson for decadent readers (*Sat.* 3.66–76, 4.51–2). But when we do turn to culinary adjectives, we find that unlike the frothy blather and cauldronfuls of flesh produced by his peers, Persius’ verse offers a strict diet indeed. It is analogized to raw vegetables such as beets (*Sat.* 3.112, 114) and to vegetarian fare in general; it is nowhere described as giving pleasure or providing satiety; and in Persius’ strangest adjective, one straight from the kitchen *or* the pharmacy, it is *decoctum*, boiled down to a residue, or rather, as Persius puts it, *decoctius*, *more* boiled down to a residue than anything else available.¹⁴

The context of this word *decoctius* is worth consideration. When Persius turns to compare his own poetry to that of the comic playwrights of classical Athens, Cratinus, Eupolis, and Aristophanes, he applauds their outspokenness and their willingness to alienate their audience, a quality Horace shrinks from.¹⁵ His own poetry, however, is somehow still more effective (*Sat.* 1.123–6):

audaci quicumque adflate Cratino
iratum Eupolidem praegrandi cum sene palles,
aspice et haec, si forte aliquid decoctius audis. 125
inde uaporata lector mihi ferueat aure.

Whoever you are who feel bold Cratinus’ inspiration
and grow pale as you hear angry Eupolis and the great old man [sc.
Aristophanes],
look at my lines too, in case you can hear anything more boiled-
down.

From these lines let my reader seethe with a steamed-out ear.

Persius thus characterizes his own verse as more ‘boiled-down’ than any blanching attacks the Attic comedians could make.¹⁶ But how does this quality assist the satirist in impacting his audience? The term

has sometimes been taken as a reference to the *density* of Persius' poetry; Bramble, for example, writes that '*decoquere* describes the refined density of Persius' manner, the opposite of the undigested style...of his opponents' (1974) 139; Cucchiarelli (2012) 177–8 expands on this by pointing to the Callimachean aesthetics underpinning a programme of compression, while Gowers (1994) 140 suggests that Persius' six satires, the entirety of his corpus, represent a boiling-down of Horace's more voluminous work.¹⁷ Keane (2012) 88 appropriately links the term back to the kitchen, suggesting that '*decoctius* also nicely represents the way the *Satires* pack such a large amount of gastronomic imagery into a small space'.¹⁸ In short, Persius' verse is dense, a brew tightly packed with strong and occasionally assaultive imagery, perhaps more outré than the comedians themselves.

All of this is unassailable. *Decoctus*, however, is above all a medical term,¹⁹ referring most often to the ubiquitous Roman practice of boiling things down to medical strength: that is, the making of medicine out of food. Indeed, a jaunt through the approximately 580 uses of the term *decoctus* in Pliny the Elder's *Naturalis Historia* and the seventy or so uses in the eight books of Celsus' *De medicina* (both first-century texts) shows that the boiling-down of foodstuffs such as radishes and lentils and of herbs such as hyssop, vervain, or linseed into various kinds of *decocta* was particularly common as a way of making medicine out of regular comestibles. To decoct was, in short, a well-known procedure for transforming the alimentary into the medicinal.²⁰ Of course, not *all* decocted substances were medicine; not *all* decocted medicines were from foodstuffs; and finally, not *all decocta* were consumed. For example, as Korzeniewski (1970) 426–7 has shown, Persius' *decoctius* at *Sat.* 1.125 probably refers to a poultice or plaster applied to the skin; the ear of line 126 is thus 'steamed-out' because a hot plaster has been applied to it.²¹ And indeed, the adjective is used liberally in the medical texts to describe how one *makes* such a plaster (the plaster itself being a *kataplasma* or an *emplastrum*), and Pliny suggests various plaster-decoctions for earache in a number of places in the *Natural History*: a decoction of capers, at *NH* 20.59.167; of sow thistles, *NH* 22.44.90; of the mysterious plant brya, *NH* 24.42.71–2—though it is not clear these are all applied when hot and thus able to steam-out ears.²² As a clearer example of his argument, the steam from decocted absinthe is said to cure ear problems when applied (*NH* 27.28.50).

However, given that Persius' concerns are more often alimentary rather than aural, in his suggestion that his verse will provide us with 'aliquid decoctius' we must also hear all the other places in the *Satires* in which his poetry is indeed alimentary, and not only edible but also

bitter, condensed, and unpleasant—like Lucretius’ famous wormwood without the honeyed cup. So it is not surprising to see that many of the medical *decocta* we come across in Pliny and Celsus are not only made out of foodstuffs but also prescribed for internal consumption. The array is dazzling—and frankly bizarre; the various problems that ailed the Romans of the first century CE apparently called for some very strange boilings-down. For example, chowing down a decocted lizard cures dysentery (*NH* 30.19.55), as does a dosage of decocted chicks in their eggs (*NH* 29.11.45); a decocted wood-pigeon dissipates flatulence (*NH* 30.20.61), decocted snails break up stones in the bladder (*NH* 30.21.66), and decocted tortoise flesh is a remedy (when eaten, it seems, but it is hard to tell) for pus in the ears (*NH* 32.14.37). Such potions are to be found across the board of medical prescriptions, even for what we would consider issues of mental health: an enema of decocted vervain is recommended for madness (Celsus 3.18.8), a draught of decocted rue for a sort of acedia (3.20.4).

Given Persius’ obsession with the digestive tract and its ailments, it is worth remarking that many of these decocted remedies—about 120 of those in the *Naturalis Historia*, and a cluster in *De medicina* 4.12–26—are particularly recommended for maladies of the stomach and intestinal tract, especially indigestion, stomach pain, and various forms of dysentery. In Pliny, such maladies can be eased or cured by the consumption of decoctions of pine bark, radishes, chicory, rue, anise, poppy, sorrel, mallow, fennel, apples, pomegranate, pears, figs, carob, acorns, fenugreek, deer’s rennet, goat’s blood, honey in which bees have died, frogs, and more; in Celsus, relief comes from decocted rue, hyssop, bramble-tops, dates, and quinces (also decocted vervain—but one must sit in it, not drink it!). It seems one cures the stomach by decoction, just as one makes it ill with fancy cookery. And the medical utility of decoction for gastric distress must nowhere be more called for than in Persius’ decocted verse, applied as a curative to all those who have listened too long to tales of Thyestes and his kind. If the perversion of proper digestion is what Persius laments in *Satires* 1 and 5, it is clear that where concoction goes astray, decoction (we might say) steps in. The satires seem to represent themselves a sort of stomach-cauldron that boils down froth into density, transforming unpalatable foodstuffs into the medically beneficial. Like Plato five centuries earlier, then, Persius is making the jump from cookery proper to ‘medicine’ and its own constituent food stuffs.²³ In his own words, his satires are a decoction whose effect upon their audience is boldly claimed to be curative.²⁴

If we are to think of the satires as *aliquid decoctius* and as such having a not-so-tasty medicinal force, we must also accept that Persius is deliberately setting himself apart from his most influential

predecessor, Horace. In *Satire* 1.1.24–6, Horace identifies his work not so much by analogy to overstuffed plates or boiled-down potions as to simple snacks:

Quamquam ridentem dicere verum
quid vetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi
doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima:

What's to stop one from speaking the truth
while laughing? It is just like when coaxing teachers sometimes
give pastries to boys so that they'll learn their ABCs.

The wheedling teacher, here, is a figure for Horace; his work, harmless *crustula* with edifying content to be offered to his audience.²⁵ Horace's modest bribe at the opening to his book of satires is a long way from his images elsewhere of overblown excess that typify men whose urges break normative bounds, whether it is Stertinus' gourmands in *Satire* 2.2 or Nasidienus and his feast in *Satire* 2.8, and as such it is hardly to be classified as a damning concession to the tastes of his readers. It is also a far cry from Lucretius' bribe of sweet honey of verse to coat his rebarbative philosophical truths. But there is no parallel to Horace's friendly tidbit in Persius' satires, which proudly trumpet their absolute refusal to offer the reader anything sweet on their Stoic plate. Like Celsus (*De med.* 2.25.1), Persius seems to feel that anything which is too sweet is bad for digestion; indeed, it runs the same risk as cookery runs with respect to medicine. More of it is consumed precisely because it tastes so good, even as the foodstuff itself—and over-indulgence in it—lead to deleterious effects on one's health.²⁶

2. The Philosopher's Plate

As a metaphor for the remedial qualities of the *Satires*, decoction does not stand alone. Persius' verse is not only analogized to a boiled-down and medicinal foodstuff with curative powers, a reduction of satire's traditional association with *satura* to what is pungent, medical, and unappetizing (if good for you). It is also figured as a food in its own right, a healthy collection of appropriate comestibles to be categorized under 'nourishment' rather than 'medicine'. If Persius' poetic targets were contaminated with meatstuffs, we see in contrast that his *Satires* claim to be offering simple and meat-free food—the same kind of

food, in fact, that the Stoics who appear in his pages themselves consume. The *Satires*' allegiance is to the modest meals of the philosophers, the humble beans and legumes on which Cornutus and Stoic students subsist, the vegetarian diet that for the Romans symbolized the simple, old-fashioned way of life.²⁷ So, for example, when Persius describes in *Satire* 3 the students who stay up all night learning Stoic doctrine, he makes a point of telling us they subsist on pulses (i.e. chickpeas, lentils, and beans) and barley ('siliquis et grandi...polenta', *Sat.* 3.55); there is no sow's paunch here.²⁸ Nor do Persius himself, or his teacher Cornutus, dine on anything different; their culinary loyalty is with these sleepless students of philosophy. Exactly like the Stoic scholars, Persius' teacher is said to stay up late into the night, distributing to his students a salutary vegetarian meal of Stoic philosophizing (5.62–5); as Persius says to him,

at te nocturnis iuuat inpallescere chartis;
cultor enim iuuenum purgatas inseris aures
fruge Cleanthea. petite hinc, puerique senesque,
finem animo certum miserisque uiatica canis.
But it pleases you to grow pale over your nocturnal papers;
a farmer, you sow the weeded ears of the young
with Cleanthean pulse. Seek from here, boys and old men,
a set limit for your mind and provisions for your wretched grey hairs.

The ears we see here play a special part in Persius' corpus, taking in both words and food, providing receptive entryways for sexual frissons and tasty tidbits, *or* for the good teachings of philosophy. They stand for the audience's willingness—or not—to be cured; as with Seneca's refusal to have his ears pleasantly scratched or itched, Persius disdains aural pleasure in favour of a more stringent approach.²⁹ For the ears are the pathway to the mind, and Persius echoes in his language the famous Platonic metaphor of the *Phaedrus* in which the lasting impact of dialectic is contrasted to the dead letter of any written document that claims to teach.³⁰ Socrates in that dialogue praised the use of dialectic to 'plant and sow in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them...and which make their possessor happy' (*Phaed.* 276e–277a, trans. H. N. Fowler);³¹ similarly, the Stoic philosopher here 'sows' the seeds of wisdom, as Cornutus the farmer-philosopher plants permanently in his student's ears the philosopher's habitual *frux*. Opened up by the steam of Persius' decocted verse, their ears and ours await this salubrious planting.³²

As with the Stoic *frux*, vegetables are presented as a food morally superior to meat throughout the *Satires*. As Dan Hooley (2012) 338

nicely sums it up, ‘Persius is rough veg for the system, full of purgative imagery: clean the ears, chew down the scratchy stuff, clear out the mind’.³³ The satirist mocks those accustomed to easy living and soft food who can’t even get a raw beet down their ulcerated throats—the result of too much dissipation (*Sat.* 3.111–14):

positum est argente catino
durum holus et populi cribro decussa farina:
temptemus fauces; tenero latet ulcus in ore
putre quod haut deceat plebeia radere beta.

A hard vegetable
is served on a cold dish, and flour sifted in a common sieve:
let us try out your jaws: a rotting ulcer hides in your tender
mouth, of the sort that (no doubt) a plebeian beet shouldn’t scrape

The jaws of this individual, ulcerated by his diet of fine spreads (*pulmentaria*, 3.102), represent the general ill-health that later contributes to his death in the bathhouse; it seems the challenge of this humble vegetarian foodstuff proves too much for him. In addition, while any ‘hard vegetable’ would presumably be difficult to swallow with an ulcerated throat, Persius’ mention of the beet has special significance. This vegetable was not only served as simple rustic fare, but was specifically prescribed for stomach problems caused by an excess of rich food because of its purgative side effects. In the third book of Apicius’ *De Re Coquinaria* (*The Art of Cooking*) beet-dishes are twice recommended as a laxative (3.2.67, 69), and Apicius is in accord with the medical advice of both Galen and Pliny (*On the Properties of Foodstuffs* K6.630 = Powell 101–2; *NH* 26.58.6, 28.209.7). That even the epigrammatist Martial notes this use of the vegetable in *Epig.* 3.47.9 (‘Pigroque ventri non inutiles betas’) suggests that its utility was not particularly abstruse as medical lore.³⁴ And though it may seem incredible to suggest that Persius is concerned with the constipating effects of rich meaty food (and hence with laxative relief) even as a *metaphor* (this is poetry?), such doubts should be allayed by his observation, in *Satire* 2, that even Jupiter is ‘delayed’ by the huge dishes and greasy sausages that his supplicants consume (*Sat.* 2.42–3). All that is missing is the suggestion that the Olympian should find himself some beets. In short, the beets are not only morally commendable because of their affiliation with a simple diet; they also approach the *decocta* in helping the digestive process and eliminating the food already in the belly.³⁵

The raw beets of *Satire* 3 have yet another salutary effect: they scrape (*radere*) the throat.³⁶ This scraping is figured as a painfully abrasive way of getting rid of diseased morals, just as in the medical

literature it is consistently recommended as a form of debridement to get rid of diseased flesh or bone. And the *Satires*, too, are supposed to ‘scrape’ their readers. When, in *Satire* 1, the satirist comments of his degenerate audience, ‘What’s the use of scraping tender little ears with the biting truth?’ (‘sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere uero | auriculas?’ *Sat.* 1.107–8) or, in *Satire* 5, praises Cornutus for knowing how to ‘scrape away pallid mores’ (‘pallentis radere mores/ doctus,’ *Sat.* 5.15–16), his point is that both his poetry and Cornutus’ Stoicism perform a parallel function to the coarse beet the ulcerous man would be swallowing were he not so far corrupted with the pleasures of cookery. Moreover, the beet-poetry-philosophy of the *Satires*, inasmuch as its action is to *radere*, itself imitates the common surgical procedure recommended in Celsus and other medical texts for removing various forms of corrupt matter from the healthy part of the body: for example, for debriding diseased bone and cartilage (Celsus 8.2.2); cleaning wounds (5.26.35B); (8.2); pulling teeth (7.12.1) and getting rid of caries (6.13.4); for tonsillectomy (7.12.2) and (ouch) reducing eye inflammation (6.6.27). Even scraping the head seems to have a salutary effect on lethargy (Celsus 5.28.14). The scraping beets of *Satire* 3, then, stand for Persius’ poetry—even as he wonders if it is worth inflicting it on us—and for Stoic wisdom; they are meant to figuratively scrape away our diseased softness, our pallid mores.

To return to our vegetarian concerns, when Persius, in his description of his lifestyle with Cornutus in *Satire* 5, takes the time to spell out what they eat and when, this passage sets itself off from the gory imagery of its opening in deliberately contrasting the simple meals of the philosopher and satirist to the hellish meat of the poet and actor: what the former ‘consume’ are not dubious stews, but long days, while the nights are spent in philosophical conversation accompanied by modest food (*Sat.* 5.41–4):

tecum etenim longos memini consumere soles
et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes.
unum opus et requiem pariter disponimus ambo
atque uerecunda laxamus seria mensa.

I remember I consumed long days with you,
and with you I enjoyed the evenings with feasts.
The two of us set in order our work and our respite together
and we ease our serious business with a modest meal.

This ‘uerecunda mensa,’ modest meal, is (like its synonyms *brevis mensa* or *tenuis mensa*) a meal without meat. Indeed the language of this reminiscence is laden with references to what is *not* happening at the Stoic dinner table. If *Satire* 5 started with Cornutus’ injunction not

to be the kind of poet who would ‘set Procne’s stewpot a-boil, or that of Thyestes’, Persius has listened to his teacher: neither his verse nor his plate is gorged with meat—not to mention human flesh. What Persius ‘consumes’ here is not flesh but abstract time. Likewise, when the satirist says he ‘enjoyed’ the evening, it is hard not to hear the primary meaning of the verb, to tear apart. *Decerpo* can denote the action of plucking fruit off trees, but it is also the verb Seneca uses to describe what will happen to Thyestes’ children at the opening of his *Thyestes* (58–62):³⁷ as the Fury asks,

nondum Thyestes liberos deflet suos?
et quando tollet? ignibus iam subditis
spument aena, membra per partes eant 60
discerpta, patrios polluat sanguis focos,
epulae instruantur.
Why is Thyestes not yet sobbing for his sons?
When will the uncle raise his hand? Let the cauldrons bubble,
their fires lit, let the arms and thighs be hacked away,
partitioned (*discerpta*), and put in. Let blood discolour the family
hearth,
and the dinner-party start.

Persius’ *decerpo*, far from Seneca’s *Thyestes* and his own Thyestean pot, simultaneously echoes and negates its flesh-laden shadow, sticking to the realm of the orchard and the field rather than the cauldron.³⁸

Finally, the ethically superior nature of vegetarian produce to meat is a theme of *Satire* 2 as well as *Satire* 5; here the men who sacrifice animal flesh to the gods are depicted as fools if they think gods care for meat (2.29–30, 45–50).

rem struere exoptas caeso boue Mercuriumque⁴⁵
arcessis fibra: ‘da fortunare Penatis,
da pecus et gregibus fetum.’ quo, pessime, pacto,
tot tibi cum in flamma iunicum omenta liquescant?
et tamen hic extis et opimo uincere ferto
intendit.⁵⁰

You hope to build up your wealth by slaughtering your oxen,
and you summon Mercury with the entrails: ‘Let my Penates prosper,
grant me cattle and offspring for my herds.’ How can they, you
wretch,
when the fat of so many of your bullocks are melting in the flames?
And yet the man keeps trying to win his goal with guts and rich
cakes.

Not only do these worshippers destroy their herds and flocks by making such sacrifices even as they pray to the gods to increase them, but they project onto the gods a desire for the same kind of meaty food that they, the mortals, value; they think (erroneously) that they can win the ear of Jupiter with a dish of lungs and greasy tripe (2.30, ‘pulmone et lactibus unctis’).³⁹ Their misguided view of the world and the gods leads directly to their implication in a meat-and-guts world even as it turns them figuratively into meat-and-guts themselves: as Persius utters deplorably (*Sat.* 2.61–3),

O curvae in terris animae et caelestium inanes
quid iuuat hoc, templis nostros inmittere mores
et bona dis ex hac scelerata ducere pulpa?
O souls bent to the earth and devoid of the divine!
What does it help to import our habits into the temples
and to infer what’s good for the gods from this wicked flesh?

As I am not the first to observe, ‘pulpa’, the word used here for human flesh is a curious import indeed, but few have grasped its original context. Keane (2006, 59) has suggested it refers to animal meat used for sacrifice. However, though a comparatively rare word in Latin, it crops up most often in Apicius’ cookbook *De Re Coquinaria* in reference to the cooking and consumption of meat or fish dishes, where it can mean any food beaten into a pulp but is most often used of meat such as sausage stuffing (*insicia*), chicken brains, offal, and even sow’s belly.⁴⁰ Thus, our ignorant farmer who sacrifices animal meat and guts to the gods ends up on the level of an edible offering himself.

Now, the satirist’s ethically correct vegetarian meal is not an entirely novel development in Roman satire—even though, as usual, Persius takes his inheritance one step further by actually assimilating his own poetry to lowly vegetarian fare, and then hitching this meal to the wagon of Stoic philosophy. Horace likewise treated simple food as a morally charged concept (cf. *Sat.* 2.2.117); both he and Lucilius, he claims, had a vegetable diet (*Sat.* 2.1.73–4, *Sat.* 1.6.115), and the bulk of *Satire* 2.2 is devoted to the peasant Ofellus’ denunciation of decadent food.⁴¹ In Persius, however, the correct diet is not just a matter of ‘quid deceat’ (Hor. *Ep.* 1.6.61), but a characteristic of the good Stoic philosopher in particular; it is as closely linked to philosophy as to propriety. As Gowers aptly comments, ‘Unlike Horace’s sunny Epicureanism, Stoicism is an uphill struggle, a goal with a strict regimen attached: sleepless nights, a morbid pallor, and stodgy meals. Horace’s *securum holus* (safe vegetables) is no *durum holus* (hard vegetables), the Stoic’s diet of unappetizing beets and

heavy lentils' (1993, 181). So too the Stoic Seneca writes at length in his ninety-fifth letter on the moral failings of those Romans who stuff themselves with luxury foods and yet are never sated. Indeed, like Persius, he traces a veritable laundry-list of diseases back to the problem of too much rich food (*Ep.* 95.16–17):

Inde pallor et nervorum vino madentium tremor et miserabilior ex cruditatibus quam ex fame macies; inde incerti labantium pedes et semper qualis in ipsa ebrietate titubatio; inde in totam cutem umor admissus distentusque venter dum male adsuescit plus capere quam poterat; inde suffusio luridae bilis et decolor vultus tabesque in se putrescentium et retorridi digiti articulis obrigescentibus nervorumque sine sensu iacentium torpor aut palpitatio [corporum] sine intermissione vibrantium. Quid capitis vertigines dicam? quid oculorum auriumque tormenta et cerebri exaestuantis verminationes et omnia per quae exoneramur internis ulceribus adfecta? Innumerabilia praeterea febrium genera, aliarum impetu saevientium, aliarum tenui peste repentium, aliarum cum horrore et multa membrorum quassatione venientium?

From this came pallor, and the trembling of muscles drenched in wine, and emaciation from indigestion worse than that from hunger. From this came the unsteady steps of tottering men and always a staggering like in drunkenness itself; from this came dropsy throughout all the skin, and a distended belly that isn't used to taking in more than it can hold; from this a spreading of yellow bile and a maculated face and the rot of bodies decaying inwardly and fingers gnarly with their stiffening joints and an inertia of muscles lying there without sensation or spasming without relief. Why mention dizziness in the head? Or agony in the eyes and ears and itchiness in one's fevered brain and the affliction of the parts we use for defecation with ulcers? And innumerable sorts of fevers besides.

Here as in Persius, overeating leads to the all too physical diseases of indigestion, dropsy, yellow bile, fevers, and ulcers.⁴² Seneca's repeated descriptions of the excesses of human consumption are born out of a philosophical injunction against self-indulgence that in Persius supplies both literal and metaphorical fodder for his poetry.⁴³ For both authors, in Richardson-Hay's words (2009, 96), 'The question of whether to eat or not to eat is code for moral purpose, ethical perception, interpretation, rational capability, and personal fortitude. Gastronomic description and images of food are...information about the actions of an individual in the service of his Self, his integrity, happiness, and self-sufficiency.'⁴⁴

It is one thing, however, to use 'gastronomic description and images of food' to supply moral evaluation of an individual or an age of decline—as Persius' predecessors in satire have done—and another, to suggest that the very medium of such images—the text itself—is a comestible. Needless to say the pages of the *Satires* are not meant to be literally eaten by their readers, despite their metaphorical self-representation as a vegetable dish or their claim that they have been

decocted for our consumption. They are only meant to be digested in the metaphorical sense;⁴⁵ the *Satires* link their curative claims to the rest of their content by dint of the lecturing and philosophizing on common Stoic truths in which Persius engages. As he hectors us, he is not unlike the Stoic figures gently sent up in Horace's own *Satires*, but here in deadly serious mode. It is self-evident that his denunciations of human greed, the urgent call for us to know ourselves, prescriptions for appropriate prayer, the description of what true freedom is, and even the chastising of imaginary interlocutors echo the most basic injunctions of Roman Stoic philosophizing. Just as a Seneca can believe that moral improvement attends upon our reading philosophically sound texts, so too the moralizing of the *Satires* is meant to cure us of the common misperceptions that ail us, and to lead us to a correct understanding of our place in the world.

3. Madness, Bile, and Hellebore

Given Persius' use of the digestive process and its difficulties as a central metaphor in his satires, we will not be surprised to see one of the known by-products of digestion, bile, feature prominently among the volatile protagonists of his pages. For bile was thought to be both an outcome of the digestive process, and a potentially disruptive force in mental self-possession. According to the ancient humorists (among them, Hippocrates and his school, Galen, and Aretaeus), the four humours yellow bile, black bile, blood, and phlegm were produced by the digestive activity of the liver.⁴⁶ If present in unbalanced quantities rather than in a harmonious blend—the result of incorrect diet—they could have a negative effect on both mental and physical well-being.⁴⁷ Even in popular belief, and among physicians not dependent on the theory of the humours, such as Celsus, an excess of black bile in particular (cf. the English *melancholy*) was thought to lead to episodes of melancholy, rage, and insanity.⁴⁸ Hippocrates writes in his *Treatise on Epilepsy* that black bile is the cause of dark passions, such as suspicious, jealousy, hatred, and revenge; Galen, who devotes a whole treatise to the humours, believed that too much black bile in the stomach caused melancholic insanity (*On the Affected Parts* 3.9–10 = K177–8); Pliny opines that 'in black bile is the cause of human insanity' ('in felle nigro insaniae causa hominis,' *NH* 11.75.193). Among non-medical authors, the same connection between black bile and mental disease obtains: Vergil's

Hercules goes nuts with rage from ‘atro felle’ (*Aen.* 8.219–20); in Plautus’ *Amphitruo*, Sosia is accused of having too much black bile and hence being insane (*Amph.* 727–8); likewise in the *Captivi* Aristophontes’ wrath and apparent delirium are attributed to ‘atra bilis’ (*Capt.* 596–8). As Aristo is made to remark of a madman in Seneca’s letters, ‘his black bile must be attended to, and the very cause of his furor thus removed’ (‘bilis nigra curanda est, et ipsa furoris causa removenda’, *Sen. Ep.* 94.17).⁴⁹

This connection between excess bile and surges of rage or insanity is repeatedly asserted in Persius’ *Satires*. When, in *Satire* 3, a lazy young writer (taken by some to be the poetic persona himself) roused from his bed complains that his pen and his paper are not up to snuff, his unhealthy state of mind and angry outburst at a dawdling servant are put down to the black bile in his system: “‘Somebody get here, on the double! | What, no one?’” His glassy bile swells up: | ‘I’m bursting!’” (“ocius adsit | huc aliquis! Nemon?” Turgescit vitrea bilis: | “findor”).⁵⁰ The angry mob of *Satire* 4 is likewise seething with ‘plebecula bile’ (*Sat.* 4.6), and when the greedy merchant of *Satire* 5 does not realize that his desire for profit is a form of madness, *Luxuria* denounces his efforts by asking him: ‘Where are you rushing off to now, you madman? Where? | What do you want? Masculine bile | has swelled in your hot chest, which an urn of cold hemlock could not extinguish’ (‘Quo deinde, insane, ruis? Quo? | quid tibi vis? Calido sub pectore mascula bilis | intumuit, quod non extinxerit urna cicutae,’ *Sat.* 5.143–5). Even the young heir of *Satire* 2 is destined for a premature end, scabby as he is and swelling with ‘bitter bile’ (*Sat.* 2.13–14), signs of an intestinal system gone badly wrong.

If a number of Persius’ protagonists are not only just plain mad, but mad due to an excess of bile, what is available to cure them? We have already seen that the satirist’s plate holds decoctions of various sorts, pulse and vegetables, and even the occasional hard beet, but none of these are indicated for madness in antiquity. Another remedy is called for and appears in his pages, and once again its metaphorical valence extends far beyond the simple question of how to cure a bout of ill temper. This is the medication made from the dangerous plant hellebore, whose roots were known to be highly toxic in the wrong doses: a misapplication of the *so-genannt* remedy, and the patient would die.⁵¹ Despite these dangers, however, ancient physicians prescribed hellebore (both white and black) for the treatment of a broad spectrum of diseases; most importantly for our purposes, insanity, but also gout (identifiable by the hot red swelling of the affected part), paralysis, and ‘epilepsy, vertigo, melancholy, insanity, delirium, elephantiasis, leprosy, tetanus, palsy, gout, dropsy, incipient tympanitis, stomachic affections, grinning spasms, sciatica, quartan

fevers which won't cease otherwise, chronic coughs, flatulence, and returning colic in the bowels' (Pliny *NH* 25.24.60, speaking of white hellebore).⁵²

From Hippocrates onwards, however, it was the various forms of insanity for which both white and black hellebore were most commonly indicated, with different physicians observing different distinctions among the kinds of madness and the efficacy of the white vs. the black varieties of the plant.⁵³ Celsus, for example, writes that 'black hellebore root is given either to those with black bile and to those suffering from insanity with melancholy, or to those who have their sinews in some part paralyzed' (*De med.* 2.12.1, trans. W.G. Spencer; cf. 3.18.17). Elsewhere he takes pains to distinguish between three different kinds of insanity (phrenesis, melancholia, and hallucinations), and recommends white hellebore for the second, white or black for the third depending on the nature of the hallucinations (3.18, 20). The mechanism of the cure seems to have been simply the elimination of the excess of bile from the body: since white hellebore was largely emetic in its effect, and black violently laxative, both kinds were felt to achieve their effects through purging the problematic element (Galen *De aliment. fac.* = K6.467, Seneca *EM* 83.27, Pliny *NH* 25.21.51).⁵⁴ As such, hellebore bears a certain resemblance to some of the other substances to which Persius assimilates his verse, such as the stomach-loosening beet.

Outside the medical sphere, reference to hellebore was mostly made idiomatically; saying that someone needed hellebore simply became an expressive way of saying 'so-and-so is nuts'.⁵⁵ Importantly for us, however, philosophers invoked hellebore as a convenient parallel to the mentally beneficial effects of philosophy, the one curing insanity brought on by black bile, the other curing the human ailment of the wrong understanding of the world.⁵⁶ Indeed, since the Stoics held the paradoxical doctrine that only the wise man was truly sane, i.e. had the correct view of what was valuable and important in life, they could rhetorically claim that hellebore was a remedy much in need for *all* men, to cure their all too human madness. Seneca opines that just as hellebore cures those who are insane for physiological reasons, so too philosophy can cure 'the insanity of people in general' (*Ep.* 94.17 *et passim*),⁵⁷ and likewise in the mouth of Horace's Stertinius, a fervent convert to Stoicism, the notion of curing misguided souls—such as the greedy—through philosophy calls for 'all of Anticyra' (traditionally the site of the best hellebore plants; *Sat.* 2.3.82).⁵⁸ As an extreme example, Antisthenes the Cynic recommended hellebore as a cure for *pleasure*, which he claimed was a form of madness worse than madness itself (DL. 6.3., Stobaeus *Eclogue* 3, 285.13–16 Hense; cf. Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.206).

Finally, hellebore was also believed to have a salutary effect upon the mind when used by the *sane*.⁵⁹ It could apparently be taken to hone one's intellectual acumen: as Pliny goes on to note, 'numbers of studious men are in the habit of taking it for the purpose of sharpening the intellectual powers required by their literary investigations' (*NH* 25.21.51). According to Valerius Maximus, the sceptic philosopher Carneades purged himself with hellebore when about to engage in argument with Chrysippus, 'in order to express his arguments more accurately and refute the other's more pointedly (*acrius*)' (Val. Max. 8.7, ext. 5).⁶⁰ Petronius reverses this story, saying that it was the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus who 'purged his mind three times with hellebore in order to find good arguments' ('Chrysippus, ut ad inventionem sufficeret, ter elleboro animum deterisit', *Satyr.* 88.4). Philosophers and hellebore thus seem to have had an association from the start; for whatever reason, no one *but* the philosophers seems to have experimented with this ancient formulation of No-Doz.

Persius brings up this drug that cures insanity and good living at the same time that he most openly urges his readers to give up their life of gourmandizing and to turn to philosophical wisdom.⁶¹ Echoing the kind of banishing of illusory beliefs to which Lucretius devoted the *De rerum natura*, he condemns the swollen skin and diseased appearance of those who have dined too well and too richly, who struggle with gout in their joints, who have the various signs of men who have not followed his joint medical and literary prescriptions; and he suggests that it is long since time for them to turn to better habits and learn the truth about the 'causas...rerum' (*Sat.* 3.639):

helleborum frustra, cum iam cutis aegra tumebit,
poscentis uideas; uenienti occurrere morbo,
et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere montis?

discite et, o miseri, causas cognoscite rerum:
quid sumus et quidnam uicturi gignimur

You can see people demanding hellebore in vain, when their diseased skin

will already have started to swell. Intercept the sickness as it comes,
then what need to promise Craterus great mountains of money?

Learn the causes of things, you wretches, and understand them:
what we are, and for what lives we are born.⁶²

What is the sickness here? The diseased skin is a sign of gout caused by rich living (also treatable by hellebore); but behind that, the sick man's ignorance of the 'causas rerum' and of what we really are bespeaks the kind of 'insanity' that Persius finds among his misguided

peers in general. Hellebore thus simultaneously cures the two main categories in Persius' rolodex of sinners: the over-eaters and the insane. But Persius chastises those who ask for hellebore long after the disease (gout *or* insanity) has set in; at this point it is too late to hope for a cure. His point for us, his readers, is that philosophical intervention must happen earlier as well, in fact as soon as possible. Persius' poetry is the 'mordax acetus' ('biting vinegar') with which the Stoic cleans his own ears and others' via the teaching of philosophy (*Sat.* 5.86; cf. Zietsman [1993]). Just so Persius' imaginary interlocutor warns the satirist about the effects of his 'biting truths' on the unhabituated ears of the lovers of epic and lyric: 'What's the use of scraping tender little ears with the biting truth?' ('sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere uero/auriculas?' *Sat.* 1.107–8).

Elsewhere Persius notes hellebore's use as a remedy for uncritical thinking to implicate the production of bad poetry and those who praise it—for the bad poet, it seems, needs to find some hellebore himself. As we recall from *Satire* 1, Persius is scathing about the value judgements of his fellow versifiers, who like such pabulum as the poetry of Attius Labeo (*Sat.* 1.48–51):

sed recti finemque extremumque esse recuso
'euge' tuum et 'belle'. nam 'belle' hoc excute totum:
quid non intus habet? non hic est Ilias Atti
ebria ueratro?

I refuse to make your 'bravo' and 'nicely done!' the final arbiter
of what's right. Shake out this entire 'nicely done':
what *doesn't* it contain? Isn't Attius' *Iliad* here,
drunk on hellebore?

Attius Labeo's *Ilias* is representative of all that was 'crudus' among the hack producers of epic poetry: the verse in bad taste, the rote echoing of poetic topoi in a literal translation, the triggering of dyspepsia among listeners. The key term here is *ebria*, drunk: as the scholia *ad loc.* suggest, despite taking hellebore *to excess*, Attius Labeo's epic remains all too dreadful; its self-purgation has accomplished nothing (50.2.7). Alternatively, the scholia suggest that we can take Persius to be referring to the acumen-sharpening properties of the drug: that is, 'Attius Labeo was a hack poet of that time who wrote up Homer's *Iliad* in verse so foully that even he himself would not have understood it afterwards unless he were purged with hellebore' (50.2.4).⁶³ Given what we have seen of the causes of *cruditas*, we could also posit that as a purgative, the hellebore that Attius' epic swallows represents its desperate attempt to get rid of what is 'crudum' in itself—the raw desires of Achilles, the rawness of its style.⁶⁴

It is worth remarking that hellebore's strikingly *anceps* nature applies perfectly to what the Greeks meant by *pharmakon* (drug)—that is, the simultaneous cure and poison.⁶⁵ Indeed, in at least one Hippocratic medical text *pharmakon* is simply used to stand in for hellebore, which need not be named, so obvious is the correlation.⁶⁶ In our Roman medical sources, *pharmakon* (spelled *pharmacum*) is most often used to designate a purge (again like hellebore; see e.g. Celsus *De med.* 5.19.10)—or a plaster (by nature *decoctum*; see e.g. Celsus 7.26.5);⁶⁷ the *pharmakon* and hellebore thus share characteristics of the curative elements in Persius' pantry, even if they are not explicitly linked. To us, of course, the dual nature of the *pharmakon* is best known from King Thamus' treatment of it in Plato's *Phaedrus*, where he denounces the invention of writing as a *pharmakon* (274e), because it is a false remedy for forgetfulness, one that will bring forgetfulness in its wake; as such, it is in fact a poison and not a cure, and stands in contrast to the effective *pharmakon*-cure that Socrates praises elsewhere, the *pharmakon teleotaton* named at the beginning of the Critias which is living knowledge.⁶⁸ But for Persius, the *pharmakon*-like qualities of hellebore render it a medicine-poison that exemplifies the curious paradox of potentially being its own cure.

This is like Persius' satire itself. Many scholars have already noted the oddity of writing anti-meat verse in the meaty genre of *satura*. They have also noticed that the poetic persona seems to exemplify few of the virtues he touts. And we cannot fail to see that Persius himself re uses much of Horace in a way that resonates curiously with his own master trope of literature-as-food. There is a sense, then, in which one could argue that the *Satires*, curative though they are meant to be, contain some of the very poison they are meant to eject from us. Perhaps one might speculatively think of them as in this regard homeopathic. Indeed, hellebore may have been effective against black bile (in ancient thought) because its action was precisely felt to be homeopathic. As Ruth Padel (1992) 69 writes,⁶⁹

Madness, above all, darkens innards. *Melancholão*, 'I am filled with black bile,' means 'I am mad.' Darkness repeatedly qualifies Greek madness...Black hellebore as a treatment for madness may reflect homeopathic therapeutic principles important in Hippocratic thinking, for they worked among many magical lines. Hellebore is in fact a poison. It causes convulsive retching. It is dark and violent and therefore cures dark inner violence, madness.⁷⁰

There is much in the *Satires* that is 'like' what we should let go of.

4. The Mad Poet

In the *Ars Poetica*—Persius’ backdrop on all issues programmatic—Horace linked the good poet to the *avoidance* of hellebore, since this allowed the ‘mad’ to remain mad, and madness was prerequisite to greatness. Pointing out that he himself preferred sanity to inspiration (AP 295–308), Horace abjures the practice not only of mad poets but of those who pretend to be mad as well:

Ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte²⁹⁵
credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas
Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,
non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea uitat;
nanciscetur enim pretium nomenque poetae,
si tribus Anticyris caput insanabile nunquam³⁰⁰
tonsonsi Licino commiserit. O ego laeuus
qui purgor bilem sub uerni temporis horam!
Non alius faceret meliora poemata; uerum
nil tanti est. Ergo fungar uice cotis, acutum
reddere quae ferrum ualet exsors ipsa secandi;³⁰⁵
munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo,
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam,
quid deceat, quid non, quo uirtus, quo ferat error.
Because Democritus thinks talent has a better outcome
than miserable craft, and shuts all sane poets out from Helicon,
a good part of them don’t bother to cut their nails
or their beard, and look for lonely places and shun baths;
for they’ll win the reward and name of ‘poet’
if they never entrust their heads (too mad to be cured even by
three doses of hellebore)⁷¹ to Licinus the barber. Unlucky me,
who purges my bile at the very start of spring!
No one would write better poems if I didn’t...But nothing’s
worth that. So I’ll play the role of a whetstone, which
can make iron sharp while having no share in cutting:
I’ll teach the duty and task of the poet, writing nothing myself,
where his sources can be found, what feeds and forms the poet,
what is fitting, what isn’t, the paths of excellence and error.

Democritus, of course, was like Plato using madness in the sense of ‘inspiration,’ not insanity, but Horace’s poets aspire to resemble real madmen and thus shun both barbers and doctors bearing hellebore.⁷² With fine irony, Horace considers this belief of theirs the true evidence of their madness, which would be incurable even with multiple dosages of the remedy; and goes on to point out that he

himself prefers to remain too 'sane' to write lyric poetry himself.

If Horace's lyric poets are mad for wanting to seem mad, the end of the *Ars Poetica* shows us why: when a genuinely mad poet makes his appearance, his verse is so intolerable that people run when they see him, and indeed with good cause: he not only bores his audience, but feeds on them. The *Ars Poetica*, which began with a disconnected human head as a sign of faulty poetic skill, now ends with the three words 'plena cruoris hirudo,' 'a leech full of blood' to indict not the untalented man, but the crazy one (AP 453–6, 470–6).

Ut mala quem scabies aut morbus regius urget
aut fanaticus error et iracunda Diana,
uesanum tetigisse timent fugiuntque poetam, 455
qui sapient [...]

Nec satis apparet cur uersus factitet, utrum 470
minxerit in patrios cineres, an triste bidental
mouerit incestus; certe furit, ac uelut ursus,
objectos caueae ualuit si frangere clatros,
indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus;
quem uero arripuit, tenet occiditque legendo, 475
non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo.

Like someone stricken with leprosy or jaundice
or mad delusions and the wrath of Diana,
those who have sense fear to touch the mad poet
and flee him [...]

It's not really clear why he keeps writing verse—if
he peed on his father's ashes, or sacrilegiously disturbed
a glum spot struck by lightning; certainly he's on a rampage,
and like a bear, if he's been able to break the bars of his cage,
the astringent reciter routs both the learned and the ignorant:
and once he's grabbed someone, he holds him and kills him by
reading,
and won't release the skin till gorged with blood—the leech!

Here we meet the Horatian mad poet, who sounds not unlike the Persius of *Satire* 1, a man whose poetry no one wants to hear. But where are the compliments due to inspiration that we might expect reading lines about hellebore? On the contrary, as the mad poet he wanders around 'inspiredly belching verses' ('sublimis versus eructatur,' AP 457), he stands revealed as everything Persius rejects, his madness comparable to the diseases caused by bile and curable by hellebore, his belching a sign of indigestion, his blood-sucking ways redolent of the poet-cannibals of the *Satires*.

When Persius himself at the end of the programmatic *Satire* 1 is

told by his interlocutor not to relieve himself where he shouldn't (1.112), the meaning is that he should not publish his sane poetry for the unappreciative public. The spectre of the Horatian mad poet is raised only to be reversed:⁷³ what Persius does in response to this warning is purge himself of his verse, as if after a dose of hellebore, by digging a hole in the dirt and 'burying' his book of poems (1.120). But the poems that are treated like sewage by their author end up being defiantly published anyhow, again in defiance of Horatian procedure: if we are told at *AP* 389–90 'You can always destroy | what you haven't published; once public, what you've said can't be called back' ('delere licebit | quod non edideris; nescit uox missa reuerti'), Persius nonetheless dredges up again his book of poems and sends it out into the world. It has work to do. Its truths are those of the doctor, not the cook, of the true friend, not the flatterer; as Plutarch puts it in *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, the friend, like a doctor who makes you drink hellebore when you need it, will tell you unpleasant truths when that will make you well (*Moralia* 55b). And Persius' stringent advice to us is not unlike the wholesome advice that Seneca commits to writing, because, like prescriptions of helpful drugs, they can minister to his 'sores'—which have at least ceased to spread (*Ep.* 8.2).⁷⁴ Persius' satires are the appropriate kind of poetry for a philosopher to be writing: a harsh production that does not titillate, but medicates, a good helping of cold, scraping, purgative Satire.⁷⁵ Philosophy now must move over for verse: it is Persius' own writing that is curative, and, as it seems he would finally claim, literature, not philosophy, can best play the role of the doctor.

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¹ I owe thanks to Matthew Wright and John Wilkins for their valuable observations and bibliographical additions. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

² On the analogy of cookery and rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, see esp. Plastira-Valkanou (1998) and Anton (1980); on medicine itself as a metaphor in Plato, see Lidz (1995). Cf. Richardson-Hay (2009, 72) on the tradition of gastronomic description in ancient philosophical writing. On the connection between pleasure and deception in the *Gorgias*, see Moss (2006); on the painfulness of both philosophy and medicine, Moss (2007).

³ In his *Tusculan Disputations*, for example, Cicero draws on the early Stoic Chrysippus in comparing the arts of healing for the body and for the soul, the latter (philosophy) less developed despite its greater urgency (*Tusc.* 3.1–6; cf. 4.23). Seneca *Ep.* 120.5 is crystal clear: 'I will tell you what this analogy is. We understood the health of the body: from this we gathered that there is a health of the mind. We understood bodily strength: from this we gathered that there is also a strength of the mind.' On Plato's use of metaphors of bodily sickness to refer to the mind, see e.g. Lidz (1995), Moss (2007). On the idea of philosophy as medicine in antiquity, Frede (1985) and Gill (1985).

⁴ Cf. Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 3.102b, where Damoxenus (fr. 2 KA) speaks of a cook who compares his 'science' to Epicurean physics; also Gowers (1993) 84–5.

⁵ *Inuitus enim sanatur et, si remedia ne coactus quidem recipit, interim certe, dum non potest, illa nolenti similis est.*

⁶ *Prima pars hominis est ipsa virtus; huic committitur inutilis caro et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius. Virtus illa divina in lubricum desinit et superioribus eius partibus venerandis atque caelestibus animal iners ac marcidum adtexitur.*

⁷ *Scabo* (unlike *scalpo*) is regularly used of pleasurable scratching rather than of abrasive scratching; see Lewis and Short s.v.

⁸ As Moss (2007, 236) sums up the claims of the *Gorgias*, 'flattery of all kinds is persuasive *because* it gratifies people's appetites, causing pleasure; correction of all kinds is unpersuasive *because* it frustrates people's appetites, and causes pain.'

⁹ Plastira-Valkanou (1998) makes this point well. For a study of medicine as an informing metaphor in Plato's thought, see Lidz (1995). For a particular diet as curative in Celsus, see Crum (1932).

¹⁰ I always steer clear of children's urine (*NH* 28.18.65), hyena eyeballs (*NH* 28.27.105), and foxes boiled alive (*NH* 28.62.220).

¹¹ *Dixi de iis malis corporis, quibus victus ratio maxime subvenit: nunc transeundum est ad eam medicinae partem, quae magis medicamentis pugnatur.*

12 <http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Celsus/home.html>. On medicamenta and poison, see Horstmanshoff (1999).

13 Dessen (1996) is an excellent general approach to Persius and his metaphors. On food in Roman satire in general, see Hudson (1989) and Motto (2001). In this essay, I do not take up the sociological aspects of dietetics as discussed e.g. in Bourdieu's (1986) study of class 'taste' as a marker of social status in modern France, *Distinction*.

14 For pioneering work on this term as typical of Nero's aesthetics, see Gowers (1994).

15 See Kissel (1990) 273–6. Persius here takes up Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.1–5, in which Horace attributes a bygone frankness to Old Comedy and stresses its influence on Lucilius. Relihan (1989) 155 thinks this means he's looking for a select audience of pedants. He points out that one's ears would get 'dirty' from hearing Aristophanes. Selden (1971) takes it as having to do with invective; Miller (2006) links it to political freedom.

16 *Decoctius* is also addressed in e.g. Gowers (1994) *passim*, Bramble (1974) 139, Anderson (1982) 173–4, Cucchiarelli (2005) 68, Keane (2012) 88–9, Reckford (2009) 50–1. Freudenburg (2001) 181–2 interprets it properly with reference to the medical manuals.

17 Relihan (1989) 156, on the other hand, thinks that any reference to the obscene and vulgar Aristophanes as a potential cleaner of ears must be purely comic.

18 The scholiast meanwhile refers us to wine boiled down to sweetness or to the smelting of silver, and often the term is applied to bankruptcy.

19 A fact that only Korzeniewski (1970) 426–7 has recognized, if only partially; he sees it can be used of plasters, but leaves out potions. Crook (1967) examines the word in its financial meaning by looking at Roman legal history. For a discussion of medical terms in Neronian literature, see Bujan (2005).

20 Here I thank my graduate student Diana Moser, who charted all of Pliny's and Celsus' uses of decocted substances as my research assistant.

21 Korzeniewski refers to an 'Ümschlage', and cites Celsus 6.7.1 as an example of the term *decoctus* used of ear-medicine. ümschlage

22 At *NH* 23.81.163, a decocted plaster of white myrtle removes pus from the ears, while *NH* 32.25.78 suggests pouring hot concocted garum (fermented fish-sauce) into your ears to help hearing problems.

23 It is perhaps worth noting that *decocta* were also used as enemas; for example, among the cures for dysentery (brought on by too much mystery stew?) was a decoction of linseed introduced into the bowels (Celsus 4.22.3). This stands in direct contrast to the titillating verse penetrating the audience's posterior in *Satire* 1.

24 Parallels to the notion of the poet as doctor in classical comedy include Aristophanes' poetic self-description at *Wasps* 650–1 and Philippides fr. 171 K–A (for the idea that Euripidean tragedy can 'cure' its audience). For the idea that *comedy's* effect on the audience might include *catharsis*, see Ar. *Poet.* 6.1449b27 and R. Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy* (London, 1984) 22–5. My thanks to Matthew Wright for these references.

25 As Kirk Freudenburg (1993) 120 has pointed out, Horace's punning references to satire in the satires point not at the alimentary origin of his genre in *satura*, but rather at the concept of limitation, the philosophical stance of 'iam satis est' that he adopts in *Sat.* 1.1.120.

26 Interestingly, Cicero's use of the term *decoctus* as a term of rhetorical criticism does not contrast it with sweetness, but rather assimilates it to an undesirable 'suavitatem...dulcem atque decoctam' (*De or.* 3.103). As one of the press's referees suggests, this may suggest that Persius is deconstructing not only Lucretian poetics but also Cicero's rhetorical programme.

27 Detienne (1977) traces the symbolism of vegetable produce from the point of view of Greek religious practice, contrasting the sterility of the so-called gardens of Adonis with their fertile counterpart in Demeter's fields.

28 Cf. Bion of Borysthene, the writer of diatribe, who describes himself as a vegetarian at fragment 17 (ed. Kistrand), and Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.74; at *Sat.* 2.6.64, however, he adds bacon to his greens.

29 On Persius' treatment of ears and ear-metaphors, see especially Bramble (1974) 26–7 and Reckford (1962) 476–83. As the latter points out, in Horace *Ep.* 1.2.53 dirty ears can't hear the *lyre*; it's Persius who emphasizes philosophy. For the pun *auri-culis* (asshole-ears), see Freudenburg (2001) 172. On the asses' ears of *Satire* 1, see Anderson (1982) 174 ff., Morford (1984) 30–1, 37–8, 82–3, and Sullivan (1978) 160–1. On philosophy in Persius and Juvenal in general, see Bartsch (2012) and Mayer (2005). For similar concerns about ears, pleasure, and philosophy, see Trapp (2001).

30 Reckford (1962) 479 notes that only here does the term *auris* rather than the diminutive form *auricula* occur, and only here is the ear designated positively; elsewhere Persius uses *auricula* as a term of disapprobation for the bad taste of contemporary audiences. For further study of Roman hearing and metaphors of consumption, see Short (2009).

31 The whole passage runs: πολλὸν δ' οἶμαι καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπεῖρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἦθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' αἰεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπων δυνατόν μάλιστα.

32 Is Persius' sowing superior to Plato's? It is at least provocative that the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* seems to sow a seed (*sperma*) in the marrow of the human body that ends up as the rational part of the soul, forming the brain (73c–d). Given the medical association between semen and brain-matter, we are left with a curious version of husbandry here. Pender (2000, 163) is willing to entertain the possibility that divine seed and semen are one and the same.

33 On satirists as healing, and satire as curative writing in general, see Kivistö (2009) 7, 37, 170–4.

34 As Matthew Wright points out to me, Aristophanes mentions this use of beets as a laxative in a metapoetic passage at *Frogs* 939–44: Euripides slims down Aeschylus' swollen art of comedy with beets and monodies.

35 <http://latin.packhum.org/loc/1294/2/259/390-394@1#259>

36 Cf. Conte (1999) 469: 'Radere, defigere, revellere, terms recurring in his poetry, which denote the individual actions of this severe therapy, point to the process of demystifying reality, the removal of the scab of deceptive appearances that is necessary for a radical renewal of the conscience.'

37 On the probable dating of Seneca's dramas, see e.g. Nisbet (1990). It is generally agreed that they precede the *Letters* and as such were probably written in the late 50s.

38 In Horace *AP* 198–207, the men who watch a scanty meal being served in drama are themselves *verecundi*.

39 For an excellent study of the food imagery in this satire, see Flintoff (1982).

40 e.g. *De Re Coquinaria* 5.1.1.4, 5.1.1.7, 5.1.4.3, 5.1.4.6, 6.2.2.7, 6.8.14.2, 7.7.1.2, 8.8.8.1, 8.8.9.4.

41 Bramble (1974) 47–8; as Gowers (1993) 159 remarks, 'It becomes clear that... sophisticated cookery and morals are anathema to each other.' Further on Horace's ethical use of food see Muecke (1993) 9–11.

42 On these associations between food, disease, and decay, see Gowers (1993)

182–5; Bramble (1974) 84–5, 87; Miller (1998); 267 Barr and Lee (1987) *ad loc.* On ulcer-causing bile, see e.g. Galen *MM* 10.1005K.

⁴³ The particular vehemence of Persius' and Seneca's attacks on excess notwithstanding, the Stoics were not the only philosophers to recommend an abstemious diet. The ethically superior nature of vegetarian produce to meat was in fact a view originally associated with the Pythagoreans, who urged abstention (or restraint) in the consumption of animal flesh for ethical reasons, including their belief in metempsychosis. Cf. Iamblichus' *Life of Pythagoras*. The words Ovid puts in Pythagoras' mouth at the end of the *Metamorphoses* 15.459–78, are particularly interesting, since his vegetarianism is contrasted here to the Ur-case of flesh-eating, Thyestes' consumption of his children. Note that even 'sunny' Epicurus served barley rather than beef: he will welcome you with barley-meal and serve you water also in abundance, 'te polenta excipiet et aquam quoque large ministrabit', Sen. *Ep.* 21.10. For a treatment of Pythagoras, sacrifice, and meat-eating, see Detienne (1977) 81–58.

⁴⁴ Cf. Richardson-Hay (2009) for a full treatment of the many loci where Seneca moralizes about food and consumption.

⁴⁵ On digestion as a metaphor for reading, see Richardson-Hay (2009). Among ancient texts, she cites Cic. *De div.* 1.29.61; *Brutus* 126; *De Officiis* 1.105; Quint. 1.8.6, 8; 2.4.5; 8.pr.1; Hor. *Ep.* 2.2.61–64, Pliny *Letters* 3.5. See also Gowers (1993) 40–6.

⁴⁶ Cf. Galen *On the Affected Parts* 5.8 = K358–9. On the Roman understanding of digestion, see also Passarella (2010).

⁴⁷ The production of bile from luxurious food is already a topic in Horace *Sat.* 2.2.2.73–5, where it causes a 'tumult' in the stomach.

⁴⁸ On black bile and melancholy, see esp. Toohey (1990). As Celsus puts it in *De med.* 2.7.19 on 'the black bile disease'—'But if there is prolonged despondency with prolonged fear and insomnia, the cause is the black bile disease.'

⁴⁹ The sorts of insanity that black bile was thought to cause are of greater scope than our term encompasses; according to Celsus, three major classifications are possible, phrenitis, mania, and melancholia, and Galen's division is also triplicate, but with slightly different terminology (Celsus, 3.18–23, cf. Galen *On the Affected Parts* 3.0 = K178). For a comparative discussion of the terminology in Latin and Greek, see Stok (1996); on the biological basis of insanity in ancient literature, O'Brien-Moore (1924) and Padel (1992) 12–48.

⁵⁰ Cf. Horace *Sat.* 2.7.34, where the failure to answer summons also results in a loss of temper, proving the poet's lack of Stoic self-control; and Horace *Sat.* 2.3.1–8, where Damasippus lectures Horace on being slow to produce any writing. For Casaubon's emendation *findor* see Kissel (1990) *ad loc.* On *vitrea bilis* describing the shining, translucent appearance of black bile, see likewise Kissel (1990) *ad loc.*

⁵¹ Pliny remarks of white hellebore that it was a particularly risky cure in 'ancient days', when the correct dosage was not known (Pliny *NH* 25.23.57; cf. Lucr. *DRN* 4.640).

⁵² 'Medetur ita morbis comitialibus, ut diximus, vertigini, melancholicis, insanientibus, lymphatis, elephantiasi albae, lepris, tetano, tremulis, podagricis, hydropicis incipientibusque tympanicis, stomachicis, spasticis cynicis, ischiadicis, quartanis, quae aliter non desinant, tussi veteri, inflationibus, torminibus redeuntibus.' O'Brien-Moore (1924) 36 notes the efficacy of hellebore against black bile, but also points out that it could purge both phlegm and bile.

⁵³ Cf. Aristophanes' *Wasps* 1489, Hippoc. *De Victus Ratione* 1.35 and *On Internal Diseases* 7.284–89; Pliny *NH* 25.22.54–23.58; Celsus 2.12, 3.18, Dioscorides *On Medical Materials* 4.162.4. Decocted beets were also believed to be useful in restoring sanity, cf. Celsus 5.27.13. On hellebore, see also Stadler *RE* 8.165 ff.

54 Pliny specifically notes the efficacy of white hellebore as an emetic and to purge black bile (*NH* 25.94. 150, 25.22.54). On the medical uses of hellebore (Latin *veratrum*) in antiquity, see O'Brien-Moore (1924) 29–36 and Anderson (1982) 177. On medical terms in Persius in general, see Lackenbacher (1937) and Migliorini (1990) and (1997).

55 e.g. Plautus *Pseudolus* 1185, *Rudens* 1106, *Mos.* 952.

56 Cf. Plut. *De cohib. ira* 2.1.

57 An older source, the Stoic Aristo of Chios, compared philosophy to hellebore for just the same reason (Stobaeus in *SVF* 1.394). The insanity of the general populace is nicely expressed by Stertinius in Horace *Sat.* 2.3.43–6: 'The school of Chrysippus, and his flock, | call anyone insane | whom evil stupidity and ignorance of the truth drive | blindly on. This rule includes nations, great kings, | with only the wise man excepted.'

58 At the end of the same satire, the Stoic suggests the rich miser should set sail for Anticyra, *Sat.* 2.3.166.

59 To my astonishment, one can still buy hellebore on various homeopathic websites and it is advocated for many of the same mental issues. See e.g. <http://www.homeopathycenter.org/remedy/helleborus-niger-0>.

60 Val. Max. VIII, 7, ext. 5: 'Idem cum Chrysippo disputaturus elleboro se ante purgabat ad expromendum ingenium suum attentius et illius refellendum acrius.' Cf. Pliny *NH* 25.20.51: 'plerique studiorum gratia, ad pervidenda acrius quae commentabantur, saepius sumptitaverint. Carneaden responsurum Zenonis libris'; Aul. Gell. *NA* 17.15. For the argument that this is not Carneades the Sceptic, but another Carneades, see Leon (1952). Cf. the same story in Pliny *NH* 25.21.51, where it is Zeno who is Carneades' debating partner.

61 Here following in the footsteps of Horace *Sat.* 2.2, but without Horace's appeal to a mean.

62 For an excellent study of the diseased body of *Satire* 3, see Reckford (1998). The doctor Craterus turns up in Horace *Sat.* 2.3.161 as well, also tending to a patient who (says the Stoic Stertinius) needs hellebore. He is mentioned in Cicero *ad Att.* 12.13.14.

63 'Attius Labeo poeta indoctus temporum illorum qui Iliadem Homeri versibus foedissime composuit it ut nec ipse se postea intellexisset nisi elleboro purgaretur.' Ferriss-Hill (2012) stresses the Roman association between literary style and morality.

64 Kissel (1990) 176–7 thinks Attius Labeo needs hellebore because it makes people think more clearly, citing *NH* 25.51. Conington in Nettleship (1893) *ad loc.* suggests 'the madness which requires deep and intoxicating draughts of hellebore to cure it.' The scholia *ad loc.* suggest that Attius was drunk with hellebore in futile attempt to get better; Scivoletto (1973) has it backwards—the poetic inspiration of a crazy person.

65 Hellebore was not the only such *pharmakon*. Plutarch in *Quomodo adu.* 22b references a certain kind of beetle with the same aniceps use in medicine as an analogy for how we should read poetry: 'But as doctors use the feet and wings of cantharis-beetle, even though it is deadly, believing that they are medicinal and undo its effects, so must we deal with poems.'

66 Wesley Smith, the editor/translator of Hippocrates' *Epidemics*, writes of his use of *pharmakon* at 5.2 that the term when used in a specific sense 'is probably hellebore, a violent gastro-intestinal poison'.

67 A century later Aulus Gellius claims that the Latin *venenum* (poison) itself originally held this double meaning of poison and cure, *Noctes Atticae* 12.9.2.

68 When the cure for this forgetfulness, that is, use of the living language 'inscribed in the soul' is itself called a *pharmakon*, Plato's oppositions seem to self-

destruct in a way that spurred Jacques Derrida to write his famous essay on the self-deconstruction of Plato's invidious distinction between writing and speech. The use of the term (in verb form) to refer to the power of rhetoric in Gorgias' *Defence of Helen* 14 likewise trades on the ambivalence of rhetoric as well. As Derrida (1981) points out, the *pharmakon* can only be evaluated in terms of its effect, after the fact.

⁶⁹ In reference to *Choephoroi* 413. On the poet's own body, see Behr (2009) and Barchiesi and Cucchiarelli (2005).

⁷⁰ For the homeopathic principle in Greek material, Padel cites Dodds (1951) 98 n. 100; Lloyd (1966) 180–1.

⁷¹ The three doses of hellebore here recall Chrysippus' supposed dosage in Petronius; cf. Brink (1971) *ad loc.*

⁷² Tate (1928) 70 remarks that 'Cicero similarly misinterpreted Democritus and Plato in attributing to them the view that madness is a necessary element in the poet's character. Democritus and Plato had spoken of divine madness. Cicero and Horace, and the Greek critics whom they follow, have removed the epithet "divine".'

⁷³ As Hooley (1997) 59 notes, this is a deliberate evocation of Horace's mad poet, but in order to point out that Persius is isolated in his sanity.

⁷⁴ 'Illis aliqua quae possint prodesse conscribo; salutare admonitiones, velut medicamentorum utilium compositiones, litteris mando, esse illas efficaces in meis ulceribus expertus, quae etiam si persanata non sunt, serpere desierunt.'

⁷⁵ This idea of satire as medicine was potentially complicated by its status as a fully Roman genre ('satura quidem tota nostra est,' Quint. 10.1.93), while 'Greek' medicine (which Celsus' treatise reflected) was early on viewed with hostility as an import. Cato the Elder famously suggests that the aim of Greek physicians in Rome is to kill, not cure, their victims (cf. Plut. *Life of Cato* 23.3–5, Pliny *NH* 29.7.14–8.16), and as one might expect, he supported a non-professional 'Roman' medicine based on individual experience and administered by the *paterfamilias*. No trace of this hostility seems to remain in Persius, though, whose remedies are perfectly consonant with those of Celsus.

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